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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

VOLUME XXXIX OCTOBER 1928 NUMBER 1

CONTEMPORARY PERPLEXITIES IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY

T. V. SMITH

IT WAS certainly a fateful day for mankind when the spirit of '76 and '89 travailed and brought forth those triplets of ideals—Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. Fateful, first, because neither of them alone is capable of achieving full maturity on mundane soil; fateful, second, because, though committed by human aspiration to a common life, they cannot dwell together in amity. Liberty had been achieved by a few in Greece; fraternity had perhaps been achieved by more in Palestine; equality had perhaps been achieved by still more in medieval ages. But these latter fateful and adventurous years have proclaimed from the housetops that all men should achieve all of them all at once. Of course such a thing was impossible, for practical if not also for theoretical reasons. But let no one jump too hastily to the conclusion that the emphasis has been therefore unfruitful. It has been oftentimes the spirited assertion of the impossible that has widened the area of the possible. Postponing for a final word the difficulty of synthesis involved in taking all the democratic aims together, let us develop certain difficulties that grow out of each ideal taken separately. These difficulties we shall grasp at their juncture with philosophical ethics rather than at their connection with political practice.

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I

And first the perplexity that the claim of liberty itself presents. Liberty constitutes one of the most paradoxical demands that men have ever made upon their world. In its democratic aspect the difficulty is illustrated by the older philosophical paradox: man cannot be free because he is a product of nature and subject to her inexorable laws; but he also must be free because he transcends nature by understanding her. Immanuel Kant, facing this difficulty purely upon its theoretic side, could find no better resolution of the paradox than to admit that man is both completely free and completely determined—subject on the one side to all the causal laws that impinge alike upon the humblest atom and upon the most resplendent galaxy; independent on the other side of every mundane force.

The difficulty in democratic theory which this both illustrates and parallels arises from the fact that the notion of freedom always implies independence *from* something and independence *for* something else. The free man achieves emancipation from one set of circumstances to sink himself in another; he cannot ever be free from everything all at once. Such freedom would be an achievement of total insignificance. But its opposite does not therefore cease to seem a significant lack of freedom. The perplexity is present, though somewhat obscured, in the fine phrase "ordered freedom." Now, there are clearly moments in which Wordsworth's plaint commends itself to every democrat: "Me this unchartered freedom tires." But there are equally lucid and authentic moments in which it is recognized that to "charter" freedom is to affix the proverbial millstone, and that to "order" freedom is generously to offer the thirsty spirit water that is not wet. Rousseau, facing the perplexity in social terms, thought to resolve it in his formula that when a man binds himself, he is not bound, but free. If the welts did not outlast the cords of binding, such an interpretation might commend itself to aspiration; but the self that

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does the binding loses its living identity in the Nirvana of habit, and the self that is bound rises to a new life that frets its energies against the chains that now have the feel of alien iron.

If the reader suspect that underneath this verbiage lie only philosophic trivialities, let him consider the rôle of law-breaking in democratic practice. It is perhaps safe to assume that every reader of these words has sometimes violated a law enacted by a democratic majority and proclaimed therefore by democratic theory to be legitimately binding upon him. He may have broken it idly, for which he ought to be ashamed; he may have broken it recklessly, for which he ought to reform; but he may have broken it conscientiously, for which he ought to be—ought to be what?

How can a good man in a democratic society conscientiously violate the will of the majority, to a respect for which he is foresworn? He cannot break it in the name of liberty, for the will of the majority is the *modus operandi* of his freedom. He cannot break it in the name of equality, for he cannot as a democrat assign the same right to every other man—that would be anarchy, not democracy. He cannot do it in the name of fraternity, for with brothers all things are common; mutual respect is the life-blood of community. And yet he does it; and, what is more, he oftentimes finds the doing of it justified in the subsequent enrichment of the democratic community to which he belongs. That this is a genuine perplexity can be testified to by the consciences of a great many admittedly good citizens. And that it is very difficult of solution is made clear when we confess at once that the most promising formula is the admission that liberty is intrinsically lawless. But even if this could be harmonized with the necessity of dependable technique as a means to liberty, i.e., if liberty could be harmonized with itself, such a conception of liberty certainly could not be harmonized with the equally pressing democratic virtues of equality and fraternity.

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That liberty builds thus its bridge as it crosses it can be seen by the democrat perhaps more clearly on grounds less intimate to him, and so more objective to his beliefs and prejudices. Both the American and the French democracies were initiated by revolution, i.e., by violation of existing law upon a large and bloody scale. That these revolutions were staged primarily in the name of liberty cannot obscure the fact that from the point of view of the pre-existing order they were entirely lawless. The fact that the lawlessness which they exemplified was violent and bloody surely does not make them more virtuous than such violation of law as does not completely upset the balance of society. They violently and lawlessly asserted freedom from an old order so that they might achieve a new order, an order in which they hoped peaceably to achieve progressive ends. But the order that ensued, whatever it may have done for them, set limitations to the aspirations of its minorities similar to the ones against which they themselves had rebelled, when they found themselves hopelessly in the minority. What can they expect of the minorities that arise under their order? They expect obedience; but they did not give it, and they do not receive it. Growth would stop or creep on at too slow a pace if they did. Conscientious disobedience to democratic law seems to play the same rôle in perpetuating democratic societies as conscientious revolutions did in initiating them. As long as there are minorities who cannot get lawfully what they badly want, they will get it illegally; and as long as there are majorities there will be such minorities. And so forever a liberty that is license becomes a liberty that is law, to eventuate again as liberty that is license.

This puts the perplexity very bluntly. It is perhaps better for the future that it present itself thus bluntly, so that everybody may know what is happening. But as a matter of fact it does not always thus present itself. The average citizen persistently feels that the wealthy are managing somehow to achieve their liberty at the expense of the average man. He

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suspects that they are disobeying the law with impunity. And so they may be. But it is sometimes easier to make the law; then you have no need to break it. Indeed, it is sometimes even simpler to elect the right judges to interpret the law and to hear your case. Consider the growth of corporations in America and the differential access to liberty which they give the wealthy man. The power which wealth gives coins itself into liberty in capitalistic democracy primarily through the privileges accorded corporations. The guaranteed protection given by the Fourteenth Amendment to the newly enfranchised and helpless blacks came with great celerity through a legal fiction to protect, not the Negroes, but great corporations masquerading as persons before the law—veritable giants whose smallest privileges endangered the largest liberties of common folk.

This paradox that liberty can be had only by taking it away is as applicable to the individual himself as it is to groups of individuals in the social process. To give free rein to one impulse in the task of personality-building means usually to limit the operation of other equally insistent impulses. Long ago Plato described this fate of the democratic man, and equated his weakness with that of the democratic society. For both alike, liberty means license, lawlessness, if it means anything at all; and license, even if it be liberty for some, marks the antithesis of liberty for others. Born of old, this liberty paradox remains one of the chief contemporary perplexities of democratic theory.

II

The perplexity in democratic theory that arises from the equality ideal has not so much to do with the question as to whether or not men *are* equal as to what foundation democracy has if, or since, men are not equal. Traditionally democracy has supposed itself to rest upon the solid foundation of human equality. "Men are created equal," says the Declaration of Independence. "All men are naturally free and independent,"

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reads the Virginia Declaration of Rights some weeks before the Declaration of Independence. "Men are born and continue equal in respect of their rights," declares the National Assembly of France on the eve of the Revolution. Men are naturally equal, cry all the theorists of the eighteenth and most of those of the nineteenth centuries. Men are equal before God, murmur the religious of every period. Comes now Darwin, however, and anthropology, and empirical psychology. Behaviorism dissipates the soul, and nothing is left of man except what science sees and men themselves feel. Since observation reveals no particular in which men are actually equal, and feeling seems too unique and private to be conceived in terms more quantitative than individual idiosyncracies, no common human core of personality remains visible to support the notion of equality. A recent sympathetic critic of democracy has expressed the resulting negativism with the announcement that differential psychology has completely blasted the hopes of equalitarian democracy. If this were only one type of democracy and there were other kinds to choose from, this field lost, not all would be lost. But does anything actually remain of democracy when it is admitted that in no sense are men equal—any more, in fact, than remains of water when all the wetness is extracted?

It may, of course, be replied in the spirit of Rousseau that it is the very fact that men are not equal that gives point to the assertion that they ought to be made equal; and one may consequently set himself heroically the task of making social organization achieve what God and nature neglected to effect. This may be a satisfying solution of the perplexity to a temperament that can confidently assert "oughtness" without any "isness" underlying it. But this type of personality, thanks to the hardening up of the human mind by science, grows progressively rarer. To say that men ought to be treated equally without some admitted equality in fact to justify the treatment claimed sounds more like preaching than like thinking.

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If, then, there is no equality in fact, there is no room for asserting equality as an ideal. Needed, then, a new foundation for democracy, or another social order to take its place. Mussolini stands ready to furnish us the latter, if we find ourselves unable to invent the former.

Were my present task to solve rather than to parade the contemporary perplexities of democratic theory, it might be argued that while every ideal—ethical, political, religious, artistic—has a certain basis in fact, it registers primarily a desire to have facts otherwise than as they are, and the consequent determination to try so to reconstruct the unsatisfactory real as to make it satisfactorily ideal. This does not, to be sure, remove all the perplexity, but it points inquiry in a direction thought by many to be more fruitful than the logic that ends by parading the foregoing perplexity in naked form. But this is not the place to develop the thought. I have undertaken this constructive task, though it must be admitted with equivocal success, in my *American Philosophy of Equality*.

III

There remains also within the democratic emphasis the claim of fraternity. Though perhaps basic to the aspiration of the human spirit, the ideal of brotherhood has remained largely on the fringe of democratic endeavor. This neglect constitutes a line of criticism against political democracy as an adequate formulation of a way of life; but it memorializes also a division of labor in modern times between the secular enterprise which democracy on its political side has chosen to represent and the spiritual aspiration which religion on its organized side has been allowed to monopolize. The separation between church and state represents the American way of seeking a unified national life by overt division of function. That the separate spheres represent no final duality of fact is fairly certain; that the present distribution represents even a permanent division of labor is highly questionable.

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To justify this suspicion, let us note, on the one side, the declining efficacy of the church as the custodian of ideals in the Western world. It may be open to other interpretation, but to many outside observers Protestantism at least seems to play a constantly lessening rôle in the organization and direction of the deeper energies of modern life. Let us note, on the other side, as supplementing this interpretation, the obvious fact that a great many organizations definitely and not infrequently belligerently non-religious serve as synthesizing and idealizing agencies in our time. Social service, philanthropy, politics, particularly as the newly enfranchised feminine citizen conceives it—these are all undertaking, and oftentimes bettering the performance of, tasks traditionally denominated religious.

With the further development and popularization of a functional logic that explains all ideas and ideals as having a common genesis from the difficulties that frustrate endeavor and a common function in furnishing a program and stimulation for removing the frustration—with this there must come, it would seem, a tightening up of the slack that hitherto has permitted the ideal to escape into some upper realm of ethics, or aesthetics, or theology, and lead there a serene but otiose existence. With the further naturalization by science of the ideal as hypothesis will almost certainly come progressive domestication in the natural realm of the ideal conceived first as ethics and then as theology. When and if this process should work itself out to as complete an eventuation as seems likely, spiritual realities will become depersonalized into ideals, ideals will shrink again into humble ideas, and ideas will become the servant of man in his practical efforts to master his environment and exploit it for his own ends. This eventuation would mark the complete secularization of the human spirit and would make one again the culture of man.

But with this envisaged unification there arises a difficulty for democracy. For then democracy as fraternity can no long-

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er look forward to the brotherhood of man through the fatherhood of God; the brotherhood of man must be sought through and for the sake of men themselves. Moreover, the practical counterpart of this dialectical shift is that brotherhood must be achieved in actuality here and now rather than hoped for in some far-off and transcendental future. The convenient religious maxim, Divide and postpone, must give way to what some would call a counsel of perfection, Unite and actualize thyself, Democracy. Walt Whitman must then supplant Rudyard Kipling as humanity's poet laureate.

To achieve brotherhood, however, in whatever name and through whatever avenue, means that a new *motif* must become operative in human relations. With brothers all things are common; this is the motto of fraternity from as far back as Plato. Democracy as fraternity can no longer build upon the maxim of capitalism: "From each according to his ability; to each whatever he can get in a field of free competition." It must, to the contrary, undertake to distribute, not on the basis of might makes right, but the basis of needs. If one see his brother in need and shut up his bowels of compassion from him, how dwelleth the spirit of fraternity in him? There seems no escape from the conclusion that if democracy is to abrogate the "favored nation's" alliance with religion—an alliance memoralized upon the face of the American dollar—it must become religious in its own right. We cannot drive out the preacher and the priest, as Mexico seems to be learning, without mastering at least some of the tricks of the trade for home practice.

Assuming thus, at least for the sake of the argument, that men have the will, have they also the wit to become fraternal? Fraternity is not thrifty, like individualism; it joys more in giving than in getting. This is the reason that heretofore the fraternity clause of our democratic charter has been tacitly held to become operative only when we get to heaven. We need free goods if we are to practice munificence with impunity.

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Nobody can be quite so generous with meal as a widow who has a miraculous meal-barrel. Now, nature is not organized upon the miracle pattern. She is stepmotherly in her niggardliness; and there seems to be an absolute limit to her fertility. It is worthy of note for its cosmic as well as its human significance that whatever maxim may be adopted for distribution—whether with Capitalism, "merit," or with Socialism, "service," or with Communism, "needs"—each alike must retain as its maxim of production, "From each according to his ability." Up to the present, humanity has not thought itself able to produce from nature enough to support both workers and a large body of idlers. Those who will not work shall not eat—this was nature speaking through Captain John Smith. It may be that with some more complete industrialization of the future this can be achieved; but who will make and tend the machines through which this industrialization itself is to be effected?

Our perplexity becomes bluntly this: Can men be got to work if given an advance guaranty that their needs will be met? If they cannot, then democracy has no way of making the guaranty; but without the guaranty, democracy as fraternity seems impossible. Can men be got to work for the joy of the working, or for the joy of giving, or is private profit indispensable for maximum endeavor? You will see that our perplexity involves a weighty issue. On the one side stands communistic democracy with its emphasis upon fraternity; on the other side stands capitalistic democracy with its emphasis upon liberty. The latter guarantees production from the top at the cost of competitive ruthlessness at the bottom. Can the latter guarantee production by fraternity all along the line? We of the Western world do not believe it. Russia does. Which is right? Along which path, if along either, can humanity most hopefully travel?

In order to circumvent prejudice, rampant in these premises, let us flank the larger issue and see how it looks in the

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small nearer home. Let us note the social significance, primarily in America, of the contrast between the teaching profession and the medical profession. We have in these organized the means of distributing two basic human goods: health and knowledge. So basic indeed to our democratic enterprise have we considered literacy that from the beginning of our republic we have regarded its dissemination as a public concern and have made public provision for it. Teachers are for the most part trained at public expense, paid out of public or philanthropic funds, regarded as serving the public rather than themselves, and encouraged to keep their eyes off wealth and content themselves with their work on a small salary. Health, which is even more basic, if possible, than is literacy, is distributed in very different fashion. The doctor insists upon dispensing medical service through private practice for a private fee differentially assessed according to the wealth of his patient. The medical profession is organized and perpetuated upon the theory that the only way to enlist the best talent and to get the best out of it is to keep before the physician the prospect of an unlimited income—almost the exact opposite assumption from that underlying the teaching profession.

Teaching could, I suppose, organize itself upon this business basis, and may yet be forced so to organize itself. I could charge my two wealthy students $1,000 each for the major operation of brain transfusion; my ten next wealthy students, $500 each; my next twenty-five best-to-do students, $100 each, and then get credit for being charitable by serving the poorest twenty-five for nothing. And with the quick shifts of the quarter system, I could make my meager salary look as pitiable as it looks to the eyes of some of my medical friends. That this could be done seems fairly certain, for, thanks perhaps to the fact that heretofore it has not been done, education awakens less sales resistance, possesses more prestige value, than does medical service. Thirty-eight per cent of those too ill to work in the Mulberry district of New York City do with-

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out medical service altogether, though the district has innumerable doctors and an abundance of hospitals. To adopt this business-like procedure for teaching might in time change its present popularity, might indeed breed a new type of sophist that would plague the teacher as much as medical quacks perturb the regular practitioner. But sufficient unto that day is the evil thereof. Business is business. Teachers could accept this challenge; and if the psychological assumptions of the medical profession and of our whole theory of business enterprise be correct, we ought to do it. But it would so violate the traditions of our professions, which in distributing its commodity according to need has become allied with religion as representing the fraternity *motif* in our democratic aspiration, that we ought to inquire whether it would not be better to socialize medicine rather than to capitalize education.

When put in this way and brought very close home it is seen again, as it was in the large, that the issue is as to human motivation. If private gain is indispensable for maximum endeavor, then the teaching profession is not enlisting as good men and is not getting as good service out of its men as does and is medicine. Modesty should prevent my passing judgment upon the first point, though it must be said that the army intelligence tests were not creditable to the medical profession as compared, say, with the engineers. But upon the second point, modesty does not constitute so effective a restraint. I do not believe that I would do a better job teaching if I had the chance of making $25,000 a year out of it. I suspect in all truth that I would do a poorer job. For once salaries reach a certain modest level so that pennies need not actually be counted, the emancipation of mind from money leaves it freer to concentrate upon the job at hand. It is not beyond the pale of argument that if the medical profession once recovered from the near pathological phobia over organizational stereotypes, it might find in the same relief similar productive potentiality.

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Heaven knows that health is important enough to deserve and to demand as complete democratization of its means as is consistent with efficiency of performance. Indeed, it is desperately difficult to treat health as a private good professionally monopolized and get it distributed at all. There is one county in North Carolina with 18,000 inhabitants and only two competent and active physicians; and the total situation has become sufficiently alarming that a national committee is now projecting a five-year study of the cost of medical service. The neglect of public health carries terrible private retribution; the germs are great equalitarians. If democracy is to mean anything in practice, health deserves to be democratized. But so does wealth, for it conditions the distribution of health and wisdom and all other human goods.

But with the saying of that we are back facing our issue on the larger field where teachers are forgotten and doctors (of philosophy, at least) engage in the merry war of words that goes on between Communism and Capitalism. It may be that the perplexity begotten by democracy's humaner emphasis upon fraternity cannot be resolved in the large, but is all the while being, in fashion semiconscious, resolved in the small. Perhaps from the very prestige that education sustains among us, from the relatively high morale that prevails in the teaching profession, from the disinclination of capitalists themselves to have education give up its differentially socialized status, we presage victory for ourselves in the resolution of our theoretical perplexity.

But whether this optimism be justified or not, only the event can disclose. It seems certain in some ultimate social insight that unless liberty can through equality get generalized into fraternity, democracy is not the final formulation for the aspiration of the human spirit. If it is the final formulation, the basic problem that faces social engineering—and it is an engineering task, for the ethical ends are available—is whether work can be so humanized or human nature so changed that

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men may yet work co-operatively for the joy of the working, making at once a living for each through efficient production and a life for all through humane distribution of the goods produced. Our basic doubt, our radical perplexity, may now be put into a final phrase: *that men will live for private gain we know; that they will die for public ends we know; but whether average men in the continuous long run will work efficiently for public ends we do not know.*

> We know but this of all we would we knew—
> Democracy's a dream unless this dream is true.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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CONVICTIONISM VERSUS NON-CONVICTIONISM

JAMES MACKAYE

NO SUBJECT connected with the philosophy of the reasoning process is more important than the issue of convictionism versus non-convictionism. An understanding of it is of great value in avoiding the confusion which so persistently pervades discussions of the nature of the true and the right (the good).

There are two kinds of convictions: (1) physical convictions, or beliefs, and (2) moral convictions, or approbations. Corresponding to these there are two kinds of *reasons* for conviction: (1) reasons for believing, physical reasons, and (2) reasons for approving, moral reasons. The latter will here be considered identical with reasons for doing. That is, a reason for approving an act affords us a reason for doing it.

The question at once arises: What *is* a *reason* (1) for believing, and (2) for approving? What do philosophers mean, or what are they trying to mean, when they use the term "reason for a conviction"? We shall endeavor to indicate in this paper that they are wavering back and forth between two different meanings and continually confusing them. Briefly, the convictionist claims that a reason for a conviction is simply another (stronger) conviction, or something of which conviction is a criterion. The non-convictionist claims that it is not a conviction at all, nor anything of which conviction is a criterion. Thus arises the issue of convictionism versus non-convictionism. Like so many philosophical issues, it develops because men are uncertain of their own meanings; they find it difficult to discover what they are really trying to talk about when they use such a word as "reason." To show that this is so, let us first consider the issue as it arises among logicians.

CONFUSION OF THE CONVICTIONAL WITH THE LOGICAL TEST OF TRUTH

Suppose we begin with an example illustrating the perplexity of the Scottish philosopher, Thomas Reid, as follows:

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We give the name of evidence to whatever is a ground of *belief*. What this evidence is, is more easily felt than described. The common occasions of life lead us to distinguish evidence into different kinds; such as the evidence of sense, of memory, of consciousness, of testimony, of axioms, and of reasoning. I am not able to find any common nature to which they may all be reduced. They seem to me to agree only in this, that they are all fitted by nature to produce *belief* in the human mind, some of them in the highest degree, which we call certainty, others in various degrees according to circumstances.[1]

Examination of this passage will help start us on the track of what has misled logicians in their search for the nature of truth. For truth is that which we have *reason*, or *good* reason, for believing. (Reid uses the term "evidence," but we may consider this as a synonym for "reason.") The central problem of logic is to discover and express the meaning which men are groping for when they use the term "reason (or evidence) for a belief." This term is obviously a class term, and elementary logic tells us that to fix the meaning of a class term means to specify certain characteristics common to all things belonging to the class and absent in all things not belonging to it. Now it is clear that Reid was in quest of his own meaning of the class term "reason (or evidence) for a belief." He was not merely seeking some casual characteristic which reasons share with non-reasons. And he tells us that he failed in his quest, for he says: "I am not able to find any common nature to which they [evidences or reasons for believing] may all be reduced." Yet he makes a stab at it, and tells us that the only common characteristic he is able to find in them is their competence to cause (being "fitted by nature to produce") belief. This fully justifies his own frank statement that he is unable to discover what he is talking about. For this cannot be what he started out to find. It cannot be what logicians seek to mean by the term "reason for a belief." For logic seeks to make a distinction between "reasonable" and "unreasonable" beliefs, according as they have or have not a "reason" for

[1] *Intellectual Power of Man*, Vol. II, chap. xx.

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them. But the meaning proposed by Reid would render such a distinction impossible, since all beliefs, even those of the insane, are caused by something competent to cause them. Hence if this is what is meant by a "reason for a belief," such a thing as an unreasonable belief would be a contradiction. It would mean a belief not caused by something competent to cause it. Reid's confusion is evidently due to his convictions. He is groping for the logical meaning of "reason" and succeeds only in finding the convictional meaning. For he makes the conviction the criterion of the reason instead of the reason the criterion of the conviction. The non-convictional or logical meaning is in direct contradiction to that expressed by Reid. This is made plain by the words of John Stuart Mill:

> The word evidence is supposed to mean something which when laid before the mind induces it to believe. . . . . But this I apprehend is a misunderstanding of the nature of evidence. By evidence is not meant anything and everything which produces belief. There are many things which generate belief besides evidence. A mere strong association of ideas often causes a belief so intense as to be unshakeable by experience or argument. Evidence is not that which the mind does or must yield to, but that which it ought to yield to, namely, that by yielding to which, its belief is kept conformable to fact. There is no appeal from the human faculties generally, but there is an appeal from one human faculty to another; from the judging faculty to those which take cognizance of fact, the faculties of sense and consciousness. The legitimacy of this appeal is admitted whenever it is allowed that our judgments ought to be conformable to fact. To say that belief suffices for its own justification is making opinion the test of opinion; it is denying the existence of any outward standard, the conformity of an opinion to which constitutes its truth. We call one mode of forming opinions right and another wrong because the one does and the other does not tend to make the opinion agree with the fact—to make people believe what really is and expect what really will be.[2]

The "appeal from one faculty to another" here stressed by Mill is the appeal from the convictional to the logical or scientific test of truth. It is the appeal from conviction to obser-

[2] *System of Logic,* Book III, chap. xxi.

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vation. A reason for a belief, according to the non-convictionist, may or may not be a cause of belief. It is simply a probability, or ratio of two members, derived by perfectly definite and non-convictional rules from observed frequencies of association. A belief which takes probability as its guide will be more likely to be fulfilled (conform to fact) than one which does not; but whether belief will or will not be determined by such a guide depends upon the reasonableness of the mind to the attention of which the reason is presented. The reasons which may be presented for believing that changes in the phases of the moon do not affect the weather are just as good reasons when they fail to cause conviction as when they cause it.

For an even clearer example of the same form of fallacy, consider the following from the well known authority on logic, Bertrand Russell:

> All knowledge, we find, must be built up upon our instinctive beliefs, and if these are rejected, nothing is left. But among our instinctive beliefs some are much stronger than others, while many have, by habit and association become entangled with other beliefs, not really instinctive but falsely supposed to be part of what is believed instinctively.
>
> Philosophy should show us the hierarchy of our instinctive beliefs, beginning with those we hold most strongly, and presenting each as much isolated and as free from irrelevant additions as possible. It should take care to show that, in the form in which they are finally set forth, our instinctive beliefs do not clash, but form a harmonious system. There can never be any reason for rejecting one instinctive belief except that it clashes with others; thus, if they are found to harmonize, the whole system becomes worthy of acceptance.
>
> It is of course *possible* that all or any of our beliefs may be mistaken, and therefore all ought to be held with at least some slight element of doubt. But we cannot have *reason* to reject a belief except on the ground of some other belief. Hence, by organizing our instinctive beliefs and their consequences, by considering which among them it is most possible, if necessary to modify or abandon, we can arrive, on the basis of accepting as our sole data what we instinctively believe, at an orderly systematic organization of our knowledge.[8]

[8] *The Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 39–40.

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This is an exact reversal of the most elementary principles of logic, which teach, if they teach anything, that the "sole data" of knowledge are not beliefs but observations, and that beliefs, instinctive or non-instinctive, unguided by observation are worthless. It is also a reversal of the concrete practice of science, which cares nothing for what is believed, but everything for what is observed. However, it is a very old fallacy. Mill, for instance, in commenting upon this same doctrine, put forth by the convictionists of his time, expresses himself thus:

> They affirm that the universality of causation is a truth which we cannot help believing; that the belief in it is an instinct, one of the laws of our believing faculty. . . . . I must protest against adducing, as evidence of the truth of a fact in external nature, the disposition, however strong, or however general, to believe it. Belief is not proof, and does not dispense with the necessity of proof. . . . . A mere disposition to believe, even if supposed instinctive, is no guaranty for the truth of the thing believed. . . . . The things which it has been supposed that nobody could possibly help believing are innumerable; but no two generations would make out the same catalogue of them. One age or nation believes implicitly what to another seems incredible and inconceivable; one individual has not a vestige of a belief which another deems to be absolutely inherent in humanity. There is not one of these supposed instinctive beliefs which is inevitable.[4]

What an instinctive belief is, and how it is to be distinguished from a strong non-instinctive belief, appears not to be explained by advocates of convictionism. It seems, however, that beliefs of this kind sometimes clash, and one is capable of "rejecting" another, though how we are to tell which to reject is not clear. However, the fact that we are capable of rejecting them shows that they are not unescapable. Although it is stated that "philosophy should show us the hierarchy of our instinctive beliefs," we cannot discover that philosopher Russell makes any effort to do so. We may doubt whether there is any hierarchy of this kind. And if there were it would not

[4] *System of Logic*, Book III, chap. xxi.

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help us to discover the truth. To classify or codify our convictions according to their instinctiveness, strength, or vividness does not qualify them for testing truth nor for testing codes by which we may be led to truth. Guidance of conviction calls, not for the codification, but the repudiation of conviction.

But we do not need to go back to Mill to find a sufficient answer to the convictionism of Russell. A more modern logician has excellently expressed the supremacy (as a test of truth) of what has been observed over whatever may be believed about it, thus:

> It is to be observed that the truth or falsehood of a belief always depends upon something which lies outside the belief itself. If I believe that Charles I died on the scaffold, I believe truly, not because of any intrinsic quality of my belief, which could be discovered by merely examining the belief, but because of an historical event which happened two and a half centuries ago. If I believe that Charles I died in his bed, I believe falsely; no degree of vividness in my belief, or of care in arriving at it, prevents it from being false, again because of what happened long ago, and not because of any intrinsic quality of my belief. Hence although truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs, they are properties dependent upon the relations of the beliefs to other things, not upon any internal quality of the beliefs.

This passage seems plainly to assert that the truth of a belief depends not upon any "internal quality" thereof (even if this quality should happen to be "instinctiveness"), but upon its relation to "other things," which lie "outside the belief itself." This, of course, is the contention of the non-convictionist. And where do we find this passage? We find it on page 189 of the *Problems of Philosophy*, by Bertrand Russell, and by its authority we may appeal from Russell the convictionist to Russell the non-convictionist. It agrees with the principles of logic and the practices of science, not to mention the plain teachings of common sense; but it does not agree with the convictionism of Bertrand Russell expressed on pages 39–40 of the same volume. Here, then, is another example of the con-

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victional difficulty which besets logicians in attempting to answer such questions as: What is truth? What is a reason for a belief?

From the clearly stated non-convictionism of Mill, as embodied in the passages already quoted, it might be inferred that he at least was free from convictionism. Great logician as he was, however, he did not escape, but himself fell into the fallacy which he so plainly perceived when propounded by others. Various examples of this might be cited, but it will suffice to quote a particularly glaring one. Speculating on the origin of the well known laws of thought, he says: "The original foundation of it [the law of contradiction] I take to be that Belief and Disbelief are two different mental states excluding one another."[5]

No one has stated better than Mill the worthlessness of convictions as tests of truth and falsity; yet here we find him asserting that the fact that belief in a thing precludes disbelief in it at the same time affords us the most perfect known test of falsity, namely, self-contradiction. Mill's statement that the two mental states mentioned do exclude one another is true enough, but it is entirely irrelevant. Any attempt to found a law of thought upon it is the purest convictionism, as much so as the attempt to found the law of causation upon men's belief in it, against which Mill protests so vigorously. The "original foundation" of the law of contradiction is that observation excludes non-observation, that we cannot observe and yet not observe a thing at the same time. Upon this simple fact, open to the observation of everyone, the laws of thought are founded. These laws indeed are laws of observation and observability, all three of them. They have no connection with convictions, except that they are admirably adapted to help men in distinguishing which among them are true and which false. Indeed, all deductive inference owes its certainty to the observation, universal in everyone's experi-

[5] *System of Logic*, Book II, chap. vii.

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ence, that when we observe a thing we observe it, and hence cannot fail to observe it at the same time. Deductive, like inductive, inference therefore rests on observations, and very common ones.

Let us pass now to a few more examples of convictionism among logicians. Here is one from Sir William Hamilton:

> The original data of reason do not rest upon reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. These data are, therefore, in rigid propriety, beliefs, or trusts. Thus it is, that in the last resort, we must, perforce, philosophically admit, that *belief* is the primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate ground of *belief*.[6]

And here is another from Francis Bowen, late professor of philosophy at Harvard University: "The effort of mind by which such a discovery is made [discovery of a law of nature] is rather an Intuition or happy conjecture than an Induction. The kind of conviction which attends the discovery when made is not mere probability but certainty."[7]

Note that certainty (and by implication probability) is a "kind of conviction."

L. T. Hobhouse, after floundering in a convictional slough through a whole treatise, finally presents us with this conclusion as an epitome of his epistemology: "What is felt to be certain, is certain, is true, is reasonable, for what meaning else can we attach to these words."[8]

I have a fundamentalist neighbor who feels it to be certain, absolutely certain, that the earth is flat; in fact, he instinctively believes it. According to Hobhouse, then, the statement that the earth is flat "is certain, is true, is reasonable"; for if it is "felt to be certain," how could it be otherwise? Of course, Hobhouse, like every other convictionist logician, when he comes to apply the rules of logic in the concrete, contra-

[6] Reid's *Works*, Note A, Sec. 5, Vol. V, *Feeling, Knowledge, Opinion.*

[7] *Treatise on Logic*, p. 409.

[8] *The Theory of Knowledge*, p. 487.

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dicts himself. If it were not so, logic would be the merest futility, engaged in comparing convictions instead of observations.

Coming now to the convictionism of those who have given especial attention to the theory of probabilities, George Boole furnishes the following instructive example: "With the degree of information which we possess concerning the circumstances of an event, the reason we have to think that it will occur, or to use a single term our *expectation* of it will vary. Probability is expectation founded upon partial knowledge."[9]

Thus probability is defined as expectation, but later in the same paragraph Boole tells us that this definition is ignored in applying the theory of probabilities: "The rules which we employ in life-assurance, and in the other statistical applications of the theory of probabilities, are altogether independent of the *mental* phenomena of expectation."[10]

In other words, when a logician starts out with a convictional definition of probability, he is forced to throw it away before he can apply the theory in the concrete. The fact that Boole defines a probability as an expectation, and at the same time asserts that applications of the theory of probabilities are altogether independent of expectations, and hence of course of probabilities, illustrates his confusion. For a theory of probability the applications of which are altogether independent of probability can hardly be what Boole is really seeking. He *says* that "probability is expectation"; but what he *does* in practice shows that he recognizes probability as a kind of *non-expectation* to which expectation must conform if it is not to be disappointed. He is confounding the reason for the expectation with the expectation itself. For, if "the reason we have to think" (i.e., expect) can be expressed in the "single term our expectation"—as he says it can—then clearly a reason for an expectation is an expectation.

[9] *Laws of Thought*, p. 244.

[10] *Loc. cit.*

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But for an even better illustration of confusing what our expectations are with what they ought to be, we must turn to the works of Augustus DeMorgan, perhaps the most assiduous student of the theory of probabilities since LaPlace. Consider the following, for instance:

> I now premise that I . . . . consider the word [probability] as meaning the state of the mind with respect to an assertion, a coming event, or any other matter on which absolute knowledge does not exist. "It is more probable than improbable" means in this chapter "I believe that it will happen more than I believe that it will not happen." Or rather "I *ought* to believe etc.," for it may happen that the state of mind which *is*, is not the state of mind which should be. D'Alembert believed that it was *two* to *one* that the first head which the throw of a half-penny was to give would occur before the third throw; a juster view of the mode of applying the theory would have taught him it was *three* to *one*. But he *believed* it, and thought he could show reason for his belief; to him the probability *was* two to one. But I shall say, for all that, that the probability *is* three to one, meaning that in the universal opinion of those who examine the subject, the state of mind to which a person *ought* to be able to bring himself is to look three times as confidently upon the arrival as upon the non-arrival.
>
> Probability then refers to and implies belief, more or less, and belief is but another name for imperfect knowledge, or it may be expresses the mind in a state of imperfect knowledge. There is accurate meaning in the phrase "to the best of his knowledge and belief."[11]

Inspection of this passage shows that DeMorgan is confounding two different meanings of probability: (1) the degree of belief which a person happens to feel toward a given event, and (2) the predictability of the event as inferable from the sum of the relevant observations. The first may be called convictional probability. It tells us how strongly we *do* believe something. The second may be called logical probability. It tells us how strongly we *should* or *ought to* believe it. The first is of no service to mankind. The second is of great service. It is the function of logic to show how it is derived from observation. Using the words (1) reason, (2) truth, and

[11] *Formal Logic*, chap. ix.

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(3) certainty in their useful or serviceable sense, therefore, we may say of logical probability that the first is proportional to it, the second is the characteristic common to its higher degrees, and the third to its highest.

Now all logicians, apparently without exception, have more or less confounded these two meanings of probability, and thus their concepts of reason, truth, certainty, knowledge, and probability have been thrown into the chaos and contradiction exemplified by the passages heretofore quoted. The logician least subject to convictionism that I have been able to discover is W. Stanley Jevons, and the following clear expression of non-convictionism and repudiation of convictionism is from his pen:

> Many writers . . . . have asserted that probability is concerned with degree or quantity of belief. DeMorgan says, "By degree of probability we really mean or ought to mean degree of belief." The late Professor Donkin expressed the meaning of probability as "quantity of belief"; but I have never felt satisfied with such a definition of probability. . . . . An all-sufficient objection is, that the theory [of probabilities] *does not measure what the belief is, but what it ought to be.* Few minds think in close accordance with the theory, and there are many cases of evidence in which the belief existing is habitually different from what it ought to be. Even if the state of belief in my mind could be measured and expressed in figures, the results would be worthless. The very value of the theory consists in correcting and guiding our belief, and rendering our states of mind and consequent actions harmonious with our knowledge of exterior conditions.[12]

Jevons' statement that he has "never felt satisfied with such a definition of probability" shows that he "smells a rat" —he detects the ominous odor of convictionism permeating the prevailing expositions of logic. And when he tells us that "Even if the state of belief in my mind could be measured and expressed in figures the results would be worthless," he epitomizes the non-convictional criticism of convictionism. For what is true of the state of Jevons' belief is true of states of

[12] *Principles of Science*, Book II, chap. x.

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belief in general. Logic is not concerned with beliefs, but with reasons for beliefs. And reasons for beliefs are not themselves beliefs, nor are they anything of which belief is a criterion, Hobhouse, Hamilton, Boole, Bowen, Russell, DeMorgan, and all other convictionists to the contrary notwithstanding. Reasons are observational, not convictional. Convictionism tests truth by belief. Reason tests belief by truth. Convictionism may be condensed into the expression: You *do* believe it; *ergo*, you *ought to* believe it. Non-convictionism may be condensed into the expression: Take no counsel of your convictions—not even of your strongest ones—for you cannot discover what you *ought to* believe by discovering what you *do* believe.

This much consideration must suffice for the issue of convictionism versus non-convictionism as it arises among logicians. Let us next consider the issue as it arises among moralists.

CONFUSION OF THE CONVICTIONAL WITH THE LOGICAL TEST OF RIGHT

The workings of the human mind have a uniformity suggesting that the convictional obstacle which we have found to beset logicians in their search for the nature of the true may afford a clue to the obstacle which besets moralists in their search for the nature of the right. That some persistent obstacle is blocking progress in this direction is obvious to anyone even superficially familiar with the chaos prevailing in the so-called "science" of ethics. The effects of this obstacle in blocking man's attempt to answer the most important question which confronts him, how he shall guide his conduct, have been ably set forth by Mill, as follows:

> There are few circumstances among those which make up the present condition of human knowledge, more unlike what might have been expected, or more significant of the backward state in which speculation on the most important subjects still lingers, than the little progress which has been made in the decision of the controversy respecting the criterion of right and wrong. From the dawn of philosophy, the question concern-

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ing the *summum bonum* or what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality, has been accounted the main problem in speculative thought, has occupied the most gifted intellects, and divided them into sects and schools, carrying on a vigorous warfare against one another. And after more than two thousand years the same discussions continue, philosophers are still ranged under the same contending banners, and neither thinkers nor mankind at large seem nearer to being unanimous on the subject, than when the youth Socrates listened to the old Protagoras, and asserted (if Plato's dialogue be grounded on a real conversation) the theory of utilitarianism against the popular morality of the so-called sophist.[13]

Following up the clue afforded by the workings of the logician's mind, we shall present reasons for believing that the cause of this moral chaos is nothing more mysterious than a convictionism parallel in practically all respects to that which has caused the chaotic thinking of a DeMorgan, a Boole, a Hamilton, or a Hobhouse; for the convictional habit of mind is even more deadly to moralists than to logicians because moral convictions are deeper, more emotional, and therefore more reason-resisting, than physical ones. Indeed, if we wish to discover the cause of the condition so deplored by Mill in the first paragraph of his *Utilitarianism* we need seek no further for it than in some brief passages to be found in later pages of the same essay. Here they are:

Our moral faculty, according to all those of its interpreters who are entitled to the name of thinkers, supplies us only with the general principles of moral judgments: it is a branch of our reason, not of our sensitive faculty; and must be looked to for the abstract doctrines of morality, not for perception of it in the concrete.[14]

The ultimate sanction, therefore, of all morality (external motives apart) being a subjective feeling in our own minds, I see nothing embarrassing to those whose standard is utility, in the question, what is the sanction of that particular standard? We may answer, the same as of all other moral standards—the conscientious feelings of mankind. Undoubtedly this sanction has no binding efficacy on those who do not possess

[13] *Essay on Utilitarianism*, chap. i.

[14] *Op. cit.*, chap. i.

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feelings it appeals to; but neither will those persons be more obedient to any other moral principle than to the utilitarian one.[15]

The deeply rooted conception which every individual even now has of himself as a social being, tends to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures. . . . . This conviction is the ultimate sanction of the greatest-happiness morality.[16]

In these passages Mill reveals why ethics has achieved the condition of futility described in the earlier quotation. It is because moralists, with a single exception (Bentham), have, in the manner of Mill, reversed the logical method, and sought to make convictions the tests of reasons instead of reasons the tests of convictions. Moral convictions—the attitudes of mind familiarly called approbations and disapprobations—are not guides. Like physical convictions, beliefs, they are the very things that need guiding. Whether called moral judgments, moral faculties, conscientious feelings, or by any other name, they are not fitted to *give* sanction to any moral code. They are only fitted to *receive* it. And if they do not receive it from a code of reason they must receive it from a code of unreason, since that is the only alternative. Our so-called "moral (approving) faculty" or conscience is no more a "branch of our reason" than our "believing faculty." Moral, like physical, reasoning must be non-convictional if it is to get anywhere and serve any useful purpose. Mill is a convictionist who happens to approve the code of utility. That is to say, looking into his mind he perceives there a conviction of approbation—an approving attitude of mind toward that code. And he tells us it is this which sanctions the code. If such is the case, then if there is found in some other mind (or his own at some other time) an opposite or disapproving conviction, the sanction is thereby annulled. For if positive convictions can sanction a code, either of belief or of conduct, then the negative of those convictions can abolish the sanction. It is like attempting to

[15] *Op. cit.*, chap. iii. [16] *Op. cit.*, chap. iii.

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establish the validity of the multiplication table, the law of gravitation, or the heliocentric system by discovering that we believe them. If this is what sanctions them, then a person who discovers that he disbelieves them abolishes the sanction. Imagine sanctioning or refuting the multiplication table by believing or disbelieving it! Yet such a procedure would be no more absurd than sanctioning or refuting the code of utility, or any other code of conduct, by approving or disapproving it. A code founded on conviction may be destroyed by conviction. A non-convictional code cannot. The code of probability, for which logicians are groping, is non-convictional, and hence cannot be refuted by anyone's disbelief in it. It is conviction-proof. There are good reasons for believing that moralists are groping for a corresponding non-convictional code of conduct which cannot be refuted by anyone's disapproval of it. This however, is not the place for the digression required to present them. Our present purpose is to illustrate the prevailing convictionism among ethical writers by reference to the words of representative moralists. In the following typical samples the synonyms for "moral conviction" are numerous, but the principle expressed is the same:

> If a term is to be selected to denote that in action and in disposition of which the Moral Faculty approves, perhaps the most precise and appropriate is *rectitude* or *rightness*. . . . .
>
> Rectitude then is that of which the moral faculty approves. The contrary of what is *right* is *wrong*. *Rightness* and *wrongness*, then, are the characteristics of action and disposition, as contemplated by the moralist. So that the *foundation of morals*, the ground upon which moral distinctions are taken, is in the essential difference between what is *right* and what is *wrong*.[17]

> A moral action is a deed known as right or wrong, good or bad when judged by a standard such that the good deed "ought" to be done, the bad deed "ought not" to be done. The good act is approved, the bad disapproved.[18]

[17] William Fleming, *Vocabulary of Philosophy*, pp. 432, 433.

[18] H. W. Dresser, *Ethics in Theory and Application*, p. 95.

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The broad fact stated in its unanalysed form, of which we have to find the interpretation, is this: that distinctively as men, we have an irresistible tendency to *approve and disapprove,* to pass judgments of right and wrong. Wherever approbation falls, there we cannot help recognizing *merit:* wherever disapprobation *demerit.* To the former we are impelled to assign honour and such external good as may express our sympathy, and to feel that no less than this is due: to the latter we award disgrace and such external ill as may mark our antipathy, with the consciousness that we are not only entitled but constrained to this infliction. So *habitual* is this manner of thinking that the very word in which we sum up its contents, the word *Morals,* means *habits, customs;* and so does the Greek word *Ethics.*[19]

To say of any action "Men have always done it" is not the same as to prove its moral worth. Should slaves be held? Should alcohol be drunk? Should competition guide trade? Should white lies be told? These are questions not to be settled by observing what men have done. We must ask why they have done what they have, and whether they might not better have done something else? Are these acts such as can morally be approved? Possibly where human facts all run one way it may be tolerably safe to take such approval for granted. But it is this clear sighted approval, and this alone, which makes the facts morally important.[20]

Here again we appeal to the moral consciousness to bear testimony to our conclusion. Every moral man knows that to do right is to do one's duty for its own sake, and that, if duty is done for the sake of some ulterior object, that act may be legal but is certainly not moral.[21]

On reviewing the claims of the Moral Sense doctrine, it appears there is a priori reason for expecting the first principle of social morality to originate in some feeling, power, or faculty of the individual.[22]

An especially significant sample of the confusion of conscientiousness with rightness is the following, from the distinguished moralist, Henry Sidgwick:

In my view the "authority of Conscience" is the authority of Reason in its application to practice: "authority" or "obligation," in my view, expresses the relation that we recognize on reflection between a judgment

[19] James Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory,* Part II, chap. i.

[20] George H. Palmer, *The Field of Ethics,* Lecture 1.

[21] F. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies,* p. 133.

[22] Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics,* p. 43.

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as to what ought to be willed by us and a non-rational impulse prompting in a direction opposed to this judgment. I can imagine no other kind of ultimate authority than this.[28]

It is of particular interest to compare the statement that "I can imagine no other kind of ultimate authority than this" ("this" meaning the feelings of approbation and disapprobation), which expresses Sidgwick's moral convictionism, with the statement quoted on page 22[28a] that "What is felt to be certain is certain, is true, is reasonable, for what meaning else can we attach to these words?" which expresses Hobhouse's physical convictionism. In these two instances convictionism has reached a stage in which any alternative is unimaginable —or perhaps inconceivable. And yet it is readily predictable that the very men who are responsible for these statements would repudiate their own code in the concrete. Suppose, for instance, Hobhouse should be confronted with the following syllogism:

A statement which is felt to be certain is certain.

In the mind of so and so the statement "the world is flat" is felt to be certain.

Therefore, the statement "the world is flat" is certain.

Or suppose Sidgwick to be confronted with the following syllogism:

An act which conscience authorizes is an act which ought to be willed and one authorized by reason and ultimate authority.

In the mind of so and so an act which conscience authorizes is the act of torturing persons who differ from so and so in their religious convictions.

Therefore, the act of torturing persons who differ from so and so in their religious convictions is an act which ought to be willed and one authorized by reason and ultimate authority.

Would they at once concede the truth of the respective conclusions? Surely not. Yet to do otherwise would be to re-

[28] *The Ethics of T. H. Green, Herbert Spencer, and J. Martineau*, Lecture I.

[28a] This and other similar references are to pages in this article.

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pudiate a test of "ultimate authority" to which they either say or imply they can imagine no alternative. For the major premises of these syllogisms are accurate paraphrases of their own statements, and the minor premises are accurate expressions of convictions in some Oriental minds—convictions indeed which aforetime occupied the minds of most men in the Western world.

This illustrates anew how, in the minds of logicians and moralists, convictionism produces a parallel paralysis. What "is felt to be" reasonable is no more a test of reasonableness in conduct than in belief. Convictionism can only tell us what is "reasonable *to*" so and so. It cannot tell us what is reasonable.

Sidgwick is one of two moralists known to me (G. E. Moore being the other) who appears to recognize in a hazy way the non-convictional criticism of moral convictionism and seeks to evade it, the result being to confirm it more completely than ever. His attempted evasion is too lengthy to quote here, but its confusion is the usual one between what we *are* and what we *ought to be* convinced of, and practically parallels that illustrated by the passage from DeMorgan already quoted. The following passage perhaps will suggest what is more fully confirmed by inspection of the whole exposition: "So far then from being prepared to admit that the proposition 'X ought to be done' merely expresses the existence of a certain sentiment in myself or others, I find it strictly impossible so to regard my own moral judgments without eliminating from the concomitant sentiment the peculiar quality signified by the term 'moral.' "[24]

If, as Sidgwick here plainly affirms, "moral" signifies a quality capable of being eliminated (apparently he means abstracted) from a sentiment, it is thereby acknowledged to be a quality of a sentiment. This concedes the criticism which he seeks to evade, the criticism that in expressing moral judgments the convictionist merely expresses a peculiar quality of

[24] *Methods of Ethics*, chap. iii.

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the sentiment which so commonly goes by the name "moral," and not necessarily anything of interest or service to mankind. This is made even plainer by the following passage (which incidentally confirms what is here claimed about the universality of convictionism, not only among English, but all moralists): "We have hitherto spoken of the quality of conduct discerned by our moral faculty as 'rightness' which is the term commonly used by English moralists."[25]

Note that in this passage "rightness" is called a quality of conduct, whereas in that first quoted "moral" is called a quality of a sentiment. The relation between the two is obvious. The quality in conduct which *causes* the quality called moral in a sentiment is given the name "rightness." That which is "discerned" in conduct by our "moral faculty" is its capacity to cause approbation or disapprobation. In short, an act is called right because of its competence to cause a kind of sentiment (conviction) called moral. That is why all moral acts are right and all right acts moral. This is the typical convictionist position, for he who defines a reason as that which is capable of causing a conviction has thereby made a conviction the criterion of a reason for a conviction. Compare Reid's parallel definition of a reason for (that which justifies) a belief as whatever is competent to cause it (p. 16).

Among logicians repudiation of convictionism can often be found, even among those who, when off their guard, fall into the convictional fallacy themselves; but among moralists the confusion is more complete. I have been able to find only one who is explicit and consistent in his repudiation of conviction (conscience) as a guide to conduct. All other apparent repudiations bring back the repudiated authority of conscience under some disguise or other. This is Jeremy Bentham. Under the name of "the principle of sympathy and antipathy" (compare passage from Martineau, p. 30) he recognizes con-

[25] *Methods of Ethics*, chap. ix.

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victionism as a fallacy into which all moralists of his time had fallen, as follows:

> By the principle of sympathy and antipathy [convictionism], I mean that principle which approves or disapproves of certain actions, not on account of their tending to augment the happiness, nor yet on account of their tendency to diminish the happiness, of the party whose interest is in question, but merely because a man finds himself disposed to approve or disapprove of them: holding up that approbation or disapprobation as a sufficient reason for itself, and disclaiming the necessity of looking out for any extrinsic ground.
>
> It is manifest that this is rather a principle in name than in reality: it is not a positive principle of itself, so much as a term employed to signify the negation of all principle. What one expects to find in a principle is something that points out some external consideration, as a means of warranting and guiding the internal sentiments of approbation and disapprobation: this expectation is but ill-fulfilled by a proposition, which does neither more nor less than hold up each of these sentiments as a ground and standard for itself. . . . .
>
> The various systems that have been formed concerning the standard of right and wrong, may all be reduced to the principle of sympathy and antipathy. One account may serve for all of them. They consist all of them in so many contrivances for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any external standard, and for prevailing upon the reader to accept of the author's sentiment or opinion as a reason for itself. The phrases different, but the principle the same.[26]

The representative citations herein recorded show that this criticism applies as well today as in Bentham's time, and that it applies almost as universally to the logician as to the moralist. Both have fallen into a fallacy which each man can understand for himself by inspection of his own mental processes. For we are all prone to convictionism, and even when forewarned by the obvious non-convictionism of science, are by no means proof against it. It is plain that Bentham's position as to the "sanction" of the code of utility is the reverse of Mill's (see p. 27). Indeed, Bentham's indictment of moral convictionism is identical with Jevons' indictment of physical (p. 25), and paraphrasing the latter, we may condense the

[26] *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, chap. ii.

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whole criticism of convictionism into a single sentence: *"Even if the state of conviction (belief or approbation) in anyone's mind could be measured and expressed in figures, the results would be worthless."* This is because a logical reason for a conviction, whether physical or moral, is not itself a conviction, nor anything of which conviction is a criterion.

It is important to point out that the moral convictionist, although he starts out to discover the meaning of "right," never succeeds in discovering it. All he discovers is the meaning of "right *to*" this person or that person. That is to say, an act which is right *to* one person may be *not* right (wrong) *to* another. But the physical convictionist does no better. He falls into a parallel fallacy, well exemplified, for instance, in DeMorgan's attempt to discover what he is trying to mean by a "probability" (p. 24). It turns out to be only a "probability *to*" this person or that person, and he specifically points out that what is a probability *to* D'Alembert is not a probability *to* DeMorgan. Moreover, he takes the pains to emphasize this point in his *Essay on Probability,* where he tells us (p. 7) that "the real probabilities may be different to different persons." In short, a statement which is true *to* one person is *not* true (false) *to* another. Thus throughout convictiondom, truth and right, though forever sought, are never found. There is no truth; there is only truth *to* someone. There is no right; there is only right *to* someone. Everything depends upon the viewpoint, the sentiments, the convictional feelings of individuals. Is it true that the earth is flat? That arsenic is a poison? That red-hot iron will burn? That God exists? That pain can be felt? According to the physical convictionist, none of these statements can be said to be either true or untrue. They are true to some persons and not true to others, according to their state of belief. Is it right to burn down a city just to watch it burn? Needlessly to torture a child, a dog, or a frog? To bomb a theater filled with people? To administer an anesthetic previous to a painful operation? To get drunk and beat your wife? According to the moral convictionist, none of

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these acts can be said to be right or not right. They are right to some persons and not right to others, according to their state of approval. Truth and right depend upon "the point of view." Throughout non-convictiondom all this is reversed. The truth of a statement depends upon whether it correctly expresses what has been, is, or is to be, observable by beings qualified to observe. It does not depend upon a believing attitude of mind in anyone. And the rightness of an act depends upon its probable effect on sentient beings, pleasurable or painful, serviceable or unserviceable. It does not depend upon an approving attitude of mind in anyone. There is no truth *to* and no right *to,* this person or that person. There is only truth and right. And neither of them depends upon anyone's "point of view." Probability varies with observation, but not with conviction. It is lack of evidence, not any "feeling" of doubt, that limits our knowledge of what is true and what is right. The evidence available *to* one person may differ from that available *to* another, but there is no issue between convictionism and non-convictionism as to this kind of relativity of knowledge. The issue is concerned, not with the availability, but the nature of evidence. According to the non-convictionist the statement that the average temperature of the ocean's surface at the North Pole is lower than at the Equator is a true statement. It is not true to one person and false to another. And the infliction of needless pain upon a sentient being—pain, that is, which results in no useful effect—is a wrong act. It is not right to one person and wrong to another. No degree of disbelief in any individual or in all mankind can render the statement untrue, and no degree of approbation in any individual or in all mankind can render the act right. Convictional criteria, both of the individual and the nose-counting kind, have no application. Thus convictionism and reason are simply the reverse of one another.

The manner in which the habit of convictionism reverses reason is the same both for belief and approbation, but perhaps is more readily perceived in the case of the latter, be-

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cause any candid person has merely to look within his own mind to observe the process in actual operation. The fact is many persons can conceive of no alternative. The process is simply this: The moralist, setting out to discover a code of conduct qualified to guide his conscience, proceeds to compare a number of candidate codes proposed by himself or others for that purpose. And by what agency does he decide which one is qualified? Why, by his conscience of course. He simply sets aside as wrong (disqualified) any code of which he sufficiently disapproves, and elects the one of which he most strongly approves. Thus he has discovered a code to guide conscience by using his conscience as a guide to the code. Its competence to cause conviction in him is what qualifies it. This is the circle of moral convictionism. There is an exactly parallel circle of physical convictionism. And in the extracts cited in this paper we may readily follow the mental operations, both of logicians and moralists, in the process of traversing this circle. They set out to discover what they *ought to be* convinced of, and in their search travel in a closed path, and simply discover what they *are* convinced of.

The manner in which non-convictionism proceeds is the reverse of this. In order to discover a code qualified to guide belief and disbelief, it is necessary first to repudiate belief and disbelief as guides to that code. And in order to discover a code qualified to guide approval and disapproval (conscience), it is necessary first to repudiate approval and disapproval as guides to that code. Having thus repudiated conviction as a guide to the code which is to guide conviction, it may next be asked, what does non-convictionism put in its place? An adequate answer to this question requires a comprehensive exposition of physical and moral logic. But briefly the answer is that it substitutes observation for belief as a guide to the code of physical reason, and non-convictional interest (non-indifference) for approbation as a guide to the code of moral reason. The first leads to the code of probability, which seeks for mankind the maximum power of prediction; the second, to the

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code of utility, which seeks for mankind the maximum happiness achievable by means of its power of prediction. Discovery of what our convictions, or those of mankind, may be is superfluous. The law of causation is not true because we believe it. If this were the case it would become untrue if we disbelieved it. It is true because it is an accurate expression of what may be inferred from observation, and hence is fitted to guide belief. In other words, beliefs guided by it will have a better chance of being fulfilled than those which are not. Similarly, the golden rule is not right because we approve it. If this were the case it would become wrong if we disapproved it. It is right because conformity to it will serve the non-convictional interest of mankind, and hence is fitted to guide approbation and conduct. In other words, conduct guided by it will have a better chance of promoting happiness and relieving unhappiness than that which is not. This brief suggestion of the non-convictional procedure must suffice for our present purposes. But ample and convergent evidence indicates that it is these two codes which logicians and moralists respectively have always been seeking, and which convictionism has prevented them from finding. As a matter of fact, both these codes have long been followed in the concrete, though not universally and consistently. All logicians and scientists are guided by the code of probability for the most part, and all moralists seek in general the happiness of mankind as an end. This is because, luckily for mankind, reasons happen to be among the commonest causes of conviction. It is when men attempt to discover the "sanction" of the codes of reason that convictionism causes them to fail. And this failure is much more serious in the moral than in the physical realm. For the logician, though he propounds the convictional definition of a reason for believing, repudiates it in the concrete. It is proposed only to be consigned to the waste-basket. DeMorgan and Boole may *tell* us that probabilities are matters of degree of belief or expectation, but when they come to apply them in the concrete they never refer to such degrees at all, but only to

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relative frequencies of observation. As Boole says: "The rules which we employ in . . . . applications of the theory of probabilities are altogether independent of the *mental* phenomena of expectation." Bertrand Russell may *tell* us that: "All knowledge . . . . must be built up upon our instinctive beliefs, and if these are rejected nothing is left," and that "we cannot have *reason* to reject a belief except on the ground of some other belief." But when he comes to the concrete question of the ground for acceptance or rejection of the statement that Charles I died on the scaffold he makes it plain that "the truth or falsehood of a belief always depends upon something which lies outside the belief itself," and that "no degree of vividness in my belief or of care in arriving at it prevents it from being false" if it disagrees with what has been observed. In short, what logicians *do* when they reason is exactly the opposite of what they *say* (and apparently suppose) they do. In theory they are convictionists, but in practice they are non-convictionists. Thus by their inconsistency they escape the stalemate, described by Mill, which has paralyzed ethics.

With the moralists, however, the case is different. There is no such uniformity of beneficent contradiction between theory and practice. They not only propound the convictional definition of a reason for approving, but they stick to it. At any rate they do not consign it to the waste-basket with anything like the consistent regularity which characterizes the practice of logicians. The consequence is that ethics is thrown into the chaos that logic would be in if logicians stuck to their convictional definitions of probability and certainty. If they did thus stick, of course, physical logic would be as nonexistent as moral logic now is. The whole thing would degenerate into a dispute about convictional tastes or "points of view." To reverse this process all we need do is substitute the non-convictional for the convictional procedure in ethics, as it has already been substituted in logic. Put the convictional definition of a reason for approving in the same waste-basket that logicians have put the convictional definition of a reason for be-

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lieving. Immediately ethics will become as reasonable as logic. Physical logic exists because it is able to propose and use a "reason for believing" which is not erected upon belief, and hence cannot be overthrown by disbelief. Moral logic will come into existence when, repudiating conviction as a guide to conviction, it is able to propose and use a "reason for approving" which is not erected upon approval, and hence cannot be overthrown by disapproval. The code of utility, in fact, can do for moral logic what the code of probability has already done for physical logic. Science, by conforming to the former, has created a material civilization; by conforming to the latter it can create a moral one—for that which non-convictionism can do in one realm it can do in another. At any rate, with its prodigious success in the material realm before our eyes, it would seem at least worth trying. And surely we should be risking very little in giving it a trial. At least we should not be risking the happiness of mankind, as we are at present doing, by insisting on the control of convictionism in morals, and therefore in conduct. Perhaps we may discover that we do not approve of the code of utility; most moralists, indeed, have discovered it; but we must learn that such a discovery is irrelevant. It is because science has learned this about belief that it has succeeded where all alternatives have failed. The motto of physical science is, "Take no counsel of your beliefs, not even of your strongest ones." The motto of moral science should be, "Take no counsel of your approbations, not even of your strongest ones." Man cannot discover what he *ought to be* convinced of by discovering what he *is* convinced of. In the moral, as in the physical, realm, there is no substitute for reason.

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SCIENTIFIC TRENDS IN ECONOMICS

MAX SYLVIUS HANDMAN

THE central problem in economics is price, that is, the manner in which human efforts are adjusted to each other and rewards allocated in accordance with these efforts. This says nothing about the justice of the rewards. It is a matter of indifference to economics whether the efforts are genuine or fictitious. As long as they can pass for genuine, the mechanism of price applies to them.

The framework within which this price-mechanism operates is a system of production—when there is no production there is no price. Robbery may pass for production, but it is self-limiting. Since the problems of the science center around the relation of prices to each other—how much is one article or service worth in terms of another—the two fundamental problems are value and distribution.

In the early days of the science, demand for goods was so sure and so pressing that the attention of all the investigators was centered on production and the efforts to be put forth in order to produce. Hence value was seen in terms of the efforts it took to bring goods and services into existence. Supply was the key to, and labor was the source of, all value. As over against the landlords who were staying at home and drinking and following after the hounds while the rents piled up in their coffers, the middle-class merchant saw himself as a laboring producer creating by the aid of machinery things out of chaos. Hence Ricardo proved conclusively that rent does not enter into cost of production. Later, when the laborers realized their position in the new economic scheme, they refused to grant to the capitalist-entrepreneur the right to consider his efforts as labor, and the socialists turned the labor theory of value against its own makers.

By the middle of the century the problem which confronted the economist was not so much production as the dis-

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posal of the articles produced. The emphasis ceased to be placed on supply and was placed on demand, and the result was an attempt to analyze the consumers' schedule of wants. It was also apparent that from his standpoint, the consumer was confronted with a choice between the numerous articles offered for sale. Hence value as the factor behind the price was no longer labor, but utility, marginal utility, according to which the value of an article is the utility of its last unit to the consumer. The additional factor is to be taken into account in this transition, that by shifting the center of gravity from labor to utility, the socialists, it was thought, were deprived of their theoretical weapon. Not because things had labor in them, but because consumers wanted them, gives them value. A little labor which is wanted much may have a higher value than a great deal of labor which is wanted little.

The great value of this marginal analysis was that by simplifying the facts in the case it brought all economic phenomena under one general rule. The price of an article is the value of the last unit to the consumer; the wage of labor is the price of the least efficient laborer; the interest of money is the value of the least useful dollar; the rent of land is the product above cost of replacement of the least productive land; and so on.

The attacks on this economics came on two counts. First, that by oversimplifying it had assumed that human beings are so rational that they know always and exactly what they want and that they can meticulously estimate the marginal utility of any part of a series of goods so that at the margin they will receive the greatest utilities. Second, that in this oversimplification it had left out the entire range of the economic experiences of man. The first attacked its psychology; the latter, its abstractness. Both attacks asked for a realistic account of economic phenomena and a revision of its psychology from rationalistic hedonism to something more in the nature of unconscious, habitual, institutional realism. The marginal

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economics stood pat for a long time in the face of all these criticisms. It was intrenched in the high places of the academy and it had a neatly logical and consistent scheme. As over against the cries of the critics to go into the wilderness of facts and the strange places of the psychological jungle, it stayed at home and fortified the old place into an impregnable logical position.

In view of all this there was nothing for the critics to do but to leave the old economics alone and go and build another city in the wilderness. This city is now being built. Its building material is primarily statistics, and its alleys and roadways are statistical correlations, spreads, modes, medians, and curves of normal frequency. They have also reserved a special park near the city which is still largely unused, and that is economic history with a new gateway for a genetic approach.

The practical outcome of this secession has been this:

The older theory spoke in terms of a normal process directed by free competition, which process if it were allowed to work itself out, would be the sort of a process assumed by the theory. Deviations from that were, in the nature of the case, considered as due to interference. One set of economic phenomena, however, was found not to fit into the normal situation: the phenomena of crises and depressions. The socialists had explained these crises and depressions as in the very nature of the workings of the capitalistic system. This the theorists denied, but they could offer no explanation except the erratic behavior of human beings as consumers. Under the stimulation of Veblen, an effort was made to get away from any "normal" economic system and to collect information bearing on the actual behavior of the system, normal or abnormal. Such a collection of data, made first by Mitchell, disclosed the fact that crises and depressions are as normal as periods of prosperity. The economic process, according to this analysis, needs to be described, not in terms of a single

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mechanism, but in terms of a series of cycles. With this conception of the cyclical nature of economic phenomena we leave behind economic statics, except as a subsidiary part of the analysis, and we get into the realm of economic dynamics. And within the realm of the business cycle there has so far been found the finest combination of historical information, statistical technique, and theoretical analysis.

What was true of the field of business cycles was also true of other fields of economics, except that in these fields the results were not as spectacular; in fact they are of a kind to make any evaluation of them in point of theory exceedingly difficult. Until America's participation in the war, the field of economic statistics was limited to the information which could be gathered in connection with monetary phenomena. In that field statistical information was most easily obtainable because monetary phenomena are self-recording. Interest rates, note-circulation, gold reserves are phenomena which lend themselves to quantitative statement and graphic presentation. It is here then that Irving Fisher's efforts at quantitative statement found their earliest expression. The experiences connected with the Federal Reserve System, and above all the period of war and post-war financing, are placing at our disposal much factual material which when scrutinized by statistical technique is sure in a reasonably short time to give us a monetary theory which will enable us to handle the distressing factors connected with the price level. We still have to overcome the inertia of the older, cruder, metal-quantity economists who speak of currency as "having something behind it" in spite of the phenomena of credit.

The next field in which progress was made toward a quantitative and factual statement was in corporation economics, because the phenomena there share partly in the characteristics of money and partly in those of engineering. There also the theory was left like a sleeping beauty in its marginal forest and another theory constructed in terms of the facts dis-

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covered. Here the facts are of two classes: those bearing on the financing of corporations, and those bearing on the question of large-scale production and the problem of diminishing returns. In this field the recent contact made with the engineers and other technicians is promising a very useful analysis. The question when large-scale production ceases to be profitable is being brought down to the refinements of the smallest unit of force exerted, load per kilowatt per minute, so much so that instead of the earlier general statements of increasing, constant, and decreasing costs, we will now have very definite statements, and not vague generalizations. In the field of transportation and public utilities, the problems are partly the problems of returns and partly capitalization and legal restrictions. The problem of rate-making often becomes a problem of utilization of the equipment, and then it runs into the problems connected with consumption, as when a gas company is compelled to charge up to winter use the cost of the idle equipment during the summer; and there in turn it runs into the question of the state of the industrial arts. Here also the marginal utility analysis of service in terms of the marginal user of gas has become too simple a matter for the practical handling of the concept as a scientific tool.

The problem of taxation presents a dark chapter in the field of economics. The general property tax, in spite of its injustice and deficiencies, still holds the field. But the experience with the war uses of the income tax and excise taxes is gradually leading us to a more intelligent taxation theory, if only the politician and the business man would leave us alone.

In the field of international commercial relations a considerable volume of information is coming to light in connection with the problem of reparations, the Dawes plan, and the neo-mercantilistic hysteria which has swept over the civilized world. So far not much of theoretical significance has come out of the data.

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Perhaps the most picturesque phenomenon in modern economics is that connected with forecasting and the efforts at controlling prices through the expansion and contraction of credit facilities. Some very spectacular things have been done in that field; business firms in the country have gone in very heavily for forecasting services. The result has been a great demand for statisticians and a fine show of statistical apparatus and technique. A great deal of this sort of thing may be perfectly useless or dishonest, but there is a certain amount of scientific evidence for it. The most important mechanism in this connection is still the Federal Reserve System, which, through its discount rate, acts as a safety valve in credit manipulation.

In the field of labor there have also been some very unique developments. The older labor economics conceived of labor as one side of a bargain, or, more properly speaking, one side of a tug-of-war where the one who pulled the hardest won out. It was assumed that the industry could stand an indefinite increase in wages by indefinitely decreasing profits, or that labor can stand an indefinite decrease in wages by bringing them to the mere subsistence level. It was considered a war of high profits versus the subsistence level of living. The demands or needs of the industry were never taken into account.

Now within the labor field itself, under the leadership of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and partly the coal miners, the problem of wages is taking the shape of a question of the place of any given industry in a market made up of producers at various levels of equipment and returns, each trying to hold his own. Often—as, for example, in the case of coal—no decent wage can be paid considering the cost of mining the coal and the selling price of it. Many producers, having to compete with others more favorably located, simply cannot live if they have to pay a standard wage. The question of wages in the coal industry is a question of the whole indus-

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try, and not of any given mine or region. Economists have seen this before, but it was not until recently that the facts became available for seeing the matter clearly and convincingly. This standpoint is gradually seeping through into general labor economics, and a view is appearing which looks at the industry as a whole—coal-mining, clothing, manufacturing—and tries to distribute the good and evil days in the industry among both capital and labor. Significant in this connection are Hamilton and Lubins' studies in the coal situation in America and England.

And finally there are even signs that the most neglected field in economics—strange as it might seem—the field of consumption, will be given a certain share of attention. Studies in the level of the standard of living and even a general theory of consumption have been assayed.

Of course it has been perfectly evident that there has been a malicious glee in this recounting of the downfall of "economic theory" and the rise to almost exclusive pre-eminence of the purely factual approach. But if this factual material should threaten to become all that there is to economics, all this malice would turn against us. One can have no illusion about mere facts, even when statistically presented, ever forming a science. The glee is due to the feeling that all this factual material is about to put an end once and for all to the theological attitude of earlier theory which spoke of its speculation in economic logic as *the* fundamental laws of economics which no one can withstand and no one can alter, and which, without knowing it and perhaps without wishing it, came to serve as the bulwark and fortress of a system of economic practices. For if there is anything which this factual material discloses, it is the ease with which economic practices can be manipulated and shifted from one place and time to another. Unnecessary expansion of credit, panics, and even unemployment is seen to be far from a necessary corollary of the workings of our system. The facts are showing us where to apply

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the pressure in order to avoid the evil consequences. It may postpone the evil day of a grand smash-up; it may avoid it altogether, and we may be having a socialistic régime without the socialists knowing it. All this is to the good. What we are interested in is the question of economic control through price manipulation; and the best way to get it is by way of complete command over the minutest forms of economic behavior. But such a control cannot remain within the domain of the minute or even large fact. After all, our economic system is a whole, and as a whole it must be treated.

For this reason it is essential that economics make use of genetic approach in addition to the others at its disposal. If the purpose of an economic science is economic control, we are at once confronted with the question: Control for what purpose? Economically, there can be only one purpose, and that is the most extensive and most highly developed form of production consistent with its self-perpetuation. In the short run this question of a non-interference with production is a matter of correlation of certain forms of production and consumption with certain others. But in the long run the problem ceases to be simply a question of immediate production, and it assumes the aspect of an entire social system which makes possible or impossible the system of production to which a certain group is committed. We, for example, are committed to the most extravagant system of production ever known, while at the same time we are also in the midst of the most delicately adjusted mechanism of economic relationships. What have we to fall back upon in order to guide us in controlling this system of economic relationships? Common sense and the short-term experiences of the price system. The price system is the youngest and the most untried of all economic systems. Now as a matter of pure logic, one cannot understand any system in terms of itself; understanding means comparison, and so an understanding of the price system would logically

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require a comparison in terms of genesis of this system with its antecedents. Where one is to stop in this genetic going back is more a metaphysical than a logical problem. Economic phenomena cannot be understood except in terms of evolution. Whether such an evolution be continuous or cyclical remains to be seen; but an evolutionary series it must be.

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

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THE HOLY COMMONWEALTH IN AMERICA

HERBERT WALLACE SCHNEIDER

OH YES! oh yes! oh yes! All you the people of Christ that are here Oppressed, Imprisoned and scurrilously derided, gather yourselves together, your Wifes and little ones, and answer to your severall Names as you shall be shipped for his service, in the Westerne World, and more especially for planting the united Collonies of new England; Where you are to attend the service of the King of Kings, upon the divulging of this Proclamation by his Herralds at Armes. . . . .

. . . . Could *Casar* so suddenly fetch over fresh forces from *Europe* to *Asia, Pompy* to foyle? How much more shall Christ who createth all power, call over this 900 league Ocean at his pleasure, such instruments as he thinks meete to make use of in this place. . . . . Know this is the place where the Lord will create a new Heaven, and a new Earth in new Churches, and a new Common-wealth together.—CAPTAIN EDWARD JOHNSON, *A History of New England, or Wonder-working Providence of Sions Saviour* (London, 1654).

The Yankee might possibly have been infected with megalomania even without his halo. Even without the idea that he was erecting a holy city on earth he might have regarded himself as peculiarly favored of fortune for a peculiarly significant destiny. But it must be evident to anyone who knows the following story that the idea of the holy commonwealth is at least in large part responsible for the distorted view which the Puritans had of what they were doing, as well as for the conceited picture which Americans still see when they think of their cosmic significance. On the other hand, it must also be evident that a genuine halo, such as this one, cannot be constructed of sheer conceit. There was just enough substantial fact underneath the idea to make it appear reasonable. Halos are seldom constructed to serve as such; they originate as real shelters, which, having lost their practical value, are enshrined rather than destroyed. On a genuine saint the halo is a natural

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growth, not an ecclesiastical appendage. The militant saints of New England came by theirs naturally, as follows.

The events which were taking place in Europe and which led to the founding of the American colonies were of too great a magnitude not to arouse the philosophic imaginations of those who participated in them, provided they had any imagination at all. There were those, of course, who broke loose from all their civilized ties, embarked on a perilous ocean, disembarked in a "howling wilderness," established themselves there, experienced a thousand dangers, joys, discoveries, and disappointments without giving the whole process a thought. Many were too bewildered to think, and more were too excited to reflect. But there were some whose imaginations were kindled and for whom all these events fitted neatly into an outline of history. Among these men the clergy were pre-eminent, for in those days it was the clergy who were the professional outliners of history, and the revealers of what in our day is called "the grand strategy of evolution," but what in theirs was called "the economy of human redemption."

History always has been one of the primary playgrounds of the philosophic imagination, and the interest in it has always been primarily pragmatic. Even today, when there is a small class of scientific historians who approach history as other natural scientists approach their subject matters, and who have succeeded in illuminating historic events by discovering their natural causes, the general interest in their discoveries is philosophic. We still seek meanings in history and pretend to be able to discern its outline and the various stages of its evolution. Accordingly the art of prophecy is still a profitable and respectable profession. Today it is the school teacher, the novelist, the editor of "home libraries," the playwright, and the popular lecturer on sundry things in which he is not versed who are shaping our conception of the general scheme of human life. But at the time of the founding of New England the clergy had almost a complete monopoly of this field.

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The old Puritans had a quaint custom of making history six days a week and assembling on the seventh to hear the minister interpret it. Apart from these institutional differences between the Puritans and us, the great gulf which separates their minds from ours lies not so much in their habits of thinking as in the body of so-called "facts" out of which thinking proceeds. For us human history begins with the anthropoid apes and is organized about the idea of the gradual development of modern civilization out of the life of primitive man, a process which we sometimes call progress, sometimes merely evolution, and which we believe will continue until human life disappears from this cooling planet. No doubt there is more myth and imagination in this picture of history than we are conscious of; future generations will soon be entertained by it, regarding it as another of those pretty myths and epics on which the human mind feeds. On the whole, however, it is constructed out of the facts and records of experience in so far as these have been discovered to us. But the so-called facts and records which were available in the seventeenth century were radically different, and the resultant picture of history was also radically different. Its main outlines were derived from Jewish folklore and Hellenic mysticism, the former of which was mistaken for history, and the latter for science. According to it history began in the mind of God, its structure was essentially moral and dramatic, being the familiar story of the revolt of subjects against their king. The final act, or, as they called it, the "last period," was already far spent. Soon history would give place to final judgment and eternal perfection; the villains would be eternally damned, and the heroes eternally united to God, their author and end. Thus to all eternity this epic of God's glory would be recited and admired by God and by all rational creatures who could appreciate dramatic beauty and moral justice.

The general course of this process had been described by St. Augustine in his *City of God*, but much work still remained

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to be done on details. St. Augustine had identified the "City of God" with the whole body of saints, visible and invisible, under Christ, their heavenly king; this body of saints was easily identified with the church of Christ; this church, in so far as it was embodied on earth, soon came to be identified with the "holy catholic church," and the holy catholic church with the Roman Catholic church. As long as the Roman church and empire were working together and as long as their chief task was one of subjecting and civilizing barbarians, this interpretation of history was quite adequate and plausible. Church and empire were not unnaturally regarded as struggling for the redemption of man against the "prince of darkness" and his subjects, the sundry heathen whom he kept benighted. But as the struggle changed and as the rivalry between the church and the kings of the newly forming nations became more open and bitter, the church was forced to fight, not heathen hordes, but powerful princes who called themselves Christian. At this crisis the Apocalypse of St. John came to the rescue with its prophecy of the Antichrist. At last the Antichrist had appeared! To the subjects of the pope the king was Antichrist, and naturally to the subjects of the king, the pope was Antichrist. However, the Protestant princes were quite willing to accept the theory that the Antichrist resided at Rome, and though they did not hesitate to claim the divine right to rule which ever since the fall of the Empire the pope had regarded as his exclusive office, nevertheless they lacked the temerity to proclaim their own kingdoms to be "the City of God." It is true Hobbes's "Leviathan" almost deified the secular state, but Hobbes's prime concern was to put the state on a purely secular basis. Hobbes was in effect undermining the whole scheme of the city of God, and though he protested against being styled an atheist, he was naturally feared as such since neither Protestants nor Catholics were ready to accept a theory of the state which was merely temporal or secular, and which left out of account the fundamental

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plot of human redemption. Few objected to his absolutism, but all to his secularism. Richard Baxter, for example, wrote:

> That *Hobbs* his Leviathan, or way of absolute Impious Monarchy, tendeth not to secure us of a Righteous Government, is a point that needeth no proof with any reasonable man; were it but because the irreligious Author pretendeth not to any such thing as the securing a succession of the Christian Religion, without which a Righteous Government is not to be expected.

In this both papist and Protestant agreed, and precisely because they agreed in theory and differed merely in practical application, they were reduced to such *ad hominem* arguments as "Antichrist," "whore of Babylon," and similar mutual vituperation. Theoretically the same is true of the conflict between the Anglicans and the Puritans. Both believed that the state should be maintained in the interest of the city of God, or the church; but in practice they could not agree on what constituted the true church. However, on the part of the Anglicans this was the merest theory. An English gentleman always has a saving sense of humor and a practical ability to compromise. He knew and privately admitted that the English monarchy was not the city of God and never would be. He knew that both the British state and the Anglican church were in fact secular in origin and aim. He accepted the established church so long as it was merely an establishment of the state. He gladly celebrated the supernatural religious mysteries, for as such they did not interfere with his secular strivings. In short, he was a pious man of the world. Both the Lords Spiritual and the Lords Temporal, though professedly citizens of two distinct "cities," were really just English lords and acted accordingly. This balance of worldly wisdom and spiritual hypocrisy, which is largely responsible for the charm of English society and the prosperity of the English nation, was temporarily upset by the Puritans, though they themselves soon recovered it when they became comfortably established in New England. In Old England these aggressive

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middle-class favorites of God, being both socially and intellectually *nouveaux riches,* lost their traditional balance and sense of humor, and ventured to hope that England might soon become the "City of God." Richard Baxter, one of the boldest of them all, at last took this final step in Protestant philosophy of history and argued that even the British Commonwealth should be turned into a "Holy Commonwealth," and in general that the civil state should be identical with the church, the visible "City of God."

All this was obviously fantastic in England. The British Commonwealth was after all British, not "holy," even under Cromwell; and no one but an English roundhead could ever have hoped to turn it into a city of God. Even Baxter discovered his folly before he had finished the book.

Thus ended the holy commonwealth in England. But in New England the case was quite different. What was sheer fantasy in England appeared to be a practical and literal reality in New England, for here the clergy were as a matter of fact the "first citizens" and leading spirits; here the social and political life centered about the various settlements and the settlements were organized into congregations. The magistrates were usually little more than sheriffs in the hands of the clergy. There was a fair unanimity, at least in the first few decades, on fundamental religious and moral matters. The Puritan ideal, as Baxter described it, was in New England more than an ideal; it was the professed rule of practice. In fact, while Baxter was writing his treatise in England, Rev. John Eliot, in Roxbury, Massachusetts, was writing his *Christian Commonwealth, or the Civil Policy of the Rising Kingdom of Jesus Christ,* which was the most radical of all. He advocated a system of unified administration modeled on the "scriptural" system of the ancient Israelites, under God the supreme King. The details of his scheme of government were obviously impractical, and even had the Restoration not caused him, at the order of the General Court of Massachu-

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setts, to suppress his book because he had said harsh words about all earthly kings, it would scarcely have become the practical guide that Baxter was. Nevertheless his general theory was quite acceptable and represented the direction in which Puritan thought was moving.

The appeal to biblical authority was a consequence rather than a cause of these events. To be sure, the Puritans were in the habit of calling their convictions biblical, just as we call ours scientific, but this was little more than an official sanction or divine rubber-stamp. The Bible, no less than "science," is sufficiently flexible to sanction whatever it is supposed to sanction. The Puritans, searching the Scriptures for texts relevant to their own particular needs, soon discovered the general similarity between themselves and the ancient Israelites. The Lord had obviously chosen them as he had the children of Israel to carry out his plans for the redemption of the world. They had been driven from their homes into a "wilderness," not out of punishment, but for the sake of building a promised land. The chief difference between them and the ancient Hebrews, as they saw it, was that they were called upon to make a promised land out of the very wilderness itself. It would be difficult to understand how a tradition as foreign as the Hebraic account of history could be so firmly implanted on American soil, had it not posessed an initial relevancy and moral vitality. The Puritans' constant preoccupation with the Old Testament and the Mosaic law was not merely a consequence of their belief in the authority of the sacred Scriptures; it was rather the natural turning for comfort and counsel to a people who seemed to have undergone a similar experience. They turned to Jewish law, as they did to their English common law, as a recognized authoritative basis and precedent for their own institutions, preference being usually given to the Mosaic code where it was at all workable, since it was constructed on a theocratic basis and adapted to the "wilderness." In fact, it is only the remoteness in time and space of the ancient Israel-

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ites and their social order that is responsible for the fact that Puritan law was not more Jewish and less English than it actually turned out to be. But even when their actual laws were quite thoroughly English the sanction which attached to them was frequently that of the law of the Lord together with the confidence and awe which that law inspired. Not only their laws but all their institutions were thus given a sanctity which only a biblical commonwealth could command, and there prevailed a general confidence in the success of their adventure which a less supernatural philosophy could hardly have engendered. The belief in their divine election for a great work soon ceased to be a mere faith and came to be regarded as an empirical fact. Accordingly, when Baxter's treatise was imported into New England it was immediately recognized as a complete exposition of what New England professed to be, and it merely remained for the clergy to expound and celebrate the grand doctrine.

This idea of the holy commonwealth made it easy for the Puritans to bring their philosophy of history up to date. God was evidently merely completing the work which he began in the Reformation. Of the three traditional "offices" of the Savior, Hooker tells us the prophetical office had been established by the early reformers, the priestly office by Luther; it remained for Christ to establish his kingly office, the office which Antichrist had most successfully obstructed.

> These are the times drawing on, wherein prophecies are to attain their performances; and the accomplishment of them is the best Commentary. These are the times, when the knowledge of the Lord shall cover the earth as the waters the sea; These are the times when people shall be fitted for such privileges, fit I say to obtain them, and fit to use them. Now the Lord will write his Laws in their hearts, and put it into their inward parts, and they shall teach no more every man his neighbour, for they shall all know me, from the least of them, to the greatest of them. This being the season, when all the kingdoms of the world, are becoming the Lord's and his Christ's; and to this purpose he is taking to himself his great might, which heretofore he seemed to lay aside.

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This proclamation of the coming of the Kingdom of Christ was in effect a declaration of independence from all earthly authority. Theocracy was, humanly speaking, synonymous with the democracy of the elect; and this democracy, if we may take the foregoing passage from Hooker seriously, was expected to lead soon to a holy anarchy, when men will obey the laws of God written in their hearts and "they will teach no more any man his neighbour." This was the essence of "Christian liberty," the liberty to be subject only to Christ. Samuel Mather, in his *Apology for the Liberties of the Churches in New England,* called it the liberty of the laity. The "Keys of the Kingdom" were in the hands of the members of particular congregations. Hitherto the keys of the kingdom had been passed on, supposedly from Christ to his apostles, from apostles to popes, from popes to prelates, and from prelates to priests. Even in the Protestant churches ministers were ordained *von oben herab,* with much ceremony, and under the pomp and display of a hierarchy of authority. Imagine then the thrill, or even the shudder, which must have passed through those farmers who took part in the sacred office of imposition of hands, which for centuries had been the exclusive privilege of popes and bishops, and which was here performed by a few pioneer farmers. No wonder some looked upon it as a most monstrous sacrilege, and others as an exhibition of the "wonder-working providence in New England." Literally *vox populi* was *vox dei.* Prometheus himself, when he stole Jove's fire, showed no more daring in the face of God than these simple "grave" farmers when they themselves selected and ordained their ministers, "called of God." In fact, the theocracy was, from the point of view of the elect, both in theory and practice an assertion of liberty and democracy. From the point of view of the "unregenerate," of course, this monarchy of God was the most thoroughgoing tyranny imaginable; but with the unregenerate we are not now concerned. For this philosophy was first of all a philosophy of the elect, erected for their own liberty, enlightenment, and consolation, and

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only later became a halo for overawing the unregenerate. Nothing seemed more evident to the minds of the Puritans than that God was actually taking a hand in establishing his kingdom on earth. All this seemed to the Puritan thinkers so obvious that, as Cotton Mather said, " 'tis nothing but Atheism in the hearts of men, that can persuade them otherwise." And they believed in it as a thing of which they were eyewitnesses. In fact, Cotton Mather described the leaders of New England as "actors" in a divine drama. God, they imagined, had elected them from all eternity to play just this rôle, and the assurance of their election and of the dignity and importance of their parts led to such "acting" as has seldom been seen on the stage of history, such exuberance and wholehearted devotion at the first, and then, as their rôle became apparently more tragic, such heroic intensity and strutting pride—surely none but a supernatural explanation can do it justice!

Nor was this philosophy merely a rhetorical device by which the ministers embellished their sermons; it seems to have pervaded the daily actions of common people. The philosophy of God's sovereignty and of divine predestination afforded no small comfort and stimulus to these early settlers. Many an American colony had started under more favorable auspices than those of New England and had suffered collapse. Even an optimistic sociologist would probably have predicted failure for the pilgrims. With little support from the mother-country, and no material resources of their own, they faced a severe climate and a "howling wilderness." How much the consciousness that they were not ultimately responsible, that they were being led by a greater power, had to do with their ultimate success is difficult to tell. It has no doubt been exaggerated by past historians and is probably underestimated by those of today. Certainly it is little short of a miracle of human discipline and energy that in the face of circumstances that would have baffled and ruined most adventurers, these Puritans not only made themselves physically secure, but in addi-

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tion began immediately to lay the foundations of government, education, thought, and literature which, though provincial, yet far outshone the achievements of any other colony and made New England the intellectual leader of the nation. New England, of course, as even New Englanders now admit, turned out to be anything but "holy"; nevertheless it is quite possible that but for the idea of the holy commonwealth, the commonwealth of Massachusetts would not have been established. However that may be, the case of New England is at least a suggested proof that the doctrine that man is not a free agent, that he is merely an actor in a cosmic drama, playing a predetermined rôle, was a more powerful stimulus to extreme effort and a more "moral" force than any doctrine of human freedom could possibly have been. It is really strange, and one of the ironies of history, that William James, with New England all about him, should have believed that the "reserve energies of men" could not be tapped by a deterministic philosophy.

To the champions of the Lord it soon became obvious that the devil had taken notice of the divine importance of New England and had bent all his efforts to its undoing. The early dream that the Kingdom of Christ was finally established in purity and tranquillity soon proved to be false, as New England became merely one more battlefield for the church militant. The Puritans, being an aggressive and militant party, readily, even eagerly, accepted the devil's challenge, and thus the idea of the holy commonwealth gradually changed from a gospel of comfort and encouragement for a poor people in the wilderness to a weapon of oppression in the hands of a fanatic, self-styled aristocracy. Finally the doctrine became a halo, lending a sacred glamor to Yankee prosperity and nourishing the desperate hope among the less prosperous that God may still make America holy.

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FUNDAMENTALS OF A NON-DOGMATIC ETHICS

S. KLYCE

I

ETHICISTS mostly agree that they have not established a verifiable base of ethics, that there is no proved ethical standard, or good end of life. Professor Brogan ironically concludes that every "philosopher refutes all other ethical standards and proves that his chosen standard is indeed the only truth in ethics," and cites seven representative ethicists as giving evidence to that effect.[1] The carefully responsible *Britannica* shows that a mutually destructive deadlock exists between the two great schools of ethicists, between (1) the "hedonists" (individualists, logical atomists, or believers in ultimate discontinuity as the reality or "end"), and (2) "anti-hedonists" (absolutists, idealists or deists, or believers in ultimate continuity or rationality).[2] Then the *Britannica* summarizes the deadlock in about 44,000 words describing notable ethical doctrines. Bertrand Russell, representative of general science, says, "It is a mistake to suppose . . . . that there is such a thing as a scientific ethic . . . . science alone cannot determine the ends of life."[3] Simeon Strunsky, representative journalist, concludes: "Today science . . . . is not in good repute on what we may call its moral side."[4] Wittgenstein, summarizing modern science and philosophy, bluntly concludes that science or mathematics has nothing to do with morals, because ethics cannot be expressed.[5] Professor Barnes,

[1] A. P. Brogan, *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXVI, No. 3 (1926), 263.

[2] *Ency. Brit.* (11th ed.), IX, 809–10.

[3] *New York Times Book Review* (April 22, 1928), p. 21, quoting *Menorah Journal* (April, 1928).

[4] *Ibid.* (January 8, 1928), p. 4.

[5] L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, with Introduction by B. Russell (London and New York, 1922), Propositions 6.42, 6.421.

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speaking for the human sciences, discards ethics in these sweeping words: "Modern physiological chemistry, dynamic psychology, and sociology have proved the free moral agency of human conduct preposterous alike in its assumptions and in its implications."[6] A young woman speaks for herself and her college mates: "I am making no attempt to estimate the moral worth of this generation. Frankly, I should not know how to go about doing so. . . . . I have no wish to pass judgment on its [the younger generation's] moral [sexual] code. To do so . . . . presupposes that one has satisfactorily defined such terms as 'morality' . . . . and such definitions as I have heard are very unsatisfactory."[7] A "college graduate of less than a year's standing" shows sharply, as another lay view, "that a college education seems to upset, rather than to build up, the moral responsibility of our young men and women."[8]

James H. Tufts implicitly agrees that no ethics has been verifiably established, and indicates what he believes will be the true ethics by saying, as the conclusion and sum of his fine *Ethics of Co-operation,* that the "Great Community," the sound coming democracy, "must create as well as prove the ethics of co-operation."[9] The present article establishes one of the infinite possible forms of the verifiable, self-consistent base of ethics. And by using that base, the article shows that sound ethics is indeed the doctrine of democracy as given by Mr. Tufts, and which more recently is being repeatedly set forth in this country by T. V. Smith and others of the "Chicago school."

As we saw before, the dilemma and hitherto inescapable *impasse* in ethics has been the fact that the hedonists or utilitarian school who believed that the world is ethically discontinuous or pluralistic, or a Many, could (by orthodox logic)

[6] Harry E. Barnes, *Current History* (New York, June, 1926), p. 366.

[7] Anne Temple, article in *Forum* (New York, July, 1926).

[8] Harriet Lyon, article in *Independent* (Boston, June 11, 1927).

[9] James H. Tufts, *The Ethics of Co-operation* (Boston, 1918), p. 73.

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show self-contradictions in the views of the anti-hedonists or the idealistic school who believed that the world is continuous or a One—and vice versa. That is obviously the ancient problem of whether the One is true, or whether the Many is real or true (or whether both, although glaringly and admittedly self-contradictory by all orthodox logic, are somehow true—and if so, how). A volume of citations could readily be given showing that the same fundamental problem in logic and epistemology is, as William James somewhere said, observably at the bottom of all doctrines. The physicist Heyl asserts emphatically, in one article, that all creditable scientists hold that the universe is fundamentally discontinuous (a Many).[10] A few months later, in another article, he agrees that the old discontinuous quantum theory is internally self-contradictory, and that physicists are now accepting the continuous Schrödinger (and De Broglie) quantum theory (are accepting a One world).[11] Russell, in his recent orthodoxly able summary of physics, wavers between accepting the (old) quantum theory which "involves discontinuity" (a Many universe), and the remainder of Einstein's relativity, "the whole effect" of which "has been to emphasize continuity" (a One universe).[12] Masson-Oursel throughout shows that philosophy "exhausts all its efforts on this single yet two-sided problem [One-Many]."[13]

[10] Paul R. Heyl, article in *Scientific Monthly* (New York, November, 1926).

[11] *Ibid.* (January, 1928).

[12] B. Russell, *The Analysis of Matter* (London and New York, 1927), p. 395. Many instances of Russell's wavering or vagueness about the One-Many occur; see pp. 386–87, 345, 80 (where he says that his events [or Many] are a continuum [or One]), etc. Russell in this volume considers the Schrödinger quantum theory, but does not seem to understand that it is a One theory; nor does Russell (except possibly on p. 395, cited) seem to understand that Einstein's first or "special" theory of relativity is continuous, and his later "general" theory discontinuous, so that current orthodox relativity is self-contradictory—a fundamental failure or dualism pointed out independently in P. W. Bridgman's *The Logic of Modern Physics* (New York, 1927), G. N. Lewis's *Anatomy of Science* (New Haven, 1926), and in my *Sins of Science* (Boston, 1925).

[13] Paul Masson-Oursel, *Comparative Philosophy* (London and New York, 1926), p. 170.

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Koffka, concluding his *Gestalt* psychology,[14] holds correctly, in fundamental agreement with Tufts's sound democracy and with this article, that in psychology both behavioristic or "separate elements" (Many), and "configurations" or *Gestalten* (continuity in a certain aspect), somehow exist.

But without showing that recently other notable writers explicitly deal with the One-Many problem under several of its numerous names,[15] I shall consider the logical solution of the One-Many, and then the epistemology, reality, or verifiably experienced facts to which that logic or verbal instrument "points," or upon which it is based, or which it "means."

It can be noted in the volumes already cited that there exists in learned literature probably over a thousand sets of terms in which the One-Many problem has been tackled—not counting numerous permutations and combinations of those nomenclatures made by commentators and historians. Every theology, and philosophy, and branch of science has invented a new set of names for the One-Many difficulty—a new set of names for its "own" fundamental problems. Therefore, regardless of what set of terms I here use for the One-Many, the chances are greatly against the success of my effort to choose sets directly intelligible and agreeable to the reader. (1) For

[14] Kurt Koffka, *The Growth of the Mind* (London and New York, 1924), p. 356.

[15] Examples are: H. Vaihinger's *The Philosophy of "As If"* (1924), C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards' *The Meaning of Meaning* (1925), J. M. Keynes's *A Treatise on Probability* (1921), Eugenio Rignano's *The Psychology of Reasoning* (1923), M. C. Otto's *Things and Ideals* (1924), Trigant Burrow's *The Social Basis of Consciousness* (1927), J. C. Smuts's *Holism and Evolution* (1926), which seven books more than imply the correct solution of the One-Many; A. N. Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World* (1926), C. Guignebert's *Christianity* (1927), L. Lévy-Bruhl's *How Natives Think* (1926), P. Radin's *Primitive Man as Philosopher* (1927), C. E. Ayres's almost wholly destructive *Science the False Messiah* (1927). I must cut short this list at about a quarter of late books of this sort I happen to have read collaterally in the past few months. Such an inadequate list is included simply to show that *mankind is definitely at the conscious beginning of a positive (1) logic and (2) knowledge,* and that investigators on all sides are independently working out both, or else destroying the old pseudo logic and the conclusions stated in terms of it.

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the One-Many problem is actually basic and all-important in the whole life of every reader; and if I fail to use the terms he is accustomed to, and hence understands (and therefore likes) best, the reader almost unavoidably will emotionally feel that I am a foreigner, a barbaric intruder, a trivial and crudely incompetent bungler with those all-important and most affecting matters. (2) Indeed, the very fact that I shall give a sharp, positive, usable solution of the problem will make the reader's own private set of terms definitely conscious to himself; and that very consciousness, where before there largely existed indefinite or mystic or One views (which are commonly and correctly named emotions), will in some degree be mentally painful to him. This is not the place in which to prove that the reader is rational and of sound character in feeling just that way—that it is to the final advantage of us all that we should always be pained when knowledge passes from indefinite emotions into sharp consciousness or intellectuality or logicalness. But let me ask the reader to remember that I intend no offense by my unavoidably barbaric terms, and no offense by offering him a newly conscious fact.

II

We may first notice the logical solution in Mr. Tufts's ethical terms as being perhaps the least painful in this place. As cited,[16] his *Ethics of Co-operation* sums up by holding that in some not definitely stated way the Great Community, or moral or democratic society, is made of co-operating individuals. Let us express that conclusion in the sharp verbal form invented by mathematicians: *Co-operating Individuals=The Great Community;* or, *Function(Individuals)=Society;* or, *Related-Individuals=Society.* Obviously, as the sum of his book, which he expresses in several different verbal forms (and which I have just put into an even sharper verbal form, named "mathematical"), Mr. Tufts says that there *is* some

[16] James H. Tufts, *loc. cit.*

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sort of whole, or sum-total, or One; it is an ethical ideal or standard—the Great Community. He also, with equal obviousness, verbally asserts the existence of parts of that whole: asserts the existence of individuals, or the Many. Plainly, if there *is* a whole, or a unit named "society," then it is self-contradictory, absurd, irrational to say bluntly that the whole *is-are* parts, or many individuals. Even grammar falls down, forcing upon us the absurdity *is-are* when that self-contradiction is exhibited so bluntly. But it is to be further observed, what no orthodox logician does *definitely* observe, that Mr. Tufts did not bluntly oppose whole and parts. He emphatically and persistently said he was talking of *related* parts, or of functioning or co-operating parts; i.e., he said that somehow, as being an existence of some sort, there *is* a relationship between the parts or Many (and that, as ethics or final truth, we "ought to" note and use it). Obviously, *relationship* also contradicts *parts:* parts that are related or joined are not really "parts." "Relationship" is a second contradiction always used in intelligible, sound, and everyday discourse or "logic." And again, as an obvious or verifiable fact, the *two* contradictions (parts-whole; related-parts) cancel each other, just as a double negative cancels itself. Or, really-related-individuals *is* a whole.

It obviously follows, from that brief solution of the problem, that all of ethics or morality is simply observable fact: that there is observable a connection, morality, natural law, between the Many or individuals, making them into a whole, or One, or perfect ideal (called by some, God). If and when any individual, in his aspect as a part, fails to observe this morality, law, or ultimate real extension of himself into being the perfect One, then he simply damages or limits or "hurts" himself with respect to his possible life or complete extension. In that obvious and simple way both the hedonists and the anti-hedonists are correct: they both, by neglecting relationship, merely fail to be fully clear.

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So this solution merely makes the reader *conscious* of relationship—meaning conscious of it both logically (as a third sort of *word*), and epistemologically or ontologically (as a *fact*). Orthodoxly, relationship is not conscious, and is therefore often honestly asserted to be "metaphysical," or supernatural, or not "really" existing, and hence to be "dogmatic" (meaning unproved and unprovable). As I mentioned before, that step, to a conscious grasp of relationship, is painful to the man making it. I have observed a number of renowned thinkers fail in their effort to take the step. Because of reasons given below, for them openly and explicitly to use relationship would seem to them like shouting their most sacred feelings and ideals from the housetops—and they cannot make themselves do it, even when intellectually they see the soundness, and the acute need, of such logical completeness and positiveness. It will become evident that such a failure is a credit to the sensitiveness of those scholars, but not to their intellectual vigor and logical integrity.

III

Democracy is unfashionable today in some intellectual circles. So the set of democratic terms used before, *Co-operating individuals=Social whole,* may be offensive to some readers. Even worse, those terms have been so much fought over as to become damaged or vague and uncertain to most men. So I shall repeat the same general base in the most precise and intelligible words I have yet been able to find. And fortunately these terms seem to be the least painful to well-read men.

We begin with logic. It is an observable (i.e., non-dogmatic) truth that language exists (as will be shown epistemologically later). It is a further observable fact, readily verifiable by looking at any intelligible discourse, that there are three logical sorts of words in the *minimum positive* language.[17] (1)

[17] John Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic* (Chicago, 1916), pp. 8–10, says he accepts this logic—and that if writing a new book on logic would use it explicitly.

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There are words (mimetic, graphic, or phonetic symbols or gestures) like *whole, universe, energy, all* (negative form: *zero*), *God* (the Father), *ethics* (meaning a consistent, or unified, aggregate of fact), which name the One, or meaning, or the situation, and which may be called One words. (2) There are words like *part, this* (negative form: *that,* or *not-this,* or, mathematically, *minus-this*), *individual, God* (a Son), *morals* (meaning individual acts), *atom, body, mass, electron,* which words assert and name a Many or pluralism, and which may be called Many words. (3) There are words like *relationship, cause-and-effect,* (negative form: *effect-cause*), *force, love* (negative form: *hate* or *evil*), *red, strong, belief, co-operation, being, is,* all verbs, *equals,* =, +, ×, :, ;, *of, by, life, evolution, true, logic, action-reaction, number, measure, value, God* (the Spirit), *ethics* or *morality* (in the sense of a relationship between acts), which words name relationship, and may be called relationship words.[18]

It next is obvious that Many words contradict or deny One words, and vice versa. But it is equally observable that relationship words contradict Many words, and vice versa. So in the everyday intelligible language we do in fact use, there is a double, self-canceling contradiction; hence our ordinary language, intuitively invented by common-sense men ages ago, is

[18] As mentioned, this three-form, or what may be called *trinity,* logic, is the minimum positive language. A dualism, or language acknowledging only the One and the Many, is not a positive language, i.e., it is self-contradictory, or destroys itself. Such an alleged dualistic "language" is intelligible only in so far as it in practice (but technically surreptitiously) introduces the third sort, relationship. My two books, *Universe,* with Introductions by David Starr Jordan, John Dewey, Morris Llewellyn Cooke (published by myself, 1921), and *Sins of Science* (Boston, 1925), show that there may be an unending number of sound logics of 5, 7, 9 . . . . sorts of words. E.g., if we wish, *time* and *space* may be considered a typical pair of additional logical forms—so that language explicitly using time *and* space is a fivefold logic, with two sets (instead of the minimum one set) of double, self-canceling contradictions. Or, *time-space* may simply be regarded as one of the numerous names given to relationship in the trinity logic. For such technical possibilities of language or mathematics the reader must be referred to my books. Those possibilities of logic have but little practical interest for ethicists today, but may be important in the future.

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a rigorous logic. That language may be generalized as follows (i.e., every intelligible sentence means, and often explicitly takes, the following general form): *The related-Many=The One.*

Three important corollaries are at once obvious: (1) As the related Many is identically the same as the One, and we *say* so, then in sound, explicit logic we say everything twice. Or, the rigorous *logical* proof of anything is to reduce the statement of it to explicit self-repetition or tautology: one assertion of it in the One form, and one in the related-Many form. Such an explicit tautology is obviously what is commonly meant by *truism:* anything that is made explicitly truistic has been logically "proved." Therefore, *in general, the only logical error is to confuse one sort of word with another sort*—because that destroys the truism in *Related-Many= The One*—this rule of course including the error of repudiating any sort of word as not existing, or ignoring its use. (2) Obviously, such truism or tautology or proved logic is circular reasoning. Statements of anything glaringly always do, and truistically must, stay in the "circle" or unit or whole of the One; the very fact that the statements do thus stay in the circle or meaning of the One *is* the verbal proof, and the *only logical* proof possible or conceivable. (3) But it is obvious that in numerous statements we neither name nor mean a whole or One which is ultimate, or is the *complete* universe or God. In this example of such a statement, *These co-operating-men=A Nation,* plainly *Co-operating-men* are only some *quantitative* portion of the *total* Many; and in consistency with that quantitative fact, *Nation* is not the whole One, but only a quantitative portion. *Nation* is what we may call a formal One, or the relativitists' "event," or what Kant was trying to say intelligibly when he vaguely said "thing-in-itself," or is any mathematical "limit" or set or aggregate or logical class except infinity and zero (which are whole Ones—zero the negative form), or is the psychologists' experience or pattern or *Ges-*

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talt, the engineers' machine, the ethicists' moral rule or ethical standard, or is a verbal or nominal or logical One, or a *standard* One. (I have never heard, or been able to invent, a satisfactory name for a standard One: logicians, I think, will be greatly indebted to the reader who can find a good name for this now quite conscious logical entity.) These standard-One statements are obviously logically rigorous or true and complete or "proved," are rigorously truistic or non-self-contradictory. But quantitatively or factually they refer to only a portion of the whole, and hence (because that portion is obviously in a continuum of action-reaction with the remaining quantity of the whole One) such standard-One statements are inexact or quantitatively incomplete. Or, in a *quantitative sense,* these logically or *qualitatively* sound standard-One statements are the objectionable "vicious circles"; i.e., the statement *Co-operating-men=Nation* involves some degree of quantitative incompleteness or error-in-the-sense-of-*inexactness,* because of the obvious fact that the quantitative remainder of the universe is always somewhat modifying *Nation;* but that standard-One statement is logically rigorous and complete—is intelligible, rational, or has a "meaning," in the essential or One sense. Therefore, no statement, except one about the *total* universe, can be *exact.* Or, *there can be no exact science*—which conclusion is equivalent to the observed physics fact that mass varies with velocity; and as all masses are in varying motion, then during any finite interval of time there truistically is no such thing as an exact body. Thus, our logic and physics ultimately coincide, circularly and essentially proving both.

Epistemology (in the sense of knowledge of existing or factual things—which knowledge, or ontological epistemology, is the "grounds" underlying the foregoing logic)—ontological epistemology is much simpler than logic, and may be stated in a brief sentence: We observe, experience, *know* the

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existing universe.[19] That observable or ontological base is the sum of all "real" or factual proof, is not mere verbal truisms, or logical proof.

But authorities usually take epistemology as meaning not only (1) the foregoing factual and absolute grounds, or the ontology, of "knowledge," but also (2) the method or forms (the logic or truism) of knowledge. This second or formal "half" of epistemology (if it be called "epistemology" rather than logic) is obviously this: if we talk about, or use words about, the existing universe, then we use words to point to or talk about it. That formal "half" is obviously a truism, an *if*-p, *then*-p; is the "as if" at the bottom of all language (Vaihinger, Ogden); it is not a "necessity," or not absolute, or not a fact, but an agreement, or an invented or formulated "form" or way of talking which, if it is to avoid being meaningless, of course must be truistic or circular (never going "outside"—never meaning other than—the "grounds" or absolute *facts*). And obviously, the direct or "simple" agreement is to agree to a logic in which each of the three sorts of words (or 5, 7, 9

[19] For experimental proof that we do see a whole, or *a* universe, see Jean Piaget, *The Language and Thought of the Child* (London and New York, 1926), Koffka *(op. cit.)*, etc.; or note Newton's well-known but anti-"Newtonian" view that action at a distance (i.e., across a real break—across "nothing"—or action with no relationship) is inconceivable; or note the fact that present physics, including the new quantum theory, asserts electrical "fields" (a continuous relating structure or existing relationship between all "electrons," etc.); or see both my books (especially *Universe*, §98), which show in detail that the universe is a continuous structure. But, if someone holds that he sees or observes or knows nothing—not even himself, say—then it is an obvious truism that he observes or knows not even a single word: hence, in that case, as another plain truism, he cannot use any words, and can neither know nor express any denial of this basic epistemology. I.e., it is absolutely impossible consistently to assert agnosticism, assert that we know we know nothing (as that very assertion says we know that general fact). The last two sentences constitute a rigorous statement of epistemology in the negative form (a more detailed positive statement of epistemology is given later in the text). E.g., the skeptic knows at least this (*says* he does, while the agnostic fancies he says he knows nothing): *I myself = Doubted-facts*, which is merely another, a solipsic, form of *One = Related-Many*, and is wholly right—provided, of course, that solipsism, or so much *verbal* emphasis upon our ultimate Godhood or absoluteness, appeals to our emotional tastes (i.e., habits).

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. . . . sorts[20]) points to reality or "truth," when and as that sort is used (it of course being taken that it is used with logical consistency, or "intelligibly"). I.e., if and when we point to, or name, the universe as a One, then truistically (1) our One words or names are "true," or mean an essential reality. And if and when we name the universe as a related-Many, then truistically (2) the Many words are true, and also (3) the relationship words are true, or point to the reality which is the relating continuum between whatever we assert or name as being the Many things. Scientific proof that such relationship does exist, in physics, in psychology, etc., has already been cited.[21]

That is a definitely non-dogmatic or non-metaphysical (i.e., non-assumptive or non-postulational and non-dualistic), or non-"trancendental" (or non-mystic, if "mystic" be defined ontologically as meaning transcendental or not factually existing), or is a positively verifiable or "scientific" logic-and-epistemology, or general basic truth, which is at the same time absolute or *known*. It is neither a "faith," nor the modern logical synonym of faith, an agnosticism.

As mentioned too briefly before, the simple, *un*sophisticated, common, everyday way of using words is to have each sort of word be true or mean reality when and as it is used. But whenever a man starts to search for, to become conscious of, knowledge, and then to express it clearly, certain characteristics of his mental habits and temperament make him tend to emphasize some one sort of words as giving him (at least) "reality" or conscious truth. (1) If he innately, or (mostly perhaps) by acquired habit, finds it easier to see the "objective" world, he tends to consider the Many as "real"—and laymen call him a practical or hard-headed man, a common-sense man, a realist, or a scientist. (2) If our sophisticated man tends to see the One as reality, to see primarily the con-

[20] See footnote 18, above.

[21] See footnotes 15 and 19, above.

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tinuity or Oneness of his own consciousness (as all children, according to Piaget's observations,[22] do in early years), he is in lay terms a poet, an idealist, a mystic, a dreamer, seer, saint, a religionist or theologian, who emphasizes the One or God as true or real. (3) If he tends to see relationship most easily as the reality (as do the mentally either more vigorous, or the more introverted or weak,[23] men of the race), then he is in lay terms a philosopher, a more intense or marked variety of idealist or theorist, a "thinker," a mathematician, or an ethicist. This third, philosopher type has heretofore found it difficult to convince the other two types of the explicit existence of relationship. So the philosopher and ethicist, because of the age-long scoffing of other men and perhaps even more because he feels ashamed of his own failure to prove the existence of relationship, tends to keep private (even to force pathologically into his "subconscious") his belief in the primary reality or "importance" of relationship, and then tends more or less verbally to emphasize either (1) the Many (that verbal emphasis making him what is nowadays technically called a realist, naturalist, behaviorist, pragmatist, neo-realist, mathematician, etc.), or else (2) the One (technically the idealist, deist, monist of various species, but perhaps not all species, metaphysician, etc.); or (3) both (making him a dualist, or scholastic, etc., highly unfashionable today). Obviously, that practical suppression of his real belief, because he is afraid he cannot prove its truth, causes the philosopher to be internally in conflict (dualistic) with himself, and to be often obscure (confused) in his language. Obviously, Vaihinger and his followers correctly discard that conflict as a verbal "fiction"; and Driesch and his even more numerous but not quite self-conscious followers do the same thing in a variety of verbal ways.

[22] See footnote 19, above.

[23] Cf. E. R. Guthrie, article in *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (1927).

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Because logic or language is an agreement or is "arbitrary" (there is nothing "arbitrary" about its ontological base), it is quite possible for us to have those three varieties of logic, and to make each sound. I am not accusing any one of the three types of students of being "wrong." If any type wishes to use a logic with his sort of reality he can soundly do so simply by being explicit about what he is calling "real," *and* by then stating his second, formal "half" of epistemology in consistent verbal terms of that particular-reality logic (that being possible because such formal epistemology does not touch actual facts, or the first, ontological "half" of epistemology). To formulate and use such a particular-reality logic is a bit difficult (as I discovered by writing *Universe* with the One only as "real," even though I personally see the Many most easily). It is easier to use our everyday language, with three verbal realities (as I found by writing *Sins of Science* in that "common" way, although in this everyday language it becomes somewhat difficult to be explicit about the principles of logic, the usually hidden skeleton of daily talk). But it requires considerable work (practice and effort) to drop definitely old mental habits as to "reality."

Thus, science may be said to deal (primarily) with the Many; philosophy and mathematics, with relationship; religion and poetry, with the One; and regardless of which verbal term we may say (as a form or logic) is "real," all intelligible statements are a combination of the three terms: *The related-Many=The One*. The fully sophisticated man consciously takes all three terms as ontologically true, just as the common or common-sense man intuitively does.

IV

We may use our foundations in solving a few general ethical problems. The question of what is "good" (involving what is "evil"?) is perhaps the most insistent and plainly comprehensive. It is now immediately obvious that, in the

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One sense, "good" is grasp or consciousness of the One; for, as there is nothing but the One, if it is not good, then truistically absolutely no good exists. If in dealing with any Many thing (person or "thing"), we consciously see that it is acting-reacting with all the rest of the universe, including ourselves, we by that activity or experience not only deal rationally or successfully with that thing, but we further, as a mere truism, have consciously expanded into all Being, or infinite perfection. We *are* the Good, and feel so or "enjoy" it, when and as we are successful or happy in our dealing with that "immediate" Many thing. There truistically is nothing other than, or outside of, the universe to limit us, or for us to be afraid of, or be ignorant of. So evil (in this absolute sense) is not any actually existing thing: it is merely a negative word for the One. E.g., the word *infinity* names the One; we use the negative word *zero* simply to say, "let us no longer name and discuss the One; let us quit talking about the One." *Evil* (in a One sense) is similarly a negative word, meaning "nothing": it is absolute ignorance, and cannot consistently exist. Next, "evil" in a Many sense is obviously simply a way of saying that truistically always at some time-space short of the total universe our definite consciousness stops or fails; i.e., evil in the Many sense is simply quantitative inexactness or inaccuracy, a matter sometimes of great practical importance, and sometimes negligible, but never "wrong" or absolutely evil, as we now see in terms of "value."

Direct problems in ethics are the practical or Many questions. Those questions in recent centuries have become greatly confused, chiefly because the word *value* has been used as a One word, and also as a relationship word, and also as a Many word (meaning a Many good, such as a good meal), without conscious distinction; e.g., that confusion occurs implicitly in Kant's famous categorical imperative.

Explicitly, God may be logically a One (God the Father), or the opposite logical thing, a Many (God a Son), or a third

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logical thing, relationship (God the Spirit). In consistent, intelligible discourse it is necessary that those different meanings of a given word be discriminated. (That is our general logical rule in another form.) And to repeat, ethics obviously has, without discriminating, sometimes used *value* as the One (or usually, a standard One), to mean an ideal, or unity, or a personal integration (morality, or consistency of character) which is to be attained. But perhaps usually *value* has pointed to relationship, meaning a comparison or measurement of one Many thing with another. And occasionally *value* has meant a Many good thing. Obviously, the same confusion exists in economics, over the words *money, price, interest;* and in sociology, over *sovereignty, contract, democracy.* The same confusion exists in physics, over the word *measurement,* which ordinarily means the relationship or relativity of Many things, a mutual comparison or judgment or "experiment" of them, but which often means a-unit-collection-of-standard-measures, or a One, e.g., 5 yards is a standard One, or a unit of five-standard yardsticks. But in physics a yardstick or other (1) standard One does not perceptibly vary enough in many cases to make any practical difference when its (2) relationship to other things comes to be considered; hence the confusion in physics between (1) One and (2) relationship was not often noticeable. In ethics, however, as soon as we make a measurement or "experiment" of one Many good with a second, and call that second a "standard value" or a One, then the second "good" promptly varies perceptibly. Any ethical yardstick, although a soundly logical standard One, refuses to stay "put" in fact, or ontologically, so well as does a physics yardstick; and the essential characteristic of the whole One, both logically and factually, is that it is eternal, fixed, exact, absolute, constant. Physics got into no appreciable trouble until Michelson and Morley observed that a moving body dragged "ether" along with it in some quantitative degree or, to state that fact intelligibly, physics observed that mass varies with

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velocity, so that truistically there exists no standard-One measure or value that is in *fact* absolute or exact: there is, as a fact, no physics *constant*. It has been simply impossible to progress in ethics until that principle of "measurement," or complete logical and factual or ontological (epistemological) meaning of *value*, had become conscious. Plainly, the complete theory of measurement in ethics—the definite conversion of ethics into a non-dogma or a sound science—is to recognize that value can have three logical meanings which must not be confused, and that value as a standard One can factually never be exact, although logically it may correctly be used as a constant: a verbal "marker," a counter, or measure. After that, the practice or application of standard values ("measurement ') in ethics requires (1) that ethicists mutually agree as to what is a convenient standard unit of good or value; (2) that they agree on various secondary standards by which to check or compare the variation of the primary value; (3) (extremely difficult) that they acquire skill and technical methods for making those comparisons; and (4) that ethicists keep on forever maintaining a check on the standard, and using it in measuring forever varying, changing Many goods, as they appear in the forever changing environment. In short, there never is any end, or quantitative, factual, Many perfection or exactness in a sound science. But qualitative or logical perfection, or soundness in principles or in One or general or "essential" conclusions, is easy.

All the remainder of ethics consists simply of taking a really conscious look at the various terms and what they point to, thus learning qualitatively or in principle directly what they mean. Three examples will illustrate: (1) The problem of responsibility or of freedom of the will is solved by noting that a man in the ultimate sense is the total universe, and that in this essential sense nothing else exists to "determine" him. So in a One or qualitative sense, the will is free, and each man is absolutely responsible. In principle, moral responsibility

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does exist. But in the Many sense, each individual acts-reacts or co-operates with all other Many things, and his will is thus quantitatively not free. But, as in a One sense a moral (i.e., actually consciously existing) man wants (i.e., truistically or absolutely means) to co-operate, or have duties, or be bound in that Many sense, it follows that if any man fails to feel free, does not want to be democratic, and hence feels fettered by his milieu, then as a mere truism there is in his mentality some serious failure to see the universe (including himself) as it is. Possibly he may be able to achieve the "escape" or "freedom" he sighs for by educating himself out of his Many ignorance or evil, but, as an obvious truism, not otherwise. (2) Similarly, in a One sense all men *are* equal; each man is the One, inclusive of all the others; hence as a truism each man is in this complete sense absolutely identical with every other. In a Many sense, no two things are, as a fact, equal for any finite time, as each is always changing differently from the others as a result of being acted upon by a different environment. (3) Similarly, in a One sense each man is immortal; he is consciously so, now, if he has a healthy mind and body. Each man in principle *is* the universe or God and, as such, infinite in every way, without beginning or end—all that being mere truism of the observed existence of the universe or a continuum. But in a Many sense, his individual mind and body, or "personal" soul, is not immortal: it is a Many thing in the Many sense; and as a truism, a Many thing is not infinite or immortal or One. As a plain, simple Many fact, a man's personal consciousness or soul becomes imperceptible to him, or in this actually personal sense ceases to exist, every time he goes soundly to sleep; so almost daily, in a Many sense, it is observably not immortal.

V

Thus the ethical or good life is simple and readily discoverable. By observing the facts, we do ("ought to") consciously experience ourselves as the infinite One, or God. That is

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ethics in the religious or One aspect—anti-hedonism. In order to do that, and when and if we in practice do it, we notice that as individuals we do ("ought to") keep in dynamic action-reaction, or balance, or temperate activity, with other individuals (men and things), thus allowing them to keep in temperate (i.e., readily supportable) balance with us. That is ethics in the scientific, deterministic, or Many aspect—hedonism, or utilitarianism.

By orthodox logic-epistemology (i.e., by formal and admitted dualism, or by any of the vague philosophical or mathematical suppressions or ignorings of relationships which in practical effect are substantially dualisms), obviously (1) those two aspects of ethics are self-contradictory; (2) and even worse, each is a partial, incomplete, and meaningless view if taken alone. The first paragraph of this article showed that authoritative ethicists admitted that orthodox failure. So the only possible solution of the difficulty is to agree to form and use some variety of the sound non-dogmatic logic and epistemology here outlined.

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CONTEMPORARY OBSERVATION OF AMERICAN FRONTIER POLITICAL ATTITUDES, 1790–1840

PERRY G. MILLER

THE clarity and consistency which formal historians feel compelled to superimpose upon the past is very often attained only at the cost of sacrificing any attempt to recapture the actual tone, the sound and the fury, the flesh and blood reality of the events themselves. In tracing the forms of institutional developments the more intangible ancestry of modern social psychology is sometimes lost sight of, although the immense importance of such considerations in our modern problems ought to be sufficiently obvious. Those who traveled on the American frontier before 1840 could hardly be expected to see much of the forest for the trees, and we only find in their observations such light on the narrative of American political progress as they revealed almost inadvertently. But as commentaries upon the spirit of American life and on American character their records are invaluable, to the sociologist and student of culture, perhaps, more than to the historian himself.

However, in the present case, contemporary witnesses seem remarkably to substantiate the contentions of certain of our historians, and in large part exonerate the "frontier school" from charges of too great an emphasis. As early as 1806 the Scotchman Melish felt as much at home in eastern United States as in Edinburgh, but, he added, significantly enough, "to view American character fairly, we must go into the interior of the country."[1] This conviction throve until, very shortly, no traveler in America could afford to omit a visit to the West, however hazardous the expedition might be. In-

[1] John Melish, *Travels through the United States of America in the Years 1806–11*, p. 48.

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deed, by 1828 Sealfield's book entitled *Americans as They Are* dealt exclusively with the West. Only after Andrew Jackson, the frontiersman, came to power, did the political methods of Philadelphia or New York call out the same shocked indignation that had been characteristic of writings on the West since 1800. These observations are eloquent witnesses to the great rôle played by the frontier in the political history of America, a rôle which the perplexed and sometimes frightened travelers appreciated, and which they set themselves more or less to recording. The majority of them were frankly puzzled, and it is through this perfectly natural but distorting bewilderment that they reflect the political attitudes of the region.

The majority of them were quite competent enough—indeed, it is surprising how competent they really were—to perceive that the more esoteric practices of the West were fundamentally expressions of indigenous psychology, and their evidence as to the nature of the phenomena does not entirely support the usual textbook version. True, there are tributes to its virtues. Levasseur, for instance, wrote with implied admiration for the Kentuckian who, when told that a Napoleon in America would usurp his liberties, complacently pointed to his rifle and said he never missed, and added that everybody in Kentucky was as good a shot as he. But those whose contacts were more intimate did not find it as picturesque. When Tilly Buttrick attempted to walk back from New Orleans to Cincinnati with a crew of boatmen, he found himself unable to keep their pace. They calmly tramped off and left him, absolutely alone, in the midst of the hostile Choctaw country, and when he had at length reached Cincinnati he found one of them lolling on the wharf who said that one by one many of the others had dropped, "some from being lame, and others sick, and what became of them I know not." One's conception of his obligation to his fellow-man was evidently necessarily limited on the frontier, and its far-famed independence had its all too prominent sinister aspect, a rollicking "devil-take-

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the-hindmost" attitude that appears to be the source of a national characteristic in many political connections. Significant in this respect is the observation that when one objected to some imposition the callousness of the westerners may have inflicted upon him, he was met by the conclusive assertion that "this is a free country."[2]

These traits seemed to many the portents of a profound metamorphosis in the fundamental human character of the inhabitants, and of the emergence of a new race, a race singularly obtuse and chaotic, however vigorous. Furthermore, a continuous reading of the travelers discloses a scene which, in its intricate convolutions, its overwhelmingly rapid development, adequately accounts for such psychic disorder. Not only was the frontier a march striding across the country from the mountains to Council Bluffs by 1840, but it was also—and I do not believe this has been so generally appreciated—a solidification, a dotting of the region with scattered settlements which were gradually filled in. There were simultaneous evolutions, inwardly as well as outwardly. Immigration came, generally, in successive waves, the first of which consisted of migratory backwoodsmen and the others of more or less capitalist farmers; but these movements were irregular, and left many oases of earlier elements in the midst of later developments. In 1840 Silk Buckingham still found log cabins being erected between Zanesville and Columbus, Ohio, under pioneer conditions. The quick progress from log cabin to farmhouse or to city, side by side with primitive circumstances, produced a strange panorama of incongruous scenes, where one was continually passing from civilization to savagery, and back again, with all degrees intermediate. It was to such a kaleidoscopic environment that frontier institutions made an inevitably belated adjustment, and it is not strange if, in the process, they were sometimes distended or pulled a little out of joint.

[2] James Flint, *Letters from America, 1818–20*, pp. 108, 168.

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The shock of their first contact with this frontier scene quite prepared the immigrants to give the go-by to much of their traditional culture. W. Faux, whose Tory sense of reality had yielded little to the romantic "cult of the outdoors," accounted the mere physical difficulties of getting there sufficient "to prepare mind and body for barbarizing in a little log-hole, like that in which I dined yesterday, belonging to Mr. Farrel, who, with his family, some adults, male and female, in all ten souls, sleep in one room, fifteen feet by ten, ... in three beds, standing on a dirt floor."[3] Timothy Flint, ardent defender of the frontier though he was, could only reflect as he regarded the Kentuckians—men who claimed to be a compound "of the horse, alligator, and snapping turtle," and who acted on the assumption—that they had been placed "on the extreme limit of order and civilization" and plead for an indulgent judgment.

But it is also apparent from the travel books that this disorganization, however extensive, was partial, that in the great western stream there were bound to loom surviving blocks of hereditary patterns, no matter how inextricably mixed with the flotsam and jetsam of acquired ones. De Tocqueville, as usual, precisely states the case when he writes, "ils y sont venus avec les mœurs, les idées, les besoins de la civilisation. Ils ne donnent à la vie sauvage que ce que l'imperieuse nécessité des choses exige d'eux; de là les plus bizarres contrastes."[4] Here then, is the explanation of the peculiar political formations of the frontier: they were importations, preserved in part, and often in form, but modified or augmented or perverted by innovations dictated by frontier exigencies or character. In so far as this was a stabilizing influence, it was good; the rub came in that the multifarious peoples hailed from almost equally multifarious sources, and so their political

[3] W. Faux, "Memorable Days in America," in Thwaites, *Early Western Travels*, XI, 230.

[4] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Ouvres et correspondance inédite*, I, 182.

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development proceeded from different substrata in more or less distinct directions. The outstanding contrast produced by this process was that between the Kentuckians, with their Virginia background, and their ideal of a "sequestered and isolated condition," and the Ohioans, northern Illinoisans, and Indianans, with theirs from New England, expressing itself "in the strong exercise of social inclination . . . . in habits of neighborhood, to form villages and live in them," and, Timothy Flint says "unfortunately," in "the disposition to dogmatize, to settle not only their own faith but that of their neighbor."[5] Undoubtedly much of the history of the Middle West, down to our own day, is implicit in these early observations.

In economic studies the travelers did the best they could, and what facts they gleaned are eloquent straws proclaiming the way political winds will blow. Bradbury and Micheaux were able to see westerners carrying with them their habits of domestic manufacture; but immediately afterward travelers began to attest the rapid growth of frontier commerce. The West decided to buy its manufactured articles, even if it could only pay for them in barter; it positively loved luxuries. Even before 1812 imported merchandise could be bought in Ohio or in Detroit as good and as cheap as at ports of entry.[6] After the war steamboats and the Erie Canal made this commerce easier, greater, and supremely important. In 1828 Sealsfield remarked that "the northern inhabitants of [Ohio] send their produce down to New York by Lake Erie and the Buffalo canal; the southern find a market in Louisiana," and thus provides one of the first conscious recognitions of the three-cornered political game that was to dominate the ante-bellum period.

[5] Timothy Flint, *Recollections of the Last Ten Years* (1826), p. 25.

[6] Issac Weld, *Travels through the States of North America, 1795–97*, p. 420. Fortesque Cuming, "Sketches of a Tour to the Western Country, 1807–9," in Thwaites, *op. cit.*, IV, 229.

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Concomitant with this activity appear notices of early attempts at manufacturing. Melish found the West, like New England, changed sharply from opposition to encouragement in 1808–10. Pittsburgh and Cincinnati soon became genuine capitals, the latter's exports in 1840 being rated at $10,000,000.

These observations explain, among other things, what support Henry Clay's "American System" obtained in the West, and the atrocious monument erected to that statesman by the citizenry of Wheeling when his pet project, the Cumberland Road, was finished. But other notes tell why the westerners, who would always flock to listen to him, would not vote for him; the West, in spite of its titanic commercial and industrial activity, remained preponderantly agrarian. The great lure of the region was unmistakably in the opportunity it offered to industry and sobriety to gain an independence; the ideal of a man sitting "under his own vine and under his own fig tree, and none to make him afraid"[1] was proclaimed early. Thus from its very inception we find the West in the grip of its peculiar dilemma, opposing within itself a bucolic ideal to that of a lusty and somewhat imperialistic industrialism. The divided mind that has made the Middle West an uncertain quantity in political campaigns was dictated by the original conditions, and caused the travelers as much confusion as it has the politicians.

It was the agrarian segment that obtruded upon the shocked or amused notice of the travelers a series of phenomena we have come to identify as symptoms of the "greenback attitude." Speculation ran riot, and produced perhaps a greater impression than the facts warranted; at any rate Sealsfield seriously declared profits of 500 per cent were not uncommon. Still, money was scarce, "not one in ten are in possession of a single dollar," and most trade was done in barter. The inescapable result was the usual wild-cat banking

[1] Melish, *op. cit.*, p. 515.

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and diversified and depreciated currency. Faux warns the traveler to change United States notes for only as much currency as he will need at one time, and tells him, then, to spend all of it in the same locality. James Flint declared in 1820 that the return of but a very small quantity of paper would compel the majority of banks to suspend specie payment, and he found the West praying that their bubble would hold out a little longer. Panics resulting from this instability were serious, those of 1819 and 1837 finding mournful memorials from the harassed tourists. At such times "all confidence was destroyed by the many evasions of payment, that occurred through the influence of what were called relief laws."[8] Prosperity, however, brought only a reversion to precarious practices; in 1836 Flagg found all Illinois whooping for the "Internal Improvement Policy," a fantastic scheme for constructing some imaginative but utterly superfluous railroads, which within a year cost the state $6,500,000, accomplished nothing, and was later referred to as the "General Insanity Bill."[9] The blank horror with which travelers regarded these carryings-on is probably as significant as the facts themselves, and laid the foundations for that trepidation felt in conservative circles when the latter have confronted the various "unsafe" men whom the West has projected into national life. It is certainly important to notice, though no traveler at the time thought it so, that in the legislature which voted the "General Insanity Bill" sat both Stephen A. Douglas and Abraham Lincoln.

The political theories and practices imported by the West no sooner appeared in their new habitat than modification began. The rampant passions of the frontier found, generally, but two legal outlets, politics and religion; as early as 1805 Cuming found that, as he came down the western slope of the Alleghanies, party hostility became progressively acute and was carried into all aspects of life. Bernhard was assured, in the Kentucky of 1825, that assassinations for political reasons

[8] Timothy Flint, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

[9] Edmund Flagg, "The Far West, 1836–37," in Thwaites, XXVI, 81, 120.

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were far from unknown, and he concluded, sagaciously, that it was "almost as dangerous to speak upon political relations of the state as to converse upon religion in Spain."[10] The reason for this particularly virulent note in the West was pointed out most pertinently by Timothy Flint:

> . . . . The ambitious, fiery, and ungovernable spirits emigrate to obtain consequence, and make their fortune. There is a continual chaos of the political elements, occasioned by this continual addition of new and discordant materials. The new adventurers that arrive have not as yet had their place or their standing assigned them in public opinion. In process of time, this new timber is inwrought into the old political fabric, thus it becomes continually repaired and new moulded. . . . . The newly arrived emigrant makes his way to public favor before his standing and character have been settled by general estimation. A few partisans find it convenient to cry up their friend. . . . . This is the very country and region for this kind of crying up and crying down. . . . . To express a doubt in this case is treason. . . . . At the mouth of the pistol it must be settled.[11]

These circumstances gave western political life a tumultuous character that had been hitherto unknown even in the most hectic of Federalist days. The western love of gregarious celebration made an election a festive affair; as a result elections in the West began and terminated in one day, though for some years in the South the old Virginian custom of a three-day period lingered, southern convivial manners being better adapted to withstand a longer indulgence. The character of western elections then becomes comprehensible as we realize that they were not only expressions of political will, but "blow-outs," safety valves for pent-up emotions. "On such election days whole troops of them ride into the town; the streets are crowded with their horses, which are tied up, and the whiskey shops resound with their tumultuous discussion. Every man gives his vote; disputes arise; and . . . . their excited pas-

[10] Bernhard, Duke of Saxe-Weimar Eisenack, *Travels through North America during the Years 1825–26*, I, 130.

[11] Timothy Flint, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

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sions frequently lead to blows."[12] When Flagg stopped at a farmhouse for breakfast the day after such an affair a still tipsy farmer told him, confidentially, "that he was four hours last night getting home from 'lection." Attended with such éclat, casting a single vote seemed something of an anticlimax, and one is not surprised to hear instances of one man voting three or even six times a day.

Springing from such an electorate, western institutions were naturally considerably disguised behind a maze of turmoil. So many disturbances occurred in the Ohio House of Representatives that in 1840 Buckingham found it familiarly nicknamed "The Bear Garden." When Missouri was admitted to the Union a wild scramble for offices followed:

> . . . . The people in the Western country, from some cause, are far more eager for distinction and for office than at eastward. Electioneering is carried on with more unblushing effrontery. . . . . The legislature convened. . . . . Some of them were neither Solons or Solomons. . . . . Indeed, in the Western country . . . . they believe almost any timber can be worked into the political ship. . . . . Some boys invented a tolerable pasquinade. It was labeled on the plastering around the speaker's chair: "Missouri, forgive them, they know not what they do."[13]

"Almost any timber"—this was the West's great contribution to American politics, as startling in civil matters as it was in military, where the men of the command actually elected their own officers, none of whom owed their elevation to records as disciplinarians. Hodgson had letters for the governor of Mississippi; for two days he sat beside him at the boarding-house table before he realized who he was; Bernhard called on the governor of Ohio and found him in the yard "cutting a wagon pole." After Lafayette's steamboat was wrecked on the Ohio, a party went to salvage what they could, among them the governor of Tennessee; the amazed Frenchmen gaped: "It was a singular sight, and at the same time an interesting

[12] Maximillian, Prince of Wied, "Travels in the Interior of North America, 1832–34," in Thwaites, XXII, 181.

[13] Timothy Flint, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

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one, to see the governor of a state . . . . without stockings, shoes, or hat, performing the work of a sailor." If anyone could do it, and everyone wanted to do it, there was no need for the eighteenth-century tradition of bashfulness; hence it was on the frontier that arose the practice "of individuals publicly tendering their services to the people, pending elections for representatives," which, on second thought, Estwick Evans admitted was better than the "system of intrigue" prevalent in the East. It sometimes had rather ludicrous consequences, entirely typical of the West, and appreciated by the more detached observers. In Arkansas a newspaper entry was copied by Sealsfield, "Mr. White respectfully begs leave to announce himself as candidate for their Representative, etc. N.B.: Tailoring business done in the best manner and at the shortest notice."

In 1828 the campaign methods of the West enabled it to steal a march on the East and put Jackson in the White House. The astute managers of the Whig opposition, unlike the historians, were not long to take the hint, and their opportunity came in 1840. If "Old Hickory" had been cried for Jackson, and "Sourcrout" shouted for Van Buren, "there was no reason why 'log cabins and hard cider' should not be used as a motto for General Harrison." The West, at any rate, knew of none, and responded like a charm. Every town had a log cabin headquarters and a log cabin newspaper. These contained sketches of the General at his log hut door (not in the least concerned that everyone knew he lived in an excellent mansion and drank champagne) and were emblazoned with various words of wisdom that had, from time to time, fallen from his lips, such as:

> Gentlemen, if ever you come to Vincennes you will always find a plate and fork at my table and never find the string of the door latch pulled in. ("General Harrison's Farewell to His Soldiers.")
>
> In all ages, and in all countries, it has been observed that the cultivators of the soil are those who are least willing to part with their rights, and submit themselves to the will of a master.[14]

[14] James Silk Buckingham, *The Eastern and Western States of America*, III, 285, and *passim*.

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The appeal of these statements to the society we have been analyzing was irresistible, and for the first time the character that had been brewing on the frontier arrived at concerted political expression. Ohio meetings declared themselves in favor of a high tariff, sanctioning their support, with characteristic disregard of fact, in the name of Thomas Jefferson! In Zanesville a citizen informed Buckingham, who had the enviable opportunity of being in the West during the campaign, that Ohio had prohibited the issue of any notes for less than five dollars, and therefore a man had to carry change in silver for all under that sum; if such things, he further volunteered, went on, Martin Van Buren would surely become king; so he was for Harrison. In a Cincinnati hotel a quixotic Locofoco announced to space in general that two or three hundred Whigs would be better off dead; later there was a drawn knife, a broken chair, several wounds, and one fractured skull—the Locofoco's. On the last days of May an assemblage gathered on the battle ground of Tippecanoe, thousands from all over the West. They had a glorious time, with plenty of heavy drinking and several good fights. The quantity of hard cider one could consume became, in that year, the measure of one's patriotism; cider presses were sold all over the country, at a profit, and the temperance people became worried. Whig appeals were masterpieces; Buckingham describes a typical placard, in Detroit, which, beneath a woodcut presenting a log cabin in the woods on a winter day, with barrels of hard cider marked "Harrison and Tyler" loaded on a cart nearby, bore the flaming inscription:

Log-Cabin Meeting this Evening
Boys! Do You Hear That?

Glorious news will be communicated. The vocalist, Mr. J. Brown, recently arrived from a Southern tour, will sing several celebrated, bang-up Tippecanoe Songs!—Two or three speakers—First appearance on the stump—"Tip" expects now, as he did in 1813, every man to do his duty.

Rally! Freemen!! Your Country Calls!!!

Exercises will close with a Locofoco speech.

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And when, in the midst of this hubbub, Buckingham called on Harrison himself, he found an imported sculptor there in despair because the old man had not one feature on his simple, smiling face that could be chiseled into abiding stone. "He comes the nearest to a political nonentity of any public man they could find, and there is therefore less to say against him." The Englishman was dismayed, but the student of American politics ought to feel himself as much at home in this frontier campaign as in any of a later date; a group of clever politicians were simply putting on a good show, a fact duly appreciated by a region which was then either frontier itself or had fairly recently been frontier, and, as a historian should see such matters, "fairly recently" is a relative term.

Observations on frontier justice tell the same story as those on frontier politics: traditional institutions being modified in incredible directions by the new environment, being compelled, will they nill they, to suffer sea changes as the frontier tidal wave swept over them. The chief addition seems to have been the vigilance committee. There are innumerable instances of public opinion reversing, in its own right, the decisions of the courts. A man who was coming before a Kentucky judge to be tried for murder met up with the judge himself in a whiskey shop on the way to the trial; the judge drank the man's health and wished him luck. In an Indiana suit the two parties began fisticuffs; the judge, "not averse to this sort of decision, joined with the constable and some other people in forming a ring for the combat." Descriptions of frontier courts, of which the number is legion, agree in their presentation of outraged conventions. I cannot resist giving at length one or two samples:

> The presiding judge and his two associate judges were in their tribunes, and the parties seated on boards laid across the stumps of trees. . . . . The defendant was called upon. The gentleman in question, whom I took for a pedlar, stood close by my side . . . . holding in his hand half an apple, his teeth having taken a firm bite of the other half. At the moment his name was called, he walked with his mouth full, up to the

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rostrum, and kept eating his apple with perfect indifference. "Well!" interrupted the judge, "what have you to say against the charge? You know it is high time to break up the court, and I must go home." The gentleman at the bar now pocketed his apple. . . . . Fortunately the speaker took the judge's hint; in less than half an hour he had done; in less than one hour the jurymen returned a verdict . . . . and the court broke up.[15]

The supreme judge, Wilson, on the bench in the midst of three rustic, dirty-looking associate judges, all robeless and dressed in coarse, drab, domestic homespun coats, dark silk handkerchiefs round their necks, and otherwise not superior in outward appearance to our low fen-farmers in England. Thus they sat, presiding with ease and ability over a bar of plain, talkative lawyers, all robeless, very funny and conversational in their speeches, manners and conduct; dressed in plain box-coats, and sitting with their feet and knees higher than their noses, and pointing obliquely to the bench of judges; thus making their speeches, and examining and cross-examining evidence at a plain long table, with a brown earthen jug of cold water before them, for occasionally wetting their whistles, and working their quid-stained lips; all, judges, jury, counsels, witnesses, and prisoners, seemed free, easy, and happy. The supreme judge is only distinguished from the rest by a shabby, blue, threadbare coat, dirty trousers, and unblackened shoes. Thus sat all their lordships, freely and frequently chewing tobacco, and appearing as uninterested as could be.[16]

The grounds for the usual observer's recoil at such a spectacle is seen in Faux's pained reiteration of "all robeless," and when it is remembered that, theoretically, the law and the practices these courts were attempting to approximate were evolved in an atmosphere where dignitaries decidedly were not "robeless," the conviction that traditional institutions were being pulled out of perspective on the frontier does not seem far amiss. Indeed, like most frontier phenomena, it is probably very pertinent to an understanding of subsequent and continued phenomena in the same realms.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

[15] Sealsfield, *Americans as They Are*, p. 39.

[16] Faux, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

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DISCUSSION

THE REINTERMENT OF HEDONISM

RALPH M. BLAKE

MR. WILD'S paper on "The Resurrection of Hedonism"[1] raises the question of the relation between ethical hedonism and desire for pleasure. With this question, in its general form, my "Why Not Hedonism? A Protest"[2] did not profess to deal. I there contented myself with trying to disengage ethical hedonism from its compromising association with two particular doctrines about desire, insisting that the form of hedonism which I am prepared to advocate neither includes nor implies either (1) the theory that the sole human motive is the desire for pleasure, or (2) the theory that the sole human motive ought to be the desire for pleasure. That I succeeded in accomplishing at least so much Mr. Wild, if I understand him aright, does not deny. His argument is concerned, I take it, with a further point. He insists, namely, (1) that every ethical theory must necessarily imply some doctrine about desires, and (2) that ethical hedonism in the form in which I have stated it necessarily implies certain very objectionable doctrines about desires. Now as to (1) I find myself in agreement with Mr. Wild; but as to (2) I wish to differ. And my point will be this: although the doctrines about desire which Mr. Wild alleges as necessarily implied by my form of hedonism are indeed, as he insists, very objectionable, these doctrines are not really, as he alleges they are, implied by my form of hedonism.

I will begin by commenting upon the first portion of Mr. Wild's argument, with which, as I said, I agree. I do think, as does Mr. Wild, that whatever a moral theorist takes to be ultimately valuable he must also assert to be that which, to use Mr. Wild's phrase, "basically" we ought to desire (p. 12). And I consequently agree with him that "Hedonism is committed to the doctrine that in our rational moments we ought to set up pleasure, or . . . . 'pleasurable consciousness,' as our ultimate goal" (p. 19). Pleasure ought, on the hedonistic view, to be "the basic end of action" (p. 19); "our *basic* desire must always be [rather, I should say "*ought* always (i.e., in all cases of really *basic* de-

[1] *International Journal of Ethics* (October, 1927).

[2] *Ibid.* (October, 1926).

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sire) to be"] for pleasure" (p. 25).[3] And since this is the case, and since I also agree with Mr. Wild in accepting Kant's principle that "the 'ought' does imply the 'can'" (p. 13), I acknowledge that, as Mr. Wild argues, a hedonist is committed to the view that for a man to desire pleasure is neither impossible nor unnatural (pp. 13 ff.).[4]

Now I do not in the least know why Mr. Wild chooses to describe this latter doctrine as "psychological hedonism." It is essentially different, so far as I can see, from anything that has ever hitherto been called by that name. But I will not dispute about words. I will merely inquire why Mr. Wild regards it as "objectionable" (p. 17). And I am particularly interested in this question because, so far as I am able to make out, Mr. Wild himself is not prepared to dispute its truth. He certainly does not deny that for a man to desire pleasure is *possible;* for he holds that for a man to desire *his own* pleasure is "neurotic," "unhealthy," and "psychopathic" (pp. 16–17); and I take it that he is not to be interpreted as thus characterizing something which he holds never actually to occur. And, further, he does not appear to hold even that for a man to desire pleasure is "unnatural." For (p. 22) he insists that on a proper psychological view a basic desire for such an end as "the sum of the pleasures of all sentient beings," and in general desires for "external, transcendent objects, such as the pleasures of other people," would be both "possible and plausible," and, I gather, neither neurotic, psychopathic, nor in any way unnatural. And surely for a man to desire such objects as these is to desire *something* in the way of *pleasure.*

Mr. Wild thus appears himself to subscribe to the *general* view that for a man to desire pleasure is neither impossible nor unnatural. Why then is it "objectionable" for me to subscribe to the same view? Because, I take it, Mr. Wild thinks (1) that an ethical hedonist is in all

[3] And in this I have *not* contradicted either hedonism or myself (cf. p. 19). For I did not deny the proposition of Miss Calkins *taken in this sense.* In denying it I understood it as follows: "the proper (i.e., the only *justifiable*), though not the invariable, object of the morally willing self (i.e., of the self when it is morally willing, as opposed to acting *non-morally*) is pleasure." Mr. Wild takes it as meaning "the proper (i.e., the *"basic"*), though not the invariable, object of the willing self (i.e., morally willing, as opposed to *immorally* willing) is pleasure." In *this* sense I should be prepared to accept the statement.

[4] I cannot, however, agree with Mr. Wild's argument (p. 13) that "Mill's proof [*sc.* that we ought to desire pleasure] holds good on the basis of a rigid and exclusive psychological hedonism which makes the desire for anything but pleasure impossible." For I agree with Kant in holding that the "ought" implies not only the "can" but also the "need not." [Incidentally, it is odd that Mr. Wild, in selecting a passage from *Utilitarianism* to illustrate Mill's view that "all desire is *necessarily* for pleasure," should have chosen one in which Mill says nothing of the sort (p. 13).]

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consistency bound to hold this view in a particular form that is quite different from the particular form in which he himself holds it; and furthermore (2) that the particular form of the view that is thus implied by hedonism is very objectionable. I should myself have supposed that a hedonist of the type I endeavored to depict would in all consistency have been obliged, by the very sort of consideration which Mr. Wild urges upon his attention, to hold this view in very much the particular form in which Mr. Wild himself holds it. The argument would run somewhat as follows: (1) "the sum of the pleasures of all sentient beings" is the ethical end; therefore (2) our "basic" desire ought to be for this end; but (3) the "ought" implies the "can"; therefore (4) it must be neither impossible nor unnatural for a man to desire this end. This course of reasoning seems to me to be cogent; and I do not in the least see why it is in any way inconsistent in a hedonist to accept as valid (as I personally do) both the argument and its conclusion.

Mr. Wild thinks that it is inconsistent. His argument on the point may be divided into two stages. The first runs as follows. As a hedonist I hold (1) that "pleasurable consciousness is always ultimately good, and nothing else is ever ultimately good." But I must also admit (2) that "pleasurable consciousness as it concretely occurs . . . . is a decidedly private, subjective affair, as everyone knows." That is to say, I must admit (3) that "actual pleasure . . . . is distinctly *my* pleasure, part of my own ineffable stream of consciousness, separate from other streams." But then I am logically bound to accept (4) the view that "the end of my action must be the *concrete* pleasure that I feel"—which for Mr. Wild means, I take it, both that my own pleasure is the only ultimate good,[5] and that my basic desire ought always to be for my own pleasure. And this is plainly inconsistent with my holding either that "the sum of the pleasures of all sentient beings" is ultimately good, or that my basic desire ought to be for this end.

But has Mr. Wild really shown that I am committed to (4)? I think not. It is true that (4) does follow from (3) together with (1).[6] But it does *not* follow from (2) together with (1). And although I should admit (2), I should deny (3). Mr. Wild's argument gets on only by supposing that (2) and (3) are equivalent, i.e., by supposing that because I

[5] Having, to his own satisfaction, thus forced me to the view that *my own* pleasure is the only ultimate good, Mr. Wild proceeds, by some process wholly unintelligible to me, to identify this with the "egoistic paradox," i.e., I take it, with the view that *each man's* pleasure is the only good.

[6] In fact from these premises much *more* than (4) follows, namely (what is quite monstrous), that the basic end of *all* human action ought to be *my* pleasure.

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hold that concrete pleasurable consciousness can only occur in *some* mind, I must therefore hold that it can only occur in *my* mind. And this, of course, is simply absurd. It is like arguing that because all private property is somebody's private property, all private property is therefore my private property—which would indeed be convenient, if true.

We now come to the second stage of Mr. Wild's argument. If I accept the view that my basic desire *ought* always to be for *my own* pleasure, i.e., (4), then I must also hold (6) that "the desire for pleasure [i.e., for my own pleasure] is essentially natural." And from this follows (7), viz., that "the desire for external transcendent things, such as other people's mental states [e.g., other people's pleasures] is unnatural." And this is plainly inconsistent with my holding that it is both possible and natural for a man to desire "the sum of the pleasures of all sentient beings."

What of this argument? In the first place, since I am not committed to (4), I am not committed to (6). In the second place, even if I were committed to (6) I should not be committed to (7). For from "to desire my own pleasure is natural" it can *not* be inferred that "to desire other people's pleasure is unnatural."

The fallacy is at bottom that of illicit *conversio simplex*. If such an inference were valid, then we might argue, e.g., that if to desire my own health is natural, then to desire the public health is unnatural—which obviously will not do.

Mr. Wild, having convinced himself by the foregoing course of reasoning that as a hedonist I must really hold such an egoistic ethics and psychology as that to which he endeavors to commit me, asks himself how I came to fall into these gross errors. And he can apparently only explain it to himself by supposing that I have never heard of the more adequate psychology of Joseph Butler and of "modern, dynamic psychologists, such as Professor Dewey." It is not only that I have "ignored" Butler;[7] it is implied also that I have not even read him. For "it simply would not occur to one holding such psychological views [*sc.* as those of Butler *et al.*] to consider hedonism as an adequate ethical ideal." Unfortunately Mr. Wild is obliged to acknowledge in a footnote that this very thing *did* occur to Butler himself (who therefore, presumably, cannot have read Butler either?); and I must really ask him to believe that it has occurred to me.

[7] True, I did not mention him. But there was no occasion. I quite agree with Butler, and for the reasons he alleges, in rejecting the sort of psychological hedonism that he criticizes. In fact I agree with him more than does Mr. Wild; for I also accept the doctrine quoted in the footnote (p. 17), which Mr. Wild is obliged to explain as a mere inconsistency in Butler, as in me.

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The only further reason that Mr. Wild gives for holding that this combination of views is impossible is that hedonism, inasmuch as it implies "a Humian or Titchenerian psychology of mental states which may actually be desired," is radically incompatible with the acceptance of the "Butlerian" dynamic psychology. I shall here leave Hume and Titchener to shift for themselves, and will content myself with simply remarking that Mr. Wild himself appears to be able to reconcile the acceptance of *some* sort of "psychology of mental states that may actually be desired" with his own continued retention of the "Butlerian" view. For he seems himself to hold (1) that pleasure is a mental state—for "pleasurable consciousness, as it actually occurs . . . . is a decidedly private, subjective affair, as everyone knows" (p. 21); and (2) that the pleasures of other people, and even "the sum of the pleasures of all sentient beings," may naturally be desired (p. 22). And these two doctrines, so far as I can see, comprise quite all, in the way of such a psychology, that my brand of hedonist is in any way logically bound to accept. Mr. Wild questions only whether it is "natural" for a man to desire his own mental states, e.g., his own pleasure. Now I do not know how Mr. Wild has persuaded himself (as he appears to have done) that this is "Butlerian." For Butler himself writes, "Every man hath a general desire of his own happiness; [this] proceeds from, or is, self-love; and seems inseparable from all sensible creatures, who can reflect upon themselves and their own interest or happiness, so as to have that interest an object to their minds. . . . . The object [it] pursues is somewhat internal, our own happiness, enjoyment, satisfaction. . . . . The principle we call self-love never seeks anything external for the sake of the thing, but only as a means of happiness or good, . . ."[8] But in any case, as I have already shown, Mr. Wild has given no sufficient reason for holding that my sort of hedonist is in the least constrained to adopt any other view of the matter (whatever its intrinsic merits or defects) than that of Mr. Wild himself.

Mr. Wild has a few more criticisms of hedonism. In the first place, he reverts to the charge of "narrowness." To this I have only answered that any theory of ethics must reject some things as evil and select other

[8] Cf. Selby-Bigge, *British Moralists*, I, 227. Even Professor Dewey does not seem to regard desire for one's own pleasure as altogether abnormal and pathological; for he allows that "if there are many obstacles and discouragements in the way of getting the object which satisfies want, the anticipation of pleasure in its fulfilment may normally intensify the putting forth of energy, may give an extra reinforcement to flagging effort. In this way the anticipation of pleasure has a normal place in the effective direction of activities." (Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, pp. 270–71).

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things as good. "But are not some ethical theories much narrower than others?" (p. 20). They are indeed. But if inclusiveness versus narrowness were the criterion of the truth of an ethical theory, it would follow that the only ultimately true ethical theory would be that which was *least* narrow, i.e., maximally inclusive. And the only maximally inclusive theory would clearly be one which included absolutely everything among its ultimate goods, and thus left nothing whatsoever as either ultimately evil or indifferent at all. Mr. Wild, of course, does not hold any such view as this. *His* criterion is quite different. "Are not some ethical theories so narrow," he asks, "as to leave out certain values which the ethical consciousness of man has always found good?" Clearly it is not, for Mr. Wild, fundamentally a question of "narrowness" at all, but of conformity to "the intuitions of the race." And there might obviously be ethical theories which by this standard would err, not by too great narrowness, but by too great inclusiveness.

Mr. Wild points out that I too have tacitly recognized the too great narrowness of "pleasure" as the sole ultimate good, by occasionally substituting for the term "pleasure" the alternative "pleasurable consciousness." So far indeed he is right. Not on grounds of "narrowness," but just because it seems to me to be the truth of the matter, I hold that ultimate value does not attach to pleasure apart from consciousness. So far as I can see, it attaches only to pleasurable consciousness. But inasmuch as I happen not to believe that there actually is, or even could be, any pleasure in the world apart from pleasurable consciousness, I have occasionally allowed myself (doubtless somewhat too loosely, but for brevity's sake) to refer to pleasurable consciousness simply as "pleasure." I do, however, agree that, as Mr. Wild puts it, "pleasure without consciousness *is* too narrow" (p. 20). And, according to Mr. Wild, "such a position is really quite inconsistent with hedonism and with his own [i.e., my own] basic thought." For if "pleasure without consciousness" possesses no ultimate value, then (1) "knowledge or consciousness of the pleasure must also be included" (p. 20), included, I take it, within everything that is ultimately good; moreover, (2) "knowledge thus becomes an intrinsic value" (p. 20); and (3) "as soon as we admit knowledge as an intrinsic value we are no longer hedonists" (p. 25).

I dispute the validity of this argument in all its parts. (1) The admission that "'pleasurable consciousness' is much more than mere pleasure" (p. 20), and that *some* consciousness must therefore be included as an element in every ultimate good, in no wise commits me to the very different view (which I should certainly reject) that a reflex "knowledge or consciousness *of* the *pleasure* must also be included" (italics mine);

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nor indeed even to the view that consciousness or knowledge *of anything* need necessarily be included (although on empirical grounds I should hold that it *de facto* will be). Moreover, (2) even though some consciousness be (or even if some knowledge or consciousness *of* something were) an indispensable element in every ultimate good, it could not thence be inferred that either consciousness or knowledge possesses any intrinsic value whatever.[9] And (3) the admission that consciousness or knowledge (or anything else you will) is intrinsically good would in any case not of itself involve any contradiction of the characteristic and peculiar thesis of hedonism, viz., that pleasurable consciousness is always ultimately good, and nothing else is ever ultimately good. For many things may be intrinsically good without being ultimately good at all.

Candor, however, compels me to confess that I do perceive the possibility of an argument (which is, however, not thus stated by Mr. Wild) which would reveal a certain inconsistency in my position as stated in the article under discussion. It might well be argued, namely, that if I admit (as I do) that neither consciousness apart from pleasure, nor pleasure apart from consciousness, but only "pleasurable consciousness" is ever ultimately good, and consequently (what I agree follows) that an element both of consciousness *and* of pleasure is necessary to there being any ultimate good at all;[10] and if I also hold (as I do) that neither consciousness apart from pleasure nor pleasure apart from consciousness would ever be even *intrinsically* good; then I have simply abandoned two of the positions which I previously professed to defend, viz., (1) that to say of anything that it is ultimately good means not only that it is intrinsically good, but also "that it contains no part which is not intrinsically good" (p. 3); and (2) the "denial of Mr. Moore's principle of 'organic unity'" (p. 3). For, as to (1), I have admitted that "pleasurable consciousness," which is in my view always and alone ultimately good, nevertheless contains two elements, viz., pleasantness and consciousness, neither of which is intrinsically good at all; and, as to (2), I have therefore admitted at least a part of what Mr. Moore maintains under the head

[9] Mr. Wild is, however, so far right (although he does not argue the matter on this basis) that this *could* be inferred (as I point out in the sequel) if the definition of ultimate good which I offered in my original article (adopting it from Mr. Moore) were (as in fact it is *not*) correct. To hold that consciousness, although itself devoid of intrinsic value, is nevertheless an indispensable element in every ultimate good *was* thus inconsistent with my *statements* concerning the nature of ultimate value, but not, I think, with my "basic thought."

[10] It is not consciousness *of* the pleasure that is required, but simply *any* consciousness that might be qualified as pleasurable.

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of "organic unity," viz., that the intrinsic value of a whole is not always the same as the sum of the values of its parts.

This argument (which I freely present to Mr. Wild) *does* seem to me to bring to light a certain inconsistency between my former statements and the view which I really mean to hold; and I therefore take the present occasion to revise these statements in such fashion as I think will remove the inconsistency. In the first place (as I now perceive) my statement of the meaning of the phrase "ultimately good" (pp. 2–3) must be altered to read as follows: "To say of a thing that it is *ultimately* good, or good *for its own sake*, means (*a*) that it is intrinsically good, and (*b*) that it contains no element such that another thing precisely resembling it in every respect save in the absence of a corresponding element might nevertheless be just as intrinsically good as it." In the second place, although I still maintain the truth of the principle that I opposed to Mr. Moore's principle of "organic unity," viz., my principle that "the intrinsic value of a whole is always in proportion to the amount of ultimate value which it contains" (p. 3), I now perceive that I should more carefully have guarded the expression of my difference from Mr. Moore. For although I should reject Mr. Moore's views concerning "organic unity," in so far as these may be understood to involve a denial of the proposition just stated, I should not reject them (and in truth never intended to reject them) wholly and simply.

According to Mr. Wild, not only his own intuitions, but also the "intuitions of the race" are all against hedonism. But the material which he presents in support of this contention is such as to leave me very doubtful whether this is so, either for Mr. Wild himself, or for the race. For I cannot myself attach any value to alleged "intuitions" concerning fundamental ethical principles, unless, as I said in my original paper, care be taken "that these are properly interpreted, and that the issues are not obscured by any confusion with irrelevant or inconsistent doctrines." And I there gave some instances of appeals to intuition which seemed to me calculated only to obscure the issue by introducing confusing associations. But when I turn to Mr. Wild's pages, I find for the most part instances either the same or essentially analogous to those which I tried to disentangle, put in the same vague way, without any indication of his having tried to rid them of the sources of confusion that I pointed out. For example, Mr. Wild's problem concerning the pleasures of the pig versus those of Socrates, or those of pushpin versus those of poetry (p. 24) is essentially the same as that of Mr. Moore (which I considered on p. 17 of my article) concerning the pleasures of the drunken breaker of crockery as compared with those of the appreciator of

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King Lear. Or again, his problem of the continuous rhapsodic dream as an ethical goal (p. 19) is essentially a combination of that of Professor Rogers, which I considered on page 10, and that of Mr. Moore, which I considered on page 17. Yet Mr. Wild gives no indication as to whether he has considered these problems in the light of the distinctions that I there tried to draw.

And Mr. Wild himself seems to me to have introduced further confusions. For example, he finds on intuitive grounds that "pleasure is a value, but not the only value"—so do I—that "other things, such as activity and thought, are not merely necessary evils or means to sensory titillations—so do I; that "without them life simply would be poorer"—so do I—that "pleasure simply is not the *only* good"—so do I. Further, "the common person undoubtedly feels that there are things we should choose even if no pleasure came from them"—so do I. And "the attempt to fuse all values into one he intuitively rejects"—so do I. Perhaps I interpret these propositions in a sense different to that which Mr. Wild intends them to have; but since he states them in a form so ambiguous that they will bear a sense compatible with hedonism, I cannot be quite sure that he has himself fully freed them from this sense before allowing himself to pass judgment upon them. In a word, I cannot be certain that either Mr. Wild or the race (to whom he appeals) have, in the cases in point, any intuitions that are genuinely opposed to hedonism; for I am left in doubt whether either of them has ever formed any judgment on the real questions at issue at all.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

REPLY TO MR. BLAKE

JOHN WILD

I HAVE read with interest Mr. Blake's comments on my criticism of hedonism. The chief point I there attempted to make was that Mr. Blake's desire to be an ethical hedonist and at the same time eschew all traces of psychological hedonism is really impossible, that the ideal cannot be *utterly* divorced from the actual, that an ethical hedonist must be a psychological hedonist at least to the extent of making the desire for pleasure a natural and eminently normal element in human nature. The first seven pages of Mr. Blake's reply are devoted to a more or less relevant discussion of this subject in the course of which I am convicted of numerous inconsistencies, in addition to the fallacies of division and illicit *conversio simplex*. I regret to say, however, that I have

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not been able to discover just where Mr. Blake really comes to grips with the question which I had in mind.

Mr. Blake agrees that "every ethical theory must necessarily imply *some* doctrine about desires," but, after reading through many pages of interesting and intricate analysis, I find myself completely in the dark with respect to Mr. Blake's "doctrine about desires," which, after all, is the real issue. The point I raised, as Mr. Blake expressly states in the first sentence of his reply, was "the question of the relation between ethical hedonism and desire for pleasure." One would thus naturally expect from Mr. Blake a psychological discussion. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, to find something that bears much more resemblance to an ingenious but rather elementary exercise in logic. Mr. Blake in the end seems to gloss over my main criticism of his position by assuming that it represents no real difference. He insists that I do ". . . . not deny that for a man to desire pleasure is possible," and that I do not hold ". . . . even that for a man to desire pleasure is unnatural," since, according to my own statement, the desire for such an end as "the sum of the pleasures of all sentient beings" would be both possible and plausible. Now, this ignores the distinction which has played such an important rôle in the idealistic criticism of hedonism, between "pleasure" and "a sum of pleasures," which is not a concrete, actual pleasure at all. So I might very well hold that the desire for a transcendent object such as the sum of external pleasures is natural, whereas the desire for concrete pleasure (one of my own psychic states) is unnatural. I laid considerable stress on this distinction in my article. But Mr. Blake does not apparently consider it worthy of his attention, and continues to speak interchangeably of "pleasure" (presumably the concrete pleasure I feel) and "the sum of the pleasures of all sentient beings" (an abstract universal). Of course it is *possible* to desire one's own psychic states, or even one's own pleasure. I never for a moment denied this. But is the desire for such pleasure a leading motive in human nature? In other words, is it natural? If so, then hedonism becomes reasonable as a statement of the end of life, but egoism follows epistemologically in its train. If not—if, on the other hand, it is natural to desire external objects, and abstract universals, such as the transcendent pleasures of other beings, which we do not concretely feel—then there is no particular human reason for being a hedonist, that is, for restricting value in any way to pleasure, since the goal which naturally follows from *this* conception of human nature appears to be something more like the richest realization of *all* the many transcendent ends of man.

Now the point I attempted to stress in my paper was that modern

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psychology, following the path worked out by Joseph Butler and ultimately by the Nicomachean ethics, seems to be definitely taking the latter stand, and thus to be knocking the props, so to speak, from under the hedonistic theory of value, leaving it, in short, stranded, with no motive power back of it in human nature. This situation, it seemed to me, constituted a problem for Mr. Blake, since he seemed to admit the relevant psychological facts (see his original paper, pp. 3 and 4). Beyond the rather vague way in which he claims to agree with me, I can find no definite facing of this issue in Mr. Blake's reply. If he really does agree with me, Mr. Blake follows Aristotle, Butler, Green, Bradley, etc., in maintaining that the objects of man's desires are in no way restricted to his mental states, but that they range all the way from so-called material objects to other people's mental states, and transcendent universals. This being the case, there is no particular reason, so far as human nature is concerned, for being a hedonist, since the desire for pleasure plays no peculiar rôle among the many dynamic tendencies that bind the individual to his world. Now, I do not wish to be understood in any way as defending the current predilection for reducing ethics to something "objective," like "social psychology," or "the physiology of the central nervous system," or what not. I do not even feel that the great ethicists have consciously bothered themselves about the "objective" facts of human nature. Their province was the ideal, not the actual. But, intuitively, I believe, inevitably they have oriented themselves to the fundamental facts. If not, their systems are mere daydreams. After all, an ethicist must cast an occasional glance at actuality. In the recent past there seems to have developed a quite extraordinary agreement among competent observers, ranging all the way from Mr. Blake himself to W. MacDougall, that man is not a passive spectator reaching out with wraith-like arms for fleeting mental states, but a dynamic center of action streaming out to all corners of the world. On this view the desire for one's own states (including pleasure), while not impossible, becomes a very insignificant element in the life of man, if not something really abnormal, or at least eccentric, as in the epicure. That is, with such a psychological basis, does not hedonism become just a trifle absurd? This is the question I hoped Mr. Blake would consider. I cannot see that he has ever really faced it.

In his original paper Mr. Blake seemed to recognize the beforementioned distinction between subjective pleasure and the abstract "sum of all pleasures," at least to the extent of pointing out that the pleasure the hedonist is interested in as the end of action is "concrete, pleasurable experience," *not* "mere pleasantness as an abstract universal" (p. 11).

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Now, bearing in mind this distinction admitted by Mr. Blake, it seemed to me that there might be some difficulty in escaping egoism, since the only pleasure that I can *concretely* or immediately feel is my own experience, other people's experience being really a transcendent inference. Mr. Blake goes to some length in very cleverly proving that the subjectivity of pleasure *in general* does not imply that pleasure occurs only in my mind; but of course I never said it did. What I stated was just exactly the opposite. My question was how Mr. Blake managed to pass epistemologically from the concrete, pleasurable experience *he* feels to the subjective pleasure in general, and particularly if, as Mr. Blake says, it is only concrete pleasurable experience (inevitably his own) which he (the hedonist) values ("what hedonist attaches value to mere pleasantness as an abstract universal?"[1]) if this is all true, just how do hedonists come to desire "the sum of the pleasures of all sentient beings"? In the light of the history of hedonism I still feel that this is a perfectly legitimate question to ask, and as yet I must say that I am not in the least clear as to how Mr. Blake answers it. On the one hand he holds that "pleasure (as a value) is a decidedly private, subjective affair," something internal and solipsistic, and on the other, that pleasure (as a value) is "the sum total of the pleasures of all sentient beings." Just how do Mr. Blake's hedonistic motives cross this epistemological gap? The reply might be made that all this is epistemological and beside the point so far as ethics is concerned. Indeed, I think that Mr. Blake would probably take this attitude, and I believe that certain of his errors may be traced to this extraordinary conception. For ethical problems cannot be solved in utter isolation. One's ethics is bound up in the most intimate way with one's metaphysics, one's psychology, and one's epistemology. If Mr. Blake in the present instance had really taken the word "subjective" with genuine epistemological seriousness, he would have been forced to explain how motives tending toward private, mental states may ever lead to the *general* good. This is the crucial point.

Instead of considering it, however, Mr. Blake rushes on to my next alleged fallacy which turns out to be that of "illicit *conversio simplex*." This is due to the fact that I make the following statement, which Mr. Blake quotes in a highly schematized form: "If the desire for a subjective, mental state such as pleasure is natural, then the desire for external, transcendent things, such as other people's mental states, is unnatural." These are my *exact* words, though *not* what Mr. Blake quotes. Now, in the context, to which Mr. Blake does not find it necessary to refer, I con-

[1] P. 11 of Mr. Blake's original essay.

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trast two types of psychology, the traditional, logically solipsistic psychology of Hume, which, I argued, provided a legitimate foundation for a hedonistic theory of value, and a dynamic or Butlerian psychology which, it seemed to me, led to an entirely different conception. That is, according to a Humian psychology, the desire for mental states is natural, because that tends to be all that there is to desire, while, according to the other psychology—and it was obviously the extreme types I was contrasting—it is not natural to desire mental states, because action is directed to external things. Thus, in the light of this contrast between two utterly distinct types of psychology, it will certainly follow that according to the first, the desire for transcendent objects becomes unnatural, as the actual history of hedonism clearly shows. What Mr. Blake has done is to take a bare statement out of its context and literalize it into an illicit conversion. Bringing the context to bear on my proposition, it assumes not only that all desires for subjective states such as pleasure are natural desires, but, since I am speaking of an extreme type of psychology, *also* that all natural desires are for subjective mental states. When read intelligently it is an equivalence rather than a mere inclusion, and hence it is no illicit conversion to conclude that *on the basis of such a psychology* the desire for other people's mental states is unnatural. Mr. Blake's discussion of the fallacy of "illicit *conversio simplex*" is most interesting, but I must beg leave to point out that in this case it is quite irrelevant. Of course, Mr. Blake might maintain that he holds an intermediate sort of psychology which makes possible both the desire for mental states and external objects. But history certainly justifies the view that psychology must be predominantly one way or the other. It is the present almost universal agreement that human nature is non-Humian that I have tried so ineffectually to bring to Mr. Blake's attention. Once admitted, this view, as held by dynamic psychologists like Dewey and MacDougall, certainly makes the reflex desire for our own mental states abnormal and unnatural.

Mr. Blake asseverates with some force that he agrees with Butler as much as myself, and quotes a long passage to the effect that internal happiness is the supreme good. I was quite aware of the fact that Butler, in common with his age, held this view, and quoted a similar passage in my paper, insisting, however, that his rather subtle Aristotelian analysis of desire led in a quite different direction. That this is the case is sufficiently evidenced, it seems to me, by the fact that Green, Bradley, Taylor, Dewey, etc., all follow Butler in his analysis of desire, but utterly reject his hedonistic theory of value. The case of an author's failing to recog-

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nize the full implications of a theory or analysis is too common for extended comment. I have no doubt, in the light of the before-mentioned historical development, that Butler, as well as Mr. Blake, would have profited immensely by a clearer perception of the full implications of Sermons 11 and 12 and certain portions of the *Dissertation upon Virtue.*

I am glad that my reiteration of the common criticism of hedonism on the grounds of narrowness has been at least contemporary with a rather extensive revision of Mr. Blake's views. As to the unraveling of Mr. Blake's precise tenets on the nature of "intrinsic" and "ultimate" value, and their rather intricate relationships, I prefer to leave this to the reader and to Mr. Blake. The chief points, so far as I understand them, are the following:

1. In his original article, Mr. Blake stated as "the characteristic and peculiar thesis of hedonism" that "pleasurable consciousness is always ultimately good, ... and nothing else ever is ultimately good," meaning by ultimately good "that it contains no part which is not intrinsically good" (p. 3). *Now,* Mr. Blake no longer holds this view, for he admits that his ultimate value, pleasurable consciousness, contains two units, pleasure and consciousness, one of which at least (consciousness) seems to possess no "intrinsic" value.

2. In his original article Mr. Blake very definitely denied Mr. G. E. Moore's principle of "organic unity" according to which "the intrinsic value of a whole is not always the same as the sum of the values of its parts" (p. 3, prop. 6). *Now,* although Mr. Blake does not seem altogether sure of himself, he says: "I have admitted at least a part of what Mr. Moore maintains under the head of 'organic unity,'" and again, "although I should reject Mr. Moore's views concerning 'organic unity' . . . . I should not reject them (and in truth never intended to reject them) wholly and simply."

I do not wish to take any particular credit for this development of Mr. Blake's views, especially since I consider that the later ones, if taken together with his hedonistic presuppositions, form a definitely inconsistent set. But I do insist that this shift is certainly due to Mr. Blake's rather tardy recognition of the crucial rôle played in the realm of value by a non-hedonic element, consciousness. The point is that Mr. Blake now agrees with the *Philebus* and Mr. Moore (*Principia Ethica,* Sec. 52, pp. 87–90) that all value cannot be reduced to one thing, pleasure, but that consciousness at least is of equal importance; that no value would be possible without being related to a percipient self. Now, with such a view, in what sense is Mr. Blake a hedonist? He might with just as much reason be called a "Selfist," since the awareness of a conscious self is just as

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essential an element in all value as pleasure. The exclusiveness which has marked all forms of the hedonistic doctrine is lost. Also, since consciousness enters with pleasure into an organic whole of value, why may not such a union be possible in the case of knowledge and moral striving and the contemplation of beauty, as our common-sense intuitions have always maintained? I think that the criticism of hedonism as a doctrine which fails to do justice to the richness of the realm of value has certainly borne fruit in Mr. Blake's case.

With respect to the doctrine of "organic unity," also, I believe that Mr. Blake's latest admissions are of the utmost importance, for, as he sees, they amount to a denial of the only strictly hedonist view of the matter, held by Mr. Blake in his original article, that "the intrinsic value of a whole is always in proportion to the amount of ultimate value which it contains" (p. 3, prop. 6). The moment we admit the principle of organic unity, it becomes utterly impossible to add values together into quantitative "amounts," and the whole hedonistic calculus, which Mr. Blake defended with asperity in his original article (p. 6), must be abandoned. Sidgwick, who held the hedonistic view in a most consistent form, saw this very clearly and defended the quantitative conception (*Methods of Ethics*, p. 134). With its abandonment for the principle of organic unity, Mr. Blake has approached closer to the truth, but has receded far from anything which, with any sense of linguistic propriety, can be called hedonism.

In the end the issue between Mr. Blake and myself is a temperamental and intuitive issue. If he still really believes that the pleasure of push-pin is intrinsically as valuable as the pleasure of poetry, as he once did, there is, of course, nothing further to be done, beyond a suitable recording of this curious fact. Mr. Blake objects to my "vague" and uncritical use of instances. There is, evidently, a certain "abstract" elimination process to which our intuitions must be subjected before they may be admitted to the royal arcanum of truth. Of course an intuition is an intuition, and *in the end* the less it is tampered with, the purer and more reliable it is. Yet I think Mr. Blake is fundamentally correct in pointing out that intuitions may be refined and sensitized by intellectual criticism and the pruning away of irrelevant material. When I follow Mr. Blake's directions, however (all of which are included in Mr. Moore's original presentation), to "abstract from all tacit reference to the differing promise and potentiality of these two states of mind, from all larger thought of their vastly differing significance (in hedonic terms of course) for the total lives of these men and of their fellows," I still do *not* find that "the state of mind of a drunkard when he is intensely pleased with breaking crockery is just

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as valuable in itself—just as well worth having—as that of a man who is fully realizing all that is most exquisite in the tragedy of King Lear, provided only the mere quantity of pleasure in both cases is the same." Morality simply is not remotely concerned with any "quantity of pleasure" whatsoever. In fact, I think it would be possible to go so far as to say that morality is primarily concerned neither with "quantity" nor with "pleasure," for the moral realm is an autonomous realm with categories of its own, and any attempt to reduce it to a calculus or to psychology must miss its inner essence. It is this fact which the common man invariably recognizes when he intuitively recognizes one pleasure or one end to be inherently "better than" another—not "more pleasurable," nor "quantitatively greater," but "better than." Without this unique and irreducible power of judgment there is no such thing as morality, though there may be prudence and even great analytic acumen.

Mr. Blake's reply is stimulating and suggestive in many ways, but I must confess that hedonism as a philosophic doctrine seems even more hopelessly inadequate to the facts of ethical experience than before. Nowhere do I find that Mr. Blake has come to grips with the weighty idealistic criticisms of the doctrine which utterly disposed of it so far as the last century of European thought was concerned, and which, so far as I know, have never been answered. In addition to its tendency toward subjectivism, its hopeless and ever receding quantitative goal, its reduction of value to a restricted type of passive mental state, I still believe that hedonism is entirely out of harmony with the few broad facts concerning human nature upon which almost all competent investigators are agreed. After all, hedonism has had its day. It has been laboriously tried out on the philosophic stage, definitely found wanting, discarded, and buried. To those whose intuitions unmistakably fail to back the common cause, and there have always been such, there must be made the equally unmistakable answer, as the ancient saying has it:

Ἡδονὴ τέλος, πόρνης δόγμα.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE INTELLIGENT WOMAN'S GUIDE TO SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM. By Bernard Shaw. London: Constable, 1928. Large 8vo. Pp. 495. Price, 15s. net.

This large book of our leading dramatist is, on the surface, a treatise on economics; but it is mainly concerned with a moral problem. After all, economic justice is a problem in ethics, not in economics. But the economists have captured so much of the ground once covered by Adam Smith's *Political Economy* that ethics is reduced to barren platitudes. However, it makes no difference what the subject matter is called, economic facts or moral facts. Clearly there is a problem in regard to the private possession, the distribution, and the use of wealth. Virtue is affected by what you do *for* your income and by what you do *with* your income. The evil in the world is not all intentional, but it is, none the less, evil. Mr. Shaw goes through a description of current practice in economic activities, the process of production and distribution, banking, law, population, rates and taxes, investment, foreign trade, women in the labor market. He also discusses methods of reform of the existing system of capitalism. In general Mr. Shaw's method of reform is parliamentary and his purpose is a socialist society.

The book is quite frankly in advocacy of the redistribution of wealth and of equality in incomes. It is refreshingly candid and courageous. The sense of a moral standard runs through all the description of economic processes, and we are never left, as we are in economic treatises, with the sense that we are merely lookers-on in a conflict of natural forces—supply and demand and the rest. The black magic of economic fatalism has not silenced Mr. Shaw; and it is good that one who has the ear of the public should use his power for plain speech and not for pious generalities. The book will be valuable to students of social theory, not as a treatise, but as a plain indication of the moral standards which can and should be applied to actual life in the earning or the spending of income. Those who do nothing for the wealth they receive are, of course, morally defective. Mr. Shaw is only following Rousseau in saying this. "Rich or poor, small or great, every idler is a thief." A society which maintains men and women gratuitously, without demanding service from them, is a barbarism. And the pretenses which flourish in universities and churches for the support of privileged wealth are simply the glass beads of savages. That

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is common doctrine among all social philosophers. But Mr. Shaw goes farther. He believes that no one should be allowed to earn more than anyone else. His own income, if larger than that of the dustman, is not really justifiable. Equality is a moral need.

It would be worth while to analyze somewhat more exactly Mr. Shaw's schemes for social justice; and it is obviously not very different from the scheme advocated by the bolsheviks. It is to be hoped, therefore, that those who oppose the ideals set up by the Soviet government—as contrasted with their very dubious methods—will face the arguments put forward by Mr. Shaw. But probably the book is too expensive and too long to have its proper weight as a projectile! The women who read it and understand it would have to be not merely "intelligent" but highly educated. Mr. Shaw writes well, that is to say, simply; but he covers so much ground that only a highly educated mind will be able to follow him without exhaustion.

There remain, however, one or two difficulties with regard to the ideal maintained in the book. First, equality of income seems to be overemphasized. Morally, there is no reason for a mathematically exact division of the power to consume goods and services. Why should not a person *prefer* to have less than his fellows? The income is so very minor an element in the art of living that perhaps a Socialist society will not seek "equality" of personal weight or of influence by means of exact divisions of the product. But of course gross inequality is impossible in a civilized society. To have too much or to have too little—these must be abolished because of the barriers which surplus and deficiency set up between persons. But men are not divided who differ in the amount they have, if all have enough. Secondly, although Mr. Shaw very well knows that an increasing amount of wealth is communal, his emphasis upon division makes one feel that he is too individualistic. The amount that you have will not worry me if I am a civilized man; so long, of course, as no man lacks enough for his life. Indeed, the emphasis upon equality of income, although aimed at preventing flunkeyism and subservience or arrogance and carelessness, makes one suspect that Mr. Shaw's intelligent woman is not so much interested in the relation between persons as in the little corner inhabited by each. However, Mr. Shaw's argument is not in the main individualistic; he knows how much has already been done in Great Britain to take over for public uses great portions of private wealth. Indeed, the change in the national balance sheet since Gladstone lived would look like a drastic revolution if we had not become accustomed to it.

The great value of Mr. Shaw's book is its close contact with the facts of daily life. For that reason it should be used to give "color" to

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the abstractions of social theory. That it is an advocacy of a program does not make it less valuable; for the attempt to avoid discussion of programs is generally an attempt to avoid thinking about what we can do. What we can do, and not what happens to us, is the fundamental problem of moral philosophy.

C. DELISLE BURNS

LONDON, ENGLAND

AESTHETICS OF THE NOVEL. By Van Meter Ames. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1928. Pp. 221. Price, $2.50.

In this book Mr. Ames has struck out into a little-traveled road. Critics, men of letters, historians of literature have, to be sure, written much that is valuable about the novel, but philosophers and aestheticians have for the most part neglected it. They have generally preferred to study the fine arts in the restricted sense, together with poetry and music. Perhaps subconsciously they have felt that the novel was not quite worthy of their attention. But, as Mr. Ames points out, the novel is fast becoming the most important form of art; hence its deeper significance calls loudly for investigation by philosophers. Enquiry into its place among the other arts, into its peculiar beauty, into its function in life, can no longer wisely be avoided. Concerning all of these problems Mr. Ames has something interesting to say. He has given much thought to the underlying aesthetic principles, and his reflections are supported by a large and varied acquaintance with the best novels of England and America, France, Russia, and Spain. There are, however, few references to the German novel; but this neglect of the German novel is so general among English-speaking people that I suppose he cannot be much blamed for it, although his book would have been even richer and more authoritative than it is had he not overlooked this store of material.

The first seventy pages of the book are introductory. We are a bit surprised to find ourselves introduced to a study of the novel through a first chapter entitled "Why We Admire Athletes"; but as soon as we begin to read we are mollified, for the chapter is very delightful in itself, and in the second chapter we are told that we admire art for the same reason that we admire athletes, namely, because it refreshes us. In this second chapter, "Why We Admire Art," Mr. Ames analyzes the aesthetic experience and states his underlying philosophy of art. "Art," he says, "is the artifice for checking the unheeding march of habit and drawing us up short before the values of a problem, objectifying them in such a way as to facilitate our attention to them and enhance our pleasure in them"

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(p. 18). In the third chapter, "Sensuous and Literary Art," a contrast is drawn between the sensuous arts, which exploit the values of the body, and literary art, which expresses social values; yet the fundamental kinship of both is insisted on, owing to the closeness of the connection between mind and body.

With chapter iv, "Why We Read Novels," we are fairly inside of our subject proper; but the crucial chapter is the following one, "What Personality Is." This chapter explains how personality is built up by assimilating the rôles of other persons, either through play and dream, or by the imitative processes of "real life." Then chapter vi, "The Novel and Personality," shows how the novel ministers to this end of creating and recreating personality in much the same way. Two types of novel are distinguished: romances and tales of adventure, which provide an escape from life, and the greater novels, which bring us face to face with life itself. Chapter vii, "The Relation of Fiction to Reflection," studies the problem of the relation of art to thought as illustrated by the novel. In the next chapter, "The Novel and Education," we are offered a comparison between John Dewey's study of the child in *School and Society* and the picture of the child as drawn by such novelists as Rolland, Kipling, Cather, France, London, Wells, Meredith, Rousseau, and Bennett. As for the intriguing chapter on "The Novel and Love and Marriage," no one, I think, can read it without taking more seriously than has been the rule what novelists have had to say on the subject of love and marriage. Chapter x, "The Technique of the Novel," while an independent study, takes its cues from Lubbock's *Craft of Fiction*. It contains a detailed analysis of the structure of Mrs. Wharton's *Ethan Frome*. The final chapter, "The New Novel," does little more than approach the subject of the changes in content and design characteristic of the new novel, due to the growing self-consciousness and complexity of contemporary life; but what we have offered us is so suggestive that we wish we had more.

The book is delightfully written in a style at once picturesque and aphoristic. There are charming passages like that on water toward the end of the first chapter, and many memorable, quotable sentences. If the book has a fault it is that of too much profusion. Sometimes the argument would be clearer, especially in the first and more abstract part of the book, if it were more matter of fact and less rich in allusion and illustration. But throughout one feels that the author has lived with novels as most people live only with men; and out of this intimate acquaintance has come a fine understanding.

D. H. PARKER

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

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FORMS OF INDIVIDUALITY. By E. Jordan. Indianapolis: Progress Publishing Co., 1927. Pp. vi+468.

"What is required at present, then, for the practical aspects of life is a dependable principle of higher objectivity, one which will enable us to think of life in terms that will neither involve as principle subjective or individualistic presuppositions nor the merely formal logical objectivist conceptions of a previous age" (p. 6). To the elucidation and proof of such "principle of higher objectivity" Professor Jordan devotes 465 pages of vigorous, well-sustained argument. The zeal and earnestness with which he applies himself to his task are due to his belief that not only is modern society in a very bad way, but also that the remedies proposed by present-day sociology, social psychology, and political theory are certain to make bad matters much worse. The root of social and political troubles lies, he thinks, in the false doctrine of subjective interest, the doctrine that society and the state have grown up to satisfy the demands and desires of individuals. In classical antiquity there was no tendency to identify portions or aspects of reality with individual life in the intimate way expressed in the relations of interest and privacy. For the Greeks, political organization meant simply the fitting together of the institutions which human nature calls for and makes necessary. But in later antiquity and the Middle Ages, under the growing influence of religion, ideas of the uniqueness of individuality and the privacy of human desire became dominant and have given direction to modern social and political theorizing. Interest is the ostensible principle on which modern practical life in all its departments is made to rest. "The modern state is the interest state; not in the sense that it undertakes to combine and harmonize the interests of individuality into a public purpose, but in the sense that it is a vast external store of values or goods from which the individual is to derive his peculiar share" (p. 19).

If we think that modern sociology or social psychology with their "scientific" approach and method are to correct this mistaken doctrine and rescue us from false psychology, ethical individualism, and political pluralism, we are, in the author's opinion, doomed to disappointment. With reservations in favor of some ideas of Baldwin, Dewey, and Hobhouse, he condemns these social sciences root and branch as quite worthless and fit only for the rubbish heap. In adopting the postulates of natural science they have dehumanized psychic facts and have been able to give a mental content to them only by an individualistic interpretation which leaves the real unity of social life out of question. This outcome is seen as inevitable. "The objective counterpart of the unique personality is an abstract metaphysical world stripped of its variety to the point of

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sheer undifferentiated homogeneity, the numerical particular of repetitive process."

In his attack upon the principle of subjective consciousness and prominence which has been given it in modern practical philosophy the author is in line with contemporary tendency. Realists and behaviorists will eagerly agree that the identification of the mental with the subjective is "due to the error of supposing that what is mental must be inner and private, must have residence within the skin of the natural individual" (p. 59). Also with his statement that the only consistent account is that which describes the facts of mind and will as objective without reference to that quality of facts which is sometimes present, i.e., consciousness. But when we find out what he means by objective fact we realize that he does not belong in the main camp of present-day behaviorists. The objectively real is the rationally organized system: "The real is the harmony of fact with the end which through growth the fact becomes." He takes for granted, he says, the doctrines of philosophical idealism as proved by the development of philosophic thought from Plato to Hegel and on to our own day. His debt to Bosanquet is obvious and acknowledged. But it would be a mistake to suppose that this book is merely a restatement of the social and political philosophy of *The Philosophical Theory of the State*. Professor Jordan has rethought the system in his own way and has achieved a formulation with elements of freshness, originality, and power. Indeed, the speculative philosophy finds in him an able defender; he keeps an easy but firm hold of a conceptual system admittedly difficult to expound, and in the actual exposition shows dialectical skill and versatility of expression. More than this, his constant references by way of illustration and application to pressing political and industrial problems of the time will make his book salutary reading for those who have been convinced without much first-hand investigation that idealism is in its practical bearings, barren, bankrupt, and sterile.

The mention of Bosanquet suggests the "general will" to which our author gives emphasis as a link between the fields of metaphysical principle and of social and political practice. Will he understands as the propulsive tendency to order, to organization, in fact, and as such is a character of all facts, whether mental or not. As such it makes no reference to the natural person, but nevertheless is the essence of individuality. Thus every "act of will" is the act of the general will whose aim is the mutualized system of means to the embodiment of ends which in the nature of the case are never private or particular. The same facts ordered slightly differently may principle all the different degrees of individuality from the natural person to the state. A social institution is a system

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of objects organized with reference to the working out of a larger purpose in the mutual activities of persons. Through institutions, not the *individualized* will, which is unreal, but the *individuated* or corporate will, which is real, finds expression. Mind is just the synthetic purposiveness of institutionalized life. Institutions may be used reflexively and without understanding by individuals. But the completed act of will is distinguishable into an inner private, conscious aspect and an overt, outside, substantial, common, sharable, objective, aspect. With the exception of the quality of consciousness, nothing essential to the individual will is not universally an aspect of objective will. So ideas are nobody's private possession and *as fact* there is no idea that can be identified with a definite natural person except through an object which is mutual as respects all other persons. But if this is so the distinction between one mind and another is obliterated in all cases where it could have any meaning in terms other than blank subjective uniqueness which leaves uniqueness meaningless.

The field which Professor Jordan chooses for the illustration and application of these philosophical principles is that of legal theory and practice. He has read widely in this field and applies with assurance his fundamental conceptions to difficult questions of law and legal procedure, particularly as pertaining to corporate organization in relation to property and contract. While the reviewer does not know enough about law or present problems of judicial procedure to make a very intelligent estimate, it would seem that the chief importance of the book lies in these concluding chapters. "Sociological jurisprudence," the author holds, is predestined to failure until it learns to accept something as the principle of personality other than the natural person and his subjective or instinctive or social relations. This is what it tends to do, however, in the emphasis which it puts upon the conception of property as a social function. But until it modifies its notion of personality, this is an interpretation of social as subjective and in terms of property, and not of property in terms of social relation. Sociology must find its principle of objectivity outside the psychology of individuals, and the law must get beyond its old subjectivist assumption of the individual as the creator and holder of rights of property.

The solution of the problem, as the author sees it, lies in a sound theory of personality as a corporate entity, an order or organization of fact in accordance with a definitely determinable principle. The ordinary legal fiction of corporation is a "monstrosity," an "abortion of juristic thought," a "fungus growth out of the development of procedure." But when the law thus treats the corporation like the natural man it is merely

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recognizing (albeit unconsciously and unintelligently) the corporative nature of individuality as the principle of the real. "The outstanding stages in the compendious whole of individuality are man, the incorporate institution, and the state. And the progressional or growth character of their relation to each other is indicated by the organism at the lower end as the form which is just approaching 'personality' and the vague and nebulous 'world-state,' or 'humanity,' or 'Kingdom of God' to which the process approaches as the as yet only partially incorporate form. . . . . The state as a moral agent is the ultimate corporation, just as the corporate body of an institution is the ultimate legal unit, the person" (p. 302).

Only the briefest mention can be made of the author's conclusions *re* property and contract as legal institutions. Neither private property which the natural person must possess and use up in order to exist, nor public, i.e., collective property, which is subject to alternative use by individuals, is of consequence as a principle of social order, in his opinion. There must be found a form of property which stands for full individuality. This is corporate property. Real property as personal is corporate property, the structure, the body, of the corporate person. It consists of those types of goods which persist as permanent instruments of social purpose. Such property implies real use by different persons in accordance with creative capacity and social function. Of contract, suffice it to say that if property is the static, contract is the dynamic, aspect of the social whole; it is the formative principle by which personalities objectify in a common end, the law by which individuals constitute themselves individualities.

A good case can be made out, I believe, for the philosophic view and the social theory which Professor Jordan champions, and he is successful in furnishing an able and (with important reservations) convincing defense. Intelligence does appear in more comprehensive and enduring forms than that of the natural human individual. Political and industrial institutions, in fact all the accumulating products of social culture, can be understood only as the objective expression or aspect of an intelligence which is universal, is cosmic, in its range and scope. Hence it follows, and this is the basic truth which seems of most value in the present work, that the individual who engages effectively in the institutional activities of society participates in a developing order or experience which is real not merely in the social but also in the universal and absolute sense. But the defect of the idealist social philosophy which weakens the force of the present author's aggressive defense is its failure to take account of the opposition and irrationality in social experience, of the conflict between the personal-social interests of mankind and the underlying conditions,

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physical and biological, of human existence, of the difference in aim and outlook between human individuals. If the immanent reason which finds expression in the unfolding social order worked as steadily and were as independent of the efforts and aspirations and inventions of "natural" individuals as he seems to think, it is hard to see how present civilization could have come to such a pass as to justify his diatribes against it. The present ills of a sick civilization he would apparently have us think are due to a mistaken emphasis placed in medieval and modern times upon "subjectivity." But this cannot be seriously maintained. We shall not begin to understand our own or any other social situation until we recognize the importance of a factor which the author persistently belittles and derides: the uniqueness of individual personality. It is of course true (as he makes clear) that all individuals move in the same world of existing fact and share in the same system of intelligible meanings. But it is also true that each individual faces his own situation in the world of fact, out of which define themselves meaningful possibilities of adjustment, satisfaction, and achievement which are uniquely his and which can be verified only through his own practical initiative. Society can advance only if it is able to avail itself of the creative powers of individuals. This means that it must afford scope and encouragement for individual insight and invention while at the same time protecting itself against what is arbitrary and ruthless in individual ambition. Professor Jordan says in his concluding pages that organized social activities must be controlled by the creative capacities of thought. He also says that free use must be made of experiment. But the thought to which he is referring is that of the organized deliberative body, and the experimentation is to take place in the realm of ideas rather than the field of action. Legislation, he holds, is essentially a process of speculative thought, of exploring in idea possibilities in the way of social ends and of the means to realize them. Granted that it is, such collective deliberation would be incompetent to direct social development if it were not stimulated and guided by the original insights and inventions of individuals verified by their own practical initiative and enterprise, and if it did not possess any organized instrumentalities of its own for investigation and experimentation. Indeed, the argument and appeal of the book as a whole is weakened by the constraint under which the author's theoretical presuppositions place him of minimizing individual initiative and individual responsibility and of denying the importance of radical conflict in the social experience of man.

The book is well printed, but contains no index; and there is an inexcusable number of typographical errors.

H. W. WRIGHT

UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

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HUMAN VALUES AND VERITIES. By Henry Osborn Taylor. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. Large 8vo. Pp. 282. Price, 8*s.* 6*d.*

This work, by the well-known author of *Thought and Expression in the Sixteenth Century*, etc., adopts a peculiarly personal style. The chapter on philosophy is appropriately headed " 'My' Philosophy." The writer gives us his own personal reactions toward the achievements of mankind in the divers avenues of human effort that correspond to the various faculties of the individual. Taken as a whole, the work is a forcible sermon on the text that the only reliable estimate of value is one that does justice to the whole nature of man, not to thought alone, and particularly not to discursive thought. As a general conclusion this is very sound; but the writer is more fluent and agreeable in his manner of statement than subtle in his criticism or startling in his originality. Only occasionally is he even arrestingly suggestive. The chapter on "Religion" is perhaps the best; but the author might with advantage have included a discussion on the respective effects of a religious and of a purely agnostic or rationalistic teaching on the mind of an average child between the years of three and eight. Observant parents would probably say that a religious teaching is the more conducive to good health; and most men remain children all their lives.

J. C. MEREDITH

CIVILISATION. By Clive Bell. London: Chatto & Windus. 1928. 8vo. Pp. 257. Price, 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

Mr. Clive Bell is well known as an art critic, and his general theory of painting has had a great influence. In this new book he attempts to cover a larger field. The evidence derived from the arts is, of course, much more valuable in estimating the quality of a civilization than any historical records or scientific analysis; and the problem is clearly one of the most important in moral theory, for the "civilization" of which Mr. Bell writes is the moral ideal that is supposed to be accepted in Western Europe. The book begins with an indication of the vagueness in the meaning of the term when statesman and journalist urged us to fight in the war for "civilization." Mr. Bell shows that many of the "virtues" which are popularly supposed to be characteristic of civilization are quite common in barbarism. He chooses as typical civilization fifth-century Athens, Renaissance Italy, and eighteenth-century France—thereby indicating the character of his own criterion of civilized life. Whatever the defect of that criterion—and it is obviously the result of a conventional education

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in Great Britain—clearly a civilized man will have some "sense of values," resulting in a taste for fine products of art and a finesse in manners. Also, it is true, the civilized man will be above all the national man, but the skeptic and the critic, not the scientific dogmatist. "Essentially the civilized man is artificial." That is true.

But Mr. Bell's criterion will not permit him to conceive a man civilized who has an impulse to social transformation in "reform" or "revolution." And so his prejudices—the result, no doubt, of an education in an ancient university, still uncontaminated by students of the "lower orders"—make Mr. Bell give quite undue credit to tyrannies as instruments of culture. He says very truly that "to discredit a civilization it is not enough to show that it is based on slavery and injustice; you must show that liberty and justice would produce something better" (p. 227); and also "an enlightened democracy has yet to be heard of." But there is a grave error in moral theory in the assumption that the ideal is not an ideal because no example of it can be found in history. Again Mr. Bell seems like most literary artists, to imagine that the reformer is a busybody who wants to cut off the author's wine. He does not allow for the possibility that the delight in transforming society from a tyranny or a plutocracy into a finer product of art may be an artistic delight. The true reformer is an artist. His "civilization" is a product of the imagination—not a copy of Athens or Florence or Paris. That he worries the complacent and doubts the excellence of the French eighteenth century does not prove him to be without a finer taste in personality than such savages as Louis XIV. Socrates was partially civilized; he did very well, considering his limitations; but we cannot accept his sketch as a finished picture. The value of such books as this of Mr. Bell's, however, is very great, especially for students of the moral sciences, because treatises have no life, and Mr. Bell's book is alive. It should be read by all lecturers and students of ethics.

C. D. Burns

London, England

SHORTER NOTICES

Falsehood in War Time. By Arthur Ponsonby, M.P. London: Allen & Unwin, 1928. 8vo. Pp. 192. Price, 2*s.* 6*d.* net.

This is a very good summary account of the chief lies used by the press and the British government during the war. The lies used in other nations are not dealt with, although indications are given to show that they were as numerous and as reckless. There is no general conclusion, except the obvious state-

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ment that this is the nature of war. But the collection of facts will prove useful to show what actually is the practice of fraud during war. It is an interesting study of the moral degradation involved in all wars.

C. D. B.

MORAL EXPERIENCE: AN OUTLINE OF ETHICS FOR CLASS TEACHING. By Henry Sturt. London: Watts & Co., 1928. Large 8vo. Pp. 334. Price, 10*s.* 6*d.* net.

This is a popular treatise, in the best sense of both words. But it may prove misleading to teachers and students of ethics. It is less conventional and less abstract than the usual textbooks of ethics, for it begins with the problems of social life, and not until the end of his book does the author deal with the doctrines of philosophers. The chapter on sin is good, although short. The discussion of war is clear, but, on the whole, misleading. The author is entirely and absolutely wrong in certain arguments. For example, he shows that moral virtues have been brought out by war, and he seems to believe that this excuses war—as if the virtue of endurance could excuse cancer. He believes that "the preparation for war is almost entirely good"; and the "almost" is little enough! Competition also is praised. The author therefore is not in the front rank for social perceptiveness.

C. D. B.

THE LIBERAL STATE: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. By Thomas Whittaker. 2d ed., revised and partly rewritten. London: Watts & Co., 1928. 8vo. Pp. 159.

The first edition of this book was published in 1907, and the author says that events and ideas of twenty years have not changed his political principles. Mr. Whittaker's political philosophy is informed by historical knowledge and by wide reading. His preface refers to the classical tradition. His book is useful as an indication of the survival of the older liberalism, not necessarily in a Liberal party, in England. But the material for modern political thought is to be found rather in the daily experience of contemporary life. In the treatment of what Mr. Whittaker calls socialism it would be difficult to find any relevance, especially as he allows the ancient phrasing to survive in his definition of socialism as "the actual conduct by a central government of all industrial operations." If that is socialism, then there are no socialists.

C. D. B.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: A CHAPTER IN WORLD-POLITICS. By John Spencer Bassett. Foreword by James T. Shotwell. London: Longman's, 1928. 8vo. Pp. 428. Price, 15*s.* net.

This will, no doubt, prove to be an interesting book for those who fail to see the League system in operation. It gives realistic details and, after a very

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summary account of the Covenant and the League organization, it recounts the events connected with the League since its beginning in 1920. Probably the book will be useful to the general reader. The summary account of the Covenant may be a little misleading, especially as the actual functions of the Council do not seem to be clearly distinguished by the author from those of the Assembly. As for the assertion that the text of the Treaty is abstract, the author does not seem to be aware of the Phillimore draft nor of the experience of inter-ally war organizations. In recounting the historical events of the past few years, the author is picturesque. He tells us, on journalistic authority, that there were magnolias at Locarno and that Sir Austen Chamberlain carried a brown paper envelope. It may be true; the only question that arises in one's mind is whether it is relevant. It is possible for the historian of picturesque detail to see nothing important. However, Professor Bassett's book is probably intended to be of interest to the general reader. He makes no contribution to political philosophy or to the history of moral experience. His statesmen are schoolboys. However, the record of events is dated, and the summary is useful.

C. D. B.

THE UNCONSCIOUS IN ACTION: ITS INFLUENCE UPON EDUCATION. By Barbara Low. Foreword by Professor T. P. Nunn. London: University of London Press, 1928. 8vo. Pp. 228. Price, 5*s.* net.

This small book is a note on the value of psychoanalysis for parents and teachers. It shows how certain depths in the personality are usually neglected. It touches upon authority and discipline and upon the hindrances to thought from emotional processes. Finally, there is a criticism of the Montessori system, of the self-government method in school, and of mental tests. Miss Low is already known as an able writer on psychoanalysis, and in this little book she certainly gives us many valuable indications drawn from modern psychology for use in the education of children. The criticism of mental tests is valuable, since mental tests have become a sort of educational fetish.

C. D. B.

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT. Translated with introduction, notes and index, by J. C. Meredith, Judge of the High Court, Irish Free State. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928. 8vo. Pp. 208. Price, 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

The introductory essays in this new edition of Kant's work are cleverly written and pointed. There is none of the traditional jargon of metaphysics; for the author has a very vivid sense of the realities of which Kant wrote. The volume completes the new translation of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, of which the first part, on the *Aesthetic Judgment*, was published in 1911. The problem of moral values is very well analyzed in the introductory essays to this new volume, which makes therefore a valuable contribution to ethics. It will correct the present tendency to concentrate upon psychology.

C. D. B.

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THE LIFE OF HASTINGS RASHDALL. By P. E. Matheson. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1928. Pp. 267. Price, 18*s.* net.

The main appeal of this "Life" is to theologians, churchmen, and those interested in recent Anglican controversies. To these it will come as a welcome and endearing memento of a fine churchman. But those primarily interested in *The Theory of Good and Evil* will not find much beyond C. C. J. Webb's short chapter (10 pages) on "Rashdall as Philosopher and Theologian." A somewhat jerky chronological treatment states rather than presents the charm of Rashdall's personality.

E. F. METTRICK

JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION. By W. A. Robson. London: Macmillan, 1928. Large 8vo. Pp. 346. Price, 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

This is a most valuable and important treatise on "real politics." It is a refutation of the old fiction that there is a separation of the "powers" in Great Britain or the United States and also of the fiction that there is no "administrative justice" in Great Britain. But the most important feature in the book is its candid analysis of facts. The state has undertaken new functions, which have made it necessary to reinforce the incentive in certain particulars. Again Mr. Robson analyzes "the judicial mind," and he shows how modern institutions have been affected by new conceptions of social welfare. The principles at work are ethical; and the study of such books as these will do more to illuminate the teaching of social ethics than many commentaries upon "free will" and "the good." Impartiality, for example, is fundamental in deciding a moral issue; but in practice is there such a thing as impartiality? There are many new judicial tribunals of a "private" character, such as committees of clubs, which are socially important. Finally, there is the difficulty that the administrative officers who, under modern acts, are given judicial power may not be competent as judges. The whole book is full of important ethical problems and suggestive ideas.

C. D. B.

THE CORRESPONDENCE OF SPINOZA. Translated and edited by A. Wolf. London: Allen & Unwin, 1928. 8vo. Price, 15*s.* net.

This correspondence consists of eighty-six letters, about fifty written by Spinoza, and the remainder to him. His chief correspondent is Henry Oldenburg, secretary of the Royal Society. In letter No. 30 we come across the earliest mention of the *Tractatus Theologico Politicus*—that higher criticism of the Bible born before its time. Just then (1665) there is a break of 10 years, and the rest of the correspondence with Oldenburg is taken up with discussion of that famous treatise. There is further criticism thereof in letters from Velthuysen to Ostens (No. 42), from Spinoza to Ostens (No. 43), from Steno (No. 67a), from Burgh (No. 67), and from Spinoza to Burgh (No. 76). Letter

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No. 58 to G. H. Schuller, a young doctor, who was with Spinoza at his death, is concerned with free will or free and compelled necessity, as Spinoza puts it. The next letter to Schuller (No. 64), and the four letters to Tschirnhans (Nos. 60, 66, 81, and 83) are important to students of the *Ethics*. The letter about the Infinite referred to in No. 81 seems to be No. 12, to L. Meyer. The correspondence with that honest grain broker, Van Blyenbergh, is delightful; that with Mr. Hugo Boxel, who held that "there are ghosts of all kinds, but possibly none of the female sex," drew a smile from the ever serious B.D.S.

Mr. Wolf's work is admirable, see especially his annotations in letters 2 and 64.

J. C. MEREDITH

A CATHOLIC VIEW OF HOLISM. By Monsignor Kolbe. Foreword by Right Hon. General Smuts. London: Macmillan & Co. 8vo. Pp. 67. Price, 2*s*. 6*d*. net.

This essay originally appeared as a series of articles in the weekly press of Cape Town. It contains a few snapshots of holism, but for the most part it is devoted to considering, "not what General Smuts has expressly put forward as his theory, but what the Catholic student should have in his own mind while studying that theory." The transcendent spiritual nature of the angels and of the kingdom of grace would appear to be the more important of the matters to be kept in mind. Monsignor Kolbe contends, quite fairly, that the central idea of holism is an old Aristotelian idea in a new garb. It might with equal fairness be contended that there is not much difference between that idea and Kant's "intrinsic finality." The pages which Monsignor Kolbe devotes to showing that the biological unit is not "the cell," but "a continuous mass of protoplasm," are the best in the essay; but those devoted to a criticism of the theory of relativity do not suggest any grasp of the subject. Einstein is not to be disposed of by cheap jibes.

J. C. MEREDITH

THE CONQUEST OF ILLUSION. By J. J. van der Leeuw. London and New York: Knopf, 1928. Pp. 234. Price, 10*s*. 6*d*.

All academic philosophy is wrong; philosophers and wayfaring men alike wander in error. They erroneously conceive "space and time and the rich variety of sense quantities to be independent realities existing outside me." The solipsists too are in error, for they deny the real world. Only those are right who recognize the fundamental illusion of assuming that *our* world is *the* world, and that somehow from that "conquest of illusion" build up a mystic, intuitionist farrago where all the problems of philosophy are short-circuited and where they glory in a celestial vision of freedom, love, justice, and immortality here and now. Doubtless many enjoy such entrancing vagueness and such a sense of wisdom; the rest will do well to keep their 10*s*. 6*d*. in their pockets.

E. F. METTRICK

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MORAL EXPERIENCE: AN OUTLINE OF ETHICS FOR CLASS TEACHING. By Henry Sturt. London: Watts & Co., 1928. Pp. 335. Price, 10*s.* 6*d.*

Moral judgment pronounces something to be intrinsically valuable, and this has a very definite meaning for man, which is enough, since for man there cannot be anything ulterior to mankind. And things judged of intrinsic value can be organized: so too can the state and all the institutions which favor the growth of moral qualities in men. In fact, morality is the living together in community, and progress in morality depends on the establishment of deliberate contrivances for improving the conditions of human life. The will to such improvements is chiefly found in a "truly democratic community." Conversely, we might in a practical spirit consider what human qualities are most fit for such a life. Here lies the most valuable part of this book, which is devised to teach us to manage men and arrange our own lives. It is a welcome if somewhat inadequate return to the Aristotelian intimacy of statesmanship and morality. But it is a poor textbook, and would have been better written simply as a wider exposition of the author's excellent little essay, *Human Value* (1923).

E. F. METTRICK

THE UNIQUE STATUS OF MAN. By Herbert Wildon Carr. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1928. Pp. 216. Price, 8*s.* 6*d.*

Though the author hardly makes clear his theme, or even follows one theme consecutively, this book is worth careful attention. The real aim is to show how the free-will problem arose, changed in form under the influence of seventeenth-century physics, and found in recent times, as Professor Carr maintains, a definite solution.

The theory of relativity has disposed alike of the Newtonian conception of space and time and of the nineteenth-century conception of matter. Reality is relative to the observer, and materiality to the kind of activity. Moreover, on the Bergsonian view of evolution as creative, the original and essentially free activity has produced both mind and matter as the conditions of its own efficiency. Hence the problem of freedom is no longer the vain pitting of an epiphenomenal mind against a real world of matter wholly governed by causal laws; that "real world of matter" has been banished to limbo, and freedom is the activity of creative mind which "acquires efficiency by materializing."

But even if the "life force" is free, and even if reality is essentially "monadic," does this prove that man has a unique status? We think not. And one thing we must note: the author, building on Hegel's "positive freedom," has radically changed the problem of freedom before he has "solved" it.

E. F. METTRICK

THE MISBEHAVIORISTS. By Harvey Wickham. New York: Lincoln MacVeagh, The Dial Press, 1928. Pp. 294. Price, $3.50.

A rapid-fire and highly unsystematic criticism of "the modern temper," the temper which, it is said, "seeks to do away with the romantic ideal of a

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world well lost for love and with the classic ideal of austere dignity." The criticism is of several of the best sellers of the day: Browne, Dorsey, Durant, Freud, Watson, Wiggam. The method is a satirical display of inconsistencies and an implicit appeal to inherited sentiments. The object seems to be to free men from the lure of scientific sophists so that they may, and will, reaffirm faith in God and freedom of the will. The ethical norms appealed to are of the type referred to by Socrates as unworthy of man.

T. V. S.

CULTURE. By G. Elliott Smith, Bronislaw Malinowski, Herbert J. Spinden, and Alexander Goldenweiser. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1927. Pp. 106. Price, $1.00.

In an opening essay, Professor Smith defends the opinion that independent invention has played little part in the development of culture and that Egypt has been a primary source of diffusion. The two following essays attack, respectively, Professor Smith's principles and his selection of facts. In a short but able concluding essay, Professor Goldenweiser shows that the point at issue has not been clearly stated, that consequently much of the argument has been wasted, and that no single answer to the question involved is possible.

CHARNER M. PERRY

THE CREATIVE EAST. By J. W. T. Mason. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1928. Pp. 144.

Published in "The Wisdom of the East Series," this small volume evaluates the civilizations of India, China, and Japan with reference to "creative freedom." Self-fulfilment is taken as the goal of creative freedom; and spiritual, aesthetic, and utilitarian activities are here taken as the three factors in self-fulfilment. India is taken as emphasizing the first factor to the neglect of the other two, particularly of the utilitarian; China is taken as emphasizing the aesthetic; and Japan is thought to exemplify all three in promising fashion. The treatment of all is tolerant and urbane.

T. V. S.

THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM MORRIS. By Anna A. von Helmholtz-Phelan. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1927. Pp. 207. Price, $3.50.

A spirited and highly sympathetic account of William Morris' social philosophy. The first part deals with the formative factors in his social personality; the second, with the history of Morris' socialism; and the third, with a critical exposition of his social ideals as such. The rôle of art in leading him through a democratic awakening into organized socialism, and then in coloring the ideals for which he worked, is emphasized. The volume is an attractive instance of the book-maker's art.

T. V. S.

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MODERN YOUTH AND MARRIAGE. By Henry Neumann. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1928. Pp. xii+148. Price, $1.50.

This is not so much a reply to, as a plea against, contemporary emphasis, notably that of Judge Ben B. Lindsey, upon sex freedom. The so-called "companionate marriage" is not here regarded as being a promising line in which to move for readjustment. There is no desire here voiced for a return to the marital rigor of more difficult divorce; but there is fear of our going farther in the other direction than we have already gone. The author thinks that current estimates of extra-marital sex contacts among the young are too high, but he is concerned with the seriousness of the present situation at whatever minimum it may be estimated. His sole reliance seems to be upon "education," especially of the ethical sort that will redignify traditional marriage and revivify the virtues in disposition that were supposed to make it successful and happy. The temper of the treatise is tolerant and high-minded; but it is doubtful whether the author has done justice to the reconstruction of marriage indicated by the gradual economic emancipation and education of women, the lessened lure of an increasing population, and the easier availability of venereal prophylaxis.

T. V. S.

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BRIGHTMAN, EDGAR SHEFFIELD. A Philosophy of Ideals. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1928. Pp. v+243.

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

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FREEDOM AS FACT AND CRITERION

FRANK H. KNIGHT

STUDENTS of ethics or social science hardly need to be reminded that one of the leading modern schools of ethical thought has been dominated by economists. The English-speaking world in particular has been utilitarian in its theory and its folk-mind from the age of the Enlightenment. Hence some reflections by an economist on utilitarianism and ethics generally may be worth consideration.

For present purposes, it is the political rather than the properly ethical aspect of utilitarianism, and especially the separation of the two, which is of interest. It is one thing to ask what is Good, and another to inquire as to what social policy is to be carried out, and by what agencies, in order to realize the Good as far as possible. There might, indeed, be such a connection between the two questions that the answer to one would largely involve an answer to the other; but it is an essential feature of utilitarian theory that it makes the separation complete.

The good, according to the utilitarians, is pleasure, which is a purely individual matter. We shall not stop to criticize this conception of the good. The issue regarding it is in fact largely verbal. Utilitarians expressly define the term "pleasure" in an all inclusive sense; it covers high pleasures and low pleasures, the pleasure of being good and that of being bad, the pleasure of peace and also that of strife, even the "pleas-

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ure" of martyrdom. If pleasure is defined as identical with motivation in general, there naturally can be no motive but pleasure—and if it is defined in any other way, there will necessarily be other motives. And that is all that appears to be worth saying on that point, with the possible exception of questioning whether it is an economical use of language to take two perfectly good words to mean the same thing when there are significantly different ideas which they might be used to distinguish with less departure from their ordinary meaning in speech and writing. The important point, however, is that for utilitarianism good is individual, and the individual is the ultimate judge of it; what is good is that the individual shall get what he wants. To Bentham especially, the particular beauty of the theory was that it definitely removed the ethical question from the domain of practical politics and set up an "objective criterion" of public policy.[1]

The actual goal of political action then became the essentially negative ideal of *freedom,* i.e., the "greatest good" will be realized through "maximum freedom."[2] Details were worked out by the British laissez faire economists, beginning with Bentham's older contemporary, Adam Smith, and culminating in Herbert Spencer, a biological sociologist rather than an economist of technical competence. In practical application, the doctrine of maximum individual freedom necessitates a further assumption, namely that the individual is the final judge of the *means* to his own happiness, as well as of the result. The utilitarian-economic position on both points is, however, relativistic. It need not be assumed that the indi-

[1] We need not pause to consider expressly the now familiar fact of a contradiction between two aspects of the pleasure theory, psychological and ethical hedonism. If every individual universally and necessarily seeks his own maximum pleasure, it is hard to see sense in saying that he ought to do so.

[2] Dean Pound derives the doctrine of maximum freedom in legal theory from the "metaphysical" foundations of Kant (*Law and Morals,* p. 103, etc.); but he elsewhere admits that all the modern schools of jurisprudence come out at essentially the same practical conclusion. It seems to be the only kind of political ideal which has meaning for the modern mind, especially the Anglo-American mind.

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vidual's knowledge is perfect, or even very good, but only that it is *better* than that of the outside agency of control, practically speaking a political bureaucracy. Smith and his followers notoriously placed their emphasis on the stupidity of governments rather than the competence of individuals, and the modern reader must keep in mind the character of the governments which formed the basis of their judgments.[8]

Sharply definite formulation of the principle of freedom waited for Herbert Spencer. In contrast with Smith, who mixed genial humanity with his hard common sense, Spencer was the cold, passionately dispassionate thinker. He explicitly defined pleasure as any mental state men strive to get or keep, and pain as the opposite. He traced conflicts of interest to biological-economic roots in the distribution of the material means of individual enjoyment, and gave the freedom theory its classical, quantitative expression as the right of each to the maximum freedom compatible with equal freedom for all others. He also supported it with a deduction from an evolutionary-biological law that life is necessarily increased and improved by making each individual free to act and to reap the consequences of his acts, since pleasure-giving and life-sustaining acts are "necessarily" identical. The good in life is its balance of pleasure over pain, and Spencer was unconscious of the absurdity involved in combining ethical with psychological hedonism.

[8] In England it was, of course, the period of the "rotten-borough" Parliament and the Hannoverian Kings whom Thackeray rhymed so spicily:

"Vile George the First was reckoned;
Viler still was George the Second;
And what mortal ever heard
Any good of George the Third!
When George the Fourth to Hell descended,
Thank the Lord the George's ended."

It is not clear just how much of a theoretical hedonist Smith was when he wrote the *Wealth of Nations*. His views seem to reflect rather "hard common sense" than rigorous analysis, and undoubtedly contain an element of the Puritan conviction that it is good for the soul as well as conducive to happiness for the individual to make his own decisions and take the consequences of his own acts.

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Contemporary with Spencer, the subjective-value school of economists worked out the implicit rationale of the economic, utilitarian political philosophy of maximum freedom or laissez faire. The result may be summed up in a series of propositions: (1) The good is pleasure (or happiness, the substitution of terms being largely an evasive effort to soften the position). (2) Each pleasure has its specific desire or motive, which impels conduct with a force proportional to the magnitude of the pleasure. (3) The intensity of any pleasure and the force of the desire for it decrease together as more of any pleasure is enjoyed, in comparison with other pleasures sacrificed to obtain the first (law of diminishing utility). (4) Consequently, an individual if left "free to choose" must automatically proportion his activities in such a way as to secure the maximum total of pleasure from the available means. (5) Interrelations between individuals work automatically, so as to bring about a maximum of pleasure all around, if such relations are also "free" or voluntary, on both sides (free exchange), including the freedom of each individual to bargain with whichever opposing party offers the best terms (free competition). Hence the field of group control is restricted to the prevention of relations other than those of competitive free exchange, specifically the protection of property and enforcement of contract.

Passing over various mechanical implications or hidden assumptions which still trouble economic theory,[4] our purpose here is to show that the very notion of freedom as a "criterion" is illusory. The theory of maximum freedom if really followed through, ends in a question-begging justification of whatever human relations happen to exist, and the only way to escape this result and arrive at any ethical judgment is to appeal to

[4] Such as the tendency of freedom to eventuate in monopoly rather than competition, the fact that bargains between individuals usually have effects, good or bad, for persons other than the immediate parties, the further fact that many wants like culture and a beautiful environment must practically be provided for on a local group basis if at all, etc. See Pigou, *Economics of Welfare*.

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an ethical judgment as such. If the notion of freedom has any ethical significance, it is derived from prior ethical norms.

The fatal defect in the utilitarian doctrine of maximum freedom as a goal of social policy is its confusion of freedom and power. Its advocates overlook the fact that freedom to perform an act is meaningless unless the subject is in possession of the requisite means of action, and that the practical question is one of power rather than of formal freedom.[5] As its actual test of equality of freedom, the utilitarians set up voluntary exchange. That is, no individual is to be asked to make a sacrifice or render a service at the behest of another unless he receives in return what he himself considers a full equivalent. Plausible this argument undoubtedly is, but there is a gaping hole in the logic. An "equivalent" to the choosing individual himself is simply the maximum that he can be made to pay, a standard of force with no flavor of fairness. An ostensible provision for "fair" equivalence comes in only through the workings of the competitive market, establishing a general scale of prices. Thus the *most* that exchange relations can do is to assure that each individual shall keep, quantitatively unimpaired, the stock of values originally possessed, as measured by free exchange among persons whose original stocks were whatever they happened to be. The principle merely settles the ethical problem by decreeing fixity for all eternity of the *existing* distribution of means of enjoyment, as measured by a process the results of which also depend on the starting point. By a twofold *petitio-principii* it sanctifies the *status*

[5] Another deficiency of utilitarianism on the side of ethics proper is its restriction of the notion of the Good to values realized through conduct and use of material means. It has nothing to say about purely internal problems of appreciation or attitude such as are the chief concern of religion in its esthetic and mystical aspects.

In our opinion it is unwise to attempt to vindicate freedom as an ideal by defining it to include power. Thus Graham Wallas calls freedom the capacity for continuous initiative, and others distinguish between positive and negative freedom. It is surely better to work out clearly the relation between freedom and power as distinct factors in conduct.

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quo. The result rests on an ethical judgment, and on an ethically indefensible one. Its ethic is in the first place the right to keep what one has. But it does not stop there, as will presently be pointed out more in detail; it also sets up the right to use what one has to get more, without limit!

The weakness of this theory of maximum benefit through maximum freedom defined by voluntary exchange could not go entirely unnoticed. Theorists of the subjective-value school were accused of bringing forth their doctrine as an answer to the socialistic labor theory of value. But if it might be used apologetically in that connection, its net significance was clearly against the fairness of the established value-scale rather than in its favor. For the principle of diminishing utility seems to lead at once to the conclusion that total utility can always be increased through one-sided transfers from persons who have more to those who have less, and hence establishes an equalitarian ideal of society. Early in the history of the subjective-value movement, one of the leaders of the Austrian school wrote a book to deal with this difficulty. He got around it theoretically by admitting that value or price does not correspond to personal significance or utility in the actual world, and making the theory "hypothetical," to fit the ideal conditions of a communistic society.[6]

Two other ways out of the difficulty presented themselves. Economists might insist on a strict separation of their subject from ethics and set up as a "science," devoted to the description and explanation of things as they are in an actually existing social order,[7] or if persistent in the interest to justify or

[6] *Der natürliche Wert*, by Friedrich von Wieser, 1889. Wieser seems almost evasive in his reference to the conditions under which value would actually equal utility. He seems to mean equality of money income, which is not theoretically conclusive, as differences in individual capacities for enjoyment might distort the result in various ways.

[7] This procedure saves the theory of marginal utility, since if men choose intelligently, the *relative* utilities of all dollar's worths of different commodities are equal for every consumer, whether rich or poor.

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criticize as well as explain, they might go back of inequalities in income to conditions of production and distribution. To a considerable degree both courses have been followed, though with by no means the clarity of distinction between the procedures of explanation and criticism that would be desirable. As our interest here is in the ethical question, we shall glance at the workings of the system of "free" exchange at the source of individual incomes.

It goes without saying that men's status with regard to their supply of the means of enjoyment is not finally a matter of stocks of goods, but of a stream of total production and its division into streams flowing to the consumers individually. In modern society it is worked out through money income, which in turn is secured through the continuous offer in exchange of "productive services" (of person, or goods of indirect usefulness). How about the freedom and equality of these exchanges and their result in maximizing total benefit? It is easy to make of the pain-cost theory of value of the classical political economy a social apologetic along this line, which is not fair, but we must limit ourselves to the logic of the question.

Under "perfect competition" it is theoretically true that the income share paid to the individual who furnishes any unit of productive service is equal in market value to the share of the social product causally imputable to that unit of productive service as its contribution to the total. But is there anything ethical about these equivalences? In order to give them ethical significance, two assumptions have to be made, as in the previous case. In the first place, the ethical claim of the owner of any productive service to its contribution to product can be no better than his ethical claim to the "ownership" of the service itself. The distribution of *income* is ethical if we "sanctify the status quo" in regard to the distribution of *wealth*, including personal endowments given by nature and those developed through opportunity and training. In the second place, again, the value-scale by which products and

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contributions are measured is itself a reflection of the existing distribution of ultimate purchasing power.[8]

As a matter of fact, it is superficial to look at the productive resources in a quantitative way. Concretely, they are not amounts, but *kinds*, and only become amounts, so that it is possible to think of quantitative equivalence, through the pricing process. One income receiver furnishes "land," another "labor," and another "capital"; one wheat land and another banana land, one pick-and-shovel work, another bookkeeping or blacksmithing and another managerial service or direction of investments, and so on almost without end. On looking into the price-fixing process by which these services become comparable, we see that it is a matter of "demand" and "supply," or rather the reciprocal of supply, namely scarcity. Hence the amount of income received by any individual depends chiefly on the two considerations of being in a position to render (*a*) services of a sort for the products of which there are consumers who can and will pay large amounts, and (*b*) services of a sort which few or no other persons are prepared to offer. To be sure, one's income also depends on the amount of any given kind of service rendered, other things being equal. But the natural quantitative differences between men are relatively insignificant, and the large incomes are actually received on the ground, either of owning a large amount of wealth or exercising some highly unique and scarce personal capacity, which again is some mixture of natural gift with the results of opportunity and training. It is mainly the scarcity that counts; it

[8] The working of the price mechanism in the control of production is a matter of technical economics rather than ethics, but has its ethical side also. If business men or "entrepreneurs" act intelligently, the higher price offers for productive services can be made by those who use them to produce the goods most in demand and employ the most efficient productive methods. Consequently all productive power is theoretically directed into the channels of greatest usefulness. But again, usefulness is measured by the existing value-scale, which reflects the existing distribution of ownership. If a man of wealth chooses to spend a million dollars for a drawing room or a tomb, that becomes the most useful employment for a million dollars worth of labor and materials, no matter how much want and distress might be relieved by using the labor, etc., to produce necessities of life.

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matters relatively little what the personal peculiarity is. One has to be a rare specimen indeed to make much money writing poetry or playing the cornet, while if exceptional enough one can make a very comfortable income by merely being large, or small, or deformed. Exceptional lawyers, doctors, and business managers also make large incomes, partly on the ground of scarcity but more on that of another principle. The price they command depends on their reputation, more than on concrete performance, and reputation tends to grow cumulatively. In large part their prestige depends on the pay itself, while it is for the prestige that the pay is received.

How far does the principle of freedom go in justifying the differences between incomes? It goes just as far as people really are free, that is, as far as the rendering of (*a*) a larger amount of a given service, (*b*) a service more in demand or (*c*) a scarcer service, is a matter of voluntary choice. That is not far, and it calls for no argument that actual differences rest to an overwhelming extent on differences in power. The evaluation of the separate contributions of individuals to the social total is overwhelmingly a matter of force and not of right, and the inequalities tend overwhelmingly to reduce and not to increase "total satisfaction."[9]

[9] The classical political economy came in its final expression in the works of J. S. Mill and Carines, to recognize that the tendency of values to reflect pain costs is hopelessly obstructed by the lack of freedom of laborers to move from low-paid to high-paid occupations, even over a period of generations. The economists never regarded rent as a remuneration for pain, and Senior, who was the originator of the "abstinence" doctrine, explaining interest on the ground of a pain, explicitly said that after the capital has passed by inheritance or gift from the possession of the original saver the payment for its use should be regarded as a rent. A doctrine of equivalence of reward and sacrifice *at a margin* and *to each individual* was, like the corresponding doctrine of relative marginal utility, wanting in the economic theory of the classical period. It would have saved the pain-cost doctrine from absurdity in the scientific sense, and written its lack of ethical significance where he that runs might read. But a clear separation of the two points of view is still in slow process of achievement.

Regarding the precise extent to which the classical economics and the pain-cost theory of value were, or are, consciously or unconsciously, formulated and taught for the purpose of apologetic, it is clearly useless to speculate. But viewing the matter historically one can hardly help watching the sanctity of property take the place

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To be sure, there is still another step in the argument. Existing capacities to render service, including ownership of wealth, are in turn the result of the working of the economic process in the past. If we pursue our ethical inquiry backward through the process, we shall find that the same principles work cumulatively, but also that two new ones come into play. The amount and kind of economic power possessed by any person "now" depends largely on the amount and kind he possessed "last year." For economic power is used not merely to produce satisfaction-yielding goods, but also (through investment in capital or personal training) to multiply itself. The important point is the powerful tendency for inequality to increase cumulatively, compounding at an enormous rate. For the more wealth or income-producing capacity one possesses the easier it is to invest not merely the same but an increasing fraction of the yield.

The two new principles which come in when considering longer periods of time are inheritance and uncertainty. In an economic order based on the private family, the ownership of wealth by individuals is not dependent alone on the economic rôle played by them in the past, but largely on the accident or brute fact of inheritance. It is not easy to see how any ethical significance can be attached to the receipt of income from inherited wealth (or training, social position, etc.) on grounds of "equal freedom" or any sort of personal desert. The second new principle, uncertainty, is much harder to reduce to formal principles, but is just as obviously important. In fact, the results of productive operations over long periods of time are highly unpredictable. In the use of given resources in producing commodities, uncertainty is relatively unimportant; but in committing productive capacity to new forms and uses it is

of the divine right of kings as the main principle of social order, as the latter had displaced ecclesiastical hegemony, with theorists shifting their ground as the facts change. All these while established were really principles of order, and as such so useful as to justify calling them sacred. All were also bases of exploitation of the many by the few. Whether the human race is capable of establishing order on a principle which does not expressly sanctify exploitation remains for the remote future to determine.

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very great. In other words, the maintenance and increase of productive capacity is in no small degree a matter of *luck,* as well as of the character of choices made.

The conventional classification of productive factors recognizes the three classes, land, labor, and capital, or nature, man, and waiting. From an ethical point of view it would be more significant to analyze income into three sources of free choice or effort, inheritance, and luck. And the greatest of these is luck! The principle of equal freedom, as expressed through a social order based on free exchange, simply takes us nowhere in the solution of the problem of economic justice. Everything depends, not on the character of exchange, but on what individuals bring to the exchange, and this is ultimately a matter of fact and not of ethics. Historically viewed, the significance of the doctrine is to justify inequality, and the project is a failure. A consistent application of the principle of maximum satisfaction would yield a theory of distribution according to effort, if individuals are recognized only as producers, and according to some composite of effort and need if they are treated as abstract human units. And this seems to be in harmony with ordinary moral common-sense if the latter breaks away from mere convention and becomes reasonably critical.

A more direct psychological examination also will show the notion of freedom to be question-begging or meaningless. Scrutiny of any typical case of unfree behavior reveals that the coercive quality rests on an ethical condemnation, rather than the ethical condemnation on a factually established unfreedom; or perhaps it is more accurate to say that they are merely different names for the same thing. Illustrations are at hand in the commonest business or legal relations. The ordinary citizen who sees a desired article in a store does not feel oppressed or constrained because he is not permitted to appropriate it without submitting to the condition of parting with the price—as long as he considers the price necessary or reasonable. And his standards of necessity and reasonable-

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ness, moreover, are entirely relative to the accepted economic organization at large. He may know that the price might be much less if some possessor of unique skill or a unique natural resource would consent to furnish the special service at a much lower yet perfectly possible remuneration. As long as everything is assumed to be in accordance with accepted standards of *fairness,* there is no feeling that freedom is interfered with. All taxes and legislative or administrative regulations take away property values, but they do not "confiscate" if sound social-moral reasons clearly underlie them. We do not feel constrained in having to take the right side of the street or side walk. We simply do not have the feeling of coercion except in connection with one of ethical disapprobation. There is psychological truth in the famous story of the cowboy coroner who brought in a verdict of suicide by doubting the superiority of four deuces to a full-house. Freedom cannot afford an objective standard of policy, a way of escape from the subjectivity of moral judgments, when the feeling of freedom itself is derived from, or at best is another aspect of, moral approval.

Freedom is also relative to power. Our ordinary citizen, again, feels no coercion in not being able to buy an object which he does not have money enough to pay for (unless, again, the fact is due to some "unfair" manipulation). It is nonsense to say that I am not "free" to fly (without mechanical aid) or that a paralyzed man has his freedom restricted by locking his door. But it may well be that under different conditions, if society were organized or administered on different principles or certain individuals had behaved differently, the individual excluded or helpless in a given situation would have had power to act. And so he may perfectly well be the victim of a heinous wrong. But it is a clear misuse of words to describe the wrong as a deprivation of freedom. It is a deprivation of *power.* The "wrongs" on grounds of which social organization or policy is to be criticized undoubtedly have the character of inequitable distribution of power rather than un-

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ethical coercion or interference with the use of power. But for *neither* sort of wrongs is the notion of freedom a criterion by which definition or identification is possible.

From an abstractly logical standpoint, again, the difficulties of the notion of freedom go still deeper. In the world-view of natural science freedom is simply a meaningless word. In terms of physical causality (behaviorism) all human acts alike and equally have their physical antecedents from which they inevitably follow, and beyond the description of these antecedent conditions no intelligent statement can be made. Nor do we in any way escape from the difficulty by recognizing mental states, attitudes or motives as causes. In that case all acts alike and equally have their adequate motives. No factual attribute or descriptive difference in either physical antecedent or motive will make one act (of a private individual or government official) right and another wrong. At most the ethical question is merely carried back a step. If we adopt the view that acts are to be fully accounted for by motives, then in order to validate any difference between right and wrong acts we must find some basis for discrimination between right and wrong motives. If we say that acts are to be fully accounted for by antecedent physical conditions it seems to be nonsensical to talk about ethical differences at all, for we can hardly call one physical configuration right and another wrong.

It will be seen that the issue regarding freedom is entirely unconnected with the old metaphysical problem of free-will. If one believes in freedom, in that sense, all choices are alike and equally free, within the limits of the possible alternatives open. If one does not believe in freedom, then all acts are alike and equally *determined* (by physical or psychological conditions, or both, according to taste). Practical requirements, however, call for a working distinction between two sorts of acts, some free and some unfree, and for a valid means of assigning some acts to one class and some to the other. The thinker whose mechanistic bias is strong enough will simply deny that the distinction has any meaning; but he will hardly convince

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any jurist or legislator who is "up against" the practical problem that he does not have to make the classification. Our suggestion is that the fallacy comes in seeking an objective standard, or one which does not finally rest on a judgment of ethical approval and disapproval. We say that the victim of a highwayman is coerced, not because the character of his choice between the alternatives presented is different from any other choice, but because we think the robber does "wrong" in making the alternatives what they are.

In no other sense is it possible to speak of coercion. No human being can ever literally "force" another to do anything (though one may of course forcibly prevent another from acting). It is most unfortunate that the word force has come to have such a confusing ambiguity of meaning; for the *threat of violence* (or threat of inflicting some other injury or loss) as a means of controlling the conduct of a human being has only a figurative kinship with the action of a physical force in changing the state of rest or motion of a mass of matter. It is interesting to note that when conduct is influenced by an offer to improve one's condition, instead of a threat of worsening it, we do not call it force or duress. The intensity of "moral pressure" exerted by a bribe is felt to be less than that due to a threat, no doubt because of the tendency to assume that the person affected must have been in a tolerable situation to begin with. Perhaps it is generally true that men feel a negative change in condition more keenly than a positive change, or perhaps we should have to seek for some historical or accidental explanation of the fact that the law takes a different attitude toward bribes than toward threats. The point of this discussion is presumably clear, and need not be labored further. It is simply and briefly that freedom is itself an ethical category and cannot possibly furnish an objective criterion for moral judgments of legislative policy.

However, if the argument for this negative result is sound, it can be followed out to some broader and more positive conclusions, of significance for the character of social "sci-

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ence," and that of ethics. This general argument may be summarized in two main stages, both of which are perhaps "self-evident" in the only sense that expression ever rightly carries. The first of these conclusions or propositions is that the notion of economy, or efficiency, or degree or extent of desire satisfaction is not "objective" in the sense in which physical occurrences and magnitudes are objective. Yet the very notion of policy, or of a practical problem, involves at a minimum the former notion of a possible greater or less degree of achievement of a desired end. There can be no such subject matter as economics nor any intelligent discussion of conduct in a practical sense which does not run in terms of teleology. One might treat of the movements of the human body or its members in terms of physiology,[10] or perhaps admit the possibility of conscious accompaniments of such changes on a merely factual level.[11] But such a discussion would not hold any place for recognizing that such movements present a problem to the behaving organism itself; the movements so treated would not be conduct, in the meaning which the term actually has to educated human beings. If, at a minimum, the concepts of desire and satisfaction, end (in a personal sense), and achievement of end, are not "real" or "objective" in the sense of being valid units in discourse, then the whole content of economics, technology and all practical discussion whatever is illusion, and the discussion itself is without meaning, mere raving. That this is not true is as certain as any assertion whatever—*at least*

[10] The same logic will in fact just as conclusively eliminate the physiological point of view also, reducing physiology to physics and chemistry. Nor will it end there. The premises of modern physics eliminate all *content* in that field also; matter is resolved into energy, a pure intangible, a physical non-existent, and one is left with a sort of higher geometry of an indeterminate number of dimensions, a system of abstract relations of a purely ideal character.

[11] It is more than doubtful whether this is in fact logically allowable. No human being could have any way of knowing the existence of such purely phenomenal conscious states unless we admit the validity of processes of inference totally different from those involved in our knowledge of physical reality and hence just as subjective, metaphysical, and inadmissible as the notion of value which the scientific intellect finds so repugnant, and the effort to get rid of which raised all these questions in the first place.

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as certain as any assertion regarding those external physical objects which are the subject-matter of the natural sciences. The conclusion in regard to the status of the notions of desire and satisfaction does not, for readers of this *Journal,* need to be put into words.

The second general conclusion is fully as repugnant as the first to the intellectual cravings of twentieth-century man, but is also unescapable. No *discussion* of *policy* is possible apart from a moral judgment. The argument of the body of this paper has shown that an appeal to maximum freedom as a "standard" involves a fallacy. The result is dogmatic acceptance of an existing distribution of power, which is an ethical proposition, a value-judgment in disguise, and an ethically indefensible one. Moreover, it involves logical contradictions. Freedom means freedom to use power, and the only possible limitation on the use of power is intrinsically ethical. To say that one is restrained from the use of power by other than ethical considerations amounts to saying that he does not really have the power, that it is cancelled by some opposing force. Freedom and coercion are ethical categories, and the only question in regard to which *discussion* can possibly be carried on is the question of what power *ought* to be exercised, or how and under what circumstances. Why should one not be as *free* to use political power as economic power? As far as the mere notion of freedom is concerned, there is no reason why the majority in a democratic state, or the sovereign group in any state, should not dispossess and exploit the rest of society at their pleasure. And the consistent theoretical utilitarian would have to pronounce the result, whatever it might be, in perfect conformity with his ethical principles. Those principles can never carry him beyond a begging of the question in justification of the *status quo.* The only real objection that could be raised is some form of the statement that political power ought not to be used in that way.

Indeed, it appears to be self-evident, as stated above, that the only reason one person should yield to another, in pleasure

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or well-being or self-realization or whatever it be called (for they are all merely different words for value or the good) is either (*a*) that he must (in which case he has no choice, no problem exists), (*b*) that he wishes to do so (and hence there is a purely personal problem), or (*c*) that he feels a duty or obligation to do so, which gives rise to a new sort of problem, a moral or ethical problem. The notion of duty or obligation is an ultimate fact of experience—as much so as desire and satisfaction, or space, time, matter, motion, and force.

Or (we might add) life, or consciousness, or beauty; and a more detailed examination would greatly extend the list of kinds of "reality" which the exigencies of talking sense compel us to recognize in this "pluralistic universe." But there appears to be justification for giving special recognition as above, to three levels of experience and of subject matter for intelligent discussion. There is first, the field of external fact (science in the narrow sense) in which the relations of events in space and time present no problem in any sense to the material undergoing change. Questions arise in this field only to man as an outsider, as problems of knowledge, in relation to pure curiosity (if there is such a thing) or to the *means* of action. Human behavior may be conceived and studied in either of these two ways: either as scientific data in which the only problem can be to discover "uniformities of coexistence and sequence,"—in more modern terms, stable configurations in space-time—or as a problem of "economy," the adaptation of means to ends. The ends are *data,* but not physically existent data, nor yet values; they are purely personal desires. Discussion on this second level, however, involves something over and above the description of actual events. It involves a judging of conduct, but only from the standpoint of the *intelligence* displayed. The norm is that of efficiency.

On the third level, ends and not merely means are problematic, and are to be discussed and judged. That men do pass such judgments, rating some aims or objectives of action to be higher or more worthy than others and recognizing that it

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is possible to be in *error* in regard to such ratings as well as in regard to choice of means for securing given ends, is perhaps more of an observed fact than a conclusion established by reasoning. It is hardly necessary to remark to people who have reflected at all about the foundations of knowledge that the common distinction between what is observed and what is inferred is naïve and untenable.

So finally, the argument as to the interpretation of freedom as an ethical standard leads even to a suggestion to the philosopher in his supreme function of ontologist. Viewing the matter in terms of the ineluctible practical exigencies, it is hard to deny "reality" to any notion which has to be recognized as a condition of a tolerable ordering of conduct or of intelligible discourse, or "truth" to any proposition the opposite of which is indisputably more wrong than the proposition itself. Accuracy is a matter of degree, even in the most exact measurements of space. From such a point of view, both private motives in behavior and ethical evaluations have to be recognized as real, and ultimately just as real as behavior itself, considered merely as a change in physical configuration or movement of matter in space.

From the point of view of "radical empiricism," indeed, the problem presented is that of explaining why the modern mind has developed the tendency to explain everything by correlating it with some change in physical configuration, to refuse to accept any other explanation or to regard anything else as truly real. The tendency itself is unquestionably "real" (and this proposition might go far in deciding the ultimate nature of reality and truth, for matter and motion are after all ideas, culture facts with a culture history and explanation). The writer of the present argument feels the bias toward physical-mechanistic thought as strongly as anyone does or can. Primitive atomism, which explains all change as a rearrangement of hard inert particles in space, is unquestionably more solid and satisfying to the mind, gives one more the feeling of really knowing what one is talking about, than any other

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view of phenomena. But a little study of physics, more effectively than any amount of psychology and philosophy, shows conclusively that such a description of the world leaves out most of the facts, and those rather the most interesting and important. The first thing that physical theory does to the physical world of common knowledge is to annihilate it; all its properties of visibility, tangibility, etc., by which it can be known, are shown to be purely subjective and the reality back of them to be unknowable. Neither the hard particle nor even the space in which it moves stands up under critical examination, or can be at all what it seems. The equations will not balance without putting in various intangibles, force, energy, and potential energy, which are fully as bad as creative will, if indeed they can be kept from running into the latter.

We have to face the fact that our craving for a simple, monistic, mechanical explanation of experience is intrinsically doomed to frustration. However, an explanation of why men have such a craving will go far to take the place of satisfaction for the craving itself. Our final suggestion is that there is a fairly obvious explanation for the phenomenon along pragmatic lines. Thought is to begin with, mainly, and throughout its history in considerable part, a biological function, a phase of organic adaptation, which in its developed stage is more and more adaptation of the environment rather than the organism. Now the only way in which the organism which has developed to the stage of purposiveness can change his environment in the least is by *moving* some part of it in space.

The sole point of effective contact between mind and matter is through the voluntary muscles and the sole activity of which they are capable is precisely this change of physical configuration or rearrangement in space, first of the members of the organism itself and secondarily of external objects. Is not this the source and meaning of the bias for reducing all existence to physical existence and all change to change in spatial configuration?

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EMERGENCE AND INTELLIGIBILITY

G. WATTS CUNNINGHAM

THE purpose of the present paper is to consider two questions in connection with the conception of emergent evolution and the basal issue which their discussion raises. The questions are: (1) In precisely what sense may the theory of emergence be said to be a new theory? and (2) Is the theory, as new, logically explanatory or only a neat confession of ignorance wholly without explanatory significance? The basal point at issue is the nature of explanation, and what, in the end, we are to understand by intelligibility.

1. In answer to the question as to what in the theory of emergence is new, one may certainly say, negatively, that insistence upon the appearance of the novel does not in itself constitute this novelty. In some sense the progressive appearance of the novel has all along been admitted in principle by both mechanistic and finalistic theories. For it has by them been generally taken for granted that out of the original causes (however interpreted) have come phenomena which in the beginning were not explicitly present. At least tacit recognition of this is characteristic of even the primitive myths of creation, as it is of the speculations of the Greek physicists from Thales on; and it has tended to become more and more crucial in the later evolutionary stories. The difference between earlier and later stages in the temporal series has generally been accepted as a matter of course, at least as a point of departure for further analysis; and it has been so accepted, I take it, for the reason that prima facie it is the most evident feature of the advent of phenomena in time. Mere insistence upon the appearance of the novel, then, is itself not novel; all of the modern evolutionary views, and all of the more ancient views in so far as they are concerned with the same set of phenomena, have seen that there appear in the temporal series

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characteristics which could hardly be ascribed to it "in the beginning." So we must look elsewhere for the differentia of that view which nowadays is called the view of emergence.

Looking elsewhere, one might expect to find the unique characteristic of the theory in the peculiar nature of that which is supposed to emerge. But here, again, one is doomed to disappointment.

With reference to the nature of the emergent, there seem to be two possible views. On the one hand, one may hold that the emergent is of the nature of a term; on the other hand, one may seek the emergent among relations. According to the first view, some constituent or entity (variously describable in detail) under certain conditions appears *de novo* in the series; according to the second view, that which thus appears is not an entity, but a novel order or arrangement of the old material. Adapting the terminology of Broad to the present context, I shall call the first view "substantial" emergence, and the second "structural" emergence.

It is no part of the present purpose to enter upon a critical consideration of the relative claims of these two views of emergents. But I wish to stay long enough to direct attention to their importance. Whether either of the views, or neither, is to be accepted is of course a question which can be answered only by an appeal to the relevant facts. My suggestion here is simply that the point at issue is a basal one and underlies other questions of far-reaching import so far at least as a philosophy of mind is concerned. The real significance of the whole doctrine of "personalism," for instance, seems to be bound up in it; the question whether finite individuals possess a substantive or an adjectival mode of being is in the end equivalent to the question whether a "person" is to be conceived in accordance with the principles of substantial or of structural emergence. And for my part I am inclined to think that the issue might gain in clarity if it were discussed under this second formulation.

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But, to return from this digression, the distinguishing feature of the theory of emergence is not to be found in the nature (whether substantial or structural) of what it is that appears in the temporal series as if new. So far as this feature alone is concerned the principle, while receiving new detailed formulation in recent controversy, is as old as the Greeks. Of course neither Plato nor Aristotle could be called an evolutionist in the commonly accepted meaning of the term, but both were nevertheless concerned with essentially those phenomena that are crucial in the recent debate; and here, as on most basal problems, they are quite modern. Neglecting their views with reference to the ontological significance of time and the ultimate origin of "souls," one might maintain, not without reason, that essentially Plato is a substantialist and Aristotle a structuralist; for Plato does virtually hold that *sub specie temporis* entities emerge, while Aristotle basically sees the appearance of new structures. One does not, I think, modernize these thinkers overmuch in attributing to them this divergence of views; on the contrary, herein lies one fruitful way of distinguishing them. Certainly this divergence runs quite deep in modern thought; not infrequently it marks a sharp difference among systems, and at times it even sunders a thinker from himself. Spinoza, for instance, is at once a substantialist and a structuralist in his conception of modes; and from this fact arises the difficulty, commonly felt by students of his system, of setting forth any one consistent interpretation of his doctrine of attributes. The preference of his metaphysics for a substantialist view of modes (not always consistently adhered to) serves but to magnify the logical inaptitude within that context of his fundamentally structuralist ethics.[1] Again, Leibniz's doctrine of the monad is fundamentally a structuralist doctrine, but with enough of the substantialist implications

[1] The dual meaning here referred to can be found, for example, in the shifting connotations of "endeavor," "effort," and "force" in the *Ethics*, Part III, Propositions VI and VII, and Part IV, Proposition III, as these bear upon the conception of "essence."

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clinging to it to make difficult a satisfactory interpretation of the law of pre-established harmony which, in consequence, always tends to prove either too much or too little for the purposes for which it is used in the system. Hegel's famous criticism of Spinoza, to the effect that what is needed in the reformation of the Spinozistic system is that Substance be changed into Subject, may fairly be interpreted as a demand that the substantialist side of Spinoza's metaphysics be so modified as to bring it into harmony with the structuralist leanings of his ethics. It is, of course, debatable to what extent Hegel himself succeeded in accomplishing this end through his dialectical procedure; but it seems clear that in intent at least he was an out-and-out structuralist, as the tradition to which his influence in British and American thought contributed has tended progressively to make explicit. And there seems to be no difficulty in tracing the same antagonism between essentially substantialist and structuralist views in many currents of recent thought, and, if I am not mistaken, in tendencies that at first glance do not appear to have any connection with that which goes by the name of emergent evolution.

Despite what has been said before, however, there is something uniquely characteristic of the theory of emergence which makes it an anachronism to speak of any classical philosopher as an advocate of that theory. The novelty of the view, I take it, lies in the logical status which it assigns to the emergent however described—the status, namely, of unpredictability. Lloyd Morgan's statement of the basal point is as concise as any: "The point of emphasis is this. Let there be three successive levels of natural events, *A, B,* and *C*. Let there be in *B* a *kind of relation* which is not present in *A;* and in *C* a kind of relation, not yet present in *B* or *A*. If then one lived and gained experience on the *B*-level, one could not predict the emergent characters of the *C*-level, because the relations, of which they are the expressions, are not yet in being. Nor if one lived on the *A*-level, could one predict the emergent character of

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b-events, because *ex hypothesi,* there are *no such events* as yet in existence. What, it is claimed, one cannot predict, then, is the emergent expression of some new kind of relatedness among pre-existing events. One could not foretell the emergent character of vital elements from the fullest possible knowledge of physico-chemical events only, if life be an emergent chord and not merely due to the summation, however complex, of constituent *a*-notes. Such is the hypothesis accepted under emergent evolution."[2] And in this emphasis lies the uniqueness of the hypothesis. The principle here stressed by Morgan is, of course, independent of his structuralist interpretation of the emergent and holds for the substantialist view as well. It is the mark of the theory of emergence, both substantialist and structuralist, and sets it off sharply from the older views. For the theory of emergence, then, the emergent is wholly novel, unpredictable on the basis of even the completest possible knowledge of that whence it emerges; until it appears it is by hypothesis nonexistent, and cannot, therefore, be foreknown. And the theory logically stands or falls, presumably, with this its crucial principle.

2. It is agreed among the advocates of the theory, as I understand them, that insistence upon the appearance of the unpredictably novel in the evolutionary series involves us in no logical difficulties. Such insistence does indeed, they tell us, force us to assume a peculiar cognitive attitude called by some the attitude of "natural piety;" but this attitude, we are assured, is nothing more occult than a willingness to accept facts as we find them and to admit that such acceptance is what we mean by understanding. If unbiased observation shows us that the absolutely novel does actually appear from time to time, and from stage to stage, in the course of nature, there for the emergent evolutionist is an end of the matter; so far, that fact we know, and it is all we know and all we need to, or can, know. Our loyal attitude to all emergents, as Morgan con-

[2] *Emergent Evolution,* pp. 5–6. The italics are all in the original.

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stantly reminds us, must be that of humble acceptance; confronted by them, we can only "consider and bow the head." There are some impious ones amongst us, however, who stand stiff-necked before such a pious admonition. They are prone to believe that the attitude of natural piety is nothing more than an impotent nod of sanguine approval of precisely those phenomena which are most perplexing, and that in moments of logical storm and stress it appears to serve us only because it is blind to the real problems presented by the sundry troublesome stages of the passing show. They may even unkindly suggest that this attitude, when made vocal, reverently delivers itself of the oracular statement that nature is really what nature really is—a statement which presumably no one has ever thought of denying, but which also no one hitherto has ever seriously mistaken for an explanatory principle. What is wanted, on their side, is that one open one's eyes and look abroad beyond that which is set down, as it were, at one's feet; not observation alone, but explanation as well, is demanded, and it is precisely explanation which, in their view, natural piety fails to give.

In such a debate the point at issue turns upon the nature of intelligibility. And with the statement of this point we are brought to the chief concern of the present discussion—and, it may as well be added, to the crux of a theory of knowledge. I wish to consider it here on the basis of the two assumptions that underlie the points of view before opposed. The first of these assumptions is that categories are descriptive and denotative; the second assumption is that categories are explanatory. Pushed further, these assumptions resolve themselves into the theses, on the one hand, that the criterion of intelligibility is the order of existences and, on the other, that intelligibility is the criterion of that order. The thesis of the present paper, a very simple and a very old thesis, is that each of these assumptions is correct in what it explicitly affirms and erroneous in what it implicitly denies. Categories are descrip-

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tive and they are explanatory, but in the end description and explanation are one; intelligibility is a characteristic of the order of existence and it is a characteristic of intelligence, but there is in this no merely circular statement. The development of this thesis must here follow its own more or less independent course; in conclusion we shall return briefly to inquire how the results meanwhile attained bear upon the concept of emergence.

The first consideration to be noted is that before thinking can take place at all there is something thought about, and the object of thought is (ideally) the controlling factor in the thought-situation. In whatever sense thought may be creative, it certainly cannot be said to be so in the sense that it produces its own object. Its object is there as a datum which is not created, but found; and this datum exerts a determining influence, since the necessity of thought has its habitat there. That thought is acquiescence under compulsion is a thesis in which we are in the end compelled to acquiesce. To the extent that thought cuts itself free from this compulsion, to that extent it tends to depart from its own nature and to fall away into mere "imagination" and, carried far enough, into inanity.

The position here stated is foundational. The direction in which its proof may be found is pointed by a rigorous analysis of the actual procedure of intelligence itself. Such an analysis would disclose, I take it, that prima facie all our judgments are interpretations of objective situations and that, in the end, every hypothetical judgment has its categorical aspect. The necessity of thought lies in the situation with which thought deals; and apart from this objective reference the necessity of thought is a meaningless, because empty, phrase. Of course, in its first formulation the controlling situation may be hypothetical, a matter of postulates and assumptions; but as such it still controls, and beyond there is always a context within which postulates move and which gives to them the signification whereby they are amenable to critical consideration and

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evaluation. Possibility never wholly loses touch with actuality, or, if it does, it is entirely fruitless for intelligence; it is vain and void, and vain because void. On this point Leibniz's persistent efforts to give a specific formulation to his principle of the sufficient reason are especially enlightening and, to my mind, decisive. Prepossessed as he is by the view that sufficient reason is entirely independent of existence and "must needs be outside of" the sequence of contingent things, he nevertheless finds himself driven at last to hold that the principle "must be in a substance which is a cause of this sequence, or which is a necessary being, bearing in itself the reason of its own existence, otherwise we should not yet have a sufficient reason with which we could stop."[8] And this is to say that the necessity of thought is in the object which it itself does not create; for the point here is independent of Leibniz's peculiar view of "substance" and its relation to the order of contingent things.

There would seem to be, then, no possibility of ultimately sundering the order of thought from the order of existence. Such a bifurcation inevitably ends in ruin; for in last analysis it leads back to the identification of the object of thought with thought itself, and so to the impalpable void. The object which compels thought is the objective of thinking, and this lies in the order of existents since it cannot lie in thought itself. There is here no intention to maintain a blank identity between the object of thought (the object in thinking) and the total objective situation under the compulsion of which thinking functions. On this point it would appear that the epistemological dualist has something important to say, and I at least would not wish to be committed to the view that his position wholly lacks foundation; otherwise I see no escape from scepticism and, ultimately, from solipsism. But it still remains true that any epistemological dualism which postulates a chasm between the two orders is inextricably enmeshed in

[8] *Principles of Nature and of Grace*, sec. 8.

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the difficulties against which, in different ways, Spinoza and Kant alike inadvertently but forcefully warn us. The object of thought is that which compels thought, and that cannot be other than an other to thought itself—an other which thought accepts and which attaches to the existential order.

And with this conclusion, I presume, we are committed to the view that the categories are, and must be, primarily descriptive and denotative. We are not free to think as we please; what we think is determined by the order of existence. "It thinks in us," we must hold, is more nearly the correct account of the cognitive situation than is the customary "I think;" and the "it" is a jealous master. That on this point there is agreement in principle among thinkers so radically at odds otherwise as are Bosanquet, Dewey, and Russell marks a very significant meeting of extremes; and the denial of it constitutes what I (under correction) understand to be the main weakness of the so-called "new idealism" advocated by the Italian school.

Thus it would appear that we must admit the truth of the contention that things as they are constitute the criterion of intelligibility. What is intelligible and what is not connot be determined apart from the given situation; in the abstract and without reference to the given, there is no meaning to be attached to the notion of intelligibility. And what the given compels us to affirm, that we must hold is the intelligible aspect of the situation in question; and it is intelligible because we are compelled to affirm it. Whether the moon is made of green cheese has no intelligibility in abstraction from the meaning of the proposition; but meaning is meaningless except as in some important sense a description of an objective situation with characteristics of its own. Thus it is precisely this situation which must determine the intelligibility of our proposition. What is intelligible is what has meaning, and it is intelligible in precisely the sense in which it has meaning; what is unintelligible is what has no meaning, and its unintelli-

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gibility is precisely identical with its meaningless character. But what has or lacks meaning, and what meaning it has or in what sense it is meaningless, the object alone can tell us. Intelligibility is of the object's making, not ours. If the situation in nature should force us to hold that "The moon is made of green cheese" it is a meaningful proposition, then *ipso facto* the proposition would be for us a thoroughly intelligible proposition and would be so accepted. Since the situation drives us to hold that such is not the case, it is to us unintelligible and absurd to hold that such is the case. The criterion of intelligibility is nature's revelation of herself, and our categories are consequently denotative. This, I understand, is the basis on which rests the attitude of natural piety.

And this principle is of far-reaching import. For one thing, if for a moment I may dwell on the point, it runs deep in a theory of value. Of course the principle has no relevancy here if valuations are to have no cognitional or reflective element, as if in valuing one is not thinking, or in thinking one is not valuing. But the question still remains whether this is the case, and for my part I fail to see that it is. On the contrary, it would seem that in the end we must hold that there is no schism between valuing and knowing. After all, are not valuations belief-attitudes? Is not truth itself a value? Is there not a logic of ethics or of aesthetics as there is of "science"? We may call these valuations by whatever name we please—"likings," "interests," "preferences." But to conceive them as "subjective" and arbitrary whims is a ruinous error; basically it sets us straight on the road to an atomistic view of mind which threatens bankruptcy, and it leaves us in the end caught in the clutches of a practical relativism. To escape this such subjectivity and arbitrariness must be denied; and such a denial must be founded upon a universality in valuations which reflection alone can supply. But an adequate analysis, I take it, would disclose the unity here implied. And herewith we are brought to the admission that valuations partake of the nature

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of the criterion of intelligibility. They have their leadings in existential situations, and are as subject to the principles of a critical analysis and appreciation as are scientific hypotheses —which, indeed, do not differ essentially from them. That things are good or bad, beautiful or ugly, is as little the expression of idle and unguided fancy as that they are round or square, vital or dead. Either this, or a view of valuation as intrinsically non-intellectual, with whatever consequences (disastrous, I must think), such a view entails.

But of more direct concern to our immediate purpose is the consideration that the principle before us discloses the futility of a certain type of argument which at times is supposed to have considerable weight. That argument is broadly as follows: since it is possible that things may be conceived otherwise than as we in fact do and must conceive them, it follows that there is reason for holding that in fact they are quite other than we can conceive. An example of this sort of reasoning is found in the rather common contention that, since it is conceivable that our sense-organs might be differently constituted and consequently give us quite different impressions, we may reasonably conclude that as they really are things are blankly unintelligible to us. The fallacy of the argument, of course, lies in the surreptitious introduction of a notion of intelligibility at variance with the principle previously outlined. For the argument tacitly assumes that there is a sort of conceivability in terms of which we can logically condemn all categories to the status of merely phenomenological points of view; and this is equivalent to the assumption that something may be conceived in a purely a priori manner and may also be seen to be foundational. But this is a mistaken assumption, if the principle that nature alone may tell us what is conceivable is allowed to stand.

There is, however, an aspect of the cognitive situation which gives a semblance of validity to the preceding argument. And that is the dual nature of the object of thought,

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which lies at the bottom of the distinction between "appearance" and "reality" and which stands at the center of many of the traditional epistemological controversies. Turning our attention to this aspect of the situation, we find ourselves face to face with the truth contained in the thesis that intelligibility is the criterion of things as they are. The distinction, I take it, cannot be denied; the question concerns rather the meaning of the distinction.

Natural piety will not serve us here, at least not in the sense in which natural piety means simply accepting out-of-hand the revelation of nature. For the peculiarity of the situation with which we are confronted is that nature presents no clear-cut revelation of herself. She speaks a various language; she tells us that we cannot confidently put our trust in mere appearances, and yet appearances are in some sense her mien; she bids us penetrate to her real essence, and at the same time the voice she offers for counsel would seem not infrequently to be the voice of Jacob. And so we are in a quandary. Mere willingness to follow nature's lead, however intense our piety, is of little avail when nature declines to speak without equivocation. Where, then, are we to look for an interpreter?

This question brings us to the parting of the ways between two quite radically different theories of knowledge. On the one side lies the way of intuitionism in its various forms; on the other side lies the way of intellectualism. Which one should take is, of course, a long story that cannot here be entered upon. There are those who insist that the road of intuitionism is a pleasant road with easy grades; my own conviction, however, is that it either leads to an *impasse* or returns finally to the other way, and that it is better to take the road of inference at the beginning. Doing this, we are to hold that nature is attained through intelligence; that nature really is what intelligence reveals her to be.

But are we not here at once caught in a vicious circle? What nature really is, we have already insisted, is the criterion

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of the intelligible; and now we are saying that the intelligible must be taken as the touchstone of the real. This certainly seems to be a purely circular position, and the question is concerning a way of escape. It is somewhat reassuring to note that the intuitionist meets the same difficulty. At first glance his way out seems perfectly straightforward, since he can appeal to the intuitable as the criterion of the real. But this is merely to push the difficulty a bit farther on, for the intuitable is at once result and criterion. And in the end the intuitionist would seem to have no way of escape at all, unless it miraculously happen that nature graciously speaks to intuition in only one tongue. Furthermore, the intuitionist has an additional difficulty; for he is burdened with the necessity of providing a criterion for intelligence, even should intuition prove to be infallible. But the fortunes of intuitionism are of no direct concern to us here, since we have agreed not to travel that road; our own predicament is the matter of moment. What is the intellectualist to do in face of the dilemma? Is there for him a way out? I think there is, but in order to indicate it some preliminary considerations are necessary.

These considerations can here be stated only in the merest outline; I shall set them down in the form of three postulates. (*a*) The first is a repetition of what has already been said, namely, that thought is always *of* something and this something controls. (*b*) The second is that this something is a situation systematic in the sense that it is a manifold such that inference may move within it from term to term. To describe the nexus within the manifold on the basis of which inference within it is possible I shall make use of the word "implication," following Bosanquet in this usage. (*c*) The third postulate (which is perhaps a repetition of the second with a different emphasis) is that this situation presents two distinguishable, but inseparable, aspects: on the one side it is that which is immediately given, or, adopting Bradley's terminology, it is at once a "that" and a "what." These three postulates

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might summarily be stated as follows: There is always an object of thought, and this object is terms-in-relations which may be either accepted as given or regarded as unstable.

From these theses there follow two quite distinct meanings of the intelligible. By the intelligible we may mean the object of thought accepted as immediately given; in this sense everything which we ordinarily speak of as a "fact," whether "real" or "illusory," is intelligible. But we may mean by the intelligible the object of thought as mediately given, that is, as that which *may be* thought; in this sense the planet Neptune, for instance, was intelligible before it was ever thought. In short, we may mean by the intelligible either that which is (psychologically) thought or that which is thinkable.

Returning to our dilemma with this distinction in mind, we can see a way out. When we say that the real determines intelligibility, what we primarily mean is that what is thought is dependent on what is immediately given; we cannot create our ideas out of nothing, but our ideas must run with fact. When, on the other hand, we say that what is real is determined by intelligence, what we mean is that the immediately given is not all there is of the object of thought, that the datum originally and directly presented demands correction in the light of its implicative context, and that this light is revealed only through the processes of intelligence. And when this distinction is borne in mind we can see that it is no merely circular statement to say that what is needed to correct intelligence is more intelligence. That which is known or thought is, so far, intelligible simply because it is thought; things are such that the thought is possible. But that which is actually thought is not necessarily what under the circumstances ought to be thought; immediate intelligibility may stand in need of correction by a deeper and mediated intelligibility which spells out the farther reaches of the situation. "To be intelligible is to be" and "to be is to be intelligible" are both true and express basic characteristics of the cognitive situation. But they

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are not simply convertible propositions, since intelligibility is a matter of degrees, and the degree contemplated by one of the propositions is not identical with the degree contemplated by the other. Only in those instances where existence and reality coincide could the two propositions be said to fall together.

With this second function of intelligence in mind, we may say that the categories are explanatory rather than merely descriptive and denotative. They are supplementary and corrective; they lead beyond the immediately presented out into the context, and they may modify it in consequence. The "bentness" of the staff in the pool is, thus, explained by the laws of optics. And it is precisely this vision of the farther look which natural piety unaided seems unable to give us; on this score it is open to the charge of incompetency. But it is not to be forgotten that even in these farther reaches of thought's vision it is still the object which controls. The nexus thus explored is not of thought's making, and explanation is still in an important sense historical and denotative. What is needed to explain the bentness of the staff is, after all, simply a more complete description of its nature; the laws of optics are its laws. Explanation is of a piece with description, and there is no sharp break between them; the difference between them is a difference which in the end is arbitrary. They are only degrees of intelligibility, and natural piety may be explanatory if it is pious enough.

Summarizing, we may say that the categories of thought are primarily descriptive and denotative in the sense that what we are to think about the world remains for the world to tell us and is not of our own arbitrary and unguided choice: we think as we must, and we must think as the world dictates. This does not mean, however, that the insight of the first look is to be taken as nature's final word. It happens, on the contrary, that this insight often demands correction, and this can be had only through the processes of inference which lead beyond. Here we may say, if we please, that our categories be-

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come explanatory. But we certainly go astray if we suppose that explanation, in its turn, is wholly independent of the object's leading, as if the immediately intelligible were on occasion sheer error and corrigible only by some sort of supernatural or non-natural a priori synthesis. Explanation is still description, but mediated description; it is just the outcome of thought's penetration into the context of the object and modification of the first appearance of the object's hither side in the light of the disclosure thus revealed. Thought is by its nature descriptive, though not merely immediately so; thought is by its nature explanatory, though not abstractly so. It always speaks the message of nature; but it does so adequately and completely only in so far as it penetrates her deeper reaches and correspondingly reinterprets and rectifies the view of the first look.

Of course I am not here laboring under the delusion that what I have been saying marks the discovery of a new principle. The principle seems to me indeed a very old one, at least as old as Spinoza's *Ethics*. But one cannot avoid the observation that in many quarters nowadays the principle is hardly given the consideration its importance would seem to deserve. On the one side, without any serious discussion of its claims, positions are advanced here and there which lie in contradiction of it; on the other side, even among its advocates, its implications are not followed to the bitter end, but are truncated at the point where they very pertinently touch basal issues. To be more specific, is not Bergson's criticism of intelligence based on an assumption in direct violation of the principle? And what, in the light of it, is one to say of Dewey's recent pronouncement with reference to the method of philosophy, or of Croce and the "new" idealists, or of the peculiar difficulties confronting the absolutists? As I understand Bergson, his basal assumption is that intelligence is never in fact denotative, while Dewey's position (with much of which I am in hearty agreement) seems to be rather definitely modified by the suspicion that in so far as intelligence strives to become

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other than merely denotative it is headed toward ruin in a vicious intellectualism; and neither view seems to square with the principle before restated. Again, Croce's doctrine of the "pure concept" can stand only if this principle is denied; and the same holds true of the new idealism, at least to the extent that its foundations ultimately lie in that doctrine. Bradley's wholesale condemnation of relations as self-contradictory and sterile, upon which rests his view of the Absolute with its haunting yet baffling deeps, I can make nothing at all of unless the principle here under consideration is definitely set aside—a principle to which he seems committed at the beginning. And essentially the same inconsistency would seem to lie at the bottom of Bosanquet's contention that from the point of view of the Absolute there is an intelligibility in finite centers of experience which hardly attaches to them per se.[4] And, in general, the absolutistic treatment of the whole temporal order and the reduction of it to merely phenomenological significance in the end raises the same issue.

This, however, is not the occasion to follow the fortunes of our principle all around the intellectual horizon. The present concern is with the theory of emergence, and so I turn to ask how the principle bears on the concept of emergents. That which emerges, we are told, is absolutely novel in the sense that it is unpredictable before the event: that which is absolutely and unpredictably novel, so the criticism runs, *ipso facto* falls beyond intelligence and is consequently sheer mystery. What, then, is the relation between the predictable and the intelligible? This is the question which remains briefly to be considered in the light of the preceding conclusions.

By predictability (if, to avoid cumbersome circumlocutions, I may be permitted to use the term) I understand the state of anything's being predictable; that which is predicta-

[4] Note Bosanquet's discussion of finite persons in the second Lecture of *The Value of Destiny of the Individual,* and the implications of the statement "We cannot expect to give a reason for the scheme of the universe," on p. 61. The point here would seem to be that self-centeredness is an "imperfection," despite the fact that it appears ineradicable. Cf. Pringle-Pattison's remarks on the point in Lectures XIV and XV of *The Idea of God.*

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ble has what I shall call the characteristic of predictability, and that which is not predictable lacks predictability. But there are two sorts of prediction, and consequently two types of predictability; and these should be distinguished, since the question at issue concerns only one type. We sometimes say that *X* is predictable when we mean merely that adequate investigation and analysis of the situation would disclose that *X* is now, and perhaps always has been, the case; in this sense the planet Neptune was predictable before it was discovered through the telescope. This sort of predictability is as characteristic of a mathematical system as it is of the material universe, and one could say that, before it was known, the relation between the diameter and the circumference of a circle was predictable. But there is another sort of prediction, namely, foresight, on the basis of what now exists, into that which does not now exist but will exist in the future. In this sense of the term, *X* is predictable when by conditions now given, but not involving the present existence of *X*, *X*'s future eventuality is determinate; examples of this sort of predictability are eclipses of sun or moon in the future, which the astronomer may foretell at pleasure. This meaning of predictability involves time, and so differs from the other meaning in which time plays no part. This is the type of predictability with which our present discussion is alone concerned, and our question is whether predictability in this sense is always characteristic of the intelligible.

It seems clear that predictability logically presupposes intelligibility and is impossible apart from it. The Laplacean calculator, for instance, who is to foresee the future of the material universe as an open book would of course be blind without complete knowledge of the detailed nature of that universe in cross-section at the moment his prevision occurs; and even with that knowledge his prevision would be possible only provided the *status quo* implicates all situations that are to occur in the course of the future. This is to say that predictability is characteristic only of systems, and that the predic-

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table falls within the intelligible. But the question before us is whether the two fall together, whether the intelligible is *ipso facto* predictable and the non-predictable is unintelligible. I see no reason for holding that such is the case, but on the contrary the main contention of the present discussion supports the opposite conclusion.

Suppose there is a system of such a nature that its basal character is modified by the passage of time, its future being precisely its growing-point and what it is being in a very real sense what it is becoming. In such a system, I take it, predictability would have no place, since the very nature of the system would do violence to the basal demand of prediction—the demand, namely, that time be treated as negligible. Here, as Bergson has I think rightly maintained, to foretell would be to forelive. But I see no reason to hold that such a system would necessarily be unintelligible. It would certainly be intelligible if it were found for the reason that it was found, and it would be intelligible precisely as found; nor would its intelligibility be lessened by the fact that prediction could not move within it. What special terms of description we should in detail apply to it the system alone could inform us; and our explanation of it would perforce wait upon description. But, having got such terms, the system would be intelligible to us in the only sense in which intelligibility has for us a meaning.

The emergent evolutionist claims that he finds systems which are precisely of this sort—systems that are dynamic and woven through time. Whether he does actually find them is a question of fact upon which we do not here enter. If he does find them, he is well within his logical rights when he holds that there are emergents which, though non-predictable, are nevertheless intelligible. Certainly there is no justification for throwing the concept of emergence to the outer darkness of the absurd merely because its advocates in the zeal of their natural piety look upon prediction as a sin against the emergent.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

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THE MORALITY OF AFRICAN RACES

E. TORDAY

THERE was always something wrong with the African. At one time the word "dirty" was as inseparable from the word "nigger" as hokus is from pokus. That was in the good old days (and for a long time after) when Negroes used to be branded like cattle—"but we yet take all possible care that they are not burnt too hard, especially the women"[1] and then crammed, six or seven hundred, into a "foul, stinking ship,"[2] where, though the corpses were carefully removed every morning during the passage, those who survived lacked all refinements of soap and perfumes. This is not so very long ago: the writer of these lines has still seen an old slave ship off the port of Banana, equipped with the bars to which the slaves used to be chained, though it was then put to more legitimate purposes. Now it is the fashion to denounce the Negro for his stupidity. Indictments of this kind never come from Nigeria, or Ashanti, or thereabouts, where prosperity, due to rational government, seems to have a salutary effect on the black man's brain; it is from the eastern part of Africa that they come in shoals. It is more than probable that the natives of Kenya, Tanganyika, etc., are inflicted with the kind of stupidity which would overcome us if, e.g., we received a hearty blow from Jack Dempsey on the jaw. The East African has received quite a number of blows, the knockout being the confiscation of his lands. What this means to him an Englishman cannot understand. The Englishman is a citizen of the world; he is, nominally at any rate, a Christian, and his God follows and protects him everywhere. Should divine protection prove insufficient, there is the navy to back

[1] These words are quoted from Bosman, a slavetrader and apologist of his profession.

[2] *Ibid.*

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him up with guns. The African has no high god; but he is guarded by the spirits of his defunct forebears. The tribal land is the resting place of the ancestors, who are so closely linked with it that in the native's mind soil and spirits are identical. The moment he leaves the land of his fathers he is like a tree cut off from its roots. He faces a hostile world unprotected, and his own passions are no longer restrained by ancient laws which he used to observe out of respect for those who made them in days gone by. He no longer knows how to live, and death has terrors hitherto alien to his mind. On his tribal land he knew that his spirit, when leaving the body, would join the ancestors underground, and, after having received new virtue from contact with them, it would return to earth in the body of a newborn child of the clan. But in a foreign land, be it only a mile beyond the frontiers of his own, his soul will not know whither to go; there will be no ancestors to receive it and it will roam at night from place to place, wailing, cold, hungry, forever and forever. And the Negro, the most deeply religious being of creation, cannot even find consolation in prayer, as those to whom he is used to pray are beyond his reach, in the land from which he has been driven. The benign influence of the ancestors is gone.

There was a time when he believed in the white man's word, but his faith in it has been shaken. The government officials he knows to be as a rule fine, sympathetic, straight men; but he has learned by bitter experience that there is something above them, some invisible, nameless power not unlike the mysterious *bwanga* with which the cunning medicine man energizes his "fetishes." This evil principle thwarts his natural protectors whenever they make a stand in defense of the natives' rights and supports ruthlessly those who, according to his ideas, have robbed him of his land. Can the Masai forget the formal declaration of Sir Donald Stewart giving him and all his descendants in the name of the British Government certain lands for all times to come, and the subsequent disre-

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gard of this pledge? The Negro asks himself why he has been treated thus? What had he done to be punished so cruelly? He does not know and nobody can tell him. The black man is dazed. No wonder he is stupid.

There was a time when he was intelligent enough. He had his faults, but stupidity was not of them. He was too conservative, but it is difficult to see why this should be counted a fault in this country where all the best people are of the same disposition. He was improvident and took no thought of the morrow; but why should he in a land where "earth is so kind that just tickle her with a hoe and she laughs into harvest"? Lazy? Yes, when there was no special need for an effort; but he has shown during the Great War what he could do in an emergency. The authorities dare not publish the casualities among the native porters. He served his masters well on either side, and his faithfulness might justify us in dubbing him stupid. He was like the ivy "which dieth where it clingeth." Examples of this would fill a book. There are the porters of Livingstone; there are the two men who rushed unarmed to the rescue of Major Powell Cotton when lying beneath a lion and beat the brute off with a whip! The writer of these lines could tell wonderful tales of acts of devotion performed naturally, without a thought that they did more than their simple duty to friend, by Mayuyu, Makoba, Meyey, Gika, the thirty Bambala, and many others. But this is perhaps the one point in the black man's favor which has never been contested.

Before he was affected by foreign influences the Negro had given proofs of his aptitude for statesmanship. His political institutions were models of democracy, even though now and then they might be upset for a short time by a black Napoleon; after the disappearance of such a dominating personality the country reverted without fail to its primitive organization. Even the foreign conquerors, such as Arabs and Fulani, adopted this old constitutional system, their higher civilization being unable to produce anything better or as good.

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Nowhere else has British rule been so successful as in West Africa, where indirect government through the natural chiefs has been adopted. The old chief governed his people by their consent and took no decision without the advice of old counselors, and, in matters of great importance, of the whole nation. He had to lead a clean life; an Ashanti chief who exploited the people or seduced the wife of one of his subjects would be deprived of his stool by his elders. If one attempted to play the autocrat, he might, as among the Yoruba, be presented with a basket of parrot's eggs and told that he was tired and that it was time he took a rest. And obediently he sent himself to rest, without axe or guillotine, by his own hand. In many tribes when the chief became old and decrepit, he handed over the reins of government to a virile successor and had himself removed, by the aid of a favcrite wife or a trusted servant, to the happy land of the ancestors. Besides, everywhere we find that the ruler had to submit to considerable feminine influence which could not fail to restrain him from violent actions. This moderating power was exercised by his mother or his sister; in rare cases by his principal wife. The "queen" had the last word in all matters; she was practically a supreme court to which the nation and the individual could appeal. Nor were elaborate constitutions beyond the African's conception, as shown by those of Uganda, Lunda, Kongo, and Bushongo. In the last-named country the natives have had for over three hundred years a parliament, chosen by the popular will, in which not only the various territories were represented, but where every trade and craft had a voice, where women stood on equal footing with men and enjoyed the privilege of vetoing any war when they thought the cause of it did not justify taking the risk of losing their husbands and sons. But these particular barbarians had banned war three centuries before the birth of the League of Nations; the most powerful people of their part of the world, they scorned the idea of conquest. They had no army, but just a police force to protect themselves against ag-

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gression. This force was not allowed to use the traditional bow and arrow and the throwing knife, as these might wound or kill noncombatants; short swords were substituted for them. Commerce prospered and the arts flourished, as you may judge for yourself whenever a shower drives you to that weird place, the British Museum. Each province, each village, had self-government, and none but national issues were decided by the central powers. The king and his council of ministers were in constant touch with the outlying parts of the realm through agents-general which every province sent to the capital.

It is time that the belief in an Africa steeped in blood by constant warfare before the white man brought the blessings of peace be eliminated to the realm of fables—or of propaganda as excuses for our own iniquities. Of course not all countries had reached the high standard of political morality of Bushongo; there were wars between villages, between tribes, and between nations. It is well that we should consider the character of these terrible conflicts of which we have heard so much in our youthful days when our pocket money was so cruelly mulcted for the benefit of missions. The grim warriors, armed to the teeth and daubed with glaring colors, would sally forth to an appointed place where the bush had been cleared for the bloody affray. The cutting of the grass on the battlefield was done in turns by the two inimical tribes. There, while still at a safe distance, Homeric boasts and vile insults were exchanged till everybody was hoarse. Behind the men stood the women, cheering them on, inventing new invectives for them when their own eloquence was at fault. Under their admiring eyes the warriors discharged arrows, hurled spears, wildly, recklessly, with utter disregard for the enemy's safety. This might go on for hours. But when the first blood was drawn, even if it was only from an unfortunate nose which had come into violent contact with a smartly hurled knobkerry, honor was satisfied and the path for peace negotiations open.

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Everybody retired happy to boast for the rest of his life how he had annihilated the enemy single-handed. Before the Amazulu had learned from the white man how war ought to be waged, the younger warriors used to send their shields and spears home by some friends and go themselves to the enemy's village to continue their courting which "the war" had interrupted. Battles were carefully timed so as not to interfere with the weekly market, and occasionally postponed when an important event, such as a wedding or a funeral, prevented one of the combatant forces from attending. Oh, yes, it was a terrible time. In some of the wars the casualties nearly equalled those of a baseball match. Yet they did not affect the density of the population. Wissmann, when he first crossed the Beniki country, found villages fifteen miles long where today it takes hours to walk from one miserable hamlet to another. This devastation was the Arabs' work. But the white man has a record just as sinister. The Ova-Herero will never again lift cattle and the Wahehe will have no more of their little wars: the Germans have practically exterminated them to teach them the blessings of law, order, and civilization. The few that remain are stupid; how could they be otherwise?

Other pastoral people beside the Ova-Herero considered cattle-raiding the most pleasurable and profitable of sports. Before we condemn them, it will be wise to read the history of the Scottish border clans. I am not quite sure that they showed more sporting spirit in their thieving than the black man. When it happened that a Herero tribe succeeded in capturing all the cattle from another, some of the loot was sent back to the defeated enemy that he might live to fight another day. The fighting men needed milk to keep them in good form, and the women and children could not live without it. The uncivilized Negro was too stupid to think it possible that a person who was hungry should not be given food; it made no difference whether he was friend or foe. When women were captured the victors married them; children were adopted. As

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the fortunes of war favored alternately one side and the other, this resulted in a constant infusion of new blood, which accounts for the natives' remarkable vitality. Another advantage was that ties were thus formed which united rivals in case of need against any foreign foe, as for example the Arab or Portuguese slave hunter or the hordes or mercenaries and bastards armed with guns by the white man. Their advent resulted in a real war, as we civilized men understand it, murder wholesale, without quarter. But the black did not want it; it was forced on him. With his back to the wall, his freedom at stake, he fought like a demon, regardless of odds.

In the administration of justice, the African chief was assisted by the whole population. Instead of twelve men good and true, the jury consisted of the whole manhood of the country who, though perhaps not specially good, nor exceptionally true, knew the contending parties and were acquainted with all the details of the case under trial. The witnesses stretched a point in favor of a friend or relation, but as they were expected to do so their deposition was taken with a considerable pinch of salt and miscarriage of justice was a very rare exception. In such parts, as among the Boloki, where no larger social grouping than the household was known, they devised a system, worthy of the wisdom of Solomon, which assured, not only impartial justice between weak and strong, but also enabled the judge to enforce his decisions. It was based on traditional law which dominates the African's social life and rests on the common consent of countless generations. It used to be taught to every child before initiation and was known and accepted by everyone. It required no sanctions; it was no more questioned than one's mother's virtue. One law decrees that a person who has wronged another cannot enforce subsequently any claim whatever against his victim until he has fully atoned for the original wrong. In some parts (Baila) he was practically his slave for the time being. When a number of Boloki families and towns had made their choice of the wise and good

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man who was to administer justice in the region, they marked their decision by devastating his plantations, cutting down his trees, and throwing down his landmarks; every head of a family, as representative of its members, had to participate in this act of vandalism. The legal consequence of it was that the new judge had a case against every individual under his jurisdiction, and could give his decisions without fear of reprisals. Besides, his position as an offended party entitled him to call upon all the families to help him to enforce his judgment. His task was not too onerous; an excellent police system made crime very rare. It was based on collective responsibility, recognized throughout Africa. The whole tribe was responsible for every tribesman, the clan for its members, the village for its inhabitants, and the household for its dependants. Any interference with another's rights by an individual implicated all his social connections. Consequently every man, woman, and child had a personal interest that no breach of the law should be committed and saw to it that his neighbors, relations, etc., kept to the straight and narrow path.

This feeling of solidarity was strong enough to overcome congenital improvidence. The Bantu have always been rightly reproached with destroying forests indiscriminately, and that not for the laudable purpose of producing paper for the spreading of truth and untruth, as we do in Canada, but simply to grow their daily bread in the clearings. But in Kongo, where timber is rare, the Bakongo have systematically afforested their country with useful trees which protect their villages and plantations from harmful winds. They have distinct names for natural *(mfinda)* and planted *(nkunku)* forests. Without a board of fisheries, the Awemba have successfully introduced young fish, transported in huge jars, into the fishless lakes and ponds of their country, and imported lechwe antelopes, captured alive in distant lands, to remedy the lack of game. After a few years' careful preservation they now derive an abundant supply of food and hides from these.

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The black man's sanitary arrangements are not as perfect as those of modern London, but it cannot be denied that they compare favorably with those of Southern Europe—and one need not go very far south, either. Hygiene was among the Negroes in some respects in advance of Europe. Livingstone, in his book on the Zambesi, calls attention to the fact that, whereas the London of his times had no sanitary water supply, the "savages" in these parts never used any water for domestic purposes which had not been previously filtered, however clear the stream from which it was taken. Their method was to draw it through a thick layer of fine sand, as it is done now in civilized countries. People suffering from contagious diseases were isolated far from human habitations; it is by this means that sleeping sickness was kept in check till the advent of the white man opened the roads indiscriminately. Inoculation was practiced against smallpox and the genealogy of the men from whom the virus was taken was first most carefully investigated. They had an excellent knowledge of medicinal plants, knew how to immunize against snake and scorpion poisonings, and used vapor baths rationally. In one tribe at any rate the vacuum needed for cupping was produced by burning grass in the cup—not a mean invention. Iron, the original discovery of which is attributed by such good authorities as Felix von Luschan to the Negroes, was hardened by dipping it, red hot, into cold water. Copper was smelted and cast.

New ideas, when fitting into their mode of living, were quickly adopted. Cassava, a plant immune from locusts, introduced about 1600, conquered the Continent in no time; rice spread even more rapidly. Any useful seed was planted and nursed with loving care. Make it worth their while and they will grow anything. The natives of the Gold Coast produce half the cocoa crop of the world on their small holdings. This tendency to adopt new things and imitate new ways is not without its disadvantages; many a native art has been killed

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by Sheffield, Manchester, and Birmingham. And don't let us forget Dingiswayo. He saw soldiers drilled at the Cape and conceived the idea of imitating the method at home; within a few years he changed a peaceful agricultural people into one of the finest fighting forces of the world. And it produced in Tchaka, the great leader, the tactician it required. Can the natives have forgotten him? It is to be feared that they have not, and that Isandhiwana has but increased in importance as the story of the victory was handed down from father to son.

When somewhere in East Africa the tired official retires to his tent to write his reports, and the new lords of the land sit down to their bridge and poker, there rises in the night the mysterious voice of Africa, the speaking drum. It speaks to the black man alone, and no stranger can understand what it says. It sounds like the echo of distant thunder, announcing the storm. Tribe whispers to tribe, nation to nation. And the helot in the east listens eagerly to the strange stories coming from far, far west. He hears the news of those who have been dragged to frosty Europe to keep a white race down which once lorded him. He hears of brothels filled with their daughters to cater to the lust of the black soldiery; of white women prostituting themselves for money to the "braves sénégalais." And he is also told that there are parts of Africa where every able-bodied man is pressed into the army, to be drilled and taught to kill, kill white men. These warriors send him a message of brotherhood, claim solidarity with him. Perhaps they speak of "the day."

He turns in with a smile and in his dreams you can hear him howl the war cry of his forefathers.

LONDON, ENGLAND

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EMERSON IN HIS PERIOD

PERCY H. BOYNTON

I

TIME has wrought whimsically with Emerson's reputation. As an independent thinker he received in due course his first promotion when he was accused of "the latest form of infidelity." Because his conduct and his character protected him from anything more than verbal abuse, and no tyranny of public opinion happened to make a scape-goat of him, he lost prestige for a while as his heterodoxies seeped into general acceptance. Of late when America with the rest of the world began to take stock of itself he was set down as a dealer in commonplaces and reproached for not having been crucified or jailed. He was arraigned with the rest of his generation as a Puritan, a Victorian, a relic of the past. He had said, "Cast behind you all conformity." He had said that he wanted to consider the constructive side of life which every day encroaches on conservatism and "puts it out of countenance, out of reason, out of temper." He had said a dozen other things of the same sort, and for a half-century had been the horror of the respectable classes whose invincible depravity he branded as the chief obstacle to progress; but the ultra-moderns lumped him with his generation. This was natural in an image-breaking age. The iconoclast cannot be wasting time in fine discriminations. On his business of idol-smashing he must work with a kind of fury. Afterward comes the further business of picking up the pieces. It has already begun within a century of Emerson's first public utterance, and the first discovery seems to be that he was not smashed, was not badly battered, was not even tipped off his pedestal; was only covered for a moment in the general débris.

At one misapplied point the iconoclasts have been right:

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Emerson can be fully understood only in relation to his period —its theology, its philosophy, its political theory. Their mistake lay in identifying him with his period instead of contrasting him with it. He was, indeed, peculiarly American, but though he was a distinctly native genius he was a type in his day. He was to a high degree susceptible to influence and tradition and to a high degree defiant of both. No one could surpass him in the tenacity with which he held fast to that which seemed good, and none in the finality with which he rejected what seemed foolish or odious. As he wrote always in the mood of the moment, with no regard for the consistency which is the hobgoblin of little minds, anyone with patience enough can cull and piece together bits to make him out conservative, liberal, or radical, orthodox or infidel, whig or tory, moralist or a-moralist, belligerent or pacifist, patriot or traitor. For his heritage was complicated, and his times were turbulent, and he was his own manner of man to be known only as one knew him in all his moods.

II

This complexity appears in his inheritance of Puritanism and his repugnance to it. In all his unconscious or partially conscious ways he was a chip off an old block. He had a deep-seated horror of the grosser vices. He observed the Sabbath and made his children observe it even though he would not have them christened. He was sedate, temperate, methodical, conventional. He was practical in the management of his affairs. He was habitually law-abiding. All such traits he inherited as implicitly as he inherited the voice with which he greeted his neighbors on the village street.

But at the point where he began to consider the Puritans in their theology, the only Puritan trait left him was his bent for apostasy. He had none of their spiritual abasement because his world was a different one from the world of Knox and Calvin. He had not the desire to mortify the flesh because

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the American scholar had no need to set himself off in this way from a luxury-loving community. He had not the will to power because there was no need of civil rebellion to restore the rights of the commoner. He had no belief in a vengeful God because in the western continent a general distribution of civil rights and domestic comforts made an anomaly of such an explanation of human affairs. The progress of science in the unfolding of natural laws disposed once for all of a personal providence, with the primitive idea of prayer and the primitive explanation of plague and famine and earthquake and lightning stroke. And, most emphatically of all, the conviction that human experience was a matter of progressive, orderly change, and that truth was not to be sought so much in religious dogma as in the pursuit of ever enlarging knowledge, made him hate the intolerance of his ancestors and committed him to permanent and progressive heterodoxy. He was to unsettle all things, he declared in one of his extravagant moments, recognizing no fact as either sacred or profane, simply experimenting, an endless seeker with no past at his back. The authority of the church and the authority of the biblical scriptures were idle words to him.

In reality, however, his whole literary output was written against the background of the past. In his theological rejections he used it—or at least the past of medieval Christendom—as a point of departure, because medieval Christendom was one thing in temporal and local environment, and nineteenth-century American Christendom needed to be something quite different, retaining the essentials of Christianity and sloughing off the accretions. It was on the issue of continuing or rejecting what seemed to him an alien and antiquated rite that he left the pulpit. (His sermon of resignation is a model of temperate argumentative writing of a kind that Emerson frequently resorted to even after he had fallen into the way of saying that he had no aptitude for it. It is a piece of solid historical argument.) And in the Divinity School Address of

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1838 his main theme was to bring home to the young theologians the defects of historical Christianity in emphasizing the Teacher above his teachings and above the moral nature of man from which Jesus derived what he had to reveal; Emerson was rejecting most of what nineteen centuries had interposed between a modern sect and an ancient prophet in order to restore the prophecies in their formal clarity.

His rejections, however, were only incidental. He set aside a revealed religion which accepted the revelation "as somewhat long ago given and done, as if God were dead," only to make way for a religion based upon another revelation, the intuitive perception of moral truth. He was as insistent as any Puritan on the theme of morality, but he meant something very different by the term—not a set of Hebraic precepts covering all the minutiae of deportment, but the revelation of that righteousness in conduct which is the natural expression of the religious sentiment. "Morals is the direction of the will on universal ends. He is immoral who is acting to any private end. He is moral—we say it with Marcus Aurelius and with Kant—whose aim or motive may become a universal rule, binding on all intelligent beings." When the Puritans queried, "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" he could comment that not to lose one's soul was presumptively to save it, and he could query in reply, "If a people have not a vision wherewith shall it be saved?" When they quoted the Psalmist that in the fear of the Lord was the beginning of wisdom, he could quote the Messiah to the effect that the truth would set men free.

In his substitution of freedom for fear lay the difference between Emerson and his remote pastoral predecessor, Increase Mather. And the followers of Mather, with his angry God, were divided in their response to him between a gentler few who feared that he would be lost in his ungodly freedom, and an outraged majority who hoped he would be damned for it. Emerson was faintly perturbed and mildly amused at this.

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He was not quite clear as to the supposed duties of a heretic; he would not defend his position; he would simply go on seeing what he could and telling what he saw.

The institutionalized theology of the New England church was bound to supply Emerson with the point of departure in his thinking. It was an insistently aggressive factor in his life. The meeting-house dominated the town, the dominie was the town-meeting's moderator. He looked back on generations of clerical ancestry. Respectability was still popularly identified with pew rent and church attendance. He was an unfrocked minister and a stay-at-home. The circumstances of his life put him into the opposition party.

But there was more than circumstance at work. The prevailing creed of the church, with its pessimistic fatalism for all but the elect, and its objectively sensational after-life for both the saved and the damned, was utterly alien to his own intellectual optimism. The prevailing thought of the church had committed him to individualism. The system had done what systems are continually doing; it had developed in one of its offspring the spirit of opposition and provided him with something to oppose. It taught him to walk and "showed him the door." He left the meeting-house for surroundings where he could see more clearly and preach more freely.

III

Outside the door Emerson found that in every direction but one the philosophers had committed themselves to dogmatisms as forbidding as those of John Calvin. The empirical scientist had been progressively cribbed and confined by the metaphysicians until the existence of mind was the one unchallengeable fact he had left him. There followed the usual result when metaphysics runs counter to daily life; but the rejection this time was made by philosophy itself. Emerson followed the Kantian lead to the belief in fundamental truths which, though not susceptible to proof and not derived from

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experience, transcend life and are perceived by direct intuition. It was the only road to emancipation for the speculative thinker.

And now, being committed to the truth as it was revealed to the individual man, he was in the comfortable position of being committed to himself.

> Bland angel as he was, he very much wanted his own way. One is tempted to say that he invented or elected his philosophy in order to get it. At all events it exactly suited him. He had no sentimental needs. It satisfied none. He had, to an inordinate degree—or how should he not have?—the pride of intellect. It magnifies mind. He was assailed by no temptations, knew no "law of the members." It contemplates none. He was impatient of constraint. It exalts freedom. He suffered from the pressure of traditional superstition. It lauds the leading of individual light. He felt acutely, with an extraordinary and concentrated intensity, the value, the importance, the dignity of his own soul. It invents the "over soul"—surely an exercise in terminology—to authenticate it.

This, which is a fair statement, savors of injustice only in its implication that Emerson was unique in his procedure. A similar approach to any other man's philosophy will demonstrate that to some degree it is his vision of truth as seen through the lens of his own temperament.

For there was more than this in the Emersonian philosophy. The Kantian transcendentalism, which in its acceptance of intuition emancipated by one stroke the speculative thinker, also restored the phenomenal universe to the experimental scientist. Emerson was very much aware of what was going on among the astronomers, geologists, botanists, physicists, chemists. He was an eager reader of their findings; and in them all he found happy confirmation of his inborn belief in the prevalence of universal law and the prevalence of progressive change. In his day it was his special and lonely rôle to demonstrate that a man could live in peace and comfort in the no-man's-land between two camps, to go about his business in invulnerable serenity as their missiles whizzed by. He accepted the universe, before Margaret Fuller or John Burroughs

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did, in his recognition of the laws of the world, or Fate. In season and out of season he harped on this string. Everything reminded him of it and he acknowledged every reminder. But he harped with equal insistence on the other string of "liberty, the significance of the individual, the grandeur of duty, the power of character." Both concepts were true, of that he was certain. As a mystic he was content to believe in them without attempting to reconcile them. But neither contending faction could forgive him for what he would concede to the other. To one he was an infidel and an atheist, to the other a transcendental dreamer and an impractical idealist.

To himself he was the quiet possessor of unassailable truth. Nature as it was revealed in its behavior by the men of the microscope and the telescope was a realm of majestic order, and it was the irrefutable symbol of the majesty whose dwelling was in "the light of setting suns and the round ocean and the living air." But he himself was a part of this natural universe, and the majestic power behind it had its residence also "in the mind of man." So he was assured that "matter passed into spirit and became a symbol, and that spirit passed into matter and gave it form." He could go far with both Jonathan Edwards and Herbert Spencer. He went in fact along the path that Edwards might have followed all the way, if the youthful scientist had not totally surrendered to the maturing theologian.

The inspiring quality of his thought is beyond all peradventure. Like the minds of the Puritans from whom he was descended, his mind had "derived a peculiar quality from the daily contemplation of superior beings and eternal interests," a quality whose gift was not only to sustain itself on a high plane but to lift others at least momentarily to its own level. He was speaking to a community which was committed beyond any parallel in history to the maintenance of moral law and to a belief in a humankind who were individually capable of self-control and socially capable of self-government. How-

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ever disturbing his philosophical anarchism might be and his theological revolt, in his own character he was a reassuring fulfillment of his convictions. And taken in their entirety his convictions are unassailable as a guide to a way of life.

But taken in part, as in the case of every great religious teacher, they have been subjected to disconcerting distortions. In the immaculateness of Emerson's nature and the moralistic rigor of his essential self he could contend for intuitional perception of truth without risk of being led into beliefs which had their source in the justification of a "natural man" with whom he had no acquaintance. Yet in the hands of later apostles of self-expression his gospel has led to Dionysian conclusions that he never dreamed of. He who needed no discipline resented the thought of discipline, not seeming to appreciate that to proceed from himself to mankind in general was the most fallible form of generalizing from a single particular. And he knew better, though he never brought his knowledge to bear when his favorite theme of the divinity in man was in question.

It is perhaps not so clear that he did know better in his care-free acceptance of the rightness of all intuitive truth. He was as confident—he reiterated it endlessly—in the finality of individual judgments as was the Calvinist whose soul-searchings led him to the assurance of salvation. In the philosophical idiom of his day, he gave all weight to "reason" or intuition and none to "understanding" or the constructive approach to truth and the critical approval and adoption of it. There was no need in his belief for Aristotelian or Arminian or Baconian tests of what seemed to be true. As, however, he followed his thoughts where they chanced to lead him, writing Whim on the lintels of his doorpost, challenging all and proving nothing, he chanced at times to write as if he were expounding a system instead of uttering a succession of lyric exclamations. And when he did so he wandered off into the sort of philosophical ingenuities that he deplored in Swedenborg. He became not

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infrequently as fanciful and as unconvincing as the philosophers whom in their eager development of intricate systems he accused of including "every fact save one—namely, Life."

Moreover, although he referred to himself as an experimenter and a seeker, he was neither of these, but a seer and an asserter, and as he declared that he wished to say what he felt and thought on any date with the proviso that perhaps on the morrow he should contradict it all, it is only by reading him in extenso that one can be sure of what was a lyric accident of the moment and what was an abiding truth.

IV

Thus one might turn from Emerson with impatience on reading that "everything is beautiful seen from the point of intellect, or as truth. But all is sour if seen from experience. Details are melancholy: the plan is seemly and noble." There are plenty to say that herein lies the reason for Emerson's blinking the facts of life. It would be a good explanation if elsewhere he had not said that "no picture of life can have any veracity that does not admit the odious facts."

He insisted on contact with life for scholar and preacher. He saw the odious facts for himself and in his acknowledgment of them he was one of the most cogent critics of his day. His belief in the capacities of the individual led to an ultimate democracy in spite of what he saw around him, but the deference some of his countrymen paid to the machinery of government annoyed him sometimes and sometimes disgusted him, as when he gave an ironic second to "I baptize thee in the name of the Governor, and of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives." Such machinery seemed to him no more than a by-product of ideal democracy. He did not set out to define its functions, not being given to definitions, but in one passage, writing to a definite point, he came close to compressing his whole theory of government: "Let us stifle our prejudices against common sense and humanity, and agree that every

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man shall have what he honestly earns, and, if he is a sane and honest man, have an equal vote in the state and a fair chance in society."

He found the average man more reassuring as an individual than as a member of the group. He was an easy mixer among homespun people. Charles Eliot Norton marveled at what a universal talker Emerson was aboard their returning ship in 1873. Thirty years earlier a journal entry accounted for his miscellaneous taste. "When, in our discontent with the pedantry of scholars, we prefer farmers, and when, suspecting their conservatism, we harken after the hard words of drovers and Irishmen . . . . this is alkali to our acid, or shade to our too much sunshine; but abide with these and you will presently find that they are the same men you left." He did more than like the commoners; he insisted often on their sound judgment and ripe intelligence, and protested against talking down to them. Books they did not like should have been written differently: "The people—no thanks to them—are nearly always right, have a low sort of right, that of common sense and instinct; and the man of talent and ingenuity is wrong."

Yet in the mass the populace depressed him. It hurt him that bad manners should prevail. When he looked at Washington's portrait in his dining-room he felt that this man had absorbed all the serenity in America and left none for his restless, fidgety countrymen. And their manners were no worse than their philosophy. Perhaps no more could be expected of a nation dedicated to trade, whose conversation was all of hay and grain and pigs and corn and apples. Nor with so little perspective was it surprising that they could be so easily misled. Twice in 1831 came the entry in the Journal, word for word, "Alas for the Majority: That old inevitable dupe and victim. What a dreary Iliad of woes it goes wailing and mad withal. Some dog of a Cleon, or Robespierre, or Douglas, or Butler, is always riding it to ruin."

This discomfort in the midst of a chaos for which the

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stupid and the pernicious shared responsibility was increased by the epidemic of reform that was sweeping the land under the lead of "Madmen, madwomen, men with beards, Drinkers, Muggletonians, Come-outers, Groaners, Agrarians, Seventh-day-Baptists, Quakers, Abolitionists, Calvinists, Unitarians and Philosophers." He was so intent on the education of the individual that he was willing to waive the group. He was satisfied that for his own part sympathy with a good cause need not involve partnership in it. Too much association would dull his faculties and thwart his usefulness. When the Ripleys and Alcott and Margaret Fuller came to his house to talk over the Brook Farm project, he could not kindle to it, but sat silent and apart. He had his own problems to solve and would not immerse himself in the most benevolent of crowds.

It was not so easy for him to see good in many of the more aggressive reform undertakings or to look charitably on them. His friends at Brook Farm and Fruitlands were planning only to withdraw a little from the open road, to breathe nobody's dust and live their associated lives under agreeable conditions. If they were not individually isolated like himself, they were at least cultivating little communized solitudes of their own. But when it came to bigger propagandist schemes, Emerson could nod his head when Thoreau growled, "Wherever I go, men pursue me and paw me with their dirty institutions, and try to constrain me into their desperate odd-fellow society." When Brook Farm was taken into the Fourieristic camp under the spell of Albert Brisbane's eloquence, Emerson began to criticize. The old family party was well enough for those who liked it, but this new scheme which provided for everything on the globe was too ambitious. It included not only both poles and the equator, but also Concord, Massachusetts; and it was bound to reckon not only with the disappointments of a handful of friends, but with possible disaster to the millions whom it was zealous to warp out of their own orbits. He who founded no system, who disclaimed any gift for argument,

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must show deference to the magnificent sweep of a Fourier. He could only set in opposition his certainty that men in the aggregate never could be handled as material to be disposed of at the will of even the most benevolent of despots. As for the "small, sour and fierce schemes of the day, each with its set of little proprietors," Emerson's head was so high in solitude that only the distant hum of them reached his ears. "The criticism and attack on institutions," he said, "has made one thing plain, that society gains nothing whilst a man, not himself renovated, attempts to renovate things around him; he has become tediously good in some particulars, but negligent or narrow in the rest; and hypocrisy and vanity are often the disgusting result."

V

A half-dozen recent studies show a tendency to reassert the strength and soundness of Emersonian doctrine, notable among them those in Mumford's *The Golden Day,* Brooks's *Emerson and Others,* and Parrington's *Main Currents in American Thought.* They bear impressive witness to what Mr. Brownell wrote nearly twenty years ago, that, though the perspective of time diminishes most reputations, it has already enlarged Emerson's, that his fame is growing, that he is peculiarly American, that he was both great and characteristic in his greatness.

Yet the recent shower of scorn which fell for a while on James Gates Percival and Emerson alike did bring its measure of consolation, if only for the degree in which it has dampened the ardor of the Emersoniacs who never can talk for five minutes without alluding to the song in the scum, or the wagon and the star, or self-excusing beauty, or the elusive mousetrap and the beaten path—people who are the most perfect confirmation of Emerson's own stricture, in *Quotation and Originality,* on the innumerable parasites who "take an ex-

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treme content in suction, which constitutes the main business of their life."

But showers cannot storm down sober judgment. Emerson was a great contemporary, because he is a sane modern. He is quite abreast of the scientific movement of today. He would find its latest revelations fresh ground for reverential wonder at the prevalence of universal law, and fresh justification for his faith in universal order. In a world which has been re-aroused to the doubt which leads toward truth, it is inevitable that there should be fresh turning to the man who declared, "No facts to me are sacred, none are profane. . . . . Nothing is secure but life, transition, the energizing spirit. No love can be bound by covenant against a higher love. No truth so sublime but it may be trivial tomorrow in the light of new thoughts. People wish to be settled; only in so far as they are unsettled is there any hope for them."

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WHAT IS MAN?

M. C. OTTO

ANY attempt made in these days to appraise human nature critically must consider the emphasis at present put on man's animal forbears. Carl Sandburg speaks the mind of the age in his poem, "Wilderness":

> There is a wolf in me . . . . fangs pointed for
> tearing gashes . . . . a red tongue for raw meat
> . . . . and the hot lapping of blood—I keep this
> wolf because the wilderness gave it to me and
> the wilderness will not let it go.
>
> There is a baboon in me . . . . clambering-clawed
> . . . . dog-faced . . . . yaping a galoot's hunger
> . . . . hairy under the armpits . . . . I keep the
> baboon because the wilderness says so.

And not a wolf and a baboon only, but a fox, a lion, a hog, an eagle, a mocking bird, and much besides:

> O, I got a zoo, I got a menagerie, inside my ribs, under
> my bony head, under my red-valve heart:
>
> I am a pal of the world: I came from the wilderness.[1]

Even in this mutilated form the power of the poem is evident. How could it be otherwise? Does it not set to vibrating what we feel in the deeps of our being? Does it not accord with what a hundred influences have constrained us to believe?

It is not the doctrine of animal inheritance in itself which calls for criticism. Just now there is no alternative to evolution but special creation, which leaves only one choice. We may confidently expect that in the future some ingenious thinker will hit upon another alternative, one that will more

[1] *Selected Poems of Carl Sandburg* (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1926) p. 110.

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adequately take care of the facts than either doctrine does today. But until this new conception has been achieved, evolution must be conceded to hold the ground. This is not necessarily true of certain deductions drawn from the evolutionary premise. They demand examination. The claim is made, for example, that in virtue of man's animal inheritance he is essentially identical with his next of kin among living creatures; that since this is so, the best solutions for troublesome human problems are to be found in the study of analogous problems as they appear in their infra-human form among the apes.

A psychopathologist in whom this view has come to admirable clearness of expression is reported to this effect: "Men and women have been trained by the demands of civilization to cover their natural impulses with many layers of disguises till it is very difficult to detect the real individual under the cloak." Now "monkeys are human beings without their masks on." Therefore "if we want to know how to behave, according to the way nature made us, if we want to know what is good for our instincts, we must study the monkeys." A colony of thirty monkeys which he maintained in California, together with various other animals, enabled him to discover human instincts in their natural form. From the study of the sex life of apes, for example, he was thus able to arrive at a clue to the natural sex demands of human beings and to study the various forms of misery resulting from the conflict between the artificial limits imposed by civilized society and impulses natural to human beings as simians, which after all they are and can never cease to be.[2]

This theory, interesting on its own account, is even more interesting as an illustration of a widely accepted type of investigation which has direct bearing on the problem under

[2] *The World,* New York, January 17, 1926, Editorial Section. Cf. G. V. Hamilton, *Introduction to Objective Psychopathology,* C. V. Mosby Co., 1925; C. Day, *This Simian World,* Knopf, 1920.

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discussion. The genetic or historic method has accustomed us to the idea that we come closest to explaining a thing when we have discovered how it came to be. From this we have passed to the belief that a thing's real nature is revealed in its primitive, rather than in its developed, form. Early religions were the outgrowth of fear; *ergo*, religion is a form of terror. The earliest moral codes were folkways which the members of a tribe were compelled to observe by those in power; well, then right is a name for might. The acts of a baby are purely egocentric; hence every human deed is self-centered. The simplest psychic behavior is the stimulus-response reflex; it follows that human personality is an "easily understandable integration of stimulus-response behavior." Turning from religion, morality, behavior, personality as these actually occur in their baffling complexity and richness, we try to find them in what they were before they had become what they are, as if by picking away the petals we could discover the rose. According to this method man *is* what he *was*, and the proper study of mankind is monkeys.

Any comparison between men and apes strikes many persons as so nasty in spirit, consequently so false to fact, that they will have nothing to do with it. But their position is precarious. The rigid separation long made between animal and human psychology cannot be maintained. Such books as Wolfgang Koehler's *The Mentality of Apes*, Robert Yerkes' *Almost Human*, and allied studies report investigations which cannot legitimately be neglected by one who seeks information on the nature of man. The more the scientific student of the anthropoid apes learns about them, as Mr. Yerkes testifies, "the more helpful lessons for mankind he discovers in their relations to their world and to one another." It is perhaps a natural solicitude for human dignity, though certainly a mistaken one, which disdains to study the animals next below us as a means of enlarging and deepening knowledge of men-

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tal processes, social relations, and methods of learning. Why refuse to study complicated questions in simplified form?

Insisting upon the propriety of studying monkeys, we need not confuse it with the proper study of mankind. And there is an advantage in dealing with problems in simplified form, provided we do not mistake them for the complex problems which are to be solved. No doubt the study of the past throws light upon the present, but the present is not therefore the past. The creature we call man emerged as less than human in the great panorama of life and he has not escaped the influence of that fact. This does not prove that he never emerged at all, or that he is today what he was when he emerged. If he has not shaken off all traces of his halting ascent, why must we conclude that he has not ascended?

In a word, man is what he is, not what he was. No epoch or hour of history has greater authority than the present epoch and hour. The stage at which man has arrived is at least as authentic a revelation of his quality as any which may be selected from the ages left behind. And that this quality is something very different, in character and in scope, from what we find in the brute is indisputable, unless we ascribe higher truth to methodological abstractions than to concrete actualities. He is capable of doing and suffering in a way that his animal brother is not. He is tortured by fears and lured by hopes to which the ape is stranger. No ape brews the venom of human hatred nor transforms passion into love. Apes speak no language, accumulate no tradition, never see the tragic or the funny side of things. They cannot invest their energies in schemes of conduct nor sacrifice their lives for illusions. Why is it that we cannot really understand ape psychology? Because we cannot return, even in imagination, to the simplicity of the ape's outlook and reactions. Is it for the same reason that we do not sound the bottom of human personality? It is not. It is because we are unable to master the complexity of man's interests and responses. Once gain a sense of man's

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enormous power and tragic weakness, his vast achievements and stupendous failures, his resistless intelligence and clinging superstition, his tender sympathy and refined cruelty, his possible nobility and possible coarseness—in a word, hold him before the mind in the bewildering actuality of his present being, and it is impossible to identify him with what he was before he had become what he is.

The bewildering actuality of his present being—suppose we had an adequate comprehension of that. We would have made a good beginning in our knowledge of man, but only a beginning. For man is much more. If we are justified in rejecting the notion that a thing's essence is to be found in what it was in a past stage, we cannot claim that it is to be found in what it is now, neglecting what it has been. We must go at least as far as Aristotle felt it necessary to go. We must transcend a thing's local, transient occurrence and attain to an appreciation of its significance when viewed in the context of other examples of its kind. What once was, what now is, did not explode into existence out of blank nothingness. It had a history. Things are events; deeds are rhythms; and "the lesson of life," as Emerson said, "is to believe what the years and the centuries say against the hours; to resist the usurpation of particulars; to penetrate to their catholic sense." Religion, for example, must be seen as it composes itself in historical perspective, viewed here and there, now and then, in primitive and developed form. As we go from one particularized type of religion to another we get a hint of something deep and urgent, something forever forming itself anew yet never coming to perfect expression. This growing something, very inadequately exhibited in any specific instance, but suggested when the several instances are studied in their temporal succession, is religion in the deeper sense, the *spirit* of religion, we sometimes call it. So of every human project and institution. So of man himself. We cannot learn too much of how his career began, nor of the stages where he rested in the long journey to

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the present. Not that we may thereby hope to come upon an early phase of human nature more essentially or truly man than another—we have considered the futility of this attempt —but that we may attain to a standpoint superior to mere phases and catch some meaning of the drama as a whole. The drama has a story to tell which no act or episode discloses.

As we attempt to survey the human venture in perspective we can scarcely fail to detect significant characteristics which may escape notice when attention is fixed on a temporal cross-section. We observe that from remotest antiquity man has refused passively to accept the world in which he happened to occur. *No* organism passively accepts the world, but the fact is conspicuous in the case of man. When we first discover him in the dimness of prehistory he is already busy trying to cajole or compel the mysterious forces about him. His methods are crude, but they show his bent. He intends to have a hand in his destiny. Beginning as a creature all but at the mercy of circumstance, he slowly extends the area in which he is able to employ means in the attainment of ends. At first his projects are simple, his means weak and uncertain: simple weapons for hunting and fighting, simple devices for catching fish, simple implements for tilling the ground. But the projects take on greater and greater proportions, the means grow more and more ingenious and powerful. In time he learns to bridle the forces of nature, enters upon an era of spectacular inventions, plans to make himself master of the planet for ages to come. Who, walking abroad in any great city today, can picture the landscape of only a few centuries ago? Who, looking out upon the contemporary world with its amazing accumulation of mechanical power, its unbelievable multiplicity of devices for material comfort, its countless organizations and institutions, can stretch his thought to match the accomplishment? One may indeed question the high valuation often put upon the transformation of the physical environment and lament the sacrifice of precious goods which it has cost; nevertheless con-

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sidered purely as an accomplishment, no language is adequate to its majesty.

In another realm, which, until a better term is invented, we must still call the realm of the spirit, man has likewise shown it to be his nature to recreate. He has gradually elevated the ethical level of his life and manners. There are able people who think otherwise. They argue that man has made no moral progress whatever; that he has merely changed fashions in the garments under which he hides his fatal depravity. And it is not difficult to gather data which make the contention appear plausible. But if certain errors are guarded against these data are less telling. Slowly throughout the centuries, and very rapidly in recent times, the great mass of mankind has pushed its way to the front, demanding and securing active participation in affairs. This great mass is prominently in our minds when we think of contemporary human nature; whereas when we think of human nature in ancient times we disregard the mass then existing and remember only the illustrious few or a selected group. No one in his senses would claim that men in the mass today live on a higher ethical plain than exceptional individuals or an exceptional group of people did in a selected period of the past. One may, however, be quite in his senses and claim that the general ethical consciousness is a finer thing the world round than it was in earlier times. There is still much of superstition, brutality, and aesthetic indifference, but the power of agreeable fiction is less tyrannical than it once was; fellow-feeling is effective over a wider range; and interest in aesthetic experience is more pervasive and liberal. This is moral gain.

Nor is it true that man's ethical outlook has not changed because the basic wants summed up in the words food, shelter, sex, continue to be motivating forces of action. They are not the simple cravings they were. Each has been enriched by inclusion within a growing complexity of interests; each has been refined by a nicer perception of consequences and a

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greater sensitivity of feeling. This would be obvious were we alive to immediate actualities. But we have been trained to approach experience through theory. We dip a conceptual net into fluid experience and mistake the catch of abstractions for the living stream. Disregarding differences between concrete behaviors, we are rewarded with the illusion of a quality common to them all. This we are pleased to regard as the *essential* character, though we never really come upon it, while the characteristics we do come upon constantly we take to be *accidental,* hence negligible. Well, it is just these neglected characteristics which give body and color to actions and which enable us to distinguish the behavior of one man from that of another. And what are we all but interrelated complexes of actions so constituted? To improve morally does not mean to refashion a mythical essence called human nature, nor to cease to be involved in the impulses and habits without which we would not only cease to be human, but cease to be. It means to bring impulses and habits under the influence of criticism, with the result that the conception of right and wrong takes on larger scope and plasticity, sympathetic imagination becomes more generous in its application, profounder potentialities and more abiding satisfactions are realized by increasing numbers of men. Can there be any doubt that improvement defined in these terms is a historic fact?

Moreover, it is easy to misinterpret lack of interest in specific ideals for the absence of idealism when it may be the best evidence of its presence and vigor. Whenever customary ways of living have undergone change it has always seemed to many persons irrefutable evidence of degeneration. So today. But the contemporary shifting of standards, loudly proclaimed as a lapse, is, to a not inconsiderable degree, a determined groping after a more satisfactory manner of life. When this is recognized our age will add its testimony to man's expanding moral sense.

Are we to draw the conclusion from these facts that human

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history shows an undeviating progress upward? Scarcely. The picture is not so bright as that. At best the advancement has been devious, with losses as well as gains. Nor have we any way of telling whether, if other routes had been selected in place of those that were, mankind might not today be in a far better state, physically and morally. The contention is simply—the word "simply" must not be taken to minimize the importance of the contention, only to define it—that in man the universal source of things has achieved a being who dissolves the world in his restless imagination and reconstitutes it after more congenial patterns. It is his genius to form purposes and invent the instruments of their realization, to make the power of natural forces and the succession of natural events responsive to teleological vision, and so to remake the world he inherits, the world in its material and also in its spiritual aspects. Denied the possibility of this recreation in the realm of fact, he transfers it to the realm of illusion. Robbed of this compensating deflection, he sinks to the level of the animal, or, in Santayana's phrase, "folds up his heart and withers in a corner."

If the adequate description of anything involves the consideration of its historic as well as its contemporary manifestations, what of possible developments still to come? Time has future, as well as present and past, dimension. Consider religion once more. Had we gathered together into one concept the essential qualities of all existing religions and enriched this by the inclusion of all the religions which at one period or another have appealed to men, we would still fall short of telling the whole story. Tendencies are alive in the world today which will make the religions of tomorrow something different from what they have so far been. And there will be morrows after tomorrow. This future aspect—what religion will become as men discover how to make new use of the propensities and experiences that are the sources of religion—must be taken into account. But nothing of which we know differs in

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this respect from religion, least of all man. His nature must be held to include what he has the capacity to become. Suppose Aristotle had produced a perfect characterization of human nature as realized up to his day, would he have done justice to the theme? Did not mankind later become what could not possibly have been discovered in his attainments up to that time? Yet the capacity necessary for this achievement must have been present even then. In other words, man was more than his present and his past disclosed; in some sense he was what he was still to be.

Now what of this man of the future? What can safely be said about him? This is one subject, if there is no other, on which there is general agreement. About the man of the future we know nothing. One may, at best, puzzle a little about him, hazard a guess or two, and, so doing, confess one's deepest aversions and dearest hopes.

The man of the future may possibly find a way to harmonize a profound antithesis which now divides his spirit. For a very long time man's ancestors belonged, with other animals, to a generalized parental stock. The centripetal pull of this relationship is influential in subtle and powerful ways. It is present in the hunger to be swallowed up in the crowd, in the herd. But ages ago a separation took place and a species of animal set out on a human career. This too must have had strong backing, the potency of which still lives in the impulse toward independence, individuality. There have been times when these two urges—to be one's self and to be one with others—were realizable in harmonious co-operation, in noble form, and by large numbers of men. This was due partly to the modesty of the average ambition, but even more to the fact that life had not suffered the standardization we are familiar with. Today these impulses are in general at war with each other. While the pressure toward uniformity permits, indeed encourages, a kind of self-expression—people are urged to live in individual houses, command their own means of

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transportation, etc.—it is antagonistic to the development of inner possibilities. Populous, rich, immersed in material comforts as we are, our intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic poverty is equally apparent. Yet one must be obtuse not to be aware of a searching for something underneath more satisfying than material individualism or bizarre expressions of personal peculiarity. Nothing is more important than that the unique centers of propulsive energy which human beings are should have real opportunity to come to fullest and finest expression, and nothing is more indisputable than that each self needs others to be in any significant sense itself. Perhaps in the future—there is no reason why the hope should be a vain one—mankind may discover a way of life for the masses combining social co-operation and enhancement of individual powers in a manner which only the exceptional few illustrate today.

It is conceivable that another problem will be solved. Until recently the institutions and occupations concerned with the production and distribution of food, clothing, and shelter were based upon the needs to be served. In the words of the economist, demand regulated supply. It does so no longer. The machinery of production and distribution has attained such vast proportions, so much is involved in its regular functioning, that demand has to be created to meet the supply. What was once a phase of activity subservient to life has become an end in itself. Perhaps not only *an* end, but *the* end. Year by year business institutions grow larger, absorbing smaller ones or crowding them to the wall. Experts are drawn in to deal with physical, chemical, economic, psychological problems. In the battle for markets the outposts are pushed ever farther afield, while the combat is intensified at home. With so much at stake it is natural that business men should not stop at this point; that they should seek to influence the enactment and administration of laws, to supersede religion as the definer of ideals, and to mold the education of youth.

We cannot appreciate how profoundly all this has changed

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the face of life unless we see it in connection with parallel historical events: the gradual elimination of a governing class, the undermining of traditional moral principle, the weakening of religious influence. With these rival claimants to power over men's lives rendered practically innocuous, the business enterprise, unhandicapped by any civilizing tradition or social responsibility, is becoming, if it has not become, the dominant force in contemporary affairs. So completely has business insinuated itself into the texture of daily living that the social consciousness suffers an acute moral paralysis in its presence. Few men dare to think seriously of tampering with its ramifying structure, however much they may deplore the spiritual consequences of its assumed prerogatives. The sanctity which formerly clothed the priest or hedged about the king now hallows the machinery of barter.

Many people who are thoroughly out of sympathy with this trend are convinced that it must be accepted. The evolution of business to a place of universal dominance appears to them inevitable. They think of it as the working out of an inviolable law of nature. And they may be right. But it is very easy to mistake the conditions we find existing for the way they must necessarily be. It was once unthinkable that priestcraft should be deprived of monopolistic control in religion or royalty in government. Both have come to pass. Is it not likely that the same fate will overtake the tyranny of business? The human spirit has shown a persistent unwillingness to remain confined within the bounds conceived and fashioned by a special class. Even today many business men are better than business, spurning to descend to its radical materialism in their immediate practice and in roundabout ways making use of material prosperity to further higher pursuits. May not the future turn out to be for them rather than for their more ruthless leaders? The present fashion demands that men and women turn with increasing intensity of devotion to the production and distribution of bread, as if man could live by

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bread alone. Nor is there any unambiguous indication that presently this fashion will change. Aldous Huxley's words may be prophetic: "One day, perhaps, the earth will have turned into one vast feather-bed, with man's body dozing on top of it and his mind underneath, like Desdemona, smothered." But it is no less possible that the discovery will be made before it is too late—indeed, much sooner than there is any visible reason for supposing—that the material wealth of society, instead of marking the summit of human achievement, may be made the sustaining root of spiritual florescence.

In a recently discovered fragment from one of Aristotle's lost dialogues, written by him when he was strongly under the influence of Plato, a truth is advanced which is relevant to a final consideration regarding the future. "Be assured," he says, "that the good of man does not depend upon abundance of possessions, but upon the right inner quality. Not even the body is regarded as in a happy condition merely because it is decked out in resplendent robes, but only if, though wanting in finery, it is well developed and in good health. Likewise one should call only that man fortunate whose soul is ethically developed, rather than the man who is rich in outward possessions and is worth nothing in himself. Why, even a horse is judged by its actual virtues. If it is a poor horse, it is not rated higher because it has a gold bit in its mouth and a costly harness on its back."

This is the speech of a man supported by a philosophy of life. It is often asserted that every man has a philosophy of life, since he has an outlook on things which, no matter how crass, superficial, or ignoble it may be, serves him as a general basis for conduct. Such outlooks we undeniably have in plenty, and no end of sentimental and obscurantist standpoints in the bargain. If these are properly called philosophies of life, a new name shall be found for the high adventure in which Confucius, Socrates, Plato, Gautama, Jesus, Spinoza, Kant were engaged; in which all those have been and are en-

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gaged, known and unknown, who illumine behavior by vision and intellectual and moral daring. No, in its better sense we are without a philosophy, even in the liberal terms of William James's definition, "a dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means." Not only are we without it, but the channels through which it might be expected to come are, with too few exceptions, dried up or put to baser uses.

This is the shadow in the picture. Over against it we can place a widespread and sincere search for the elements of culture, the spiritual values without which our material triumphs mount before us as giant mockeries. Men and women in unbelievable numbers are turning to the classic interpreters of life, and to contemporaries who speak with the classic authority, hoping to find a way of bringing meaning into a feverish struggle which it itself cannot satisfy. The phenomenon is full of promise. Will they not discover in the end that what they seek must be created anew to meet peculiar needs and conditions? Will they not presently learn that a vital philosophy is indigenous; that the best to be found in the past is a stimulus to the discovery and enlistment of the contemporary forces which further a life of excellence? And if they do, then once again a philosophy of life will come into existence which men can put into practice with self-respect and creative joy. A new epoch in the liberation of the human spirit will be ushered in.

Turning back over the route which this discussion has taken, the conclusion must be that man's nature cannot be exhausted in one stratum of existence. He is what he *is* in the complexity and contradictoriness of his present striving. He is what he *was* in those ages of which he is the ripening fruit. He is what he shall find the means of *becoming* in the generations to be while yet his race may last. Being so much, he presents the appearance of hopeless contradiction, denying what he expresses, expressing what he denies. In strictness indefinable, he defines himself every age and every hour. He escapes the neat formulas in which the unimaginative would capture him

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and refuses to validate the graphs invented to picture his career. No work of reason or art has portrayed the depths to which he can sink or the heights to which he can rise. Helpless, without environmental opportunity, recalcitrant conditions have been unable to crush him, nor favorable conditions to lull him to rest. He may come to naught in the end, but while the planet permits he will be, as Whitman said, "immense and interminable" like the great rivers; he will be the "golden impossibility" of Emerson, the "not yet formed" of Browning, the "indescribable focus of the universe" of Hardy. So that, committing the aesthetic impiety of giving a turn to the Carl Sandburg poem, we may say:

O, I got a zoo, I got a menagerie, inside my ribs, under
my bony head, under my red-valve heart:
I am a pal of the world.
And I got something else.
It drew me out of the wilderness, looking, looking. . . . .
Wherever you meet me, you'll find me looking. . . . .
You'll find me looking . . . . looking . . . . looking. . . . .

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

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THE ETHICS OF GIOVANNI GENTILE

VALMAI BURDWOOD EVANS

GENTILE'S views on ethics are consistent with the rest of his philosophy, which for our present purpose is in the background. He endeavors to show that all forms of mind resolve into philosophical activity. This being assumed, it is clear that in some sense ethics too must be philosophy, and, from this point of view, the distinction so frequently drawn between ethics and metaphysics must be dropped. Ethics should not be defined as though it were concerned with the ideal in opposition to the real, because it is not possible to maintain any such opposition.

According to Gentile, while it is true that the problems of ethics are bound up with the question of value, it is also true that the answer to the question "What do we mean by value?" cannot be dissociated from the question "What do we mean by reality?" The answer to this question is given by the characteristic doctrine of Gentile: ". . . . The concept of act is the only one which can be reconciled with the concept of value, because it is the only one which allows for a certain intuition of freedom.[1] A popular error maintains that value and reality can be dissociated, and in fact normally are dissociated; and we must rid ourselves of this. It is based on the old opposition between idea and reality. It identifies value with idea. There is an idea, we are told, of beauty, and another of justice, another of courage, and so forth. These ideas are values. The moral life consists in striving to realize these values, which we call in ethics "ideals." Ideals may also take the form of moral laws, categorical imperatives, etc. They *are* not, but they *ought* to be. Contrasted with what ought to be, we find the things that are, deeds of crime, frustrated efforts, ugliness, and ignorance. These are real, and they ought not to be.

[1] *Logica*, II, III, I, 11.

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Criticism of this popular view may be found in the work of several philosophers, among them Bradley, Croce, and Gentile. It is enough to summarize it here. The ideal which is not real has no value, simply because it is not real. What is not, is nothing, and can not therefore be valuable. If ideals are valuable because they influence the acts of men, they are real in influencing those acts; their value is due to this reality. They are real so far as they are realized, so far as human deeds are good and beautiful. Just as upon examination, "ideas" are seen to be indeed valuable, but only so far as they are real; so "realities" are seen to lose their reality except so far as they have value. A crime is only real so far as it is action of some sort, and therefore has a value—it realizes an ideal of a kind. It is unreal just where it lacks value. To be bad is to be not-good, that is, not to be. True reality therefore is identical with value; it is the union of being with what ought to be.

This reality, Gentile says, can be found only in mind, which, alone of all realities, *is* just so far as it *should be*. Any lesser reality is not completely valuable; and any ideal is not even fully what it ought to be, because it is not real. But mind is real through self-realization, and it must realize itself in order to be real.

By mind Gentile means thought, which, he says, we usually take to be of two kinds, the active thinking which we ascribe to a subject, and the object of that thinking which seems to be acted upon or thought about. But really there is only one kind of thought—the active thinking of the subject which in concrete reality contains the object which it makes. Thinking absorbs the contrast between existence and value, and, according to Gentile, the contrast between intellect and will also, replacing them by the concept of concrete mind as the act of self-creative thinking. This act is both real and a value.

The philosophy of Gentile here opposes itself to many philosophies which assume a radical difference between willing and thinking, or the practical and the theoretical activities

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of mind. His line of reasoning may briefly be suggested to be this: You cannot perform a moral action without knowing what you are doing, that is to say, without *thinking;* nor can you think without being in the act of doing your duty or neglecting it, that is to say, without *willing*.

Only what he calls a "thoroughgoing intellectualism," he argues, can allow that the will is absolutely free, for on any other view the will is limited by the intellect. Freedom, in order to be freedom at all, has to be absolute. There is no such thing, for example, as a *limited* freedom of action, although the phrase is often used. The limit beyond which the action is not permitted is the condition upon which the action is permitted at all. The action is therefore determined or restricted. The freedom of mind, therefore, implies that the thinking in which it is found is the whole of mind. Anything else would be a limitation of the thinking act, which would cease to be free.

Descartes tried to show how the will could be distinguished from the intellect and yet be free. But the intellect, if real, is just as much a hostile reality, from the point of view of the will, as the brute force of nature over which the defender of free will argues that the will does triumph. Perhaps it was because Descartes glimpsed the truth of this that he argued that the "decisions" of the intellect are not in fact made by it, but by the active will. Thus, in spite of being an intellectualist he tends toward the absorption of knowing in doing: for if his will is to be absolutely free it cannot be obliged by the evidence of the intellect to decide in a certain manner. The will, it would appear, chooses without regard to the evidence.

In this case the freedom of the will is the power to create the object of knowledge. It does not accept materials provided by the intellect. It makes its own. But then it is knowledge, for knowledge consists in judgments that reality is so and so rather than so and so. Here is an unexpected result. An attempt to leave intellect and will side by side with the firm assertion of the freedom of the latter results in the annihilation

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of the former. But it is the result which follows from the nature of freedom. There cannot be two activities. At most we can distinguish within one activity an aspect which qualifies it. The one activity we may call the free act. There is no other freedom. Freedom can belong only to Absolute Mind, not to the mind of the finite person who is influenced by other persons, hemmed in by nature, and by the boundaries of limited knowledge which is limited power. "Dualism is today overcome by denying the distinction and precedence of doing to knowing in mind; by making the activity in which mind realizes itself as self-creation consist in self-consciousness."[2]

On frankly facing the situation, it is not difficult to see that this identification of thought and will is necessary. No one can deny that to think well and wisely is hard work. At the least it is activity. The popular distinction between theoretical and practical activity cannot stand in the end, unless on condition that we assert that to know is not to do, and that to will is not to know. Really to will is not to will blindly, but consciously, in full awareness of the act itself which is knowledge.

It may be objected that "doing" or "activity" is a genus of which knowing and willing are two species. But the distinguishing marks of the species are not to be found. To know is not to be active toward an independent object, for (assuming the truth of an idealist philosophy) there is no independent object. And to will is not to choose between two possible methods of acting according to some motive, for that is determinism—the false admission of passivity into active mind; nor is it to choose without a motive, which is to be irrational—the death of mind. Will is the act of the present which absorbs the past and creates the future. Knowledge and will are therefore both productive activity, both free, because the same pure act.

This identity of knowledge and will, which Gentile says

[2] *Logica*, II, III, II, 34.

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has been considered a reproach to his theory, he regards as a glory of it. It is the end of dualism which retained its hold here even when it had lost ground within theory of knowledge as such. "But, once the will is freed from its fantastic relations with an external reality . . . . what criterion of distinction remains between knowledge and will?"[3]

Only through this identification of willing and thinking is a solution of the problem of freedom possible, Gentile thinks. Mind as a process, a self-realizing act, is both necessary and free. This in a way which is comprehensible. The changes of nature, a nature taken in abstraction from mind, are necessary in a sense, but it is a necessity which is merely an aspect of contingency. The fact, until it is understood, when it is no longer mere fact, is accidental; its contrary appears equally likely to have occurred. Only the necessity of thought, that is, a necessity which is understood, is and remains a necessity for thought. This necessity is, however, also freedom, since a self-realizing reality is also self-creative, and to create one's self is to be free.[4]

Theory is different from practice, and science is quite another thing than life, not because the intellect is not will or the will is not intellect, but because at one time thought, the real living act of mind, is taken abstractly, and the other time concretely.[5]

While it was supposed that the act of choice was a selection by the will between two alternative modes of being, it seemed either that the will was not free, but determined by the superior attraction of one alternative over the other (and the will is equally determined whether the two alternatives are motives or ends, whether it is drawn from before or pushed from behind), or else it seemed that the freedom of the will consisted in its ability to choose arbitrarily between the alternatives, which is the least rational of all methods of choice,

[3] *Teoria*, XV, 201.

[4] *Logica*, I, I, V, 100.

[5] *Teoria*, XV, 203.

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the "liberty of indifference." But there are not two objects before the will. There is the act of self-realization. Choice is made in the self-creative act which creates being and combines freedom with necessity; for the necessity is that of thought, and thought is the chooser.

This conception of "necessary freedom" implies the rejection of the notion that ideals transcend realities, even in the case of the ideal of a transcendent Goodness; for, being external to man, such a goodness is a natural being. Man, in order that he may be moral, cannot be the blind follower of a law imposed upon him, even if this law be from above. The moral will is the free will, which to be free must be its own law.

Nevertheless there is another aspect of this autonomy of the will. The will is also love, and love is understanding—the rational creation of what is not the self continually resolving into the self. Man grows in morality while he grows in knowledge and the appreciation of the wills of others, for so he is led to the understanding of the will which is perfect and may be called the divine will—the self-realization of concrete mind. When his will unites with this will, making it his own, he is entirely free; but not till then. Freedom, to be freedom, must be absolute; but no freedom other than divine freedom is absolute. All beings, all wills, except the infinite will, suffer the limitations of other wills and of the whole natural world of which they are part.

Man is moral so far as he denies the limited desires, the limited points of view, of finite beings. This denial of man is not an act which can be performed once and forever. It is perpetually renewed. The negation of mind implied by such a denial is possible to mind without destroying its identity, for the moment or aspect of negation is essential to it—not indeed to mind as a substance, as it was once thought to be, but to mind as a process which idealism, according to Gentile, implies it to be. The subject, in order to know itself, has to objectify itself, that is, to destroy itself as subject.

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This act of knowing is a moral act, and expressed ethically reads that the self, in order to realize itself, must be denied: he that loseth his life shall save it. The paradoxes of religion are those of philosophy; at close quarters the appearance of paradox vanishes. But the fulfilment of moral injunctions, the realization of moral ideals, is found only in Absolute Mind, which alone is aware of the eternal negation of itself by which it lives. Many men, many things, are but the empirical representation of the real world; they belong to the partial knowledge which takes the part for the whole. When such partial knowledge is no longer set up as concrete, we see that many men and things are in essence united within the infinite subject, that their reality consists in this union which knowledge eternally denies only in order to reaffirm it.

For nature is eternal; it is not something which mind will ever completely destroy. Its destruction would be the destruction of mind, which would cease to develop with the loss of that non-being without which there can be no dialectic. As from the point of view of logic the object is necessary so that the subject may know itself, so from that of ethics—in reality one with logic—the denial of self-will is necessary in order that the will of the self may be fulfilled.

As part of the problem of freedom, there is usually raised a question which is more of theological than of philosophical interest, for it is not capable of statement in terms that philosophy can refrain from criticizing. This is the question whether a real future which is foreseen by some mind, e.g., by the mind of God, is compatible with the free will of limited minds. But infinite mind cannot transcend the minds of men, though it transcends them in their limited aspect; the future is not ultimately real in independence of mind; it is not "there" to be foreseen or not foreseen, because time itself is but the act of mind objectifying itself. The free will of men is not a freedom of indifference. There is only one freely acting sub-

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ject, infinite mind, and men are free so far as they make their wills one with that activity which we call the will of God.

Gentile shows that the question in its original form is incapable of answer. Nevertheless, attempts have been made to answer it, and they are still being made. On one view, all actions are absolutely necessary, because they are linked in a chain of cause and effect. Thus it is possible for science to foretell the future. With the growth of knowledge, we shall be able to foretell human actions. An infinite mind, such as that of God, must therefore be able to tell the future. This view is consistent, and only fails when the conception of cause and effect is criticized. To this we shall refer briefly below.

A modification of this view, which is less self-consistent, has it that infinite mind with infinite knowledge must be able to foretell the future; yet the actions of men are free. Many efforts have been made to defend this untenable position, not least of them that of Leibniz in the *Théodicée*. In the end the doctrine that the acts of men may be foreknown, whether by themselves or by a divine mind, implies that men are facts of nature obeying laws, and therefore not free.

Natural laws appear to recognize that reality changes, but do not do so; they deal with "unchanging change." The movements of the heavenly bodies with which astronomy deals are regarded as so many lines already drawn upon a given space. This future is not really future; it is past, and this is the reason why it can be known. The same thing is true of the acts of men. If these can be foretold, men are facts submitting to an external law. Not only are they facts, but so is the God who foretells them; he is bound by his knowledge of his own future. A theory such as that of the defenders of free will who try to save it by a proof of the novelty of facts or of their "contingence" are on the wrong track; a new fact automatically joins the series of facts. It is the category of facts, of the series of cause and effect, which must be criticized.

The law of causation cannot give a rational explanation of

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the universe. Condition and conditioned in a causal series form a unity, but it is a unity which is not concrete. If the abstract union of condition and conditioned is regarded from the point of view of the philosopher who studies the concrete situation, we see that this abstract union is conditioned by the act which thinks it. It is the object of a free act, free because it is the realization of the subject; but also it is necessary because the realization of the subject is made possible only by means of the object.

This shows us that we must not return to the abstract dualism of conditioned and condition from which we set out. The object or fact which is their unity must not be opposed to the act by which it is thought. The fact is made by the act, yet it *is* the act. Being is merely necessary, but thinking is necessary and free. The fact has its meaning in the dialectic of mind. This is the only freedom. Those who seek for freedom among facts, for freedom in spite of a future which can be foretold, are therefore doomed to failure. The freedom of man is possible only through understanding, that is, *creation,* of facts, and the awareness of the activity which unites them with the infinite mind which is the union of value and reality.

That freedom is found only in infinite mind expounds and reinterprets the ethical teaching of Kant. That the will is good in itself means that it is not made good by direction toward some end or ideal such as the greatest happiness of the greatest number, but by the way in which it continues the process of the mind's ideal of self-realization. Self-realization is, to a limited extent, the privilege of every being whom we call a person, but in its infinite completion can be found only in the self-realization of the absolute mind, which is therefore the infinite and perfect person. "Now the divine will must be done, and done in earth as in heaven, done in human will. And in so far the world is no longer that which is, but that which ought to be; not that which we find, but that which we shall

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leave, that which arises in so far as we make it arise through the energy of our mind."[8]

Where there are many persons; these persons limit each other, and so live in a world of many things and many ends, some of which clash. This is a natural world. Men so far as divided from each other by discords and misunderstandings are natural beings. In union and comprehension they rise above natural being to infinite mind, which is spiritual being; they become one in a process of universal self-realization. Thus again, understanding which seems to fall under the head of knowledge, but not under that of will, is in fact "good will," or moral activity. The moral act is a pure act of mind, and as such it annuls mere division, which is discord, and creates a unity of harmonious distinctions, such as that to which perhaps the nations of the earth may one day attain.

Mere divisions are limitations, and therefore hinder the activity and development of mind. Hence the great moral teachers ask for the denial of self—not the infinite self, but that self which cuts off its knowledge and its needs from the knowledge and the needs of other men, pursuing its own satisfaction in its immediate present, to the exclusion of the satisfaction of others. It follows that the denial of the self in this sense must be supplemented by the denial of other selves: the self which is to be realized is no limited self, whether it be one's own or that of another. "The greatest good of the greatest number" is a formula which mistakenly looks for the moral end outside the development of the subject; and not only this, but it retains the limited conception of man as a natural being, as though the counting of heads were means to the knowledge of the value of the thoughts within.

Gentile's view of ethics may now be summarized: Absolute reality, which alone is perfectly free and therefore perfectly moral, is a process of pure thinking. This thinking is

[8] *Logica*, I, Introd., III, 29.

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also a moral act, perfectly harmonious in the case of mind as pure act.

One result of this identification is that there are no longer two coequal departments of philosophy dealing with the two kinds of activity of mind. Logic and ethics, when taken concretely, turn into each other. Knowledge and will are one, and the truth about one is the truth about the other. Hence the answer to the question Is value truth or is it goodness? is implicitly contained in the identification of knowledge and will as free activity. The contrast between the ideal which is not real but brought into existence by the will, and the real which is not ideal, but known to be what it is by the knowing mind, is resolved into the ideal which continually realizes itself but is never fully realized. This process of realization is both truth and reality. Reflection upon an act of knowledge shows that the knower has responsibility for his knowledge. He is aware of his own activity in knowing, and for this activity he is responsible. Knowledge is a virtue; in the end it is the whole of virtue; but to maintain this fairly we must mean by "knowledge," knowledge in the concrete sense, not a knowledge first distinguished from, and then identified with, virtue. On the other hand, virtue is knowledge. A moral act cannot be an act unconscious of itself. The man who performs a moral act must know what he is doing. Otherwise by common consent his act is non-moral. His act is not made moral by the relation in which it stands to some external end, but by its own nature.

To think is, therefore, a moral responsibility. Man feels that he *must* or that he *ought* to think as he does think. Every resource of his reason must be employed in his thinking. It is a moral duty. And again, his moral acts are those for which he feels responsibility, that is to say, those in which he is fully aware of what he is doing. If we ask for the ideal of ethics, Gentile tells us that it is also the ideal of logic—that the ideal should realize itself, which may be equally well expressed as

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the wish that the real should idealize itself. It is no external goal, but the act of life itself, thinking and doing, one and the same act.

Of the accepted ideals of various ethical theories the hedonist or utilitarian view is condemned by Gentile's reasoning; its outlook is limited to the natural world. The self-realization view, again, whether or not combined with that of self-sacrifice and striving after a common good (as in the system of T. H. Green), requires supplement and reservation. The self-realization and self-sacrifice form the positive and negative aspects of one process, that of absolute mind, so that to talk of the common good strays too near the error of the utilitarian system. True self-realization and worthy self-sacrifice is not the regulation of life merely by the ideals and wishes of fellow–finite beings, but by union of the striving finite will with the infinite will which is alone perfect freedom and endows the finite with liberty.

GOUCHER COLLEGE

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WILLIAM BLAKE IN MODERN THOUGHT[1]

WILLIAM F. CLARKE

TODAY, in all the scattered branches of science—physics, psychology, anthropology, biology, sociology—new fields are being mapped out and new stores of knowledge laid up, but as yet there seems to have emerged no central focus, no dominating idea, around which all this knowledge can be gathered up and organized into something like a living whole. William Blake, who lived in a time when human society, in all its various aspects, seemed to be going to pieces for want of this same dominating, organizing, central idea, had a vision of the source of the whole trouble and of the one, and only, means of healing the desperate ills to which humanity had been reduced: the living whole, "Universal Nature," had, in men's thoughts, been split up into detached and lifeless fragments, mere qualities of life. From these fragments an "Abstract" had been made, which abstraction not only destroyed the original, universal whole, but took the life of every member of the analysis:

> From them they make an Abstract, which is a Negation
> Not only of the Substance from which it is derived,
> A murderer of its own Body, but also a murderer
> Of every Divine Member. It is the Reasoning Power,
> An Abstract objecting power, that negatives everything.

Was Blake the prophet who, over a hundred years ago, looked forward to and foretold the coming of the philosophy of living, concrete events in which matter, sense, reason, emotion, will, and creative intelligence are all blended into an infinitely complex, inseparably related, living whole?

Blake considered "Sublime Poetry" and prophecy as one

[1] The texts used for the Blake passages have been either the Oxford edition, edited by John Sampson, or the Everyman edition, edited by Max Plowman.

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and the same; and he quite seriously took himself to be a prophet in the line of the old Israelitish prophets. It is the function of the prophet to have an intense and clear vision of the living Center of the universe, and from this vision, which is a positive, intellectual experience, to create an expression which can convey to others the intellectual and emotional conviction which takes possession of the prophet himself. The supreme poet must be both mystic and prophet: first he must have the mystical experience, and then, by the compelling influence of this experience, he must of necessity go out into the world and proclaim his gospel. Blake was able to combine with the mystic and the prophet the keen and penetrating intellect of a philosopher of absolutely fearless integrity, and so was, perhaps beyond all his fellows, capable of delivering the content of the mystical moment from the obscurity of a purely private and uncommunicable experience. It was to this end, "To Justify the Ways of God to Men," that he devoted the whole strength of his now undisputed great genius.

The irresistibly compelling nature of the true mystical experience is nowhere described in more convincing language than in the book of Isaiah, which was written somewhere near the time when Socrates was teaching in Athens. Isaiah, living in a society where men were given over to the worship of the works of their own hands—dead, mechanical things, mere symbols of detached aspects of their own lives—and feeling himself degraded and contaminated by the milieu in which he was immersed, sought, in the depths of his own spirit, for light and relief from the intolerable burden which he bore, the burden of his own and his country's degradation. In the "temple" of his mind, darkened with the "smoke" of doubts and fears, he has a vision of the altar of God on which burns the eternal flame of life, and he is utterly humiliated with the conviction of his own unworthiness:

> Woe is me, for I am undone!
> Because I am a man of unclean lips.

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One of the seraphim touches his mouth with a "live coal" from the altar, and his lips are cleansed and his iniquity is taken away. He then hears the voice of "the Lord" saying, "Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?" and without hesitation he answers "Here I am; send me."

Isaiah, having seen the vision and heard the voice, in the person of the "servant of Jehovah," then describes the function and lot of the prophet:

> The Lord God has given me the tongue of them that are taught, *that I should know how to sustain with words him that is weary:* he wakeneth morning by morning, he wakeneth mine ear to hear as they that are taught. The Lord God hath opened mine ear, and I was not rebellious, neither turned away backwards. I gave my back to the smiters. For the Lord God will help me; therefore have I set my face like a flint, and I know I shall not be ashamed.

And he warns his hearers of the futility of kindling their own little fires and girding themselves about with mere "fire brands":

> Behold all ye that kindle a fire, that gird yourselves about with firebrands: walk ye in the flame of your fire, and among the brands that ye have kindled. This ye shall have of mine hand; ye shall lie down in sorrow.

Blake, who was under no delusion as to the nature of his own visions and voices, felt himself quite at home with the ancient prophets and had no hesitation in putting his own interpretation upon their experiences. In "A Memorable Fancy," he writes:

> The prophets Isaiah and Ezekiel dined with me, and I asked them how they dared so roundly to assert that God spoke to them; and whether they did not think at the time that they would not be misunderstood, and so be the cause of imposition.
>
> Isaiah answered: "I saw no God, nor heard any, in a finite organical perception; but my senses discovered the infinite in everything, and as I was then persuaded, and remain confirmed, that the voice of honest indignation is the voice of God, I cared not for consequences but wrote."
>
> Then I asked: "Does a firm persuasion that a thing is so, make it so?"

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He replied: "All poets believe that it does, and in ages of imagination this firm persuasion removed mountains; but many are not capable of a firm persuasion in anything."

Blake, too, had his moments of supreme joy when he "saw" himself taken into the "Bosom of God," which he identified with the universal prophetic or poetic genius. And these moments were no moments of total absorption into the body of the One: they were moments of the clearest intellectual vision, in which everything in his past experience became illuminated with new light and clothed with new meaning:

> All I ever had known
> Before me bright shone. . . . .

From the all-comprehending viewpoint of this universal center of concretion he tells us it is possible

> To see a World in a grain of sand,
> And a Heaven in a wild flower,
> Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand,
> And Eternity in an hour.

All of us have had some minor intimations of this experience, when we have hit upon some new and illuminating synthesis which has cleared up difficulties for us and focused scattered, wandering thoughts.

As all Blake's philosophy is based upon the utterly convincing validity of his mystical experiences, and the whole of the strength of his genius was devoted to the elucidation and expression of the truths there revealed

> To open up the Eternal Worlds, to open the Immortal Eyes
> Of man inwards into the Worlds of Thought: into Eternity:
> Ever expanding into the Bosom of God, the Human Imagination

the questions for our consideration would seem to be: (*a*) How did Blake arrive at his experience? (*b*) What was the nature of this experience? Was it veridical? (*c*) Did he succeed in expressing his experience in such a form as to carry conviction of the truth embodied there to his fellow-men? (*d*) Can we, in our need today, utilize his message? These are all

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very large questions and can only be sketchily dealt with in the compass of this paper; but I hope to be able to say enough to justify, and stimulate the desire for, independent research in the minds of my readers.

a) Blake lived through the last half of the eighteenth and the first quarter of the nineteenth centuries: He was born in the year 1757 and died in the year 1827. During the latter half of his long life the whole world was in a turmoil of wars and bloody revolutions. The prophetic spirit in poetry was despised and neglected. The famous artists of his day were painting portraits, and anything like imaginative art was dead. Politics had become a selfish gamble for power in which the interests and lives of the people were ruthlessly sacrificed. The organized churches were, in Blake's mind, and perhaps truly, the greatest curse of the age; they had substituted for the religion of Jesus, with its ideal of spiritual and intellectual freedom, the religion of "Satan," the religion of intellectual and moral slavery to a God of tyrannical, abstract laws and incomprehensible "Mystery"; and this antithesis to the religion of Jesus they were foisting upon the people in his name. There were "hirelings" in all the positions of leadership:

> For we have hirelings in the Camp, the Court, and the University, who would if they could for ever depress mental, and prolong corporeal war.

In philosophy the word "God" had become emptied of all meaning, so that God could be comfortably dismissed to a distant and powerless heaven; and science, in the approving words of the great Huxley, "made for the banishment from all regions of human thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity." Natural philosophy and natural religion were the sources of the controlling ideas of the time; and nature was something complete in itself, an absolute, detached from the spirit of man. The spirit was either forgotten or denied. As one might expect, with this false leadership, society was decadent and the people blind. Blake makes one of his symbolic

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characters, one who should be the spirit of inspiration, exclaim:

I am made to sow the thistle for wheat, the nettle for a nourishing dainty:
I have planted a false oath in the earth; it has brought forth a Poison Tree:
I have chosen the serpent for counsellor, and a dog for a schoolmaster to my children.

(Had there been Behaviorists in Blake's time, he would no doubt have said "rat" instead of "dog.") Such is the desperate result of looking for inspiration in the things beneath ourselves.

It was in the reaction of Blake's powerful and deeply religious genius against this welter of disorganized life—life which he called death—that his mystical visions were developed. Finding no satisfaction for his infinite hunger and thirst for truth, and beauty, and "brotherhood" in the conflicting and mutually destructive elements in the outside world, he was driven, in his determination to wrest a meaning and a value from life, to make an exhaustive analysis of the content of his own spirit and the spirits of his fellow-men. In his works Blake gives us a many-sided picture of the results of his labors, up to his final awakening in "the Bosom of God"—"into the Life of Immortality." He gives us no key to a safe and easy method of access to this life of immortality; it was, in his case, as with all great mystics, bought with the price of blood and tears:

What is the price of experience? Do men buy it for a song,
Or Wisdom for a dance in the street? No! it is bought with the price
Of all that a man hath—his house, his wife, his children.
Wisdom is sold in the desolate market where none come to buy,
And in the withered field where the farmer ploughs for bread in vain.

b) What did Blake find at the center of the human spirit? He found no single, simple thing which could be described as light, or love, or beauty, or will, or even as the *élan vital*, but a very complicated state of affairs, a very complex, living, or-

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ganized whole, in which all those elements were involved. At the very center of them all was their rightful organizer and director, and their ultimate source, the creative intellect, the poetic genius. Blake arrived at his goal at the end of an intensely active, intellectual process, and not by any supranormal method of access to truth; for him all truths are verifiable by the same method:

> What is the Divine Spirit? Is the Holy Ghost any other than an Intellectual Fountain? . . . . What is that Talent which it is a curse to hide? What are the Treasures of Heaven which we are to lay up for ourselves, are they any other than Mental Studies and Performances?

All propositions must ultimately be brought into the intellectual fountain for verification. The two great classes of men for Blake were the wise and the fools; for him the hopelessly damned were the "Elect," those who had reached a state of such blissful self-satisfaction that no further intellectual efforts were called for on their part:

> The man who never changes his opinion is like
> standing water and breeds reptiles of the mind.

In Blake's time, as we have pointed out, natural science was beginning to lay claim to the whole content of man's domain; from this domain man himself, except as a rather insignificant object amongst other objects, was excluded. There was a realm of natural objects which had an absolute validity of its own, and there was also a realm of ideas, of reflections of natural objects, images more or less true, but of no consequence to the real world, which was quite capable of running itself on what Blake calls a "cog-wheel" system, where one wheel turns another in an endless chain of tyrannical, logical necessity, in contrast to the organically synthetic method of the spirit:

> I turn my eyes to the Schools and Universities of Europe,
> And there behold the Loom of Locke, whose woof rages dire,
> Washed by the Water-wheels of Newton: black the cloth

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> In heavy wreaths folds over every Nation: cruel Works .
> Of many Wheels I view, wheel without wheel, with cogs tyrannic,
> Moving by compulsion each other; not as those in Eden, which,
> Wheel within wheel, in freedom revolve, in harmony and peace.

Blake's great discovery was that in detaching the realm of natural objects and the realm of ideas from the living intellectual fountain men had taken the life both of objects and ideas —they were "murdered," frozen into "solids without fluctuation." He also realized, quite clearly, that the objective world of natural science, as we know it, is just as much a construction of the human spirit as is the ideal world.

In the worship of "Reason," reason from which all spiritual creative freedom had been eliminated, Blake saw that men were worshiping mere fragments of themselves, works of their own hands and minds, past moments in their own lives. There is little wonder that the fiery, revolutionary Blake, thirsting for spiritual freedom in a mechanical, hidebound, falsely conceived world, identified this "Reason" with Satan and Accuser, who had made generalizations from his own private data and called these generalizations—which were mere abstractions from reality—the eternal laws of God to which all creatures must submit:

> Where are they who worship Satan under the Name of God? . . . . O Deists! Deism, is the Worship of the God of this World by means of what you call Natural Religion and Natural Philosophy, and of Natural Morality or Self-Righteousness, the Selfish Virtues of the Natural Heart. This was the Religion of the Pharisees who murder'd Jesus.

For Blake, the function of reason is that of the gatherer of the fruits of the harvest of experience, fruits which must be presented at the altar of Life, there to be fused, in the fires of the intellect, with the wisdom of the past, and so enter into their own immortality.

What is this ever acting fountain centered in the bosom of man? It is the very fountain of life itself, and can never be externalized—heard, or seen, or touched. It is the actual ex-

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periencing agent in all our experience, and so cannot be subject to our five senses. They can only deal with the fragmentary works of the spirit, and: "If it were not for the Prophetic Character, the Philosophic & Experimental would soon be at the ratio of all things and stand still, unable to do other than repeat the same dull round over again." The flow of this life, with its infinite store of the treasures of eternity, comes to us by inspiration, it is the very breath of life. It is this life which gathers up the fruits of the senses, and, by its synthetic power, from them creates the natural world; it is this which brings the presence of the infinite universe in judgment upon our local facts of experience, and makes truth; it is this which binds the scattered world of individual men with the bond of the same spirit, and makes imaginative sympathy possible, and gives us the only possible foundation for individual, social, or international peace. In its universality, this life, which gathers into its own "person" all that goes into the making of man, is the ultimate critic of all individual creative work. It saves man from all petty egotistical standards, and delivers him from the sin of self-righteous pride, or bumptiousness. It is infinite, eternal, immortal; and we men in being centers of action of this life share in the very person of God, for: "God only acts and is, in existing beings or Men." For Blake, Man was *not* God, but he *was* divine; and his divinity was summed up in the historical Jesus:

> . . . . There is no other
> God than that God who is the intellectual fountain of Humanity.
> He who would see the Divinity must see Him in His Children,
> One first in friendship and love, then a Divine Family, and in the midst
> Jesus will appear. So he who wishes to see a Vision, a perfect Whole,
> Must see it in Minute Particulars, organized; . . . .
> But General Forms have their vitality in Particulars; and every
> Particular is a Man, a Divine Member of the Divine Jesus.

This, then, was the substance of Blake's mystical experience: he found, at the innermost center of life, the eternal,

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creative spirit of God. It was the discovery of his own unity with this spirit which released him from the unbearable bondage of a ready-made world, with a fixed and determined natural and moral order, and gave him the ultimate experience of godlike "Liberty." In the joy of this mystical experience all nature was illumined with a new light, for he saw behind all appearances the same life of God:

> . . . . Each grain of Sand,
> Every stone on the Land,
> Each rock and each hill
> Each fountain and rill,
> Each herb and each tree,
> Mountain, hill, earth & sea,
> Cloud, Meteor & Star,
> Are Men Seen Afar.

It is the same with ideas as with natural objects: they, too, have their reality in the minds of men. Truth and error "are not only Universal, but Particular. Each are Personified. There is not an Error but has a man for its Agent, that is, it is a Man. There is not a Truth but it also has a Man." And so, as the life of the spirit consists in continually throwing off error and receiving truth, it necessarily consists in throwing off "Knaves from our company," and receiving "Wise Men into our Company Continually."

Here, then, is the ground of the reality of the mystic vision. In this vision there is no "object," for subject and object are one: man, in the depths of his own spirit, finds God. Is this a dark and hidden mystery into the secrets of which only the sanctified, initiated few have access? On the contrary, the Kingdom of God is the natural possession of all men. It *is* the creative imagination, the source of all truth, of all beauty, of all harmony and peace. The analytic activity of the logical reason would be powerless without the concurrent activity of the synthetic intellect, the prophetic genius, which continually holds the pieces of the analysis together, clothes the dead bones with plastic flesh, breathes into the body the breath of life, and makes dry bones to live. Even the skeptical Bertrand

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Russell—a mystic in spite of himself—is no stranger to the joy of the mystical experience, the joy, not of the cold contemplation of abstract mathematical formulas, but the joy of the creation of truth, of beauty, and of intellectual fellowship.

c) It must be left to my readers, who are drawn to a further study of Blake, to judge whether he succeeded in giving such an expression to his experience as to carry, to honest critics, the conviction of its validity. He himself says, in one of the "Proverbs of Hell":

> Truth can never be told so as to be understood, and not be believed.

This, on the face of it, looks quite simple and easy, but of course the whole point lies in the necessity that it should be understood. It is possible that Blake, in his early days, underestimated the common man's difficulty in understanding simple truths, truths which look quite self-evident when once grasped. Howevèr, he quickly discovered that simple truths, when clearly stated to ignorant people, could take on a horribly shocking appearance, and cause his best friends to avoid him as a lunatic and a terror; and he realized, too, the utter futility of philosophical best-sellers which could be used as textbooks for "uplift" reading circles. No, the only preparation for the right reception of simple truths, which are at the same time revolutionary, is what Blake calls intellectual "hunting and war"—severe mental labor. Finally he made up his mind that "What is Grand is necessarily obscure to Weak men. That which can be made explicit to the Idiot is not worth my care," and so came to bury his grand truths in such a labyrinth of symbolism as would compel the necessary mental effort preparatory to the reception of the embodied truth; he did not believe in casting his pearls before swine.

But Blake's symbolical treatment of philosophical subjects was by no means merely a device to set his readers "hunting"; Blake found that there were no terms at his command which could convey the fundamental conception of the complexity of life which he was seeking to express. Simple terms like love, or truth, or reason were immediately abstracted from the liv-

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ing, organic whole in which the ideas had their being, and were not only not understood, but became a positive source of error: love is nothing without a lover; truth only lives in the mind of a man; reason is a function of the intellect and a servant of the whole man. In fact man's spirit is, as the Freudians have since discovered, a very complex affair, and can be more truly pictured as an intimately related family of living creatures than as a homogeneous "something," useful, like the ether in the physical world, to refer to as a final base for mental phenomena.

The whole of the later years of Blake's life were devoted to the expression in prose, in poetry, in line and in color, of all the complexity of man's spiritual life as manifested in the individual, in social relationships, and in his relation to God.

d) If, whilst immersed in a deadly atmosphere of error, to be able to maintain a firm intellectual grip upon the essential unity of all life and to see in vision the time when men will put off error and put on truth be the sign of a prophet, then surely time has made good Blake's claim to belong to the brotherhood of the prophets and to be an understanding friend of Jesus:

> I pretend not to holiness; yet I pretend to love, to see, to converse with daily, as man with man, and more to have an interest in the Friend of Sinners.

Blake knew nothing of Nietzsche, or Bergson, or Freud, or Bradley, or Alexander, or Dewey, or Whitehead, or Leon Brunschvicg; but one can safely say that much, very much, that is of permanent value in the thought of all these outstanding moderns lies imbedded in his works.

The great weakness of the philosophy of our day has been the almost complete absence of any serious philosophy of the spirit. We are seeking to incorporate in a philosophy of "events" all that goes on in the hearts and minds of men (for we have discovered that it is only in the grasp of a conscious mind that the contents of a full event are held together and reveal a meaning), and so far no analysis of the spirit has yet

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emerged which can approach in depth of insight the work of some of the great medieval mystics. Blake dissected out every fiber of man's spirit, but he never for a moment lost sight of the fact that, in doing so, he was murdering an indestructible whole, a whole which could only be understood when all the separated parts were organized and re-established within the "bosom" of a man. The whole difference between outward sight and inward vision is that, where the one is analytical and separating, the other is synthetic and unifying.

Did Blake find a meaning for the term "God" which, in the words of Bertrand Russell, would be worthy of a "free man's worship" and adoration?

Blake's God is not just a name for the sum of everything that is. He is the one complete, concrete reality. The physical universe is that part of the nature of God accessible to the five senses of men. As, in our bodies, we are all partakers of the infinite physical universe, so, in infinite variety and degree, are we in our spirits partakers in the one, infinitely complex, spirit of God. God is not truth, or beauty, or power, or love, or intelligence, but is the living, organized center from which all these terms draw their life and meaning. Man is the individualized center of God; God is the universal center of all creation. Blake expressed the difference between abstract ideas of God and his own more concrete idea in these lines:

> God appears & God is Light
> To those poor souls who dwell in Night,
> But does a human form display
> To those who dwell in realms of Day.

But we men, being actual partakers in the spirit of God, do not share this life for nothing; we are God's agents, and so fellow-creators with him of the world. Blake, in an impassioned passage, makes his hero, Los, the spirit of prophecy, express this idea:

> Then Los grew furious, raging: "Why stand we here trembling around
> Calling on God for help, and not ourselves, in whom God dwells,
> Stretching a hand to save the falling Man?"

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No man is the whole of God; but it is in man that God is visible; and so it follows that: "The worship of God is, Honoring his gifts in other men, each according to his genius, and loving the greatest men best; those who envy or calumniate great men hate God, for there is no other God," and "If Jesus Christ is the greatest man, you ought to love him in the greatest degree." Blake was intensely Christian; but he himself was conscious that his Christianity was the antithesis of the Christianity of the churches:

> The Vision of Christ which thou dost see
> Is my vision's greatest enemy. . . . .
> Thine loves the same world that mine hates;
> Thy heaven doors are my hell gates.

Blake's Christ was the incarnation of the spirit of creative liberty—the spirit which knows no law but the law of intellectual freedom and spiritual growth:

> I know of no other Christianity and of no other Gospel than the liberty both of body and mind to exercise the Divine Arts of Imagination, Imagination, the real and eternal World of which this Vegetable Universe is but a faint shadow, & in which we shall live in our Eternal or Imaginative Bodies when these Vegetable Mortal Bodies are no more.

But for fear that this liberty of body might be construed to mean the right to be "happy" in a too purely animal way, he adds:

> What is the Life of Man but Art and Science? . . . .
> What are the Pains of Hell but Ignorance, Bodily Lust,
> Idleness & devastation of the things of the Spirit?

And so, then, Blake found, springing up within his own heart and in the hearts of his fellow-men, an ever flowing intellectual fountain, a fountain which no man had made, but which is the creative source of all life. If any man consciously drinks of the waters of this fountain he finds within himself "a well of water springing up unto Eternal Life."

This is the God whom "no man hath seen at any time," but whom the Son "hath declared" and doth, ever, still declare.

BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA

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BOOK REVIEWS

PLATO'S THEORY OF ETHICS. THE MORAL CRITERION AND THE HIGHEST GOOD. By R. C. Lodge. New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1928. Pp. x+558. Price, $7.00.

A Platonist reviewer ought perhaps to approve of this book on the Platonic principle that we should commend every man who sets his hand to any intellectual task and manfully works it out. Professor Lodge has certainly worked out indefatigably his ideal of an exhaustive, inductive, scientifically generalized, and textually verified study of the Platonic ethics. And many students will be interested in a book that groups, pigeonholes, and catalogues, on whatever principles, so many Platonic utterances, however collected.

The book has a further claim on my sympathy in that it disregards, even more than I would, the alleged developments and changes in Plato's thought, and that it tacitly assumes throughout that the conclusions of Plato, when we have established them by adequate induction, will be found to be essentially true and right. The standard of rightness, of course, is usually set by Professor Lodge's personal philosophy, which he finds in Plato as assuredly as, though with less sophistication of ingenuity than, Philo Judaeus discovers Platonism in the Old Testament. "Our final conclusion," then he says (p. 477), "is thus that the highest good for the universe consists in the ideal functioning of the whole so as to realize the maximum of value-potentiality inherent in its elements, and that the highest good for a particular human being consists in so living as to constitute a consciously organic portion of this whole, and, in so living, to realize his own deepest happiness and well-being." If it were possible to translate "maximum of value-potentiality" into anything more Attic than the pseudo-scientific style of Epicurus, Plato might accept with a smile this tautologous idealism as a harmless, if vague, expression of the moral ideal. But it does not tell us much about Platonism. The assimilation of Plato's thought to our own, however, is a temptation that few interpreters resist, and for which the experienced reader will make allowance.

My own chief criticism of Professor Lodge's book is that, while fifty pages would amply suffice for an account of Plato's ethical philosophy, the pages of this book are 558. Though he is intensely devoted to Plato,

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Professor Lodge has an essentially Aristotelian mind. He will make order in all this confused, dilettante, aesthetic, impressionistic, literary, scholastic, and philological study of Plato. The truth cannot escape the exhaustiveness of his collections and the systematic completeness of the categories and topics to which he distributes them. He has card- or Jowett-indexed the whole of Plato, and every passage must be worked in somewhere. Thus a page from the beginning of an essay on "Private and Public Spirit in Plato" we read (p. 249): "This material is partly broken up in the process of mastication, and is further dissolved in the abdomen by the "internal heat," thus separating the nutritive material into its elements. In this process of digestion the elements of earth, water, fire, and air, which have been separated from their original connections in the meat or drink taken into the organism, become thoroughly mixed together and constitute a rich fluid of great nutritive value," etc.

Professor Lodge may reply that this is scientifically appropriate in an exhaustive treatment of the subdivision, "public and private spirit" in (1) eating and drinking. But I persist in thinking that he merely found it the most convenient pigeonhole for that *zettel*.

This affectation of a complete induction leads in practice, though not of course in Professor Lodge's avowed intention, to the treatment of all the dialogues as equally evidential, and of all utterances, dramatic or ironical, as equipollent. That would be the effect on the reader in spite of the summaries in which the author endeavors to disengage Plato's real opinions. It would have been better to give a brief, trenchant, pregnant account of Plato's ethical philosophy, and then, if it was necessary to publish the collection of topics, to present them frankly in tabular form.

I said that fifty pages would suffice for an exposition of the Platonic ethics. I am not sure that it could not be done in a dozen. My starting-point would be the plain fact, contradicted by perhaps a majority of interpreters, that the Platonic ethics is not to be deduced from the Platonic metaphysics. There is of course some relation, as there is between all the ideas of any thinker. But essentially ethics and metaphysics are separable in Plato. The doctrine of ideas repudiates materialism and everywhere supplies an idealistic background for the moral life. But that once for all recognized, we can study the ethics by itself. Possibly Professor Lodge means this, but he does not clearly say it or consistently conform his practice to the principle.

Metaphysics apart, then, the Platonic ethics falls under a few simple divisions: (1) illustrations in the minor dialogues of the necessity and the difficulty of defining ethical terms; (2) the search for arguments that will convince, or at least confute, the ethical nihilism of a war-weary,

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cynical and overenlightened generation—for proof, in short, that virtue and happiness coincide; (3) the attempt to find a compromise between the necessity of acknowledging the truth in a certain sense of hedonistic utilitarianism and our justifiable idealistic distaste for that way of describing the moral life; (4) as an essential part of the argument of both (2) and (3), the principle of the comparative worthlessness of the lower or sensual pleasures, which, except so far as necessary, are bought at too high a price, because they are preconditioned by pain.

These categories are not of my invention. They are the topics on which ethical discussion actually turns in the dialogues. They could be doubled by including politics and sociology in ethics, as for some purposes we must. And they can be indefinitely multiplied and confused by bringing in, as Professor Lodge does, every Platonic utterance that by remotest implication can be made to yield an ethical suggestion.

The titles of Professor Lodge's chapters will give a sufficient notion of *his* categories: Part I, "The Moral Criterion in Platonism," chap. i, "Who Is the Moral Judge?"; chap. ii, "The Objective Basis of the Moral Judgment"; chap. iii, "The Moral Standards"; chap. iv, "The Psychological Aspect of the Moral Judgment: (A) Analysis, (B) Genesis"; chap. v, "The Validity of the Moral Judgment"; chap. vi, "Conclusion: The Moral Criterion." *The Moral Criterion and the Highest Good,* Part II. "Scales of Goods in Platonism," chap. vii, "Soul—Body—Wealth"; chap. viii, "The Value Scale: Wealth—Strength—Beauty—Health—Courage—Justice—Temperance—Wisdom"; chap. ix, "Private and Public Spirit in Platonism"; chap. x, "Mind and Its Value"; chap. xi, "The Divine and Its Value"; chap. xii, "Conclusion: The Significance of Value-Scales." Part III. "Highest Goods in Platonism," chap. xiii, "Pleasure, Wealth, Health"; chap. xiv, "Power"; chap. xv, "Happiness and Its Ethical Value"; chap. xvi, "Immortality and Its Ethical Value"; chap. xvii, "Goodness of Character as the Highest Good, Temperance, Justice"; chap. xviii, "Genius, Religion, Science, Philosophy, Mind, as Chief Good"; chap. xix, "The Mean, and the Idea of Good as *Summum Bonum*"; chap. xx, "Civilization, the Community, Intelligent Self-Knowledge on the Part of the Community, Law and Order, the Comprehensive or Composite Life, the Excellence and Preservation of the Whole, God"; chap. xxi, "Conclusion: The Platonic Highest Good."

A detailed comparison of these categories with mine would call for another volume. I can only fall back on the short cut which I have often been driven to employ in dealing with the impracticable immensities of Homeric and Platonic criticism, and illustrate by a few examples how the wrong method leads to mishandling of the evidence. If the examples

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are mere slips of the pen or not fairly representative, then this way of criticism is unfair.

My objection, then, is that Professor Lodge's method exposes him to the danger of treating all passages as equally evidential, regardless of the content, the dramatic tone, and the specific purpose of the dialogue, and that it leads to the accumulation of citations that have little to do with one another and that are too often associated by Professor Lodge's, not by Plato's intentions. I select a few notes almost at random. In note 18 on chapter i to support the statement that "it is universally assumed" in philosophical and ethical discussion that "one or both of the parties . . . . " possesses sufficient judgment to give some kind of decision we are referred to *Protag.* 352D–57E; *Meno.* 82C–85E; *Rep.* 336B ff.; *Theaet,* passim; *Parm.* 137BC. If these passages support the proposition it is only in a sense so vague as to be useless, and it is confusing to the student to bracket them. In *Parm.* 137BC, for example, it is explicitly said that the youngest is chosen as interlocutor because he will be least likely to raise difficulties. (Cf. my *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 58 and note 430.) Note 29 in the same chapter confirms the statement that the man of good moral character is the measure of all things. What he judges to be good is good, what he judges to be evil is evil by *Theaet.* 166E f.; *Laws* 661B, D, 662, 945B ff. The *Theaetetus* passage in its context has no real bearing on the idea. Note 62 in the same chapter gives eight references for the standpoint of the Idea of Good which is coolly identified with the unhypothetical first principle. Two of them at the most are relevant. The association in professor Lodge's mind is merely that they are all broadly idealistic or refer to what is in some sense best. In chapter v, note 5, the conjunction of *Rep.* 529C and *Parm.* 130D in view of their contexts is pointless. In the list of references in note 3, chapter xxxv, *Rep.* 438E is wholly irrelevant. In note 67, chapter vii, *Rep.* 534C, *Phaedr.* 253D, and *Laws* 864A are obviously associated only by a common word in an index. In note 113 to chapter vii the references are again a rather far-fetched jumble. In note 271, chapter x, *Rep.* 497E and 528B are combined to the astonishing conclusion "that the Platonist would disapprove of the private anti-social pursuit of scientific or philosophic research in the ideal state."

Professor Lodge has doubtless considered these and similar objections to his method and decided that he can safely disregard them. He seems to believe that a matter-of-fact assemblage of all expressions of opinion and judgment in the Platonic writings supplies the basis of a scientific induction which eliminates the slight errors due to virtual neglect of the personality of the speaker, the dramatic situation, the refinements

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of style, the subtleties of dialectic, the intentions of satire, edification, allusion, or polemic, the special purport and aim of each dialogue, and the entire relation of Plato's thought to the thought and controversy of his time. The experiment, perhaps, was worth trying, and Professor Lodge has certainly given it a thorough trial. But I do not believe that it is possible to understand Plato in this way. And the insufficiency of such a method will, I think, reveal itself in the imperfect relevancy of many of the citations and the juxtaposition in the notes of passages that have little or nothing in common, if due attention is paid to their context. My few examples were selected at random and hastily. But I have read enough to feel sure that any critical scholar who will examine the notes will find many more of all degrees of irrelevancy. Parallel passages and the association of ideas are slippery things. Anything may be associated in some way with anything, and it is difficult to prove absolute irrelevancy. Wherever the index points to the same word, or, at the other extreme, wherever the interpreter divines a suggestion of his own thought, it is possible to argue that there was a connection in the author's mind. But I do not think that my general criticism that a too large proportion of Professor Lodge's references to the text are not really pertinent would be invalidated even if he should be able to argue plausibly that in some instances I have been mistaken.

PAUL SHOREY

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ETHICS. By Frank Chapman Sharp, Professor of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin. New York: Century Co., 1928. Pp. vi+566.

To sit in judgment upon a book like this may seem an act of arrogation on the part of the reviewer, whoever he may be. Professor Sharp has produced a work which represents a lifetime of painstaking and conscientious study; and no one in our country was better prepared than he to undertake it. He has made a significant contribution to the literature of ethics: it is not a textbook for beginners but a *vade mecum* for scholars. Works of this type are rare in our country; indeed, they are not plentiful anywhere; we have only to remember that the first edition of Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics* appeared in 1874, Bradley's *Ethical Studies* in 1876, and Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* in 1883. Like these distinguished contributions to the field, Sharp's *Ethics* is a book for the closet, a book to be consulted by those who desire a more comprehensive and intensive study of the subject than is usually offered. And the book is healthily positive: it is free from the shallow skepticism characteristic of many of

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the present-day "sociological" ethics. Professor Sharp believes in the existence of conduct valid for the entire race, hence the normative problems of ethics form for him an integral part of the subject—from the view of practice the most important. The fundamental concepts—the meaning of right, good, wrong, the standards of right, the principal standard of moral judgment, the object of moral judgment—are analyzed and clarified.

Right conduct is defined as that which is desired when it is looked upon from the impersonal point of view. When I call a volition right, I believe it represents the way I want everyone to treat everyone else under the same conditions, everyone here including self. And it is this use of a standard of conduct, applicable to everyone, that marks the birth of the moral judgment alike in the individual and the race. Right action involves knowledge of what is right and the desire to do it. And moral law claims sovereignty over all our significant actions, hence it must have the last word (p. 15). Moreover, a volition is objectively right when it aims at the greatest attainable good of all who will be affected by it, when it actually results in the maximum of good attainable by the agent under the circumstances (p. 148). And in civilized society, at any rate, the greatest body of our moral judgments is based upon the belief that the conduct in question is conducive to welfare or harm . . . . of some conscious being thereby affected. The trend of the actual moral judgments of the race verifies this conclusion. Another point is emphasized: the good of the more excellent has, as such, a superior claim to that of the less excellent. Moreover, an absolute standard of the measurement of excellence exists, though no one attained it (p. 146). It is the one universally valid ideal.

Intrinsic excellence, however, Professor Sharp maintains, cannot serve as a criterion of right and wrong: the immediate attractiveness of conduct does not as such determine its rightness. The "aesthetic" theory will not serve us; rightness of action has no relation to its "value," extrinsic or intrinsic. Nor will intuitionism, according to which the mind possesses the power to see intuitively or directly certain universal principles which lie at the foundation of all our knowledge, nor Kant's rational principle, which is a definition of right, not a criterion of right, avail us here (pp. 386 ff.). The significance of the intuitionistic school, we are told, consists in its teaching that morality cannot be explained in terms of the egoistic side of human nature. The fundamental formula for the standard of right is: That act is right which produces the greatest amount of pleasure attainable under the circumstances or produces the minimum possible amount of harm. The aim to produce such a state is

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said to be inwardly right in the moral proper sense of the term. Some course is always actually right (p. 456). We have here the old hedonistic creed. "I find myself attaching no value whatever," Sharp declares, "to ends which I distinctly recognize as having no pleasure content." "It is only as the attainment brings pleasure that on reflection I feel any disposition to pronounce the experience good" (p. 408). Good thus conceived can only mean what is desired when reflection has led me to reduce original chaos of desired objects to a self-consistent or harmonious system. This means that pleasure is the sole element of value in experience; this is ethical hedonism, not psychological, nor is it the view that the sole object is my own pleasure. Moreover, pleasures differ only in amount, not in quality; Bentham's calculus is the last word in the field. And "men do actually regard pleasure as the ultimate good" (p. 420).

According to this view, the martyr's sacrifice would be good because, and only because, it results in pleasant feelings all round. It would be unreasonable to do what is called good if it did not produce a surplus of pleasure. Even if this were so, it would not follow that pleasure is the only thing worth while. To suffer hardship, poverty, martyrdom simply to increase the sum of pleasant feelings in the world, and nothing more, will seem to many of us most unreasonable. "To reduce the original chaos of desired objects to a self-consistent or harmonious system" would seem to me a more reasonable ideal.

The sources of moral judgment are to be found in benevolence and malevolence; the source of eudemonic judgment lies in benevolence. Where conflicts arise, the choices are: greater good, more striking good, the good of the nearer, of the more excellent. Good motives are desired, as well as good results; where motives are bad, the good results come only by accident. Moreover, I want a society in which men are kind; no one will have this desire unless he has some interest in individuals who constitute society. The average decent person has a good deal more altruism than he thinks. The action is right which aims to bring into existence the greatest amount of good for all concerned attainable under all conditions. The obligatory today includes: respect for life and physical well-being of others, their property, good name, and integrity of family, ... veracity and faithfulness to promises, and positive services to one's family . . . . , intimate friends, to other individuals in dire need or great danger (pp. 140 ff.).

There is, according to Sharp, no such conflict between the demands of self-interest and the good of society as is commonly supposed to exist. Egoism and altruism are two different directions of the same force, not the property of a select few. There is probably no completely selfish

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man. Egoistic and altruistic acts are performed with an end in view. If a moral judgment is to be valid, it must be free from the influence of purely egoistic consideration. Benevolence has the function of supreme supervision because it everywhere represents the good. Morality has its source in the roots of our being; the eudemonistic ideal is the source of the moral life. It is important to note, in this connection, that benevolence includes willing well to self. "That action is right which aims to bring into existence the greatest amount of good *for all concerned* attainable under the conditions" (p. 139). "The positive happiness of each of us is a matter which has been intrusted primarily to our own hands." It must be remembered here that reasonable action (where choice is inevitable) consists in the choice of the greater good in preference to the less, whoever may be benefited and whoever may be required to make the necessary sacrifice. Right conduct and reasonable conduct are the same thing. We want to know whether, if we ever saw into the whole situation more deeply, or saw around it more completely, we should cease to recognize the claims of another's good upon us. We want to assure ourselves that our conviction that we ought to serve others as well as self is not the consequence of some blindness, or narrowness, or obliquity of vision on our part, some incapacity to see things as they are. The reasonableness of the moral ideal is its authority. The less interest is to be sacrificed to the greater. The question arises: Is the man who does right out of loyalty to the moral ideal happier for his loyalty? Sharp's reply is that virtue does not invariably bring happiness. But one of the tasks of humanity is so to mold the structure of social existence that the coincidence of these two elements of life may become more and more complete and enduring. The possession of strong deeply rooted interests in our fellows tends to enrich our life, and so greatly enhances its joys and mitigates its inevitable sorrows (pp. 463 ff.).

The question of aesthetic judgments upon character and the intrinsic value of character is also taken up. According to our author, these are not, as such, moral judgments; the object of moral judgments is to realize an end. The function of moral beauty is to supply additional and very powerful motives for performing old duties. Life would have been robbed of much of its sunshine and its charm without it (pp. 154 ff.). Why such judgments should not be regarded as moral is not clear. It is true, courage, fortitude, self-control, perseverance are not in themselves moral qualities; they acquire moral value according to the nature of the ends in pursuit of which they are exhibited. It is true, a murderer may exhibit such qualities; but would we call his character beautiful? It is true also that the murder may have been "beautifully" done, decently and in

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order, aesthetically. But taking the situation as a whole and in its relation to society, is not the action lacking in "moral beauty"? Taken out of its setting, abstractly, the act may seem beautiful, just as an act might seem to be moral if so taken.

Among the many other interesting and important topics treated by Professor Sharp is that of punishment. Dysdemonic acts aim at pain as such, while the ideal of benevolence commands: Injure no one solely for the sake of injuring him. The dysdemonic judgement approves doing harm and disapproves of doing good to one who has harmed another, not as a means to a further end, but as an end in itself. This is the law of retaliation. Revenge, however, can have no place in a life guided by the moral ideal. This does not mean renunciation of punishment; it is justified as the less of two evils: it acts or tends to act as a deterrent from wrongdoing. Nor does it mean that the wrongdoer is outside of the pale of the ordinary moral code, nor that suffering is to be inflicted for the sake of suffering, nor that the amount of punishment for wrong is to be determined by the intensity and persistence of our malevolent feelings, nor that there can be no forgiveness until there has been punishment. Punishment is the state's organ for defending its members against violence; it acts as a deterrent; without it there would be more criminals (pp. 134 ff., 279 ff.). This is the modern and generally accepted view. It is a question, however, whether retributive justice can be regarded as mere revenge. It is not a mere desire to inflict pain for its own sake; there is in it the thought of the outraged ideal of justice, which is a social ideal. Is it immoral to wish evil ill?

FRANK THILLY

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

THE PRAGMATIC REVOLT IN POLITICS. By W. Y. Elliott. New York, Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. xvii+540.

The need for some clear statement of the relation between philosophy and concrete political movements is so great that Professor Elliott has earned our gratitude simply by making the attempt to achieve it. Indeed, the temptation is to let approval of the program of this book overcome grave doubts as to the clarity and coherence of the performance. To discover unexpected connections between apparently remote regions of thought is, philosophically, a great good. But it is equally true, as Mrs. Carlyle once observed, that "the mixing up of things is the Great Bad." *The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics* is strangely and ambiguously compacted of this virtue and this vice.

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The central theses of the book appear to be three: (*a*) There is an important connection between the thought tendencies variously described as "pragmatic," "pluralistic," "anti-intellectualistic," "positivistic," and the like on the one hand and some rather dubious political developments —Fascism being the chief and favorite—on the other. (*b*) Ideals, unifying principles, rational purposes, are essential to any adequate analysis of social grouping, which is thus "co-organic," including economic interests and group demands but transcending them in an organizing, moral unity which is the state. (*c*) Under existing conditions the "rule of law" as embodied in the political practices of Britain and America is, with some modifications in the way of decentralization, as near the ideal as we are likely to get and greatly to be preferred to any radical or "pluralistic" substitutes. These theses are supposed to supplement each other in the following fashion. Pragmatism or anti-intellectualism involves the rejection of any unifying purpose and common standard. Hence it leads in practice to the predominance of some group interest or other on the basis of force or "economic determinism." The tendency which has its inception in the misguided liberalism of James and Dewey reaches its climax in the pragmatic policies of Il Duce. Here the "co-organic" state is presented as an alternative and shown to point beyond all such plural, irrational and fragmentary interests to their rational unification in the law of the land, whose basis is the common will to coherence and order. Finally, such a co-organic structure is provided—not ideally but with moderate adequacy—by the national, sovereign state which thus turns out to be the guardian of order, moral freedom, and rational decision against those disintegrative forces which, in the name of pragmatism, have been in revolt.

Such a summary sketch does less than justice to the scholarship and tremendous detail of Professor Elliott's analysis which wanders deviously through law, economics, social psychology, ethics, politics, and metaphysics. Even the main thread of the argument is difficult to follow, much of the constructive case being interwoven with polemics and modified in varied restatement and repetition. But the foregoing seems at least a minimum of the dividend declared in this ambitious undertaking and, as far as is possible within the limits of this review, I shall attempt to evaluate it.

The primary level of argument is philosophical, and it is here, as it seems to me, that Professor Elliott is basically mistaken. For he has confused two quite distinct philosophical issues, and it is upon this confusion that his argument depends for most of its force. There is one philosophical issue between those who hold that critical and intellectually

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validated harmony is an ultimate desideratum in social and political affairs and those who appeal to brute fact, force, or immediate interest in such matters. There is another and quite different point of dispute between theorists who believe that such rational harmony is attainable only through the maintenance of a single absolute standard or criterion which can brook no external criticism or test and those who hold that all standards are provisional and subject to revision in the light of wider meanings and fresh contacts with reality. Both issues can be lumped under the head of "intellectualism" versus "anti-intellectualism," and both are concerned with "pragmatism" in some form. But the "pragmatism" which gives scope and comfort to the "irrational" in the first sense has little but the name in common with the appeal to broader and wider ideals which characterizes the second. It was to be hoped that a reasoned analysis of the political implications of "pluralism" would have seen the difference. Such is not the case here. Having identified "value" and "ideal meanings" with devotion to a "coherence theory of values" (p. 84) and the "synthesis" of "conceptual logic" (p. 75), the author calmly assumes that all divergence from "Reason" in this second sense—from the appeal to a single and ultimate set of meanings to which all others can be reduced—is equivalent to an appeal to force, immediate interests, and the like as against any intelligent criticism of values. And with this initial begging of the question in favor of absolutism the stage is set for the Fascist menace which is not slow in appearing.

The application of all this to political issues is not far to seek. The traditional theory of national sovereignty has held that the "rule of law" implies a final and ultimate authority in national affairs to which, in the last analysis, all other social forces are subordinate and which is not legitimately criticizable by any standard but its own. "Pluralistic criticism" of the intelligent sort has been directed to the proof that such absolutism is illegitimate, that the state itself represents only one interest among others, and that the exclusive and unlimited right of any one interest is a vicious abstraction, just as theoretically the attempt to reduce reality to any one set of ideas or meanings is a "bifurcation" of the natural world. There is no set of principles or powers so complete as to need no external criticism or limitation, and this, it is held, is true as much of the state in practice as of intellectual abstraction in theory. Here was a connection between theory and practice ready to hand for Professor Elliott and of far-reaching importance. Instead, we have the familiar and misleading spectacle of an appeal to "reason" against "force, fear, and economic determinism," on the assumption that if there is no exclusive standard in theoretical or practical affairs there can be no

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standard at all. The "pragmatic revolt" then becomes the appeal to immediate interests against more pervasive and abiding needs, and our author becomes the spokesman of harmony in a naughty and syndicalist world. Pragmatism holds "that there are no norms except convenience and survival" (p. 496); and the mild and benevolent Mr. Dewey is made to sponsor a "fear-theory" of political obedience (p. 234) because, forsooth, he has held that such obedience depends upon social sanctions. Why social influences should imply fear and force, particularly for a theory like that of Dewey or Mead in which the very "ideals" of Professor Elliott have a social meaning and sanction, is a little hard to see. But "survivalism" is found to be the watchword throughout, and values are tested "by pitting them like game-cocks for a test of consequences" (p. 77), with only economic determinism to decide the issue. It is a dark picture, surely, and one which finds its practical complement in selfish group interests, the rejection of "constitutional morality," and finally the reaction to dictatorship. If these be the fruits of pragmatism it is indeed suspect.

All this becomes peculiarly inept when applied to a detailed criticism of men like Laski and Dewey. We are surprised to learn that Mr. Dewey regards economic adjustment as "a moral end of its own" (p. 357), that his tendency is to omit all values from the study of social phenomena, "purpose having been omitted from the beginning" (p. 64), and strangest of all that "The function of the moral intelligence, according to Instrumentalism, is merely the criticism of means toward uncriticized ends. The process of attaining them is purely economic, and the criterion for testing the means is the efficiency with which the ends are attained" (p. 238). This is later qualified as "perhaps" not quite accurate; it seems to me wrong from beginning to end. It is reconciled with Dewey's own liberalism by reason of the "inconsistency" with which Dewey develops his theories. The suggestion might be made that the inconsistency lies rather in the attempt to fit such theories into a false type of "anti-intellectualism" wholly inconsistent with experimental pragmatism. The analysis of Mr. Laski suffers from a similar error, and again the author is surprised and pleased to find this "pluralist" inconsistently appealing to intelligence in the end. The analysis of M. Duguit is much more just, but it is only with Sorel and Mussolini that Professor Elliott is really at home. With them is the pragmatism which he was seeking from the start. It is not surprising that he found it.

The "co-organic" theory of the state, which sums up the constructive side of the work, is much more fruitful. It is defined as holding a "co-organism" to be "an organic unity, functional in structure but partly

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purposive in its limitations and in its development" (p. 377). It includes and recognizes the plurality of economic groups and interests and at the same time subordinates them to a "normative" unifying idea which is a common will to rational unity and coherence. Like Ernest Barker's admirable account, it describes such unity as largely ideal, but as possessing a real basis in the common purpose which holds conflicting interests together. Its opponents are on the one hand those misguided theorists who recognize only economic and selfish group interests in society, and on the other those who defend the real personality of groups and thus subordinate the ultimate and irreducible personality of the individual. On both counts Professor Elliott seems to have all the best of the argument, and while the term "co-organism" is not beautiful, it indicates a tendency to compromise which, emanating from the idealist camp, is distinctly encouraging. It is on this middle ground of social theory, where he is somewhat disentangled from the horror of "anti-intellectualism," that the author is at his best. But in insisting upon the importance of ideals—shared meanings and purposes—in the organization of social affairs, Professor Elliott is hardly a voice crying in the wilderness. There is an excellent practical study now available in this counterblast against "skeptical" anti-intellectualism. It is *The Public and Its Problems*, by John Dewey.

The third level of argument is that of concrete political proposals, and here the confusion in philosophy is clearly enough evidenced in practical results. Having agreed that shared meanings are essential and that all immediate demands must be criticized in the light of wider values, we are now asked to accept the "constitutional morality" of American and British judicial practice as the embodiment of such rationality. Here we find stability and order, a coherent structure of law, and a morality of genuine consent (p. 75 ff.). To tamper seriously with this structure is to surrender order to the clash of immediate interests, and that means anarchy or dictatorship. Mussolini recurs here at every verse end, and the defeat of labor in Britain's coal strike is emphasized. Here is the conflict of reason and the irrational in the concrete, and the settled purpose of the community is always against "special interests" and in favor of "harmony." But here again we have to distinguish between *some* harmony and one in which a single interest—in this case that of order and stability—is always dominant. For the interest in stability is but one among others, and not always the most important, and there are many things worse for an honest man than the violation of the rule of law—if it is a bad law. To suppose that the rule of law is self-justifying merely because it is a law or because it is stable is to return to the very abso-

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lutism which Professor Elliott disclaims but which his practical attitude seems to support. Again, the pluralist can make a more ultimate appeal; sovereignty itself is justified only by its consequences, and these are not to be determined wholesale in advance. The "rule of law" has its roots in social needs and its test in moral and intellectual ideals, and it possesses no ultimate or prescriptive right of its own.

Such is the genuine case against "sovereignty" and against the type of intellectualism which has in the past supported it. And so long as that is true we are not likely to be frightened by a Mussolini nor unduly exalted by praises of the unique moral significance of "government under law." In the very full and elaborate index with which this work is provided the names of Sacco and Vanzetti do not occur. Ideals there will be, and the criticism of ideals in their widest contexts and meanings, but neither organism nor "co-organism" is likely to return to credit the legal absolutism against which the "pragmatic revolt" has made its protest.

In the foregoing criticism I have neglected many interesting and valuable ideas which Professor Elliott develops in the course of his argument. The book itself is an attempt to return to philosophical principles, and it is in that light that I have tried to criticize it.

ARTHUR E. MURPHY

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

THE ORIGIN, STRUCTURE, AND WORKING OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By C. Howard Ellis. London: Allen & Unwin, 1928. Large 8vo. Pp. 528. Price, 21s. net.

This is an important book, not merely because it is the only adequate record of the working of the League system, but also because it includes criticism of the moral practices and theories on which war and peace depend. Mr. Howard Ellis, who is a journalist at Geneva, has been in close and continuous contact with the Secretariat and has attended all the chief League meetings. But the book is not merely an account of facts. It begins with an analysis of the effects of the "war mind" in Great Britain upon the structure of the Peace Treaties. A similar analysis could no doubt be made of the war mind in other nations at the time that the League system first began to operate. However, when the League was established and the United States had definitely withdrawn from any official co-operation in the task of resettling Europe, the war mind gradually lost its power. The moral standard of normal human intercourse began to operate even in the minds of professors and publicists

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who had shown by their recent pronouncements how easily the educated are dominated by the herd instinct. The moral standards implied in the actual working of the League are still far from clear. It is important that students of the social sciences and especially of moral philosophy should be "behaviorists" at least in this, that they look at what men do. Practice in the League system indicates a change in pre-war mentality and perhaps even a change in pre-war international morality. The League Conferences and the international Secretariat imply the assumption that states have common interests which they can openly and continually pursue by co-operation. But if so, then the dominant conception of sovereignty and still more the moral theory of Hobbes with regard to the relation of governments are obsolete. It is important for students of morality to observe that in this matter practice has run ahead of theory. Unless reminded of ancient habits, the tendency since the war among the governments of Europe has been to co-operate, not indeed through their foreign offices, but through other departments. The League system confirms that tendency. The history of moral progress will no doubt mark the past few years as a time of important change; but politicians and journalists have not, in general, noticed the change. Professor Quincy Wright, of the University of Chicago, stated some years ago the general character of this moral change; and he is quoted by Mr. Howard Ellis (p. 345). But the actual experience of the past two years has indicated that the change is even more fundamental than was supposed.

Mr. Howard Ellis discusses at length the implications of the Kellogg Pact in relation to the League system. He condemns the limited vision of some advocates of the outlawry of war who appear to be still "isolationalists" in their political assumptions. He remarks that the United States has been steadily gaining power and losing moral prestige since 1919. But the loss of moral prestige is perhaps largely due to the conclusions drawn from the abstention of the United States during recent years while the task of re-establishing the state system on a new basis has successfully proceeded. The moral character of peoples must, of course, be judged, not from the professions of their spokesmen, but from the effect of their action or inaction upon other peoples. The trouble is that no people seem to be aware of the effect its mere existence as an organized unit is having. The whole morality of nations is primitive.

If moral philosophers could be induced to attend to those issues in which clear thinking might assist to improve moral action, perhaps international morality could be developed more rapidly. It is therefore to be hoped that this book with its very exact and extensive descriptions of actual practice will be used by those who are concerned with the study of

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moral action and moral ideals. Two more volumes are to follow the present volume: one to contain a history of the League's work, and the other to indicate tendencies pointing to the future. The present volume is concerned only with the growth of the League system as so much "machinery" for co-operation between states.

C. DELISLE BURNS

LONDON, ENGLAND

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF EQUALITY. By T. V. Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. Pp. xi+339. Price, $3.00.

Professor Smith's book is one of those worth-while studies in the history of ideas of which we have all too few. It is well documented and entertainingly written, and its historical chapters gain point and illumination from the positive philosophy with which it closes. In every chapter there is apparent, not merely wide reading and accurate scholarship, but an enthusiasm for the democratic way of life that makes the work much more than an academic essay. It is an excellent example of the contribution philosophy can make to life.

Beginning with an account of the conditions in early American life making for equality, the author outlines the successive stages in which the ideal of equality acquired more concrete meaning and wider application through the slavery controversy, the movement for woman suffrage, and the struggle for industrial and economic opportunity. He points out also that along with this development in political and social equality there grew an increasing doubt as to physical, mental, and moral equality. The theory of evolution and the study of individual differences made it impossible to regard men as independent specimens of a fixed type. The idea of static, ready-made souls gave way to the conception of active organisms, receiving their form from the social environment, and capable of indefinite modification and development. "The old contention insisted upon an inexpugnably given somewhat so fixed as to inhibit any thought of fundamentally changing it and as to discourage any thoroughgoing effort at remaking the social and natural order, which also became infected with its rigidity. This conception has also its biological given, but its given is plastic enough to raise hope that something may be done progressively to eliminate the undesirable elements of man's inheritance."

The contrasts between these changes in political and social equality and the newer conceptions of human selfhood necessarily involved changes in the philosophical theories by which equality was to be justified. The earliest American philosophy, as typically expressed in the Vir-

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ginia Declaration of Rights and the Declaration of Independence, was the social contract theory inherited from Locke and the seventeenth century, which posited an original state of nature in which all men were equal, and from which they emerged only through the contract that established political unity and gave rise to the necessary inequalities involved in governmental authority. The demand for equal rights was thus based upon the assumed fact that men were by nature equal, or, to put it historically, had been originally in a condition of natural equality. The justification was sought in a past fact. This inherited social philosophy during the nineteenth century was supported, as well as modified, by the theological doctrine of the equality of souls before God, and by the Kantian moral individualism which made the rational person an end in himself. Utilitarianism also, with its insistence that each man is to count for one and only one, assumes inplicitly an equality of susceptibility to pleasure and pain. These all, while neglecting the concept of the historic state of nature, based their contention upon the equality of souls as a given and static fact.

All these earlier theories the author regards as rendered obsolete by the newer conception of the individual. Men are not literally equal; yet we ought not to discard such a practically valuable concept. In his Preface he states his utilitarian position.

> Men *are* what they *function as*. The appeal to the practical fruits of the claim of equality for its justification rather than to the metaphysical or theological roots of individuality is here emphasized; and equality is held to be justifiable as a claim of right, apart from any arguments based upon the metaphysical nature of man. If men are not actually equal, they nevertheless ought to be treated more equally than they now are, as regards access to education, distribution of economic opportunities and goods, and participation in other privileges. In defense of this "ought" it is argued that human nature is dynamic, that by such treatment men can actually be made more equal than they are, that such equality is desirable because it conditions co-operation, that some measure of co-operation is prerequisite to any human life at all, and that a maximum of co-operation is the *sine qua non* of that good life to which the social prophets and spiritual seers of mankind have long pointed the way.

With this general teleological and social conclusion it is hardly possible to quarrel, though the pragmatic terminology dictated by the author's natural piety seems rather irrelevant. Indeed, it is hard to quarrel with anything in so admirable a piece of work. The only feature that did slightly dampen the reviewer's enthusiasm might be ascribed, in part at least, to lack of space and the popular character of the book. Although the book deals with equality as involved in democracy, nowhere are we

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given an adequate definition or analysis of either term. One unacquainted with the philosophy of Locke, therefore, might readily be led to infer that the equality of souls denied in recent theories had been affirmed by that earlier thinker, the truth being, of course, that Locke's natural equality referred solely to the absence of any legitimate authority apart from that voluntarily constituted through the social compact. Differences in all other respects he was ready enough to admit, but in none of them was there to be found the ground for political control over the life of another. Indeed, one might perhaps go further and question how far the contract theorists really meant to found equality upon a mere fact at all, and whether it is quite historically just to imply that the recognition of the future reference of ideas as constituting their meaning was the achievement of the twentieth century in America. But these questions are apart from the main argument of the book which forms a very valuable contribution to the intellectual history of America.

NORMAN WILDE

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

CHRONICON SPINOZANUM. Tomus Quintus. Hagae Comitis Curis Societatis Spinozanae, 1927. Pp. xxviii+191.

This volume, commemorating the two hundred fiftieth anniversary of the death of Spinoza, begins with the discourse pronounced by Renan at the Hague on the occasion of the two hundredth anniversary of his death. Renan contrasts the simplicity and piety of Spinoza and the affection of simple folk for him with the horror in which he was held in pharisaic circles of pretended enlightenment. His free thought sprang from the intensity of his religion. Spinoza discredited the supernatural, but he championed the ideal. Says Renan, "the ideal remains the soul of the world, the permanent God."

There follow dissertations upon Spinoza by contemporary scholars of various nations, in their own tongues. The reviewer cannot read that of J. H. Carp, of Belgium, which comes first. Britannia, however, is represented in the English of S. Alexander, who draws some lessons from Spinoza for modern philosophy. He says that Spinoza is a living example to show how needless is the fear that a physical world has no place for religion or beauty. For him the physical was never separated from the psychical. The modern conception of organism Spinoza prepared us to recognize, but himself fell short of. The splendor of his metaphysics must not make us forget that his great work is called *Ethics*, and culminates in the ideal of the free man. Right and wrong are man made but

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not conventional or artificial. Spinoza's defect is that for him it is a dictate of reason that man should seek the common good, whereas "a later naturalism would hold that the existence of right is the discovery, not of reason, but of experiment." His account of religion is similar to his statement of value in its difference from our own. Deity is for him the discovery of reflection; for us it is an empirical fact. Though Spinoza did not work with biological conceptions, Mr. Alexander believes that his *conatus* is almost biological, "that by which everything strives to persist in its being and is expressly declared to be the essence of the thing."

The contribution by Franz Krejčí, of Czechoslovakia, is fortunately rendered in German. He says that today the cry is going up on all sides for a new religion, and when it comes, Spinoza will be recognized as its founder. The direct consequence of determinism in the religious field is pantheism, and the idea of an impersonal God, which avoids the contradictions in the obsolescent conception of a personal God. Spinoza did not discover pantheism, but it came to h m under circumstances that make him the culmination of religious development. It is interesting that he was of Jewish origin. The fulfilment of the Old Testament which Jesus undertook has been accomplished in the pantheism of Spinoza, in whom the religious evolution of the Jewish people reached its high point.

It seems to this writer that Spinoza is the true explanation of the existence and the wonderful resistance of the Jewish race in the post-Roman diaspora.

Harald Höffding is Dania's contributor, and his article, like some of the others in the volume, is translated into German after appearing in its own words. He points out that Spinoza differs from modern philosophy most conspicuously in denying real validity to the concepts of time and evolution. Höffding agrees with Alexander that Spinoza approaches our biological outlook in his psychology of the will. For him the ultimate ground of all value is an urge, really the urge toward self-realization. Man's freedom consists in recognizing the perfection toward which he should strive, thus having within himself the law of his activity. Spinoza's personal religion was his joy in the knowledge and love of that perfection which underlies and fosters all existence, and for him the value of any religion is that it represents an idea of God, an ideal of life the imitation of which can make possible a good and righteous life.

Léon Brunschvicg, writing for Gallia, discusses whether we today are Spinozists. Spinoza accepted the appearance of naturalism, even of materialism, in order to dissipate the mirage of the supernatural, to make way for the knowledge of a true spirituality. "That is why, in so far as we will be able to move from science to religion, as from the truth to the

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truth, without disrupting the indivisible unity of the mind, without renouncing the full light of intelligence, we will have the right to say that we are Spinozists."

Carl Gebhardt, for Germania, tells how the house at the Hague, in which Spinoza completed the *Ethics* and his life, the house of which Renan said, "It is from here perhaps that God has been seen the closest," was bought by the Societas Spinozana. It is thanks to Adolphe S. Oko, of Cincinnati, that in the fall of 1926 the negotiations with the former owner could be brought to a close through the guaranty that the remainder of the fund internationally subscribed would be forthcoming. The purpose of the Domus Spinozana, the international organization formed for the control of the house, is to equip it as a living center of thought, to provide conference rooms which will serve as a home for research and a meeting place for scholars of all countries, and to enrich the house with objects of Spinoza interest, such as portraits, documents, letters, books, and a complete collection of Spinoza literature. The library will be the main feature. So far as is known there are today five Spinoza libraries: that belonging to Cornell University; the Spinoza library of the Hebrew Union College Library in Cincinnati, the creation of Adolphe S. Oko, today certainly the most complete Spinoza library; the private library of Adolphe S. Oko, which will some time belong to the library in Jerusalem; the Spinoza library of the University of Louvain; and the Spinoza library of Dr. Gebhardt at Frankfurt A. M., which is the richest next to the one in Cincinnati.

Bernhard Alexander, for Hungaria, writes on Spinoza and psychoanalysis. There seems at first no connection, since Freud's views have grown out of his medical practice and his theories have been built up solely as a means of healing the sick, whereas Spinoza's goal was the truth. Freud would have little patience with the pure metaphysics in Spinoza, but medical men have had great respect for his book on the emotions since the *Physiologie* of Johannes Müller (1833–40) in which Spinoza's definitions were taken over. The emotions signify human bondage from which we are to be led into the world of freedom, of happiness. The emotions are to be overcome by true knowledge. Freud and Spinoza are concerned with the same object, the human soul. Freud would cure the sick soul; Spinoza would guide the imperfect to the perfect. The Freudian conception of health is closely related to the Spinozistic notion of happiness. Even Freud's subconscious, by which he means the unverbalized part of our experience, has a counterpart in Spinoza's intuitive form of knowledge, a knowledge without, or before, words. An important portion of Freud's teaching was anticipated when Spinoza said that the mind

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strives to imagine that which increases or fosters the body's power to act, but that when the mind conceives something that hinders or inhibits the body's ability to act, then it strives to recall things which will shut out the existence of that thing. And when Freud thus sums up his doctrine in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica:* "The therapeutic results of psychoanalysis depend upon the replacement of unconscious mental acts by conscious ones," is he very far from epitomizing the value of Spinoza's philosophy?

Giovanni Gentile, for Italia, points out the affinity between Spinoza and the great Italian philosophers, Bruno and Vico, and says that recent Italian philosophy derives directly or indirectly from Spaventa (1850), a Hegelian idealist who was a profound student of Spinoza. Gentile says that man needs Spinoza's faith that he is one with nature in which God is manifested and realized, but adds that one needs to go beyond Spinoza to the faith that the necessity of nature is taken up, negated, absorbed, and resolved in the freedom of the spirit.

Ignacy Myślicki, for Polonia, has written the most important paper in this volume. He shows the significance for our time of three thoughts of Spinoza: one in the realm of social life, the recognition of reason as the factor that creates civilization; the second, relating to the scientific domain, is objectivity in the social sciences; the third, concerning the domain of religion, is pantheism. Civilization is the result of the progressive socialization of individuals, the creation of an organization which is the guaranty of order, concord, peace, and security in all human relations. This organization is the work of reason, and no philosopher has raised his voice with as much force, authority, and universalism as Spinoza for proclaiming the importance of the rôle of reason. He hit the vital spot in the modern sophist Hobbes, when, in place of the distinction established by the latter between the natural state of egoism and the factitious social state, founded upon the power of convention, he introduced the distinction between the imagino-emotional state as individual and the rational state as social. Spinoza includes society in his conception of nature, and studies it in the same spirit as he would anything else in nature. It was Descartes who consecrated objectivity in the study of nature; it was Spinoza who extended this principle to the humanities. Finally, in his pantheism Spinoza has worked out the religious doctrine that best fits the needs of our time. "The ideas *Deus, Natura,* and *Substantia* represent the elevation in a universal degree, to the sublime level of cosmic forces, of creative power, reality and reason, that is to say the primary categories of the modern mind and the highest values in the modern conception of life." Dr. Myślicki asks if it may not be time to organize a propaganda for the religion of Spinoza, and says that Spinoza himself had the

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conviction that after the Old and the New Testament the moment came for his teaching. In this religion "Man must not be passive, must not abandon himself to his weakness, must not crumple within, but on the contrary he must be strong, lift himself to the height of the tasks which are incumbent upon him, and raise himself above circumstances. But these imperatives are not imposed; they flow from the knowledge of the immanent absolute. Thanks to this knowledge, good and bad for man shall be relative, liberty shall for him be the opposite of constraint, and not of necessity, and his immortality will go on increasing in the degree to which he shall extend the field of his action."

Joaquim de Carvalho, for Portugallia, tells how appreciation of Spinoza has been growing in the country from which his family was "barbarously and stupidly" exiled, especially since the beginning of this century, when Teófilo Braga concluded a lecture on him, exclaiming: "Que nos ilumine a glória imortal do Judeu Português, que tanto nos eleva!"

A. Deborin, for Russia, informs us that Spinoza is greatly honored by the Russian Marxists because Spinozism has for 250 years been the synonym for progress, for materialism, free thinking, and atheism. They would differ from him in regarding man as the product of social relationships; they would go beyond his naturalism to make a qualitative distinction between nature and society. Nevertheless the general materialistic tendency of his social and political thought has had a direct effect upon the Marxian views. It is enough to say that for Spinoza property is not something natural, but belongs to the *status civilis*. (But for Spinoza is not the *status civilis* itself natural?) Spinoza said that the authority of theologians and the might of tyrants rested upon the ignorance of the people, and the Marxians are following him in their fight against superstition and religious prejudice. They believe, like him, that freedom is recognized necessity and that God is nothing but nature.

Anders Karitz, for Suecia, writes the concluding paper in this volume, on the influence of Spinoza in the Nordic countries, especially Sweden, which has been chiefly due to the Swedish philosopher, Thorild, a contemporary of Goethe, whose writings are widely read and possess great literary charm, as the quoted passages show.

VAN METER AMES

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

THE NEW MORALITY. By Durant Drake. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. xii+359.

Though there is always novelty in the ease with which Professor Drake shows us how to solve our complicated problems and in his confi-

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dence that conflicts of interests and of views can be quickly removed by a small amount of thought, *The New Morality* contains little else that will be new to readers of his *Problems of Conduct*. Explicitly written for the layman, the more recent work subordinates discussion of theoretical problems, states in a more journalistic fashion the point of view of the *Problems of Conduct*, and applies this point of view to a still more varied assortment of contemporary problems. In addition, it contains many references to recent literature, and in it the formulation of problems is revamped in various ways, as, for example, in the substitution of "From Puritanism to Freud" for "Epicureanism vs. Puritanism."

According to Professor Drake, "the new morality" is "the morality which, basing itself solidly upon observation of the *results* of conduct, consciously aims to secure the maximum of attainable happiness for mankind." Morality began in animal evolution when a hostile environment forced individuals to redirect their conduct in order to survive. The theory of morality must begin with the recognition of two opposed aspects of experience, one such aspect being intrinsically good or pleasant and the other intrinsically bad or painful. Such recognition leaves problems unsolved and duty is still irksome, because "what is best in the long run and for the greatest number" is not always attained by following our present inclinations and tastes. The task of morality is not to distinguish between intrinsic good and bad—this distinction cannot be missed—but to foresee future goods and bads and to control conduct in accordance with such foresight.

From this point of view Professor Drake discusses almost every current problem from prohibition, the crime wave, and divorce to race prejudice, war, and the league of nations. He brings to the discussions a considerable amount of specific information, undoubted sympathy and enthusiasm, and a strenuous determination to be intelligent and broad-minded. To some readers the treatment may seem a trifle facile; but the book is not intended for such readers. To another audience it will doubtless bring much enlightenment.

CHARNER M. PERRY

SHORTER NOTICES

PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF RIGHT THINKING. By Edwin A. Burtt. New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1928. Pp. xii+590.

Professor Burtt has given us a thorough, concrete and surprisingly complete introduction to the problems of "right thinking." The traditional problems of logic are by no means neglected, even the syllogism receiving exhaustive treatment in a somewhat altered form. But the addition of "reflective thinking" to the survey has enabled the author to set these rather abstract matters in

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a wider and more concrete perspective. "Thought" is here treated in its concrete sense, starting from Dewey's familiar analysis, and is made to include those problems of scientific method which only recently found their way into logic books, and even questions of value and criticism which still appear as a distinct novelty. This combination of the more congenial problems of the "orientation course" with the more substantial matter of traditional logic appears here as of profit to both. Moreover, the book contains a wealth of concrete material for analysis, and the student will not need to go beyond its covers for authoritative instances of "right thinking" in operation. The chapters on "Statistics and Correlation" and "Scientific Progress" are especially enlightening from this point of view, the latter providing an account of the early steps in modern Astronomy and Mechanics which will be useful to many more advanced students of philosophy than those for whom the book was written. The book as a whole is heavy, both in bulk and style, and is more likely to impress the student by its matter than by its manner. But teachers of logic will have good reason to be grateful to the author none the less.

In spite of his effort to avoid "ultimate" questions, the author finds himself in rather deep waters, especially in Part IV, which deals with values. Having taken "functional analysis" as it appears in the exact sciences, as the type of "right thinking" and defined objectivity in terms of social agreement, he is unable to find a very hopeful outlook for those types of thought in which value cannot be eliminated and no social agreement seems possible. Professor Burtt faces the difficulty frankly and makes a fine plea for right thinking in ethics, law, history, metaphysics, and religion; but it is not clear from whence the light is to come. If we take as our standard those sciences which specifically eliminate values it is hard to see how the same method can be applied to ethics or religion. And if objectivity *means* social agreement there is little likelihood of such objectivity where relevant differences in valuation seem both natural and desirable. It is no wonder that on this basis little concrete aid from right thinking can be expected. But has not the author stated the problem too narrowly? If values themselves are facts of a certain specific sort they need not be discounted in a scientific treatment *of values;* they are in fact among the relevant data from which such a science would start. And if objectivity means simple occurrence and has no special reference to "social agreement," then these differences may be conceded without eliminating the objective control of fact. It will remain true that the complexity of such problems makes progress slow and difficult, but the difference between such "right thinking" and that in the physical sciences is one of subject matter and degree of abstraction, not of objectivity or "factual" character. At times Professor Burtt seems to be adopting this position, but the treatment is not decisive, and it leaves the matter in a rather more tentative state than seems either necessary or desirable.

ARTHUR E. MURPHY

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

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CHRISTIANITY AND THE STATE. By William Temple, Bishop of Manchester. London: Macmillan, 1928. 8vo. Pp. 198. Price, 4*s.* 6*d.* net.

This small book contains a short summary of the history of political thought since Plato, an analysis of the "group" theories of the state, reference to contemporary experience, such as the national strike in England in 1926, and a condemnation of state absolutions in international affairs. Bishop Temple depends for his presentation of the case upon the work of R. H. Tawney Professor Unwin, of Manchester, and Professor MacLoer; and his political theory is clear and consistent. But it is not clear what Christianity has to do with the problem. There are some vague references to moral principles which are Stoic in origin and still more indefinite references to dogmas such as immortality; but there seems to be no definite Christian doctrine which in the least affects the development of political ideas. At any rate since the Reformation Christianity has not affected the growth of political ideas at all. Bishop Temple does not even give any clear conception of the position of "the Spiritual Power" in society. The book is interesting in its omissions as well as persuasive in its restatement of the modern view of the state.

C. D. B.

CONDEMNED TO DEVIL'S ISLAND: THE BIOGRAPHY OF AN UNKNOWN CONVICT. By Blair Niles. London: Jonathan Cape. Pp. 376.

This book is in the form of a story, but it contains important evidence of the working of the French penal settlement in Guiana. No doubt the moral problem involved in the use of this kind of punishment for crime is better stated in a story than in a treatise. The difficulty of an ethics based upon statistical information is obvious. Here the author has in view possibilities of reform in the penal system. She signs her preface from New York City and claims to have spent some time in French Guiana. The material she has provided will make very good subject matter for the discussion of the moral problems of crime and punishment.

C. D. B.

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

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MORALE AND PRESTIGE VALUES IN MUNICIPAL EMPLOYMENT

LEONARD D. WHITE

MOST studies of the reactions of human nature to the work environment have been motivated by the desire to discover those conditions which guarantee the highest rate of productivity per worker. Scientific management, stop-watch control, and standardized techniques have often been opposed as devices for driving labor and deprecated as taking the creative impulse out of most forms of mass employment. In the light of these fears, the notion of the state as a model employer has never meant enough to its employees to persuade them to accept the philosophy or practice of scientific management in the conduct of public affairs.

Since Professor T. V. Smith renewed interest in work as an ethical concept, however, studies of human nature in the work environment have to be oriented in part at least to determine the conditions which permit the maximum satisfaction to the worker.[1] We may suppose, indeed that the realization of such an end would in fact represent a realization of full potential productivity; but certainly from the point of view of social objectives, the two aims are not identical.

In business and to a less degree in public administration a vast amount of thought is being given by students of person-

[1] T. V. Smith, *The Democratic Way of Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), chap. v.

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nel administration to ascertain the bases of a sound work environment. If naturally these commence with analyses of physical conditions such as space arrangement, heating, lighting, and ventilation, they inevitably proceed to deeper analyses of the psychological environment. Generally speaking, it is now recognized that a sound psychology is fundamental both to sustained productivity and to the achievement of employee satisfaction, and the social engineering task of creating healthy attitudes among employees emerges in full panoply. At once the whole range of conditions of work is engaged, and their reconsideration from a new point of view becomes essential.

Two experimental studies contributing to this end have recently been concluded at the University of Chicago, the description of which is the purpose of this article. The first presents an analysis of the conditions of employment in the municipal service of Chicago from the point of view of their relation to morale; the second seeks to identify and measure the prestige value of municipal employment among the citizens of Chicago. Both are portions of a larger enterprise in which the underlying bases of human efficiency are being explored—an enterprise which will require eventually to deal with such concepts, among others, as leadership, motivation, and adjustment, and with the administrative devices essential to manipulate them effectively to produce the desired results.

I

For the purposes of the first study a high morale was defined as (1) a state of mind in which men and women voluntarily seek to develop and apply their full powers to the task at which they are engaged, by reason of the intellectual or moral satisfaction which they derive both from their own self-realization, their achievements in their chosen field, and their pride in the service; (2) a social situation in which men and women are aware of the degree to which they are mutually

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affected by these motives, and respond to this knowledge. A low morale indicates the contrary situation. The term is in a way the successor to *esprit de corps*, but more definitely points to civilian than to military groups.

The general hypothesis of the study was that a municipal service is effective only to the degree that its individual members possess and apply capacities of a high order. It is the recognized duty of a civil service commission to discover the requisite capacity and provide for its admission into public office. Hitherto, however, it has not been recognized that it is anyone's particular business to see that these capacities are used to their full extent when once an appointment has been made.

The general outcome of the study indicated that in the absence of systematic and thoughtful attention to the latter task, conditions develop which make it impossible for the city to command the full potential resources of its officials and employees. They do not capitalize the energy, inventive capacity, and driving power which are awaiting the magic touch to spring to life. They cannot use these undeveloped capacities in part because they do not possess the confidence of their employees, in part because they fail to encourage those incentives which might build an effective structure of voluntary co-operation, loyalty, and enthusiasm.

In order to understand the particular recommendations of the study, it is necessary to state that Chicago adopted a well-drafted statute providing for the merit system in 1895, but that the operation of the law has varied greatly from administration to administration. From 1911 to 1915 notable progress was made by the municipal Civil Service Commission, followed by a marked retrogression from 1915 to 1923. Mayor Dever, elected in 1923 and retired in 1927, was friendly to the merit system, but his Civil Service Commission was unprogressive, and its failure to remedy the abuses of preceding years caused a profound depression among the better elements of the city service.

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It was the task of the present study, initiated at the request of Mayor Dever, to state the conditions which were depressing the morale of city employees, and to suggest remedies. It soon became apparent that the level of morale varied greatly from office to office. The Health Department, then operating under the vigorous and intelligent leadership of Dr. Herman N. Bundesen, was in a highly satisfactory condition; the Department of Public Works, headed by an able business man, Mr. A. A. Sprague, was in excellent shape. Other departments showed unsatisfactory conditions, and a few were in deplorable straits.

The chief reasons for low morale seemed to be (1) rampant political interference in appointments, promotions, assignments, and management of the staff, so widespread that it was assumed to be well-nigh universal; (2) maladjustment of salaries, so that varying rates of pay were offered for the same kind of work; (3) lack of recognition; (4) absence of uniform and effective discipline; (5) lack of a healthy social life among the employees of the city, leading to their corporate helplessness in the face of some almost intolerable abuses. It is not essential to develop these manifestations of a perverted civic life; they have often been described in most of the great American cities.

Of more significance is the tentative analysis of the stimuli to which men and women in civil employment respond, and the devices which were suggested to bring them into play. Without taking account of the treatments of motivation which have come from the pens of social psychologists, our first-hand contact with hundreds of municipal employees suggested that the basis of a sound employment situation was to be found in satisfying the following demands on the part of the workers: (*a*) the demand for justice in conditions of employment, both individual and group; (*b*) the desire for recognition; (*c*) the need for stimulating leadership and for personal and institutional loyalties; (*d*) the need for stimulating social

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contacts; (*e*) the desire for achievement; (*f*) the demand for effective personal adjustment to the job.

There will be little interest in repeating here well-established methods of personnel agencies for securing these objectives, such as a sound classification, rigid enforcement of the spirit of the merit system, improvement of efficiency records, improvement in physical conditions, and uniform and reasonable discipline. In the course of the study, however, some more novel proposals were also made which may have significance, in spite of the fact that none of them was adopted.

Thus considerable emphasis was placed on means to secure recognition for notably meritorious performance. The mayor was invited to make an annual presentation to the department which had performed the most distinguished service during a given year. Individual recognition varying with the type of employee was proposed. For policemen, cash awards are now provided; they might well be extended to such groups as the street cleaners, sanitary inspectors, and waterpipe-extension men. For laboratory technicians, it might easily be possible to grant special leave to work out some important research problem in a university laboratory. All along the line, provision might be made to recognize inventions and improvements suggested by employees, a device well established in industry and fully capitalized in the British Customs and Excise Department.

In order to institutionalize the inventive capacities of the service, it was proposed to establish regular quarterly meetings of technical and professional employees, and in addition to create the "Business Organization of the City of Chicago." This was to comprise about two hundred of the key officials, was to meet from time to time with the mayor, to make reports of a technical nature through its committees, and to serve as a means for focusing attention on the administrative as opposed to the political aspects of municipal government. To strengthen the professional and technical work of the city

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an Institute of Municipal Administration was suggested, comparable on a local scale to the Institute of Public Administration in Great Britain.

"Ye shall not live by bread alone"; but in the reaction that overtook the city government shortly after the publication of these proposals, the regular staff found itself almost without bread by reason of the superabundant distribution of the loaves and fishes among the faithful. Probably such an analysis is more appropriate to the Chicago of the future, more or less distant! At any rate, it may stand as a type of investigation and experimentation which departs from the established but relatively limited practice of personnel management in municipal governments.[2]

II

In the course of the study of conditions on municipal employment in Chicago, the writer became aware of a feeling among employees that they were disparaged by the public. Opportunity was lacking at the time to examine this opinion, but on further reflection the importance of the matter grew, and it was eventually decided to explore the state of community opinion on the prestige of municipal employment. This naturally was a study of a situation outside the city hall, as the morale study was primarily a study inside the city hall.[3]

The general point of view underlying the prestige study was that "public opinion" about city-hall employment is influential, along with many other factors, in controlling the type of person who gravitates toward official life, in determining his attitude toward his work, and hence to a definite degree in governing both his productivity and his own self-realization, the achievement of personal values in the work environment.

[2] This study was published by the city of Chicago in 1925: Leonard D. White, *Conditions of Municipal Employment in Chicago, A Study in Morale.*

[3] To be published by the University of Chicago Press under the title, *The Prestige Value of Public Employment in Chicago.*

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The point may be made clear by an illustration. For generations the British, German, or French Civil Service has had a high prestige among all classes of the public. As a direct consequence of the respect and esteem in which civil servants are held, a due proportion of the ablest men and women are willing to make a life-career of the public service; and once established in public office, find a constant reminder of the satisfactions of their employment in social attitudes toward their status. Thus the Society of Civil Servants (London) chose as its motto the proud device: "We Serve the State," and not all the disappointments of post-war reconstruction dim the luster of this standard.

In the United States, as elsewhere, scales of prestige appropriate to different occupations or callings exist. Presumably they vary from class to class, and certainly they differ from the rankings which would be characteristic say of France. But here as abroad it is true that social prestige is one of the factors influencing choice of an occupation, and of an employer, and one of the considerations which make for satisfaction or dissatisfaction with one's calling or station.

The study of the prestige value of public employment in Chicago, therefore, is a preliminary attempt to discover what point in the prestige scale city-hall employment really holds. Is it in fact true, as many city employees think, that the public disparages their calling, or perhaps more accurately their employer? If so, to what extent is this true, and what reasons are given by a representative sample of the public for the view which they entertain?

For the purpose of this study a simpler and rougher technique was employed than that devised by Thurstone, but one which nevertheless permits statements to be made in statistical terms as well as in qualitative terms.[4] In order to under-

[4] L. L. Thurstone, "Attitudes Can Be Measured," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIII, 529–54.

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stand the results achieved, a few words are necessary with regard to the methods employed.

Two schedules were devised, of which the first laid the basis for the general conclusions, while the second was supplementary and confirmatory. Twenty paired occupations were devised to represent as fully as possible the whole range of municipal employment. One member of each pair represented a municipal employment, the other an equivalent employment by a non-public employer. Thus by way of illustration:

Senior file clerk, city clerk's office
Senior file clerk, The People's Gas, Light, and Coke Company

Chemist, Department of Health, City of Chicago
Chemist, Sinclair Refining Company

The order of positions, public and private, was varied.

Eventually 4,680 persons taken from many walks of life in various parts of the city checked for each of the twenty pairs the member (i.e., public or private) for which they held the higher esteem, thus giving us 93,600 individual expressions of opinion. The same group also responded to fifteen questions about significant aspects of public employment designed to throw light on the reasons which determined their choice within the paired occupations. Pertinent information was also secured from each person enabling us to set up differentials by sex, age, education, occupation, country of birth, years' residence in Cook County, and economic status as indicated by rent per room per month.

The second schedule presented a word-association test, in which were employed thirty words containing ten or twelve which were thought to be significant, and a completions test designed to indicate more accurately the distribution of opinion on the three qualities of efficiency, honesty, and courtesy.

With these preliminary remarks about method, we may turn at once to the results. The prestige value of public employment in Chicago, so far as the opinion of the present sam-

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ple is concerned, is a negative quantity. Forty-three per cent of the total number of 93,600 choices were so cast as to indicate a belief in the superior prestige value of municipal as contrasted with private employment; 57 per cent revealed a preference for the prestige value of private employment.

This distribution of opinion was not on the whole as unfavorable as had been anticipated, and if full corrections were possible to bring the sample into accurate relation with the total population of the city, it is clear that the indicated distribution would be less unfavorable. Lacking exact knowledge of the educational and economic status of the people of Chicago, this adjustment could not be completed.

The gross result is of perhaps less interest than the differentials established by sex, age, education, occupation, race and nationality, and economic status. These differentials are of significant interest as rough indications of varying attitudes toward municipal employment, and can be most easily presented in the form of prestige indexes.

The index is derived on a scale so devised as to indicate positive and negative quantities. If one hundred persons without exception indicate a preference for the prestige value of the public position in each of the twenty paired occupations, the resulting index is +100; if they choose the private position, —100; if they divide fifty for each, they occupy a neutral position, or zero on the scale running from +100 to —100. Any point on the scale is determined by multiplying the difference between a given per cent distribution of opinion and 50 per cent (the neutral point) by 2, and adding the appropriate sign.

The prestige index of the males in the group of 4,680 cases was —18.78; that of the females, —7.78. This difference may be explained on the basis of a more persistent idealism on the part of women as a group, or on the theory of less practical acquaintance with the conditions of city-hall employment. Women have been excluded from large-scale public employ-

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ment longer than from private employment, and the prestige value of public employment may be affected thereby.

The prestige index of the age-group fifteen to nineteen was +8.18; that of the age-group fifty and over, —39.80. Intermediate age-groups follow in regular descending sequence between these two extremes. The inverse relation of age and prestige index was thus clearly established.

The prestige index of persons with six years' education or less was +18.66; that of university men and women, —42.10. The prestige index remains apparently fairly stable through the period of high-school education not far from the neutral point; but the college and university years witness a rapid and determined decline.

The prestige index of various occupational groups showed interesting variations, which can perhaps most readily be displayed by Table I.

TABLE I

PRESTIGE INDEXES BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

Occupation	Prestige Index
Unskilled labor	+33.72
Skilled labor	— 0.20
Student	— 0.76
Salesman	— 6.96
Stenographer	—15.70
Clerical	—19.12
Housewife	—32.20
Professional	—34.56
Executive-proprietor	—46.44

Too much cannot be read into this table, but the difference in opinion shown by the unskilled labor group, on the one hand, and the executive-proprietor group, on the other, is significant. Realizing the numerical importance of the unskilled and skilled labor group in an industrial city like Chicago, one appreciates that an academic view of public employment may be quite untrustworthy.

The prestige index of the foreign born was +6.90; that of

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native born with foreign father, —13.70; that of native born with native father, —21.60. This differential revealed very nicely one hypothesis with which we started, that the esteem in which public office is held among foreign groups in Chicago is higher than among the native born. The influence of foreign fathers on native-born men and women also is clear. The prestige index of the colored people in our sample was +12.76; that of the native white, —21.68.

As a rough index of economic status, rent per room per month was employed. Satisfactory evidence was secured only for 3,042 persons, who were, however, well distributed among five rent groups, ranging by $5.00 intervals from less than $10.00 per room per month to $25.00 and over. The prestige index of the lowest-rent-payment group was —2.52; that of the highest-, —26.42.

Space will not permit further development of these figures, nor of the distribution of answers to fifteen questions bearing on significant phases of public employment. It may be said that these answers corroborate the opinions revealed in checking the twenty paired occupations. The supplementary schedule, showing in some detail the distribution on the three qualities of integrity, efficiency, and courtesy, was the most damaging evidence which turned up against city employees. The word-association test corroborated the general results. In short, the various parts of the experiment hang together reasonably well, and the results are in harmony with conclusions reached by competent and disinterested observers.

To return again to the general aspects of the experiment, the opinion revealed by the study seems at first sight to substantiate the views of city-hall employees who are depressed by what they believe to be an unfriendly opinion of the public. On the other hand, it is equally clear that definite and important groups in the city are well disposed toward city employment, and these groups are in large part those from whom public employees are drawn. There is considerable evidence,

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also, that hostile opinion is directed rather against the politicians intrenched in such offices as mayor, alderman, and school board than against the permanent city employee.

It must also be stated that the opinion recorded in this study is not to be understood as a rational, informed opinion based on accurate or extensive acquaintance with the conditions of public employment. It is a mixture of fact and fancy which defies separation. All that can be claimed for it is that it is opinion, and operates effectively as such.

It still remains unknown to what extent and with what precise results it counts in depressing or sustaining morale. Another study, focusing this time within the city hall, is needed to establish this connection on a scientific basis; but this study waits until the wheels of God have ground out a more propitious moment.

On a larger scale students of the social sciences need to know much more about the hierarchies of prestige characteristic of the important social groups which comprise contemporary society. The social inheritance of prestige scales, their permanence or mutability, their respective bases, and their effective influence in determining conduct are all worthy of thought and experimentation. Simpler and more accurate techniques are undoubtedly available for such inquiries.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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SOME IMPLICATIONS OF JURISTIC PRAGMATISM

FOWLER VINCENT HARPER

I

ONE of the disconcerting factors about the study of jurisprudence is the variety of meaning which the term conveys. All are familiar with the looseness with which the expression is used, and one is at once cautious to designate clearly the limitations with which his usage is to be attended. The result is that classifications have been made which tend to distinguish jurisprudence from broader and more narrow fields of legal investigation.[1] German writers set jurisprudence over against the philosophy of law, both being subdivisions of the "science of law," in the broad sense.[2] One effect of such classification is to emphasize the distinctions between jurisprudence, as the science of law in the narrow sense, and the philosophy of law, at the expense of recognizing the relation between them. It is submitted that jurisprudence, in this restricted sense, should be regarded as dependent upon philosophy of law, or, as some will have it, the philosophy of law as dependent upon jurisprudence.[3] The interrelation between the two seems to be such that the two propositions are interchangeable, for each field is indispensable to the other.[4]

It is true, as everyone knows, that for a long time now, legal philosophy has been in ill repute. This indeed is a monstrous situation when the investigation of "fundamental principles" is thus neglected. But it may very well be because legal philosophy has had in many years but little to offer a

[1] Cf. Rottschafer, "Jurisprudence: Philosophy or Science," *Minn. Law Rev.*, XI (1927), 293.

[2] See Gareis, *Science of Law*, p. 15; *ibid.* (1911), p. 22, n. 3.

[3] See Miraglia, *Comparative Legal Philosophy* (1912), p. 89.

[4] Cf. Berolzheimer, *The World's Legal Philosophies* (1924), p. 10.

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world of workingmen and working ideas. But there are signs of a change of front, and the interest in philosophical investigation is unquestionably increasing rapidly. The reasons for this are not far to seek. General philosophy is tending to restrict its field to include only such philosophic propositions as can be investigated by means of the modern scientific method, by which is meant the method of observation, experiment, and trial hypothesis as commonly used by men of science since the days of Kepler and Copernicus.[5]

By such a conception of the philosophy of law, there is at once a tendency to eliminate the speculation upon those propositions about law which, by hypothesis, are incapable of being proved. That this does not inordinately hamper the province of legal philosophy is at once clear when it is remembered that in many such propositions it can never be shown that there is, in fact, any problem to be solved.[6]

Then again, by confining philosophical investigation in law to those propositions which may be attacked with the temper of the scientific spirit and which may be subjected to scientific processes, the great and constant threat to legal philosophy is at once eliminated. An entire system of juristic philosophy need not crumble into nothingness the instant that science and experience detect some fatal flaw in the data upon which it is reared. An analogy may be drawn from the effect upon philosophy generally of the new physics with its complete abandonment of the notion of cause, which effect has been so pressed upon philosophic and scientific men generally; or from the effect of modern astronomy upon the older notion

[5] Cf. Russell, "Scientific Method in Philosophy," *Logic and Mysticism and Other Essays* (1925), p. 97.

[6] Cf. Tourtoulon, *Philosophy in the Development of Law* (1922), pp. 26–27. "Two radically different reasons, however, may be given as to why a problem is insoluble. One reason is that the problem is too high for intelligence; the other is that the question in its very asking makes assumptions that render the question meaningless. The latter alternative is unerringly pointed to in the celebrated case of design v. chance" (Dewey, *Influence of Darwin, etc.*, p. 14).

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of a "universe" as opposed to a "multiverse." We are reminded by a scientific philosopher:

> In the days before Copernicus the conception of the "universe" was defensible on scientific grounds: the diurnal revolution of the heavenly bodies bound them together as all parts of one system, of which the earth was the center. Around this apparent scientific fact, many human desires rallied: the wish to believe Man important in the scheme of things, the theoretical desire for a comprehensive understanding of the whole, the hope that the course of nature might be guided by some sympathy with our wishes. In this way, an ethically inspired system of metaphysics grew up, whose anthropocentrism was apparently warranted by the geocentrism of astronomy. When Copernicus swept away the astronomical basis of this system of thought, it had grown so familiar and had associated itself so intimately with men's aspiration, that it survived with scarcely diminished force—survived even Kant's "Copernican revolution," and is still now the unconscious premise of most metaphysical systems.[7]

This survival is nowhere better illustrated in legal philosophy than in the "universal" conception of the various philosophies of the law of nature prior to the modern distinctions between *form* and *content* of the neo-Kantian school. Older natural-law philosophies, especially those which survived in American law,[8] represented the older philosophic concept of the eternally valid or universal law, a relic of medieval astronomy, to which positive law must conform and by which it could be measured.[9]

That both philosophy and science must deal with the same subject matter is now so generally conceded that both philosophers and scientists are beginning to recognize it.[10] If, then, the philosophy of law be regarded as seeking to clarify the method of law, to rationalize its processes and to furnish

[7] Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

[8] See Haines, "The Law of Nature in State and Federal Judicial Decisions (1916)," *Yale Law Jour.*, XXV, 617; Harper, "Natural Law in Constitutional Theory," *Mich. Law Rev.*, XXVI (1927), 62.

[9] Cf. Pound, *Interpretations of Legal History* (1923), pp. 5–6.

[10] Cf. Storek in *Journal of Philosophy*, XXIII (1926), 22, reviewing H. W. Carr, *Scientific Approach to Philosophy* (1924).

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tests and criteria for the attainment of its ends so that the consequences of law can be subjected to the devastating fire of applied science, there is at once provoked a field of study which is capable of inquiry upon purely empirical bases, and one which affords a tangible subject matter.

But whence, it may be asked, is such a philosophy of law to come? Must there be constructed from the whole cloth an entire new system of legal thought, or is it to spring full blown from the science of law? In truth, the yeast of various positivistic philosophies has been working in the law for many years, manifesting itself in various forms. For a score of years, now, since the interest in America has been focused upon sociological jurisprudence, there have occurred not infrequent hints in the literature of the philosophy of law which must eventually emerge. Old ways of thinking, sometimes called by new names, at frequent intervals threaten to develop into a systematic philosophic program in law. And yet, though it is strange indeed, a pragmatist philosophy of law has failed definitely to appear or to be as boldly proclaimed as might be expected,[11] although measureable success is accompanying experiments in some quarters.

Pragmatism no doubt has much that is useless for law and doubtless for an enduring philosophy of any sort. Its theory of the knowledge process and James's radical empiricism seem to offer little help for law. There has been, no doubt, enough of metaphysics in modern legal speculation. Further there is no more need for a new method for preserving and for justifying the rubbish of the law than there is need for a new process of justifying the rubbish of religion or of ethics. But pragmatism with its empirical bases and its eye directed toward fruits and consequences can surely be retained as ground for the superstructure which is developing upon it.

What has pragmatism, then, to offer that is particularly tempting to the law? It offers an empirical and scientific way

[11] See Wu's reference to the pragmatist jurist, *Ill. Law Rev.*, XVIII (1924), 285, 286.

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of thinking that is peculiarly capable of transplanting directly into the loam of Anglo-American law. It directs the legal philosopher to answers for his problems that fit strikingly well into the common-law system.

Consider, if we may, the pragmatist thesis. "The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth *happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by events. Its verity *is* in fact an event, a process; the process of its verifying itself, its *verification*. Its validity is the process of its *validation*."[12]

To the sociological jurist this is indeed not unfamiliar, for it is the bald statement of a thesis which must form the justification of his method. And yet the effect of such a philosophy boldly and deliberately applied to legal phenomena is startling. Every rule of law is just or unjust as, and according to, its subsequent justification. Justice becomes an attribute of the legal rule by way of its relation to subsequent experience. The justice of the rule is, in fact, the process of its justification. In Judge Cardozo's phrase, "there is an endless 'becoming,'"[13] and it is toward this that the eye of the pragmatist jurist is directed.

Thus the decision in every case is a projection into the future and a prophecy of the effect upon the social order of the conduct thus regulated. Now the "just" becomes merely the expedient in adapting the legal order to the social and economic structure. The legal rule enunciated in a decision becomes but a "working hypothesis" which will be demonstrated, experientially, to be sound or unsound. The rule will be just or unjust as its consequences reveal.[14] As law for Justice Holmes means prophecies of what the court will do; so, just law for the pragmatist jurist means prophecies of what will

[12] James, *Pragmatism* (1914), p. 201; Preface, *Meaning of Truth* (1911), p. vi.

[13] *Nature of the Judicial Process* (1922), p. 28.

[14] Cf. More, *Ethics*, chap. v. The "consequences," however, include the present as well as the future. Cf. Tufts, *Creative Intelligence*, p. 384.

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produce the most satisfactory and most desired consequences, in the main and on the whole view.

The pragmatist tool is logic, but logic of an experimental type as the only kind consistent with the pragmatist viewpoint. By this logic there is substituted, in Professor Dewey's words,[15] "the method of search and discovery" for the old syllogistic process. The logic that lends consistence and systematization to the law is not abandoned, but it is made purely "instrumental" rather than an end in and for itself.[16] Thus the instrumental view of logic is founded in and may be said to be a part of the pragmatic process. A pragmatist philosophy of law will be the theory of the synthetic process of co-ordinating the legal materials with desire, with experimental logic as its working tool.

Law, from this standpoint, becomes a part of the general scheme of instruments for readaptation. It but assists society in its experiments of readjustment. Every application of a rule of law is a prophecy, good or bad, as to conditions necessary to make the future satisfactory. It thus requires in every case, verification—in the strict legal sense, justification. The whole genius of the pragmatic attitude is that it has no theory of reality, and in law it will have no unprovable presuppositions about abstract justice. It has been called an "emancipated empiricism" and is content, says Dewey, to "take its stand with science."[17]

It has been said that law is not like the physical sciences in that its subject matter is a physical phenomenon to be accounted for by a theory worked out by observation of facts,[18] but nevertheless the consequences of the social phenomena which constitute the subject matter of law are capable of observation, and legal hypotheses can be tested by experience

[15] "Logical Theory in Law," *Corn. Law Quart.*, X (1925), 17, 21.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 19. [17] *Creative Intelligence* (1917), p. 55.

[18] Pound, "Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," *Harv. Law Rev.*, XXV (1912), 598.

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and validated or invalidated. Physical science formerly accepted as its fundamental premises a priori assumptions which were regarded as self-evident, and the revolutionary character of the modern scientific method must be ascribed to its elimination of such a priori categories and its concentration upon the consequences of hypotheses.[19] Scientific philosophizing, accordingly, formulates as explanations of these hypotheses nothing but certain "empirical generalizations," which can themselves be modified from time to time when the working hypotheses are corrected by the consequences in experience which follow.

From unexpected sources there come indications of the attitude of the pragmatist in the philosophy of law. Especially is this true where the sociological school has made headway. In America, the most brilliant exponent of sociological jurisprudence has been pronounced "a thoroughgoing pragmatist."[20] Vander Eycken finds that " it is no longer in texts or in systems derived from reason that we must look for the source of law; it is in social utility, in the necessity that certain consequences shall be attached to given hypotheses."[21]

The movement on the Continent for "free judicial decision" has behind it, in some quarters at least, a juristic pragmatism. In Germany, where the transcendental philosophies of the neo-Hegelian and neo-Kantian schools are strong, this is not so noticeable, but in Gény we find significant indications of a philosophy which is, in method, not inconsistent with science. He says:

> Now it cannot be repeated too often that legal science is essentially a science of action, having no purpose except that of finding the necessary rules for the government of certain human relations by external social sanctions. It is based on facts of social life which it aims to order and

[19] Cohen, "Place of Logical Theory in Law," *ibid.*, XXIX (1916), 622, 631–32.

[20] See Wu, *op. cit.*, XVIII, 285, 297.

[21] *Méthode positive de l'Interprétation juridique*, p. 401, quoted by Judge Cardozo, *Nature of the Judicial Process*, pp. 121–22.

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arrange in such a way that the consequences flowing from them are those which are socially desirable.[22]

The connection between sociological jurisprudence and juristic pragmatism is not difficult to understand. Sociological jurisprudence demands a pragmatist philosophy of law—in fact, it presupposes it. Dean Pound has pointed out, in his critique of sociological jurisprudence, five characteristics of the sociological jurist,[23] every one of which is teleological, in the broad sense, namely, by assuming a system wherein purposes are realized within wider or more narrow limits. The necessity for a pragmatist attitude in philosophy is consistent with none but the teleological method in science.[24]

Sociological jurisprudence has pointed law toward social justice and has assumed that law must seek to attain certain ends. What it needs is (1) a philosophy which will explain its method and furnish it with a rationale; and (2) one which will provide the sociological jurist with tools and show him how to use them by (3) furnishing him with some scale of values by which he can hew his way through the experiential flux of the legal order.

Jhering's great thesis, as everyone knows, provides a method which in its bare form but puts off the ultimate problem.[25]

[22] "Judicial Freedom of Decision," *Science of Legal Method* (1912), p. 16.

[23] "Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," *Harv. Law Rev.*, XXV (1912), 489, 512–16.

[24] Cf. Dewey, "Philosophic Method," *Experience and Nature* (1925), p. 37. "The purport of thinking, scientific and philosophic, is not to eliminate choice but to render it less arbitrary, and more significant. It loses its arbitrary character when its quality and consequences are such as to commend themselves to the reflection of others after they have betaken themselves to the situations indicated; it becomes significant when reason for the choice is found to be weighty, and its consequences momentous. This statement is not a commendation of the will to believe. It is not a statement that we *should* choose, or that *some* choices are self-justifying. It is a statement that wherever reflection occurs and intelligence operates, a selective discrimination *does* occur. The justification of a choice is wholly another matter; it is extrinsic. It depends upon the extent in which observation, memory and forethought have entered into making the choice, and upon the consequences that flow from it. When choice is avowed, others can repeat the course of the experience; it is an experiment to be tried, not an automatic safety device."

[25] Cf. Gény, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–14.

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Sociological jurisprudence, in its more developed form, while it lends direction to, yet does not completely fix, the empirical limits of the juristic process. There is still wanting a systematic philosophy of law. Sociological jurisprudence is a method in the science of law, while juristic pragmatism is a scientific method in the philosophy of law. Experimental logic is the actual juristic tool with which the work is performed. As auxiliary equipment, for purposes of testing hypotheses through examinations into their consequences, there must be legal sociology, legal economics, and the behavioristic ethics which is in the process of formulation. Thus the functional study of law extends the juristic process and furnishes means by which recurring checks can be made. As Dean Pound predicted, some years ago, "the sociological movement in jurisprudence is a movement for pragmatism as a philosophy of law . . . . for putting the human factor in the central place and relegating logic to its true position as an instrument."[26]

But if the sociological movement presupposes a pragmatist philosophy in law, it does so no more than other characteristics of American legal thought. Pragmatism has been regarded as peculiarly American and particularly adapted to the culture of a people of our experience. It is not inconsistent with the spirit and methods of the common law. Judge Cardozo has declared that "the juristic philosophy of the common law is at bottom the philosophy of pragmatism,"[27] and Dean Pound has described the process which only juristic pragmatism can explain as one of the "purely juristic methods of systematizing the judicial finding of law." He continues:

> This method, in appearance crude and unscientific, is none the less justified by its results. It is, in truth, the method of the natural scientist, of the physician and of the engineer, the method of trial hypothesis and confirmation. The tentative results of a priori reasoning are corrected continually by experience. A cautious advance is made at some point. If just results follow, the advance goes forward and in time a rule is devel-

[26] "Mechanical Jurisprudence," *Colo. Law Rev.*, VIII (1908), 605, 609–10.

[27] *Nature of the Judicial Process* (1922), p. 102.

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oped. If the results are not just, a new line is taken, and so on until the best line is discovered.[28]

There are still other reasons to expect the seeds of pragmatism to flourish in American law. Continental critics of the neo-Hegelian fold have criticized sociological jurisprudence and the entire doctrine of "interests." Berolzheimer says:

Just as well, or just as ill, as on the basis of the "justice based on needs or interests" might cases be decided by the throw of the dice. The "justice based on needs or interests," which in the last analysis may be reduced to Jhering's utilitarian theory, offers an erroneous standard for the weighing of the unweighable. Moreover, it puts profit and advantage in the place of right and justice, so that the function of doing justice would be degraded to a mere act of administration.[29]

But that which here offends this pretentious conception of "justice," which presumably may not always be one with "profit and advantage," is by no means so outrageous to the Anglo-American legal philosopher. The notion of justice which approves and fosters the widespread tendency toward administrative justice and individualized application of law is not only consistent with the thesis of juristic pragratism but is reinforced by such a philosophy. "Administration," declares Pound, "has thus far proved the most effective agency of administrative justice. Thus we may understand the growth of administrative justice which has gone forward so rapidly in the last twenty-five years. Administration had little place in the pioneer, rural, agricultural society of the last century. It belongs to a busy age."[30] The conditions which the American scene affords and which have produced administrative machinery and the sociological method in juristic science demand likewise a philosophy which is akin to nothing more than to juristic pragmatism.

[28] "Courts and Legislation," *Science of Legal Method,* p. 214; cf. Cardozo, *op. cit.,* p. 23; cf. Pound, "Theory of Judicial Decision," *Harv. Law Rev.,* XXXVI (1923), 940, 953.

[29] "Perils of Emotionalism," *Science of Legal Method,* p. 172.

[30] "Law and Social Work," *Ind. Law Jour.,* III (1927), 183, 189.

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And thus we are brought to realize that not only does juristic pragmatism sanction the teleological method in science, but that it is in complete accord with the evolutionary conception of law.[81] But herein, again, is there a radical difference between the orthodox historical jurist or the neo-Hegelian type and the pragmatist philosopher. It is evolution of a different sort. The older evolutionist will disprove, to his entire satisfaction, the entire utilitarian doctrine by showing how "each substantial and fundamental change in the law has been the result of a struggle and the victory of one part of the community over the other—a struggle, to be sure, under the banner of a more modern and advanced idea of justice, and a victory of law purified over a stagnating condition that had come to be felt as unjust."[82]

The deterministic attitude here finds expression in the notion of law as something found, rather than made;[83] something to be studied rather than controlled and directed. A pantheistic universe has swallowed up law, leaving nothing but the marks of history.[84] The kind of evolution characteristic of juristic pragmatism, however, is more modern, and indeed more radical. In the first place, it is free from the presupposition of the old-fashioned evolutionist philosophy which assumes, on strict biological analogy, that all change is for the better.[85] It will not deny that the "unfolding of the idea of liberty" might very conceivably amount to deprivation of both individual and social freedom. In other words, it is not

[81] Dewey, *Influence of Darwin, etc.* (1910), pp. 8–9.

[82] Berolzheimer, "Perils of Emotionalism," *op. cit.*, p. 171.

[83] Pound, *Law and Morals* (1922), p. 16; *Interpretations of Legal History* (1923), p. 16; "Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," *Harv. Law Rev.*, XXIV (1911), 591, 599.

[84] Cf. Tourtoulon, *op. cit.*, p. 617.

[85] Cf. Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, pp. 22 ff.; Russell, "Scientific Method in Philosophy," *op. cit.*, p. 105; cf. Cohen, Editorial Preface to Tourtoulon, *Philosophy in the Development of Law*, pp. xxv–xxvi; cf. Tourtoulon's discussion of "Progressive Evolution," *ibid.*, pp. 603 ff.

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forced to assume that the natural order of things is growth rather than deterioration; progress rather than retrogression.[36]

Now juristic pragmatism maintains that there is nothing inconsistent between a teleological system and a deterministic system.[37] The historical view is mechanical, not as opposed to organic but as opposed to volitional, and determinism is understood as mechanical determinism. For the pragmatist jurist there is no contradiction in maintaining that the law is both teleological and deterministic because the determinants are not necessarily posited in a system of mechanical causation. Bertrand Russell will insist that it may be teleological and, at the same time, mechanically determined,[38] although we are not to accept Russell's conception of pragmatism nor yet concede the logical positions into which he argues it.[39]

Another important contribution which juristic pragmatism offers is the method of finding some scale for supplying the criteria for judgment. "Value-standards," as they have been called,[40] are one of the most immediate demands upon the theory of law.

Here it is that the instrumental aspect of judgment is important. Since the scientist's ideas are "working hypotheses" and have value as they enable him to predict and to control, his ideas are the instruments for directing experience, by constructing anticipations and conditions appropriate to their realization. The test of the truth of his idea is in the carrying from anticipation to realization. So, as applied to law as a test of justice, the "workability" of the rule to resolve the difficulty which created the problem in the first place will furnish the

[36] Consequently, we get the conception of responsibility. Cf. Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 17: "but if insight into specific conditions of value and into specific consequences of ideas is possible, philosophy must in time become a method of locating and interpreting the more serious of the conflicts that occur in life, and a method of projecting ways for dealing with them; a method of moral and political diagnosis and prognosis."

[37] Cf. Russell, "On the Notion of Cause," *op. cit.*, pp. 201 ff.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 208. [39] *Ibid.*, p. 203.

[40] See Rottschafer, "Jurisprudence: Philosophy or Science," *Minn. Law Rev.*, XI, 293, 298 ff.

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only test possible and the only one necessary. Beyond this, nothing can be demanded of the law. "Hence judgment arises in the self-conscious realization of a problem. . . . . When the difficulty has been apprehended, the judgment emerges as the consciousness of the conditions which will attain the desired end of action freed and unimpaired."[41]

Just as truth for the pragmatist becomes a class name for all sorts of working values in experience,[42] so justice for the pragmatist jurist becomes a class name for all sorts of definite working values in legal experience. And as economics long ago gave up the notion of an absolute or real value and recognized that it is want only which makes value, so the juristic pragmatist looks for no value except that which is raised by social and human need. This yields a conception of justice which is organic and synthetic and one which is in constant process of reconstruction.[43] Values vary directly with wants, and since it is want that is to be measured rather than value in any other sense, the problem is not insurmountable, for sciences other than law are developing pragmatic tools for estimating the intensity of social needs.

II

So, since "it is the business of legal science to teach the law as it actually works,"[44] the construction of a scientific philoso-

[41] S. F. McLennan, "Typical Stages in the Development of Judgment," *Studies in Logical Theory* (1903), pp. 128, 137.

[42] James, *Pragmatism*, p. 68.

[43] "Intelligence and reason imply (*a*) considering the proposed act or the actually performed act as a whole and in its relations. Especially they mean considering consequences. In order to foresee consequences there is required not only empirical observation of past experience, not only deduction from already formulated concepts—as when we say that injustice will cause hard feelings and revolt—but that rarer quality which in the presence of a situation discerns a meaning not obvious, suggests an idea, 'injustice,' to interpret the situation. Situations are neither already labeled 'unjust,' nor are they obviously unjust to the ordinary mind. Analysis into elements and rearrangement of the elements into a new synthesis are required. This is eminently a synthetic or 'creative' activity" (James H. Tufts, "The Moral Life and the Construction of Values and Standards," *Creative Intelligence*, pp. 354, 363–64).

[44] Ehrlich, "Judicial Freedom of Decision," *Science of Legal Method*, p. 77.

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phy of law may well be the logical task of those interested in such fields of thought. That there is a need for such a philosophy cannot more unhappily be illustrated than by the pronouncement of an American judge that in the common law "there are no working hypotheses."[45]

The materials for such a philosophy should be ready and waiting in the actual workings of the law. If the method actually employed in legal science is one that presupposes an experimental philosophy, that method in operation should be expected to reveal the sources for such material. We need not be reminded by Wurzel that the method betrays at once the point of view from which one approaches a subject and will determine different results accordingly.[46] Since the sociological method is one that is consciously developed by legal science, and since it is consistent with the pragmatic view, we may expect best results from an investigation of opinions which reveal the sociological jurist deliberately pursuing his science, although in view of the empiricism which the common-law system has developed, the attitude of the juristic pragmatist is not deeply latent beneath the entire process.

In considering the complete process of judicial reasoning, it seems obvious that legal science has a unique function to perform. It must establish certain hypotheses from the available legal materials from which the decision in the instant case can be developed, and it must anticipate consequences which will justify and explain the decision when it is reached. But it has been pointed out by Professor Dewey that, as a matter of fact, the conclusion does not follow from the so-called "premises," that the premises and the conclusion are two ways of stating the same thing. The development of the premises and the development of the conclusion are one and the same operation.[47] It appears in the form of the "giving of reasons" in the

[45] R. L. Fowler, "The New Philosophies of Law," *Harv. Law Rev.*, XXVII (1914), 718, 721.

[46] "Juridical Thinking," *Science of Legal Method*, p. 295, n. 13.

[47] Dewey, "Logical Theory in Law," *Corn. Law Quart.*, X (1925), 17, 23.

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opinion of the court. Surely if the court in its opinion is purporting to represent the logical steps through which the judicial mind actually passes in working out the problem, it is fooling no one so much as itself. The entire opinion merely sets forth the hypothesis which is involved over and over again in different forms. Logic has been described as the "derivation of a consequence from a rule or a principle or a precedent which, accepted as a datum, contains implicitly within itself the germ of the conclusion."[48] What is really important is that we recognize that here a datum of legal experience occurs by refining hypotheses constructed from the legal experience at hand, which themselves anticipate an explanation of that developed datum.

The philosophy of law, if it is to perform its task, must now develop "empirical generalizations" from which the hypotheses which the court has set up may proceed as conclusions. While this is the part of the entire process that is concealed to a greater or less extent, it is here that the ends of law are postulated and that the secret of the method is to be found. Now in so far as pragmatism constructs a thesis which demands a teleological method, it to that extent points laws toward the consequences and demands a technique which the sociological jurist has supplied. Without a juristic pragmatism, however, sociological jurisprudence lacks a rationale and is entirely without a sound philosophical basis.

But philosophy must do more, and pragmatism does more. It must provide some standard whereby to test the decision once it emerges. Hence the decision rendered is but another hypothesis just as those from which it is developed. It is an attempt to control future experience. It is a prophecy of what conditions will produce the realization from the present anticipation. It is to be tested, proved, and justified by its consequences. If it "works," it will be just; if its working value is high, it will to that extent be verified.

[48] Cardozo, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

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Thus it is seen that just as an experimental logic regards the premises of its processes as but working hypotheses, so a juristic pragmatism regards the rule of law enunciated in the decision arrived at as a mere working hypothesis, to be tested by subsequent experience, as sociology, ethics, and the allied sciences shall reveal it.

In this entire process, there is seen the inseparability and interdependence of the science of law and the philosophy of law,[49] and the necessity for a consistent theory in both. Both demand, moreover, tools which will assist the jurist to arrive at the postulated ends and pursue the prescribed method. Not the least essential to the satisfactory working of the system is the aid of extra-jurisprudential disciplines in checking up on results and measuring the reasons therefor.

By this conception it is seen that the philosophy of law is nothing more than a process. Philosophy and science constitute one co-ordinated system of thought, science being subordinate to philosophy in the logical scheme, but inevitably linked to it. Legal philosophy now proceeds upon no presuppositions whatever except the principles of logic which are not substantive presuppositions at all, but merely such as pertain to the method, not only of philosophy but of all science.

Now the philosophy of law seeks to determine the ends of law and to direct science to the attainment of them. Thereafter it provides for tests for the hypotheses, supplied by the applied sciences. It will be recalled how the analytical method has ever revealed a philosophy of presuppositions of a fatal kind. The procedural presuppositions of the principles of logic assume a substantive form in the syllogism. This has ever been the limitation of the analytical jurist. His method is good so far as it goes, but when it becomes a philosophic system which depends upon the absoluteness of the content of the logical conceptions, it ceases to be serviceable.

[49] Cf. Wu, "The Juristic Philosophy of Roscoe Pound," *Ill. Law Rev.*, XVIII, 285, 287.

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Sociological jurisprudence, however, calls for and must reveal a different philosophy, for in so far as the process of formulating the ends of law is concerned, the "empirical generalizations" from which the hypothesis proceeds are conditioned upon a valid method of determining social needs. Thus when corrections are made upon the hypotheses, where, by competent investigations of a functional nature, the consequences reveal errors in the application of juristic science, there is no invalidation of the philosophy of law. Wherever, then, in an actual opinion, the sociological method is discovered, there should be behind the process a philosophy of juristic pragmatism whether the basic principles are articulate in the opinion or not.

Thus an examination of judicial decisions which have made possible the great flood of social legislation within the past three-score years, completely revolutionizing the legal conception of "due process of law," proceed from a deep-rooted pragmatist thinking. Hours of labor laws which had formerly outraged the liberty of contract dogma have been found to "work" better than the older hypothesis.[50] Statutes alleviating conditions of employment, while formerly regarded as "insulting" to the American workingman,[51] have higher working values than decisions which emanated from natural law but left the laborer "free to starve."[52] Freedom of silence guaranteed by "natural right"[53] is abandoned when service-letter statutes for employees remove an evil which sociological and economic science lays bare as all too real.[54] Sterilization laws

[50] *Dominion Hotel* v. *Arizona*, 17 Ariz. 267, 151 Pac. 958 (1915); *State* v. *Collins*, 47 S.D. 325, 198 N.W. 557 (1923). See *Harper*, "Due Process of Law in State Labor Legislation," *Mich. Law Rev.*, XXVI (1923), 599.

[51] See *Godsharles* v. *Wigeman*, 113 Pa. St. 431, 437, 6 Alt. 354 (1886).

[52] *Knoxville Iron Co.* v. *Harbison*, 183 U.S. 13, 46 L.Ed. 55, 22 Sup. Ct. 1 (1901).

[53] See *St. Louis S.W.R.R.* v. *Griffin*, 106 Tex. 477, 171 S.W. 703 (1914).

[54] *Prudential Insurance Co.* v. *Cheek*, 259 U.S. 530, 66 L.Ed. 1044, 42 Sup. Ct. 516 (1922).

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become constitutional when it is demonstrated that society sustains wrongs which are great in comparison with the personal inconvenience which attends a simple operation,[55] and zoning ordinances are valid when the social standard of aesthetics demands a more workable rule than the old individualist philosophy of the common law could afford.[56]

The common law, too, affords constant evidences of the juristic pragmatism which alone can solve its philosophic problems. A modern commentator on the law of negligence has called to mind two decisions involving the violation of a statute by plaintiff, as a defense. The Vermont court found it good, because the plaintiff was doing an act which was forbidden, and the law consequently imposed no duty upon the defendant to exercise care toward him to protect him from danger.[57] The Wisconsin court, however, found that plaintiff's violation of the statute had nothing to do with the injury, and consequently it was no defense in an action for negligence.[58] As some will have it, the decision turned on the proposition that the statute was not designed to relieve the defendant from his wrong.[59] In any event both decisions were logical enough and both, perhaps, sound. The writer says:

> The question was one of sound policy, and the Wisconsin court took one view while the Vermont court took the other. Which was right? There is no right and wrong in such cases. It is a matter of judgment, good taste, an interpretation of the community's desires; in short, law making; at least the bounding of the scope of the protection afforded by the rule of law in question.[60]

Thus when jurists talk of judicial decision, not in terms of a logically determined system or a historical determined phe-

[55] See Justice Holmes in *Buck* v. *Bell*, 47 Sup. Ct. 584 (1927).

[56] See Baker, "Constitutionality of Zoning Ordinances," *Ill. Law Rev.*, XX (1925), 213.

[57] *Johnson* v. *Irasburgh*, 47 Vt. 28 (1874).

[58] *Sutton* v. *Wauwatose*, 29 Wis. 21 (1871).

[59] Green, "Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause," *N.C. Law Rev.*, VI (1927), 1, 14–15.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

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nomenon, but in terms of "judgment," "good taste," and "interpretation of the community's desire," they are talking in terms of working hypotheses, offensive to any form of natural law. Courts are almost consciously talking juristic pragmatism when they reject hypotheses on the grounds that "precedents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do not fit the conditions of travel today. The principle . . . . does not change, but the things subject to the principle do change. They are whatever life in a developing civilization requires them to be."[61]

And so, if there is anything characteristic about juristic pragmatism it is that it seeks to bring the law in accord with life and with reality. Contrary to some impressions that pragmatism, by reason of its empirical nature, is concerned only with dead facts,[62] juristic pragmatism must project its legal hypotheses into the future and have, at all times, one eye pointed in the direction of future experience. Rules of law are only tentative. They do not have, strictly speaking, the quality of justice. It is not a case of "right" or "wrong," but of the most workable regulation of conduct. Thus allowance is made for life and its vicissitudes. Law will not necessarily be logical, for life is illogical. "The moulds expand and shrink."[63] At all times, the law must attempt to look ahead, and it is this foresight which will make for progress in law, and it is the capacity and equipment to make intelligent corrections and modifications that will make the law tolerable and useful to society.[64]

[61] Judge Cardozo in *MacPherson* v. *Buick Co.*, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).

[62] Cf. Kocourek, Introduction to Berolzheimer, *The World's Legal Philosophies* (1924), p. xx.

[63] Judge Cardozo in *Glanzier* v. *Shepherd*, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).

[64] A well-settled doctrine of equity provides it a defense against a bill for specific performance to show that plaintiff had had knowledge of material facts, obtained through superior instruments and facilities of information, which he failed to disclose and which, although not amounting to actual fraud so as to support a recision, yet results in such a hard bargain that its enforcement would be inequitable

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Often a court, following the common-law tradition of individualism, will purport to turn its decision on grounds reached by a specious legalism, and lip service to dogmas, when, in fact, the real reasons are those explained by juristic pragmatism—looking to the fruits and consequences by a projection into future experience. Thus a court in "balancing the equities" of litigants may argue that "in a case of conflicting rights, where neither party can enjoy his own without in some measure restricting the liberty of the other in the use of property, the law must make the best arrangement it can between the contending parties, with a view to preserving to each one the largest measure of liberty possible under the circumstances."[65] In truth, however, the secret is out when the same court puts the problem in other terms: "Shall the complainants be granted, in the way of damages, the full measure of relief to which their injuries entitle them, or shall we go further, and grant their request to blot out two great mining and manufacturing enterprises, destroy half of the taxable values of a county, and drive more than 10,000 people from their homes?"[66]

Again, in refusing an injunction to prevent a tannery from polluting a stream which if issued would impair or conclude

(*Banaghan* v. *Malaney*, 200 Mass. 46, 85 N.E. 839 [1908]). A different situation is presented, however, when it appears that plaintiff's means of information were, in truth, no better if not inferior to defendant's, and plaintiff had no reason to suspect that defendant had not the same information as he. Here there is no reprehensible conduct on plaintiff's part which could be construed as moral culpability. Yet he cannot have specific performance (*Cowan* v. *Sapp*, 81 Ala. 525, 8 So. 212). (The rule is different, however, in England. *Turner* v. *Green*, 2 Ch. 205 [1895]; see discussion of the two cases in Pomeroy, Sec. 2206, n. 94.)

Here the court has not been concerned to base its decision upon the dogma of clean hands. It has gone farther, and looked to the facts and the consequences, finding the bargain quite as hard whether plaintiff has been morally culpable or not. The economics of the cases are the same. By looking to the consequences, both in the immediate situation and in the future, the result has been determined in conformity with the desirability and social utility of those probable consequences.

[65] *Madison* v. *Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co.*, 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658, 667, cited in Cook's *Cases on Equity* (Abr.) (1904), p. 365.

[66] *Ibid.*, 83 S.W. 658, 666.

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operation of the industry, the court did not "feel justified in decreeing the issuance of an injunction, the consequences of which would amount to nothing less than a public calamity."[67] Already reference had been made to an injunction against a paper mill which had caused it to be shut down for five years.[68]

And so juristic pragmatism may be at the bottom of much discarding of hypotheses which have proved unworkable and hence unjust. Little is heard in modern law of fraud about *caveat emptor;*[69] fine distinctions between "affirmations" and "warranties" have ceased to be important in the law of sales;[70] constant tendencies in the law of torts and credit transactions to distribute loss where it can most easily be carried will readily occur;[71] more socially workable principles will be injected

[67] *Driscoll* v. *American Hide & Leather Co.*, 102 Misc. 612, 170 N.Y.S. 121 (1918), cited in Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 353, n. 1.

[68] *Whalen* v. *Union Bag & Paper Co.*, 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805, cited in *ibid.* (1913), p. 351. Can the attitude of the pragmatist jurist be more forcefully presented than in the principles which underlie the whole course of the development of equity jurisdiction? "The absence of precedents or novelty in incidence presents no obstacle to the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court of equity. . . . . Chancellor Cottinham in *Wallworth v. Holt*, 4 Myl. & C. 619, says: 'I think it the duty of this court (meaning equity) to adapt its practice and course of proceeding to the existing state of society, and not by too strict an adherence to forms and rules, established under different circumstances, to decline to administer justice, and enforce rights for which there is no other remedy.' Paraphrasing the language of Justice Herrick in *Green Island Ice Co.* v. *Norton*, 105 App. Div. 331, 86 N.Y.S. 613, 94 N.Y.S. 1147, the jurisdiction of Equity is constantly growing and expanding, and relief is now granted in cases where formerly the courts would not have thought for a moment of so doing. From time immemorial it has been the rule not to grant equitable relief where a party praying for it had an adequate remedy at law; but modern ideas of what are adequate remedies are changing and expanding, and it is gradually coming to be understood that a system of law which will not prevent the doing of a wrong, but only affords redress after the wrong is committed, is not a complete system and is inadequate to the present needs of society" (Judge Dill in *Vanderbilt* v. *Mitchell*, 72 N.J.Eq. 910, 67 Atl. 97, cited in Cook, *op. cit.* [1907], p. 283).

[69] Cf. Feezer, "Social Justice in Field of Torts," *Minn. Law Rev.*, XI, 313, 317 ff.

[70] Cf. *Chandelor* v. *Lopus*, Croke Jac. 4, in Williston, *Cases on Sales* (1625), p. 668, with Un. Sales Act, Sec. 12.

[71] *McPherson* v. *Buick Co.*, cited *supra.*

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into the law of defamation;[72] and the law of evidence will provide hypotheses to produce a greater consistency between their consequences and actual experience.[73]

If a philosophy of juristic pragmatism is worth anything, it will be because it provides legal patterns of thought which are calculated to lay emphasis upon juridical facts and upon social facts; it looks to the first for the hypotheses of the legal order, to the latter for their consequences. It thus confines law to the realities of life and should clear the way for a greater perfection of the sociological method, and, at the same time, lend symmetry and clarity to the legal system.

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[72] Even without express statutory authority (*Hutchins* v. *Page*, 75 N.H. 215, 72 Atl. 689 [1909]).

[73] Cf. E. A. Harper, arguing for the application of rules of evidence that will produce "a desirable result and one not inconsistent with the reason underlying the rule itself" ("Admissibility of Declarations of Corporate Agents," *Univ. of Pa. Law Rev.*, LXXVI [1927], 1, 18).

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THE LIMITS OF MORAL TOLERANCE

A. K. ROGERS

THE fashion of adopting a laudatory attitude toward the claims of scientific research as a basis for social programs has so much to recommend it that there is perhaps some danger nowadays of its winning a too uncritical acceptance. Already the movement has made considerable headway. Unless the facts unearthed prove too annoying, even the loyal partisan will accord a measure of respect to the social statistician; he can afford to do this because, for one thing, factual evidence is seldom unambiguous and he always is at liberty to substitute for inconvenient data considerations more congenial. Any cause whose treasury will justify the expense is now apt accordingly to have its own fact-finding agencies, with the result that a skeptical observer might be excused for questioning whether the net outcome may not be to render somewhat easier that prevailing state of mental confusion which is the great *desideratum* of those who are desirous of putting something over. It is true the possibility is always present of overbearing the prestige of special and competing interests by the higher authority of the state. But what the advocates of a "science" of politics still have failed to do is to show any very compelling reason to suppose that governments are going to be more scrupulous in their use of facts than those they are relied on to correct. A government is nothing but a group of men with particular interests who happen to have got control of the political machinery for the time being, and if they refrain from doctoring the conclusions of their expert advisers or, what is still more effective, from picking advisers on whose soundness they can count in advance, it will not be because they lack the will. It is not the least of the public services which Mr. Coolidge has performed that he has

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shown the possibilities that reside in a conscientious attention to the personnel of commissions intended to determine the facts on which political action may be based.

More relevant however to my present purpose is another objection to a sole dependence on scientific fact-finding to meet political requirements—the inability, that is, of statistical information to offer guidance unless we already are agreed about the direction in which we want to move. The reason this second point is so often overlooked is the existence of a variety of human ends which we are accustomed with some excuse to take for granted. Health is for example one of these, and, consequently, most of the problems about health we can afford to leave in the hands of biologists and doctors. To a lesser extent the same thing holds good of a fairly extensive group of problems with which economic theory has traditionally been wont to deal. Few persons are prepared to adopt a public policy which means a loss of national resources or an interference with the healthy processes of trade, and the only way to forecast the probable effect a given policy will have upon the wealth of nations is through an accurate knowledge of economic data for which expert training is required.

But also it is not safe to overlook the fact that questions are all the time arising which are apt to be prejudiced by such a preoccupation with economic ways and means. It is just as dangerous to take prosperity as a self-evidently valid goal as it is to commit one's self to any other abstraction without first making sure what it stands for in particular. In its current use prosperity means a state of things where manufacturers and traders are able to count on high prices and a large excess of profits. But this, when it is stated plainly, will arouse much more enthusiasm in those who have commodities to sell than in their customers; while a measure of prosperity no doubt will filter through to many of the buying public, official assurances that the best way to aid the poor is to increase profits and lessen taxes for the rich cannot escape an air of paradox.

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And one may go farther still and question whether conspicuous economic prosperity in whatever form is an end which may be counted on to meet the approval of all reasonable men. In the past it has appeared a truism to nearly all of those reputed wisest in their understanding of man's ways that prosperity cannot go beyond a certain point without risk to his more creative and spiritual activities; and while such a judgment has ceased to carry much weight to the present generation the fruits of its rejection are not altogether reassuring. Art and religion cannot be in a very healthy state when the one has more and more to turn to the service of commercial exploitation for its rewards, and when Christian zeal is driven to find its escape from smugness in crusades against Darwin, in baiting co-religionists, or in forcing personal abstentions on protesting neighbors. I have used the word spiritual here with some misgivings since there clings to it a flavor of piety which is repellent to many minds; all I mean it to imply, however, is the existence of human preferences in the form of self-conscious possibilities of feeling or enjoyment which can be distinguished from the utilitarian values of biological preservation or industrial efficiency. Not that success in the art of getting on in the world is without its contribution to the joy of living. But once its value is recognized as lying not in itself but in the inner satisfaction which it brings, the way is open to the further recognition that it enters into competition with an indefinite variety of other ends against which it will need on occasion to be justified.

So long as people disagree then—and I presume no one will deny that they do differ pretty widely—as to what kind of life is to be taken as the most desirable kind, the adoption of even the most apparently self-evident among them as a premise without some preliminary scrutiny is open to considerable risk. That moralists are often disposed to such a course is only to say that moralists are very much like other men, and it is one of the most universal proclivities of human nature to

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take for granted that, if I prefer a thing, only perversity in my neighbor will prevent his sharing in my preference. So long as one can avoid asking himself questions—which usually means so long as he finds the general run of people complaisant toward his own tastes—he may be able to remain indefinitely in this persuasion, and whatever contributes to such an outcome has in consequence a very strong appeal. Thus it is among the recommendations of the traditional family ideal that it protects a man from temptations to self-scrutiny by intrenching him within a friendly group which he can count on not to raise annoying doubts about his favorite assumptions, and it is only natural he should resent modernism when it encourages his wife and daughters to cultivate opinions of their own. But once forced to take active note that there are different preferences current in the world, a man of any intelligence is bound to feel himself under some compulsion to justify his own partialities instead merely of reiterating them. And having gone as far as this he may even be led to entertain the further possibility that no one sort of life represents *the* good life, and that morality needs to find a place for a number of competing goals.

Such a suspicion gets no inconsiderable reinforcement from the fact, which at least calls for explanation, that conventional ideals pretty generally nowadays are having to defend their claims against the hostile critic. Even the inclusive ideal of the "social" life after gaining in the last century an almost overpowering prestige is now showing signs of wear. The prevailing note of the new generation among its intellectuals is an individualism which shows slight respect for social authority, while everywhere a practical disregard of law is growing which extends, whenever the law is not content simply to discountenance the things for which they have themselves no inclination, to the most reputable members of society including those who make and enforce the law. One ought not to be misled here by taking too seriously official spokesmen who urge re-

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spect for law as the saving social virtue and who are so impressed by the wickedness of questioning authority that not legal violations simply but whatever conceivably may lead to such violations in the future—freedom of discussion for example—become proper objects of public reprobation. The most casual examination will make evident that the clamor in behalf of constitutionalism and authoritarianism at the present day is a sign of weakness rather than of strength; its source is plainly not assurance but apprehension, due to a perception of the growing strength of hostile forces.

It is no occasion for surprise that those who do not themselves share actively in the spirit of revolt which gets expression in the youth movement or the feminist movement or the demand for freer artistic expression, should put it down to the perennial impatience of an undisciplined human nature with the barriers which the wisdom of the ages has erected against man's inborn gift for making a fool of himself. And doubtless modernism has its too exuberant side; there is rather generally to be observed in the advanced thinker in every age a certain self-admiring complacency that verges on the absurd. But the ground for this criticism to which the more earnest modernist is likely to expose himself lies less in his fundamental premises than in his failure to live up to them consistently enough. Usually he may be counted on to be a stout opponent of all forms of public censorship; this is only natural since his own preferences are the ones most likely to be interfered with. In the same way in an earlier age the effective advocates of freedom for the religious conscience were the dissenters from established creeds. But the Puritan is not, on that account, to be reckoned as the typical example of a religious tolerance. And as a spiritual phenomenon there is no very thoroughgoing difference between the habit of despising anyone less moral than one's self and of despising those less enlightened than one's self. In so far as the good is a form of personal enjoyment to be verified experimentally, we have no more right to

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tell a man that he "ought" to enjoy some particular kind of good than that he ought to submit to moral authority. "Life" is not to be identified with emotional excitement, as it is now rather the fashion to assume. A sense of value which has its source not in emotional but in physical adventure and which finds expression in the explorer or the athlete has also a claim on our respect. The life of the mind, too, is another mode of active process and the man of intellect who gets his peculiar satisfaction from the quiet and passionless exploration of new realms of thought is likewise living in his way the life of high adventure. And in logic there is no way of stopping here. The unadventurous life may have as well its experimental appeal; if a different sort of man looks to the settled and prudent ways of common living, to family joys and the opportunities of a business or professional career for the values that appeal to him as most alluring, no one is justified in saying that he misses his true good. The only test for experimentalism is not the intrinsic superiority of one form of satisfaction to the rest but the honesty and realism of the judgment which each man passes on himself.

I think it may be assumed then—though if anyone is so impressed by the superior nobility of his own way of living as not to grant it voluntarily, I see no way of forcing the admission—that a great many different ideals have a legitimate place in the world none of which, our own included, have we the right to press upon our associates and neighbors. This appears no more than the natural judgment of any reasonably catholic mind. And it might seem from this that we are also pointed to a further and more radical inference—that a man has in consequence no business to compare rival schemes of life at all or to condemn those which fail to meet the requirements of a so-called standard. I am justified in rejecting for myself competing ways of living in favor of the one that meets my personal tastes. But in doing this, I concede implicitly to everyone alike a similar privilege. The one test for determin-

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ing whether the good has been attained is the judgment each man passes on what constitutes, for him, the most enjoyable existence; and since everyone must decide this for himself and no one voluntarily will choose a lesser measure of enjoyment when he can get a greater, any universally authoritative difference between good and bad may seem to be deprived of rational support.

This is a thesis which has recently been set forth with much persuasive skill by Professor Fite, and before the moralist follows his first indignant impulse to reject it, he would do well to consider what may be said in its behalf. That some very considerable extension of the habit of moral tolerance has a justification in experience, there is a growing readiness to grant. At least it facilitates a common understanding without which society falls apart into mutually embittered nationalities and sects and classes; and it is worthy of notice too that we seldom find men setting up to be better than their neighbors without displaying limitations of vision and of sympathy which do not altogether recommend them to the modern taste. Even the giving of advice to others is a luxury in which the prudent man will hesitate before indulging freely; and when advice is forced on the recipient in the shape of authoritative personal judgments, it almost universally will betray so many signs of undue self-assurance as to explain if not to justify the irritation which the chronic advice-giver is likely to arouse.

There is no need to draw the consequence from this that everyone ought to be allowed to act as he pleases subject to no restraint. If another man's conduct interferes with me in my pursuit of happiness, I shall feel the natural inclination to stop him if I can; and when his actions are of a sort to render him a general nuisance, there seems no reason why men should not band together and set up rules which he shall be forced on pain of punishment to respect. But such a practical standard is not to be confused with an assumption of moral superiority. We should then be led in consistency to restrain the lawbreak-

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er not because he is a bad man or because the ends we ourselves pursue are somehow superior to his, but because his ends are different ends incompatible with ours and because we are strong enough to make our own prevail. In this way we have a support for social order without the need for indulging in that spirit of self-righteousness which offends the realistic mind.

In a position of this sort, I think there lies without much doubt a very substantial amount of salutary truth. It will always seem false and vicious to minds that have never tried to exercise themselves in the practice of standing outside their customary moralistic prejudices and assessing objectively the evidence on which they rest; to such minds even the attempt appears a betrayal of moral principle. But if a man once has seen ground for questioning the assumption that to be moral means to feel and act in submission to conventional ideals, he will probably find it a relief to shed some of his unction and to credit to those who differ from him a measure of the good faith he claims for himself.

Nevertheless I find it difficult not to sympathize more strongly than Professor Fite appears to do with the usual judgment that this is an attitude at which, if it is pressed too far, the enlightened conscience will rebel. While a degree of tolerance has now entered more or less securely into the popular creed most people are still unprepared to extend indefinitely its range; they will doubt whether this is a psychological possibility even. The most easy-going critic of affairs will hesitate to show indulgence toward every sort of human character and behavior. It may be found practicable, though it is not particularly easy, to exercise the Christian duty of forgiveness by drawing a line between the sinner and his sin and to excuse the offender while refusing to palliate his fault. But this is at any rate still to fall back upon a standard, even though no one may be in a good strategic position to find fault with others for their failure to live up to it. The great apostle of tolerance

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himself, Spinoza, in spite of his insistence on the unreality of value standards and the perfection of a universe in which everything has its necessary place, ends by setting up a standard of his own to which judgments of comparison attach. The man who remains under subjection to the emotions may be seen in theory as a link in a determined series which we neither expect nor desire to be other than it is; but it is impossible that we should feel for him the same respect we feel for the free spirit who has emancipated himself from the irrational and slavish passions. The notion of the end of life as full self-expression is, in fact, itself inconsistent with an indiscriminate tolerance. The thing we are justifying is not the end a man actually pursues but the end he *would* pursue were he aware of the true requirements of his nature, and there is no need that the two should be identical. To have any guaranty whatever that a given man's choice meets the demands of a good life, we must presume that there exists in him an adequate measure of intelligence. Unless he acts clearsightedly and thoughtfully, unless he knows his own capacities and limitations and knows the world in a sufficiently realistic way not to misjudge too badly the possibilities it offers, the chances are all against his reaping that reward of true enjoyment which alone enables him to talk of the outcome in terms of goodness. And it would be absurd to claim that people always know best what is to their own real interest; wide experience, a clear head, and a sensitiveness to human values will always give some men a better right to be listened to than others and so will put us in the way again of something like a general standard.

Of course intelligence will need to be interpreted intelligently, and it is quite possible that "reasonableness" might itself be taken in a way that turns it into just another special end that makes a varying appeal to different people. "A short life and a merry one" may be a perfectly rational motto if one feels that way about it; to say nothing of the large consideration that, with the future so uncertain, prudence itself would

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seem to dictate that we be not too prudent, a type of mind undoubtedly exists for which too staid and cautious a pursuit of happiness may actually be self-defeating. It needs the impulse of the moment, the charm of the fresh and unpremeditated, to quicken the emotional pulse and give the full sense of being alive, and it may well prove to be that for such a temper vividness and poignancy of feeling will compensate for much attendant loss. But this does not really touch the issue. The ideal of an emotional intensity of experience is a defensible ideal, but only in case it springs from a genuine self-knowledge and does not simply mean following the easy course of self-indulgence. The vastly greater number of those who neglect the common rules of prudence live to regret it, which is all the proof one needs that they have missed their calling; such a failure in prudence is a sign of unintelligence, and reason condemns it rightly, therefore, because it is forced to confess its own shortcomings when confronted with the accomplished fact.

And the standard I have in mind will not stop merely with utilitarian considerations but most naturally will involve as well internal differences of quality that guide our judgment. These last the thoroughgoing modernist often thinks it possible to exclude from the premises; witness the vogue which Freudianism has almost overnight attained. For the Freudian, repression of the natural instincts, instead of being what makes man distinctively a moral being, is the one original sin. The aim of intelligence is to release every particle of human energy, which otherwise would fester and spread contagion to the inner life; and the business of the expert in human living is, in consequence, not to apply standards of relative value to items all equally deserving of respect but merely to regulate their flow so that instead of being diverted into stagnant backwaters, they may join a single onward-moving current. Sensibly interpreted such a claim has of course a great deal in its favor. But on its working side the ideal of a full play of im-

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pulse is very apt to turn out to be only another of those generalities which gratify the speculative demand for a formula much more completely than they meet the need for guidance; we shall have to possess a far more adequate knowledge of human nature than at present before it can be accepted as a sufficient definition of practical intelligence. What is likely to happen in such a case is not judicious subordination of the relatively unimportant but a crowded emotional experience where intensity of feeling counts for more than rational self-knowledge; in particular when the root of all impulse is looked for in the urge of sex will the outcome be almost to a certainty the preponderance of a narrow and oversentimentalized type of special interest.

And what now I started out to say was that, if we mean by intelligence not merely a hit-or-miss experimentalism but experiment guided by conscious principles, the chance for formulating practicable rules for organizing life—and intelligence means organization if it means anything—will be much bettered if we are prepared to make cautious use of those inner distinctions carrying an emotional appeal which are plainly present in experience and which claim for themselves the right to lay their commands on impulse. Doubtless an entirely cool and unimpassioned appraisal of human conduct might, in some ways, constitute in practice a distinct improvement over the confused and turbid judgments which now render moral opinions so often the tool of prejudice, intolerance, and injustice. But as a matter of fact this does not exhaust the natural workings of the human mind; the persistent tendency to view some forms of conduct with a sense of emotional disapproval is so nearly universal that even the critic of moralism will himself be found indulging it. Mr. Mencken, for example, gets much of his effect through the scorn with which he views all those who do not see eye to eye with him, and apart from the presumption of a standard this has no rational excuse. Folly that is no more than the failure of human souls to recognize and

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attain their good is pathetic rather than absurd to anyone whose ideal of humor fails to be adequately embodied in the sight of a fat man slipping on a banana peel; to furnish an object of condescension or contempt there will have to be intrinsic differences of quality in the human scene.

And this as I say is what very few people can avoid assuming. It is impossible to keep the emotions that naturally assert themselves in viewing human conduct on the level of mere subjective feeling. Certain forms of sexual gratification, we will say, arouse in me a sensation of disgust; how can I keep this from being translated into an objective standard? As a Spinozist I may tell myself that such a propensity to pass judgment ought to be discouraged. But the repugnance is itself a judgment. The only way I can manage to escape the sense that here is an act unbecoming to human nature is by trying to eradicate my aversion, and that I shall hardly be prepared to do; I should despise myself if I did not have the feeling. And I should hesitate still more to try to rid myself of the emotional revulsion that seems a natural response to brutality or inordinate greed or any of the other qualities that render a man a menace to his neighbors. Tolerance is in its way an excellent thing, but it is going too far when we tolerate the intolerable.

It is possible one way might be suggested to relieve the difficulty which these conflicting demands of our human constitution place in the way of a logically consistent attitude. The essential vice of intolerance lies not so much in the attitude of disapproval as in the self-righteousness which accompanies it. On the other hand too easy a tolerance is a rather cheap substitute for human sympathy if it leads us to stand aside and wash our hands of any active responsibility for social good. But there is another motive for concerning ourselves with the moral state of our neighbors which is not identical with a claim to moral superiority. This is the motive of a personal interest in people which keeps us from drawing back entirely

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when we think we have reason to suppose ourselves possessed of facts which they are overlooking and which make it seem likely that they are not going to work in a way to bring them genuine satisfaction. Even here a gentleman will exercise restraint in intruding on premises that are not his own. Nevertheless the wish not to see another through ignorance or inattention fail of his real desire is a motive a great deal easier to justify than the more pretentious motive that actuates the moral rigorist.

And I should be much disposed to think that, in the absence of such a personal interest in the good of concrete individuals, any disposition to pass moral judgment however fortified by general principles is open to serious risk. A failure in human sympathy is almost certain to have by-products which put new obstacles in the way of helpful co-operation, and if the reformer can manage to restrain his natural acerbity toward those who offend his moral tastes, he will in so far stand a better chance of avoiding pitfalls. But unfortunately this is a counsel of perfection. For the most part a man is laying himself open to a considerable chance of self-deception when he tells himself that it is only because he loves his neighbor that he desires to correct him. And so long as this remains the case, sympathy will need to be supplemented by another feeling with which only in rare natures will it blend completely. I may have a measure of success in making allowances for those whose conduct I dislike, and I may refuse to be vindictive in the sense that I am ready to forgive a repentant sinner and not pursue him with penalties beyond the point where they are needed for his reformation. But to ask me not to feel an active resentment toward the man who persists in conduct which offends my sense of fairness is to ask for something psychologically so very difficult as to lie outside the sphere of practical politics; and it would hardly be desirable even were it possible. The first step in any genuine reformation is that a man should see himself as others see him and feel the same

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repugnance to his acts that they excite in impartial bosoms; and until this comes about the feeling of antagonism which takes the form of a desire that anyone who persists in certain courses should get hurt in consequence cannot be abandoned without the loss of a serviceable and, it would seem, a necessary tool. No doubt there is something to be said for the doctrine that this enlightenment is after all best brought about, not through hostility that leads to retribution, but by a passive love and forgiveness. In the case of personal offences it is very likely true that we often avoid unnecessary trouble by refusing to insist too much upon our rights, though the fact does not seem to be that men universally are prepared to respond to such a treatment; it may first be necessary to win their respect by showing that we are not afraid to fight for our just dues. More particularly when we have to deal with men in abstract and official ways does it become uncertain that our good will is going to get across to them; it may be best to avoid a quarrel with my neighbor at the expense of what in justice I might claim from him, but if I were to import the same principle into my relations with public corporations or political machines, I should probably fail of any effect except to convince them that I am an easy mark. Meanwhile whatever the value of Tolstoiism when the offence is against myself, its force is manifestly weakened when it is made a rule for governing my attitude toward attacks on other people's good. I have no right to stand by and see others injured in the vague hope that I may thereby arouse the aggressor to a sense of shame; the vastly greater probability is that he will quite overlook my good motives and attribute my non-resistance to cowardice instead.

What I have been attempting in this brief discussion is, as against certain current tendencies whose influence seems likely to grow rather than diminish, to justify a residuum of dogmatic intolerance in the moral life whose source may be located in instinctive repugnances which experience reveals, and

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which may acquire a rational standing not indeed through any intrinsic claim to special authority but from the empirical success with which these feelings hold their own and are even strengthened as experience develops and becomes reflective. Meanwhile I am quite prepared to grant that this goes only a short way toward answering the questions that really count for most. If tolerance has its limits it still remains to settle what these limits are. In man's natural zeal for exercising the moral faculty against offenders this is a task that has been very imperfectly performed; and I am increasingly inclined to feel the importance of the problem that is set by the need for laying down the lines along which the impulse to moral censure can safely be indulged without passing over into self-righteousness and snobbery or becoming enslaved to catchwords. And in particular is this demanded when, as in the field of politics, denunciation allies itself with methods of coercion. But such a task would carry me far beyond the limits of the present essay.

NEW HAVEN

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

H. L. CHAO AND L. HO

I. INTRODUCTION

CHESTERTON once remarked:

> We think that for a landlady considering a lodger it is important to know his income, but still more important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy it is important to know the enemy's numbers, but still more important to know the enemy's philosophy.

If this remark is true, then it is by no means a futile attempt to portray the philosophical background of the Chinese Revolution, which has just reached a virtual, if not an actual conclusion and which has significance not only to China but also to the outside world.

Ever since the dawn of the Republic in 1911, China has been a land of revolutions. There have been so many political coup d'états, military engagements, economic crises, and social upheavals that any student of Chinese affairs is most likely to be pessimistically bewildered. Did not a certain cynical Japanese statesman point to Gibbon's *The Decline and Fall of Rome* when asked about the prospects of China? Now the Nationalists within a short span of two years have marched from Canton to Peking with amazing success. The recent cooperative spirit among the Nationalist leaders and the constructive program undertaken by the Nationalist government at Nanking compel us to inquire about the philosophical background of the Chinese Revolution.

II. MONARCHISM

Let us start with monarchism. Since the Chinese Republic is built on the ruins of the age-long monarchy, the voice of the *ancien régime* cannot die down all of a sudden. To be sure, it

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is very feeble now, but it still has its existence. For the sake of clarity, we may classify the monarchists into two groups, the superstitious and the intellectual. With the former group, the presence or the absence of the Chinese Emperor is the indubitable key to the political labyrinth of China. To their way of thinking, as soon as the "Son of Heaven" reappears on the dragon throne, all will be well. Their attitude is innocent and pathetic. They are sometimes hypnotized to such an extent as to believe in the rumor that in a certain far-distant, misty mountain there lives a youth of divine origin under the tutelage of the holy monks. Some day he will save China from her present turmoils. So they join hands to pray for his early appearance on the scene. All this signifies nothing less than the superstition of the ignorant mass. With the spread of popular education, their sincere belief will be shaken to its very foundation.

On the other hand, the intellectual monarchists were either prominent scholars or men of great prestige under the *ancien régime*. Kang Yu-Wei started the monarchical reform movement back in the nineteenth century; Wang Kuo-Wei tutored the last Manchu Emperor with his profound knowledge of antiquity; Ku Hung-Ming, the esoteric linguist, stood on his conservative ground to the last moment of his life; Cheng Shih-Yi, the noted classical poet, championed a lost cause with Stoic spirit. They all thought the republican revolution of 1911 was a great misfortune in view of the fact that the teeming population of China was accustomed to the age-long monarchical institution and totally unprepared for the Western political democracy. They conceded the necessity of progress and reform, but any appeal to sudden revolution as that of 1911 struck horror to their bleeding hearts. If the scale of political fortune had been in their favor, they would have proceeded to restore the Manchu monarchy, adopt the system of constitutional government, and declare Confucianism the state religion of China. They aimed to unify and pacify China by

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authority of monarchy, Confucianism, and other historic traditions of China. But the introduction of the Western democratic ideas was so rapid that their slender hold could hardly keep together the broken jar. It is no wonder that they became very unpopular and sought retreat in philosophy or suicide. However, we must not forget their contribution to the progress of China when they were considered as radicals some thirty years ago.

III. MILITARISM

Militarism is the next panacea upheld by many soldiers and politicians for the ills of China. They conceded the abolition of monarchy, but insisted upon the suppression of democracy. In the place of the bygone emperor, they would like to see the president or the generalissimo play the imperial game. They suppressed democracy on the ground that the professors and students should confine themselves to teaching and learning while the merchants, workers, and farmers should remain quietly at their jobs, instead of meddling with state affairs. Generals Tuan Chi-Jui, Wu Pei-Fu, Chang Tso-Lin, and Sun Chuan-Fang held the same view. They wanted to govern China by personal authority and unify China by military force. Sometimes they showed slight leanings toward constitutional government, but military control was their chief theme.

Alas! this military panacea has proved to be a dismal failure. The militarists themselves were often at cross-purposes. In dealing with foreign powers, they were none too competent. Sometimes for the sake of advantage in their internecine warfare, some of them invoked foreign aid unscrupulously. Moreover, the geographical barriers and the local prejudices were too much for their military prowess. So one militarist stumbled after another, leaving only a few trembling remnants in the midst of the revolutionary forces.

IV. LIBERALISM

Another prescription for the ills of China is liberalism. It is represented by those intellectuals who are acquainted more

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or less with the intellectual development of the Western world. Mr. Liang Chih-Chao and Dr. Hu Shih are the outstanding leaders. They teach their followers to cherish skepticism and think for themselves. They maintain the theory that the inculcation of the critical spirit into the mind of the Chinese students will pave the way for the renaissance in China. In the realm of politics, democracy is championed no less than individualism in education. As a result, the students have revolted against the old institutions and conventionalities. They have played a not insignificant rôle in Chinese politics at the expense of their scholarship.

The platform of the liberals is to unite China by peaceful methods because the racial and cultural unity of China, from their point of view, precludes the resort to brutal force. Once they proposed a program of what they called "good government" for China to be carried out by honest men toward a definite goal. Usually they lay special stress on education, which is practically under their guidance. In dealing with social problems, they are to be ranked with the guild socialists. Being broad-minded, they are more inclined to internationalism than to nationalism, with little sympathy for the bloody communists.

However, the critical spirit created by the liberals works as a boomerang against their efforts at organizing a political party to realize their attractive program. They are no less deficient in the arena of practical politics than they are efficient in the realm of literary and rhetorical excellence. After all, they have supplied but a negative force against oppressive authorities, and failed to realize the rosy dawn decried by them across the more sinister contour of the nearby landscape.

V. NATIONALISM

A new force working for the unification and independence of China is nationalism. It is introduced chiefly by the students returned from Europe and America, fed up with the attributes of the Western nationalism, jingoism, and chauvin-

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ism. Although akin to the first one of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's "Three-People Principles," yet they look askance at the much lauded principles of that great revolutionary leader as too impractical. They would rather import Kemal and Mussolini to lead the march of New China than participate in Sun's utopia.

Their program is to resist external aggressions and to purge the nation of its internal traitors, to seek no external aid, and to make no internal compromise. Russia to them is no less a menace than the other imperialistic powers. The bloody communists hatched by Russia's benevolence are no more welcome by these nationalists than the indigenous militarists. In short, they seek to unify China by inculcating the national sentiment in spite of the opposition of the internationally-minded elements.

VI. COMMUNISM

It is but natural that the internationally ostracized nation of Soviet Russia should have found an outlet in the Far East and joined hands with the Chinese revolutionists a few years ago. For a time, it seemed that the rising tide of Russian influence was to sweep away all the prestige of the other Powers in China. After the communists were admitted into the Kuo Ming Tang (the Nationalist Party led by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen), the revolutionary army was amazingly successful—marching from Canton in 1926 to Peking in 1928. Certainly the bloody communists should be given a great deal of credit for their rhetoric, propaganda, desperateness, and organizing genius especially with the lower stratum of the Chinese society—qualities accountable for the initial success of the revolutionary army. But as soon as the revolution was carried to the center of China, the communists became intolerable to the revolutionists. A sudden and complete split was the result.

The communists appealed to the toiling mass of workers and peasants to seize the factories and land with unscrupulous violence. They were not only uncompromising in thinking

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but also desperate in action. With the Russian gold in one hand and the ignorant mass on the other, they should have had a happy time had not the able general Chiang Kai-Shek, struck them with death blows rapidly and efficiently. As to their creed, Marxism, understood or rather misunderstood, is their source of faith; as to their friend, the dear Soviet Russia cannot be equaled by any other Power. They had a short millennium in Changsha, a secret plot in Peking, and an open revolt of three bloody days in Canton. After all, their strength of desperateness and unscrupulousness proved to be their weakness too. Besides the incompatibility of communism with the social and economic conditions in China, the Chinese mind characterized by moderation and temperance could not be recast in the communistic mold overnight. So communism failed dismally.

VII. SUN YAT-SENISM

The last but not the least is Sun Yat-Senism. After innumerable ups and downs in practical politics, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen came to realize that the popular prejudice against his political theory was built upon the old dogma: "To know is easy but to act is difficult." So he sought to reverse it with all his eloquence, and propounded the contrary theory: "To act is easy but to know is difficult." Any failure in action shows the lack of sound knowledge; with sound knowledge and vigorous action, success is near at hand. This is the line of reasoning Dr. Sun pursued. With his indomitable courage and eloquent tongue, he also sought to restore the self-confidence of the Chinese people by dispelling their inferiority complex through an appeal to history and anthropology. To his mind, every Chinese, whether leader or follower, theorist or man of practical affairs can play a useful part in the reconstruction of China.

As a revolutionary leader, he perceived the three necessary stages China must go through in her political reconstruction, namely, war, tutelage, and constitutionalism. The stage

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of war is inevitable in the process of overthrowing an *ancien régime,* the stage of tutelage for instructing the people in the art of government, and the last stage of constitutionalism for the welfare of the people. Now, two years after his death, the first stage seems to have ended, and the second stage is in operation under the dictatorship of his party, the Kuo Ming Tang. We hope his followers will not be dazzled by power and wealth so that China may not tarry too long on her way toward constitutional government.

Dr. Sun's political theory is embodied in sententious Chinese terms—the so-called Three-People Principles and Five-Power Constitution. Under the former heading there are (1) the People's Nation or Nationalism, (2) the People's Sovereignty or Democracy, and (3) the People's Living or Socialism. Under the latter heading, the Western tripartite powers of the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary are mixed with the Chinese double powers of examination and censorship. Judging by the present régime of party dictatorship (not party government) under the Kuo Ming Tang, the Five-Power theory of the great leader seems to have been forgotten by his staunch disciples.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing brief analysis of the philosophical background of the Chinese Revolution, we may conclude that the monarchists and militarists are like old dogs unable to play new tricks while the liberals and the nationalists espouse theories either too new or too foreign to suit the Chinese taste. As to the communists, their theory is too dangerous to be accepted by the Chinese people. Sun Yat-Senism, named after its great leader, couched in sententious terms and maintained by the victorious army, now reigns in China. It is practically a philosophical opportunism in the midst of revolutions capable of reflecting the spirit of the age and enlisting the largest number of followers.

NEW YORK CITY

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AN INDIAN POET LOOKS AT THE WEST

PERCY THOMAS FENN, JR.

THE fundamental problems of human life are much the same, wherever man dwells. To believe that Western thought is the reservoir of revealed truth is to betray something more than confidence in one's own heritage. Much is being written in these days concerning the necessity for co-operation between nations and for the regulation of commercial rivalry. One conference succeeds another on disarmament. Yet hostility and distrust remain. Lying across these discussions and hopes is the shadow of embattled moralities. The West can afford to learn. A great thinker, born of an ancient culture not yet mechanized, offers an idea now forgotten, that the spirit is greater than the machine.

Tagore's political views are conditioned by his philosophy.[1] His philosophy is rooted in the rich experiences of his youth. He was reared under the influence of the deeply religious spirit of his illustrious father, who combined discipline and inspiration with great activity. He looks back on this period as one of utter disorderliness. It is marked by an extreme sensitiveness which held him aloof from the world and gave him the attitude of an observer. He was acutely aware of the impact of sensations. They seem to have plunged him without discrimination into a chaos from which he was always engaged in extricating himself. Two great experiences need to be mentioned. The first one came when he suddenly and definitely perceived that universal life is beautiful and joyful. He discovered that this life is forever seeking expression, even

[1] The bulk of Tagore's doctrines will be found in his *Reminiscences, Personality, Sādhanā,* and *Nationalism. Stray Birds* is useful. His poems reveal most clearly the mystical and devout character of his spirit. In all of his works, the student must be on guard if he would penetrate his thought. The charm of Tagore's utterance and his felicitous use of figures of speech provide pitfalls for the unwary.

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in the most trivial ways. The conviction was born in him that the adjustment of the individual to the world involves oneness with this natural life. The second experience is marked by a longing to share the life of others, or to share life with others. This longing is realized when he overcomes his diffidence, for his developing sense of the unity of mankind operated to prevent preoccupation with his own emotional life. These two perceptions, then, took hold of him—the perception that joy and beauty are native to the world he was living in, and the perception of the natural bonds which unify all men. At length he was able to fuse them into a formula: "Reality is the expression of personality." This idea may be stated in this wise: Man is striving continuously to make two great adjustments, the adjustment of himself to society, and the adjustment of himself to the universe (or the will of the Supreme Being). The story of man's life and activity is the record of this dual effort. Tagore's teaching is the application and elaboration of these beliefs.

The political part of his philosophy may be traced directly back to this foundation. His arraignment of present-day nationalism is based on the conviction that it stultifies the personality. If it stultifies the personality, then it dulls and blunts man's perception of reality. This indictment is striking because he himself is what a Western man would call a patriot. Although the educated Indians of his youth were practically devoid of strong patriotic feeling, he was exposed to it in his family from his childhood up. At the age of fourteen he wrote a patriotic paper on the occasion of Lord Curzon's Delhi durbar. At one period of his youth his home was the meeting place of a group of enthusiastic and gifted young nationalists who were striving to inspire the renascence of today. Nationalism which is a deep and spiritual love of one's country, he feels, should be differentiated from that nationalism which is really soulless. It is the latter which is the object of his indictment.

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If Tagore's personal philosophy is the outgrowth of the conflicts and aspirations of his youth, that philosophy in turn is the standard by which he judges political life. The whole forms a religio-political body of teaching. Now the center of this teaching is the person, or, better, the personality. All living creatures feel their personality. Man and the animals have a common nature. But man has been able to develop science and philosophy because he has a surplus of knowledge over that which is necessary for the preservation of his life and the propagation of the race. Animals have not this surplus, and must consequently devote all of their knowledge to the useful purposes of existence. In like manner, man shares altruism with the animals. But he possesses a great deal more than is necessary to continue life. Upon this surplus he has founded his ethics. In a word, man's fund of emotional energy is not consumed by the labor of creating and sustaining life. Upon the vast residuum not so used, he has built his civilization.

It is apparent that Tagore regards the emotions as the creative forces of life. Thus reality becomes the expression of personality. Science does not deal with reality as it is here defined. The world of science is an abstract world of force. The world is really known only insofar as it is felt. It has attributes only in relation to one's personality. The world known to science can be apprehended and used by the aid of the intellect, but not by the emotions; it is not felt. The diamond, for example, has meaning for a person not because it is native carbon, but because it seems to him a precious stone and influences his emotions accordingly. In like manner, in the world of reality, a tree is a tree and not a formula. Taste can be realized only by tasting. Analytical treatment of the object tasted is futile in this vital respect. Science seeks an impersonal principle of unification; man seeks a personal one. The world, then, "takes its form in the mould of man's perception."

The personal principle of unification sought by man is to

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be found in the Supreme Being, the Supreme Person. The words are familiar to Western Christendom, but the meaning is foreign. To the intellectual Hindu, the Supreme Being is not a mind or spirit guiding the universe; he is the universe. Among the uneducated this belief takes the form of a deification of natural forces. Thus the relation of the individual to the universe is fundamentally a religious one, and is a striving for the realization of the oneness of his personality and that of the Supreme Person.

The statement that the world of science is an abstract world falls with a sense of shock on Western ears. Scientists work on the assumption that they are dealing with reality. The explanation of its meaning is to be found in this doctrine of the nature of the universe and of man's relation to it. It can be said that the psychological fact that an altered attitude of mind frequently makes a thing seem to change its properties is of greater personal significance than the fact that it is the mind which has changed and not the thing. To resolve the thing into its physical units would be to produce an abstraction with which the person has no perceptual experience, and, consequently, no emotional experience. But it is the world which is perceived, with which the individual enters into relations. It is this world which is real to him. This point is emphasized because Tagore stresses the concrete nature of the relation of the individual to the world.

The adjustments which this relation entails are made through the individual's own life, through his conduct of affairs, and through his institutions. The result at any given time is recorded in his civilization. But man has done more than this, and what he has done is difficult to describe. He has applied names to his institutions, as, for example, society, the state, war. He has summed up his operations with an idea, and has fallen under the influence of the concept. Tagore would regard these institutions objectively. To him they are ways and means. But man has come to regard them as organic

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things in themselves. He has endowed them with a life of their own. He has converted them into abstractions: society; state; nation; commerce; politics; war; church.

> In their amorphousness man is hidden and truth is blurred. The one vague idea of war covers a multitude of miseries from our sight, and obscures our sense of reality. . . . . The idea of society has created forms of slavery without number, which we tolerate simply because it has deadened our consciousness of the reality of the personal man. . . . . Everywhere in man's world the Supreme Person is suffering from the killing of the human reality by the imposition of the abstract.

At the bottom of Tagore's mind seems to be a fear that man is unfit to use the power his intellect has placed at his disposal. If the world is unknowable outside of our relationship to it, how important is the guide to that relationship! Truth deprived of its appearance loses the best part of its reality—then how great is the need for clear perception! Tagore places his hope in the religious instinct. From the beginning of history man has felt the touch of personality in the universe. A large part of his activity has gone into the weaving of legends and rituals, creeds and dogmas, to express his sense of contact with the Supreme Being. It is true that he has committed crimes in the name of religion which might test the ingenuity of hell for punishment. Yet he has never ceased his supplications. It may be objected that, if one is to judge by results, his prayers have not been effective. Tagore would probably reply that man is accustomed to follow his own desires until disaster overtakes him. Who is God, that he should pull man's chestnuts out of the fire?

Now, the civilization which man has created has in turn left its mark on him. Man is molded by his environment. To make this point clear, Tagore contrasts the effect which man's surroundings have had on him in the West and in the East. All modern civilizations, he says—and he includes that of the Greek city-state in this class—were cradled in bricks and mortar. They were born within city walls. The walls, divisive,

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bred exclusiveness, set up false distinctions, and made artificial barriers against other societies. Fear was engendered, and jealousy. The natural outcome of such a situation is the competition of one society with another, and war. And so it was. On the other hand, in the East, man was cradled in the forests. He depended on Nature for his shelter, his fuel, and his sustenance. Brought up in the closest contact with Nature, he was quick to study her, to seek harmony with her. India, and by implication, the East, has never lost the effects of her origin. The West would subdue Nature. The East would seek unity with Nature. The West sees a break between the world of things and the world of man. The East sees kinship and continuity. The scientific man of the West sees the interaction of natural forces. The Eastern seer finds an eternal will working and manifesting itself in these forces. For the one, the goal is conquest. For the other, it is the realization of the infinite. So potent is the influence on man of his surroundings.

It is the West, however, with which Tagore is concerned. He is frankly scandalized by the mess into which man has blundered, in this part of the world. As has been pointed out, man is living amid surroundings which intensify his darkness. Not only has he obscured his faculty of perception by the fog of his materialism: he has become a haunted soul, struggling desperately in the wreckage of his hopes. The reason for this state of things is not far to seek. It is to be found in the nation. The spirit of nationalism is the deceptive guide which has led men astray. Nationalism, Tagore feels, is the curse of modern civilization.

The nation, from this point of view, is the distortion of society, and not the fruition of it. Men organized in society have no ulterior purpose. Society is an end in itself. It is the expression of man's social spirit. It makes possible the regulation of the relationships of communal life. The nation is society organized for purposes which are ulterior to this end. Nationalism is the spirit of this organization. The transfor-

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mation of society in the nation is the result of an abnormal growth of the political power. This power is necessary for the regulation of social life. It is not evil in itself. But when it grows until it dominates the life of the society, then it can no longer be restrained within its proper sphere. It tends toward the control of the whole life of the society. The result is, that society becomes a machine, a wealth-producing mechanism. The lives of the individuals making up the transformed society are, of course, lost in the greater life of the nation. The moral man becomes the commercial man or the political man.

Material prosperity and power are the objects to be achieved by the machine. Commerce forms an alliance with politics. Rivalry with other nations results inevitably. Competition and struggle for the sources of wealth characterize the life of the nations. The mechanical, the mechanized spirit eliminates, if it cannot stultify the moral spirit, and reaches to the roots of life itself. Men have delivered themselves into the power of this abstraction, the nation. There can be no end to the evil train of cause and effect until comes either catastrophe or a new birth.

Men have delivered themselves. It is not that men have been gripped by some evil demon. They have blundered in their quest for reality. It is their own misdirected desires that have evoked the spirit of nationalism. The majority of nationals are either animated with a nervous fear of other machines, or else they are pridefully striving to make their own dominant in worldly power. Indeed, nationalism has, as it were, become a species of religion. As if the curtailment of his manhood were not enough, the national must raise his voice in a paean of praise "for the benignity of a mechanical apparatus in its interminable parody of providence."

Tagore is careful to distinguish between Western civilization and Western nationalism. The spirit of the former contains the real culture of the West. Western art and literature have true fertilizing power for all time in the soul of man. The

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tireless probing into the mysteries of the universe; the unceasing and self-sacrificing search for means to heal the sick and to lighten misery; the establishment of law and order in society; the study of the earth's soil for the purpose of increasing its yield of food-stuffs for the benefit of man—all these are the contribution of the spirit of Western civilization. They compel admiration. They are the efforts of a kindly and idealistic spirit, a spirit which still values the rights of man. It is a spirit which is still capable of being outraged by the rapacious acts of a predatory nation. As Tagore phrases it, the spirit of Western civilization moves in freedom; but the nation of the West forges iron chains of organization which fetter it.

What will the end be? The answer cannot be told. Today nationalism is dominant. The spirit of civilized culture is becoming, if it has not already become, its handmaid. Man is losing his ideals, though not the facile utterance of them. Humanity is poisoned at its source when a whole people is imbued with an overweening pride in its own superiority. On the other hand, the nation is overburdened with the load it has assumed, and it staggers under the weight. Yet it is driven on by its nature to increase the burden; it is driven by circumstances to attempt to outreach its rivals. It has undertaken a way of life in which there is too little room for adjustment. The West has manufactured an abnormality, and the world is haunted by the ghastly abstraction of the organizing man. He has achieved a "federation of steam boilers."

The way of life is to be found in a fresh grasp of truth. The World War has raised the veil from the face of nationalism. Henceforth man knows to what he has offered his soul. Nationalism must give way to a spirit of unity which is neither commercial nor political. There must be a moral spirit of combination. Reality remains today what it always has been, and what it ever must be, the expression of personality. The salvation of man lies in redirecting himself so that he may penetrate more deeply with the light of scientific knowledge into reality.

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After due allowance is made for his religious and social background, it cannot be said that Tagore's teaching contains much that is new. That is the reason why he is important. It would be difficult to find a more convincing demonstration of the profound ties which give a certain unity to Oriental and Occidental idealism. It may be said that generalities cover a multitude of differences. That is true; but the fact remains that an acquaintance with the *Upanishads* is not essential to the recognition of Tagore's main theses. Some knowledge of the New Testament, combined with an understanding of the past twenty-five years of European history, will serve very well.

Certain points may be noted. Tagore's estimate of nationalism as a machine finds support in Western orthodox economic theory. Graham Wallas attacks contemporary industrial life from the sociological and psychological points of view, as providing man with an environment to which his history has not adapted him. Professor Carleton J. H. Hayes years ago drew on his own account a close parallel between nationalism and religion, and has recently repeated it in his *Essays on Nationalism*. Tagore is at one with Bertrand Russell in the latter's protests in behalf of the individual, though at the opposite pole in his theory of the nature of the universe. He is not far from Krabbe, when he argues that an individual in society should not surrender his faculty of making a moral judgment of the rightness of a law. Tagore uses the word "Nation," with a capital "N," to express the idea which is carried in Western political philosophy by the word "State." The doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the State approximates the meaning of Tagore's conception of the abnormal growth of the political power of the Nation. Each notion involves the control of the life of the individual insofar as the needs of the State or Nation make it necessary. The two ideas are not on all fours, however, for the exaltation of the State is based on a metaphysical conception of the State as an organism, while for Tagore the Nation is a machine-like organiza-

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tion. Furthermore, the metaphysical theory holds that the life and will of the individual receive their supreme expression through the life and will of the State; but the teaching of Tagore is the exact reverse. By the word, society, Tagore seems to mean that organized group which in the West is popularly known as nation or people. It is a group occupying a definite geographical area and united by economic, ethnic, and cultural ties. Tagore's objective is the subordination of the political power within such a group to its own proper sphere. It is not clear exactly what this sphere is. If it implies the existence of other powers, each concerned with the regulation of a particular phase of the life of the group, then Tagore is indeed swimming in some of the most powerful currents of contemporary thought. One is reminded of the corporation theories of Gierke, Maitland, and Figgis, and of the pluralism of Laski and the Webbs.

The religious aspect of Tagore's theory is without a suggestive Western counterpart. Perhaps the Christian Socialist movement of the last century comes closest to his thought. For the last attempt to combine religious and political theory one has to go back to the Protestant Reformation, when the medieval doctrine that heresy is a form of treason still had staunch defenders. If modern religious organizations were interested in creating a new religio-political system, it is at least arguable that they would consider treason a form of heresy. During the last war, each state appropriated the Supreme Being. The churches seem to have given this effort their official approval. But it is impossible to do more than to indicate a tendency. Events seem to show that Tagore's conception is alien to the prevailing attitude of Western Christendom toward nationalism.

The doctrine of the self-determination of peoples, enunciated by the late Woodrow Wilson while he was president of the United States, bears obvious resemblances to the doctrine of Tagore. Seldom has a modern theory had more important

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percussions in the field of international relations. Events have shown that it can be readily used to destroy the very life it was designed to promote. It can be used to further the hot ambitions of peoples who are actually unfit for nationhood. It can be a powerful weapon in the hands of political power to justify an imperialistic policy. Or it can be confined within its original meaning—which is, of course, that a people possessing the requisite attributes of nationhood should be in fact, an autonomous and independent society.

Perhaps the fate of this famous doctrine is the best commentary on the teaching of Tagore and his like-minded followers, whether they be of the West or of the East. It is good that such things should be said. But only as man learns wisdom can they be translated into practice.

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EDUCATION FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

ROY FREDERICK SWIFT

I

THE guardians of the state, said Plato, should watch nothing more closely than the children "for what is in their souls." The best thought has always made the child central in education. In practice something else has usually had that place. In the struggle between the individual and the group it has been the individual who has been subordinated in a process usually conceived as one of adjustment. The concept of adjustment has proved to be a half-truth. Kropotkin has shown, what any one may observe, that survival even in nature is not the result of a "war of each against all," in which the ordeal by battle is the only test. Among animals, and to a greater extent among men, mutual aid is one of the decisive factors. Indeed some persons are so fortunately situated, merely by accident, that an effortless life is possible.

The order of physical nature itself is, perhaps, not such as to justify the view that life can exist only by successful adjustment to an alien environment. Professor Henderson seems to have shown that there is also fitness of the environment to life. In some sense provision has been made for the appearance of life in the very foundation stones of the physical universe. The universe is "bio-centric." It must, of course, be admitted that "niggardliness" is a prominent trait of nature, but it is an oversimplification of the problem to regard life as merely the adjustment of a plastic organism to a fixed and rigid physical environment. A valuable criticism of the concept of "adjustment" is given by Miss Follett in *Creative Experience*. Here it is shown that the concept is inadequate to describe the actual situation. Integration, creative synthesis

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is the form which successful solutions of problems of human relationships take.

The error of regarding education as a form of adjustment to a supposedly fixed order, either of nature or of society, is a very serious one. There is, in the first place, no such fixed order. Where there is order at all it is a changing one. As Professor Dewey has shown, the control and direction of the environment is of great importance. It is admitted that children must learn to meet successfully a world which they find and do not make, but the question is as to how they are to be best fitted to do this. Perhaps the chief pressure will always be toward accommodation to things as they are, but such an attitude, painfully comprehensible by anyone of experience, is nevertheless self-defeating. Neither vigorous intelligence nor ideal impulses can accept such a way of living as finally valid.

It is very natural that those who have adjusted matters to their own comfort should want others to keep their appointed places in the scheme of things as they are. Nor is it surprising that the doctrine of the self-determination of peoples is regarded by many as a vicious doctrine.

In spite, then, of all that has been said about the central position of the child in education, it is usually the child which is to be molded and adjusted to the environment, to nature, and to social structures. We have not reached the point of conceiving the education of the child as a creative synthesis, an integration of child nature and social structure. It is fitness of the child for social structures, not the fitness of social structure to the child which is the basis of practice, whatever the theory.

Much has been said, also, about the social character of education. The child needs to be "socialized," it is said. Very well, but this may mean many things, some of which are very undesirable. For one thing, it may mean the shaping of the child to fit some supposedly static order. The product usually desired is an individual formed after an external pattern—so-

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cial, economic, political—and not a pattern emerging from the interplay of individual and social nature. This has proved to be useful, apparently, in primitive groups and in static societies such as existed in China. But it has never succeeded in a modern individualistic society, certainly not in an age such as this into which we have drifted. The root of the desire for it is, at bottom, the distrust of intelligence.

It will not be acceptable, for there is no fixity or permanence in the modern social order. In a moving world real education is possible only by training in capacity for self-direction, and this makes necessary the control of social structures and their determination by rational ends of living. Without such adequate control of the environment, we can never be certain that the individual would remain adjusted to his world. He may thus be left stranded at any time, without the training which might enable him to adjust himself to the new order of things. In practice, little intelligent interest has been taken in this problem. In place of a rational philosophy of education, we would substitute a so-called empirical estimate of what people will be doing. Children, for example, may be expected to live in houses where electric fuses burn out. Train them, then, to replace fuses in such a contingency; determine all such prospective needs and we shall have the content of education. The child, it may be said, is then fitted for life.

A serious and not merely fanciful result of such a view of education and human need, if accepted, is that children of "working" parents, the so-called "laboring-class," will have their education defined in terms of a like vocational expectancy. This is not wholly irrational nor inexpedient, but the tendency is inevitably toward the arbitrary fixing of the future of the child. This is the more easily developed as a social and educational policy because of the interest of the employer class in the supply of labor. The pressure, therefore, to keep things as they are, to maintain the continuity of dominant interests in other things than labor supply, inevitably leads to

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the sacrifice of the child to a pre-established order, to an environment which is valued chiefly because it is the basis of the religion of things as they are for those who possess and control them. It seems not to have occurred to many that there is really no assuredly established "social order."

II

The rights of personality have been greatly advanced by education based on the free play of activity and imagination of the child. In contrast with the mechanical and intellectualistic view of education—the filling-station method—this is a great advancement. But fundamental as it is, no solution of this problem in modern society is possible which is confined to the child alone. The school would become and make children "consummate artificers of liberty," but, if this is to be done, the environment of the child must be humanly controlled in the interest of the individual. For, if the problem of social structures and institutional patterns is not included in the problem of the education of the child in freedom and self-activity, we shall have a nation of liberated youth with no place to go. If freedom and plasticity of child nature is accepted, then freedom and plasticity of social structure must also be accepted. This is the crux of the whole situation. For if social structures, the environment, is to remain outside the free movement of thought and activity, the problem of adjustment would only be aggravated.

It is difficult to see, then, how a philosophy of the education of the child can be dissociated from a philosophy of the environment, of social reconstruction. The newer ideas and practices in education will lead only into blind alleys for the individual unless it envisages the liberation of society as the natural correlate. If the child is to be freed and developed in an artificially created environment, such as the school often is, then suddenly thrown into the "real" environment—rigid structures both of institutions and ideas—it will have been

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done a doubtful service. In such a case it would perhaps have been better to have trained him to a hard and calculating mentality, such as he is to meet, to an unimaginative and insensitive nature. Things are, we are assured, what they are. If the child is trained in liberty, kindness, and sympathy; if made sensitive to truth and beauty, to fairness and justice, the problem of adjustment, in a world where "adjustment" is the solution, is made more difficult. At present sensitiveness, humanity, imaginative sympathy are in advance of effective intelligence. Youth is trained to an idealism which must, often at great moral cost, be speedily unlearned. He is trained to a knowledge and to freedom which are far in advance of social structure and custom, with little thought as to the successful remaking of those structures and customs. This in spite of the fact that real freedom is impossible without freedom to bring social institutions and individual nature into a creative synthesis. For it must, of course, be remembered as fundamental to the problem, that no such thing as freedom of personality is possible in a rigid and unyielding environment. This makes education for self-activity and the development of free play of imagination, important in itself as it is, inadequate for living. There must be a field for activity and materials for development.

III

This is not a new social experience. Perhaps it is the normal experience of every changing social order. The most notable example is that of Athens, because there it brought forth such a wealth of literary expression. Plato, knowing nothing of electric fuses, and being a philosopher besides, is not often considered important for modern education, yet his analysis of the problem of the education of the young might, with incidental alterations, have been written for today. He was confronted with essentially the same situation as confronts us. He saw clearly the hopelessness of freedom of activity of individuals without freedom, by those in authority, in molding

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social structures. Aristotle was in essential agreement with Plato in the importance attached to the influence of the environment, though he was complacent whereas Plato was afire.

Individualism and the breakdown of authoritative standards are characteristic of both ages. The demand in each case is for trained intelligence to deal with problems of human living. In both, education came to be largely the preparation for some special occupation. The Sophists furnished the professional and technical training of their day. In both cases education for public responsibilities and for character are neglected. In both the problem of the capacity of the individual for government is central. Plato thought a scientific knowledge of individuals would show them falling into distinct classes, and built upon this theory. His analysis was defective, but we accept, on the whole, the view, and are building upon the results of psychological methods of selection and classification. Plato was hasty in suggesting very far-reaching policies on the basis of his theory. It remains to be seen whether we also may not be too confident in our applications.

Plato was a radical in the true sense. He was a champion of free intelligence, placing it at times above law itself. He was profoundly discontented with the social order of his day, and suggested some radical changes. He was impressed by the influence of the environment and also by the importance of the rights of child nature. The educator, he thought, must deal with the environment as well as with the individual. He must, in fact, be a social philosopher. The problem of the *Republic* is, broadly stated, that of the good life. Its conditions were to be found primarily within human nature itself. If human life were lived on the highest level possible to human beings, this would be the good life. But this involved an accordant environment. To live on the highest level of human possibility demanded an outward social structure of a certain type. This was an absolute necessity, and it explains why

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Plato advocated such far-reaching reforms or changes in the institutions of society. Education was the "nurture" of the soul in accordance with "nature," and proper nurture required the right environment.

Two things in this conception of education may be noted. It was, for one thing, a training for some special work, or function, the education of the individual to do what he by nature was best fitted to do well. We are giving much attention to this phase of education today. We are even trying to determine what each is fitted to do, although there is a tendency to base the type of education which the child is to be given upon the class of society to which he belongs. The conception today is somewhat narrow and is defined largely by reference to the mere matter of making a living. It may be remarked here that even though we state this view broadly it is susceptible of serious social implications, and especially is it easy to become involved in preconceptions of social status, as seems to have been the case with Plato. It is difficult to keep separate the doing of a thing because one is by nature fitted to do it, and doing it because, as a member of a class, *belonging* to a certain class, one may be supposed to do this rather than something else. Given the doctrine that people naturally fall into the social and economic status which it is their "nature" to do, selection by guidance of an "invisible hand," it is easy to draw inferences of great social importance.

Another aspect of this view of education, with which we are more especially concerned here, is that the individual in early life should be given those fundamental attitudes and feelings which should determine his character. The child would thus be given a bent toward those forms of conduct and those ideals which he would afterward find to be the rational ends and modes of living. Through habituation and imitation the child was to learn to "hate the evil and love the good." This was to take place before the child could know the reason for it. Plato wrote:

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. . . . Let them imitate from very childhood whatever is proper to their professions—brave, sober, religious, honorable men, and the like —but meanness, and every other kind of baseness, let them neither practice nor be skilled to imitate, lest from the imitation they be infected with the reality. For have you not observed that imitations, whether of bodily gesture, tones of voice, or modes of thought, if they be persevered in from an early age, are apt to grow into habits and a second nature? [*Rep.* 395·]

The environment is thus of basic importance. The child

will commend beautiful objects and gladly receive them into his soul, and feed upon them, and grow to be noble and good; whereas he will rightly censure and hate all repulsive objects, even in his childhood, before he is able to be reasoned with, and when reason comes, he will welcome her most cordially who can recognize her by the instinct of relationship, and because he has been thus nurtured [*Rep.* 401].

As indicated above, Aristotle shared this view with Plato. "Hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; for this is the right education" (*Eth. Nic.* 1104b).

It may be said, however, that this is not the function of education, at least not of school education. Yet this is a crucial point. For Plato it was the function, not only of education, but of government and legislation to produce this result. The government, indeed, was an educational institution, in his view. It is such in fact with us, but we do not think of it in this way. Hence do not take account of determining influences upon the child. Perhaps no other influence is of so great importance in shaping the individual as the influence of government.

The same difference in standpoint is revealed in the attitude toward law. Laws to us are for the most part merely regulative enactments. They are made and unmade, amended and ignored. They are largely external and often arbitrary. Most laws now being enacted are mere administrative measures. To Plato the most important thing about a constitution

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or law was the preamble, and this was designed to persuade the mind, to give it a rational basis in action. Had Plato written the Prohibition Amendment, he would have thought the most important thing would be the preamble which would have been designed to persuade the mind of the citizen and lead to the acceptance of the law. Law should, therefore, have the power of attraction, not simply that of compulsion.

There are dangers in this view and nothing reveals the heart of our problem today so clearly as our uncertainty as to its truth. Plato himself believed that citizens should be "consummate artificers of liberty for the State," but the means for the achievement of this which he advocated seem to us, no doubt, somewhat arbitrary and often mistaken. We are uncertain, not only as to the means, but as to the principle itself. Doubt, however, as to whether the child mind should be molded cannot obscure the obvious fact that just this does happen. We cannot prevent it if we would. But we do not know how to regulate or direct it. We may wish to be rationalists but do not know how to substitute reason for imitation. It seems evident today that there is failure in the proper habituation of the child in right action and in the provision of proper forms or patterns for the child to imitate. We cannot present satisfactory environmental patterns, unequivocal ideals, and standards of conduct. We do not possess them nor do we know what they should be. We lack a social and political philosophy, to say nothing of a philosophy of life.

To Plato, the determination of all this was the function of the statesman. It seems that for him the education of the masses was not to go beyond that indicated in the foregoing quotations. Their character and conduct were to be determined by participation in a received tradition. But someone had to understand, to grasp the basic principles of the whole situation. Hence the philosopher-king. Thus was raised most sharply the problem of democracy. It may be doubted whether we do better. In so far as we recognize this problem at all, we divide the function among several types of "guardians,"

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teachers, clergymen, and parents, who in fact do not agree upon principles or policies. For the most part the "statesman" is one who is charged with the duty of protecting and forwarding certain of our interests, often conceived as class or specialized interests, and above all business interests. Plato held that the statesman was to have genuine scientific knowledge, not the knowledge of opinion, the politician's intuition, "which is in politics what divination is in religion," but knowledge grounded and reasoned. He was to know what human nature is and what it is capable of becoming, and how society must be organized in order to bring it to its highest reaches. It may be discouraging to have to wait until "political greatness and wisdom meet in one" before cities "cease from ill," but it may also be necessary.

The environment today, with its institutions, activities, and stimuli, does mold the minds of the young. What are those patterns after which they are now fashioned? They exist in a confused variety—this is the most serious aspect of the problem—the conflicting variety and the consequent confusion. How may the young arrive at synthesis, integration, wholeness in contemporary society? They get no unified impression from their environment.

The inclusive and authoritative ideals and standards, patterns of action and of feeling, through processes which need not be discussed here, have largely disintegrated. We have no received traditions. This has released individual impulses in all the confused diversity of their wild and untamed nature, impulses which normally would be directed toward definite objects and pursuits. The world into which the child enters has lost its centrality. This is reason enough why the child is not made the center—there is no center. The life of the child is a variety of relatively independent and dispersed activities in the community. This multiplicity and diversity of life is presented to the mind in the moving-picture, in the newspaper, and in numerous activities in school and community life.

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How are the young to respond to this welter of impressions and build an integrated life and character? Human nature has only an uncertain and weak principle of integration in itself, and the environment offers no principle of integration. In its independent and isolated variety it merely stimulates the naturally anarchic tendencies of man's original nature. As the young see before them the varying patterns—the ideals of the family, if the family be so fortunate as to have well-defined ideals; the ideals of the school, which may conflict with those of the home, as in the attitude toward cheating; the practices of politics, in the church, the community, the nation, and among nations; the emphasis of the newspaper and the moving-picture—with all this mass of diverse impressions, how shall the young learn to order their lives in any consistent manner?

They cannot do so, it would appear, by listening to their elders. For their elders are likewise victims of the same disorganization and multiplicity. They themselves have no unambiguous and integrating ideals or authoritative principles. They feel more or less vaguely, sometimes strongly, however, that things are upset, but they are, for the most part, helpless. The world is not only "too much with them," it is also "too much for them." It has become the fashion to take a "short and easy way" with the problem by observing generously enough that the young have always gone their own way, that they have always done about the same things, and that, on the whole, they have come out well. But this is not a very deep and exact analysis of the situation. It is, of course, an interesting attitude. It shows, for one thing, the dominance of the point of view of youth over that of adults. Children were formerly afraid to criticize their elders, now the elders fear to criticize the young. But more important, the elders are uncertain, confused, conscious of ignorance. Doubtless this is a wholesome spiritual state for the elders, but not necessarily

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so for the young. In any case, the young are left to their own devices in making selections almost wholly without education in the capacity for self-guidance. Everyone is to live his own life, without, however, having learned to do so.

It is clear that it is important to develop, by some means, habits and tastes in the young which will have some degree of determining influence upon judgment. Education in this respect is almost wholly neglected. Moreover, it seems equally clear that this cannot be effected without the control and, if necessary, the will and capacity to reconstruct the environmental patterns which confront the young. At present our chief thought is directed toward the mastery of the physical forces of nature and the fitting of the individual for things as they are. But this type of education leaves the child helpless against the forces of imitation and suggestion. If the same constructive attitude were taken toward the mastery and direction of social forces and institutions, the problem would at least be defined.

The application of free intelligence to the social order has often been advocated. Having achieved great results in the realm of physical nature, it is felt by some that we should turn our attention to a like mastery of human nature. There are real difficulties here, however. For free intelligence is necessarily a radical force, and we may see today the reaction toward conservatism at the mere suggestion of its use. For the freeing of intelligence seems to lead to the tentative rejection of those forms and structures of tradition which are the authoritative patterns in molding the mind of the young. Or perhaps it happens the other way around. This does not matter. What matters is that there is not only doubt as to whether traditional ideals should be used at all, but there is the problem of selection and the method of inculcating those ideals so far as there is confidence in their use at all.

The emphasis is often now being placed upon training in reflective thinking. We are in effect saying to the young, here

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is your world in the raw. You must deal with it as you can. We shall help you to learn to think, but you must rely upon your own critical and reflective powers. This seems, on the face of it, valid, and perhaps is the only consistent attitude. Will it be effective? We cannot ignore the fact that it is placing a great burden upon the minds of the young, and we may well doubt whether it may not be an unconscious shifting of responsibility. Is it possible for the older generation to escape the duty of exercising an authoritative control over the growing mind? Are we, therefore, giving the young a fair chance? Thinking after all does not go on in a vacuum, content and structure are necessary. Judgment may be determined by character, by habits, and by tastes. Thus we seem driven back to an old and ultimate question—the nature and existence of objective structures—a question which Plato did not avoid but also perhaps failed to answer satisfactorily.

This problem is one which we refuse to face. We want no metaphysics, no ultimates, no absolutes, no fixtures of any kind. All our resources are to be applied to special research, the great search having proved futile—or is it only out of fashion? We may read of the making of mind. Are we then to cease making minds and learn only how they have been made? Meanwhile minds are being made, mis-made, and un-made, and the consequences will furnish generations to come many research problems, if not matter for reflection.

The minimum of obligation which age owes to youth would seem to be wise habituation, sane emotional education, well-defined attitudes, balanced judgment, and humane and civilized tastes. These are not being given by present commercialized art through which life is presented to the child mind. It is admitted that the moving-picture and the newspaper, for example, give a distorted view of life, but we do not know what a true picture would be. We could rule out certain things, no doubt. Moreover, there is the question of censorship. Do we want to present a selected picture to the child or

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should we rely on teaching him how to think and let him be the judge? Shall we expose the mind to everything which someone finds it profitable to offer? There are many things which we cannot censure; Public Opinion, that Great Sophist, is immune from criticism. It is impossible, however, to escape the fact that life and mind cannot be formed without some kind of pattern, some standard, or standards. We cannot rely upon either taste or judgment and at the same time reject the view that the conditions of these should not be given the child.

Is it possible to escape, in the last analysis, the question of whether there are in fact standards, truths, and ideals which are authoritative for human living? Plato thought that there are, that beauty, truth, justice are essential and eternal forms of reality. He believed in objectively real standards and patterns for human life. The modern world either does not think there are such, or does not know what to think. It may be thought that this is too much to expect, that an authoritative philosophy of life is impossible. Or it may be said that, if we had such an authoritative philosophy or standards, the imposition of them would bring back the old tyranny. Perhaps it would. But perhaps we must choose—or can we after all choose? Has it come to that?

It may be that there are no fixed structures which determine the form which life must take. It appears to be true, however, that the general drift of things will continue, that national culture is a compelling force and not to be produced magically; there are elements of which account must be taken. It may be doubted whether in view of this, it is quite fair to encourage youth to believe that they may remake the world. Creative thinking, even reflection is a notable achievement. But there are conditions, recalcitrant material in human beings, in ideas, customs, and institutions. No people is without its *ethos,* a relatively definite and permanent character. Even America has its traditions, though some may have the appear-

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ance of hardened goodness. The destiny of a people is not manifest, but it may not be wholly ignored.

There are, then, no unconditioned choices. A genuinely functional philosophy of man and society must grow up out of this relatively permanent nature. Freedom to live and to change, both ourselves and social structure, is restricted. Our most limited task would appear to be, not necessarily indeed the determination of the essential form of the ideal individual in the ideal society, but rather the essential form of our own character as a people. Just as the effective virtue of the individual is dependent upon finding the appropriate form of activity for him, so that of a people depends upon finding the appropriate social structures through which "natural" forms of activity may be expressed.

What are we, then, as a people? There may be other ways of getting at this reality, ill-defined and imperfectly realized though it is, but one way is to recall to ourselves the ideals and the purposes formulated in the preamble to the Constitution and in the great utterances of the nation's leaders, especially those of Lincoln. In these we have presented clearly and earnestly what may be called the democratic way of life, a genuine philosophy of humanism. To this way of life the nation has been more than once dedicated. Its essential meaning is that whatever the good life may be, *it is for all.* It will be necessary, however, to give concrete content to this ideal in accordance with the changed order of life. The purpose of the nation, as stated in the Preamble, is in part to establish justice, promote the welfare of all, and to secure the blessings of liberty and happiness to ourselves and our posterity. Two difficulties confront us here. Modern industrial and urban society make it necessary to define welfare, liberty, and happiness anew. Freedom of contract, for example, is a very different thing now from what it was a century ago. Moreover, it is necessary to become concerned with fundamental principles and with the philosophy of our government and institutions.

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The provisions of the Constitution itself were meant to carry out the purposes stated in the Preamble. The Preamble itself, however, has been forgotten in the attempt to interpret the special provisions. Instead of reading clauses in the light of the purposes enumerated in the Preamble the tendency has been to read them in the light of special interests and current or traditional economic doctrines.

It is clear that we are losing our essential freedom, largely, perhaps, because freedom is no longer a living thing and conscious purpose of the people, and because this purpose has been lost in the multitude of its specialized interests. It is necessary, therefore, to define anew the essential meaning of what we as a nation are and what we value and purpose to bring to pass. This must be made a conscious possession of the individual citizen. We need to interpret ourselves to our own past and define our future in the light of this. Appeals to respect the Constitution are not what is needed.

This definition of national character should be the pattern consistently held before the young. Thus we should have a criterion for the judgment of the innumerable and nondescript patterns now confronting them. Education would be an integration based upon values and traditions. This would also give a standard for social reconstruction. Desired changes would appear then as a matter of loyalty to civic and cultural realities, and not as attempts to take from some in order to give to others, as is often the case now. For at present the motive of reconstruction is largely a reaction to specific and sometimes, perhaps, transitory situations which affect special classes, and are, consequently, methods of adjustment not of integration.

This would aid rather than aggravate the problem of nationalism. What is bad in nationalism is not the preservation of a people's culture, but rather the unwise assertion of interests which develop in the process of adjustment of demands. The maintenance of the integrity of the nation is the basic

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thing. Conflicts of "interests," whether of individuals or nations, may have no relation to character. Nations seldom go to war in response to the demand of the nation's character, but of some impulse or isolated demand, often of a class. In such cases action is based upon ignorance. To know, therefore, what we are as a nation is the basic condition of rational action.

The genius of America is certainly not that of timorous adjustment to a fixed order, but rather that of free activity and creative achievement. The conquest of a continent and the creation of great and free institutions such as the public school has been a great triumph of the human spirit. It would seem, however, that we are entering a new era in which the civilization which is the product of that effort has begun to weigh heavily upon us, and the free movement of life tends to become congealed. Life is more and more a problem of the individual finding his place in a system of social and economic structures—a matter of adjustment. With this comes the loss of freedom of thought and action; "shades of the prison house" have begun to close in upon the growing nation. If this, the common experience of older civilizations, is not to be our fate, it is necessary that the untrammeled spirit and creative effort of the pioneer, both in individual and social constructiveness, become once more the possession of the young. To define the character of our people and to make it a self-conscious possession is the obligation of intellectual leaders, and is a common undertaking. It might well be a formal, co-operative undertaking.

ROCKFORD COLLEGE

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CHEATING AS SEEN BY COLLEGE STUDENTS

THOMAS M. CARTER

THIS article is a partial[1] report of the mental reactions of 443 college students to a problem calling for ethical discrimination and judgment. The students were those whom the writer has had in classes in education and psychology at Albion College during a period of four years. Most of the students were Juniors and Seniors. The data were secured in the following manner: A situation or problem involving cheating in examination was presented to the students. Relative to this problem certain pivotal questions were asked. The problem and the questions relating thereto remained constant. The problem was as follows:

"Two students sitting in close proximity to each other answered the same questions in three successive examinations in the same manner. Where a mistake occurred in one it occurred also in the other."

Five questions were asked relative to the problem: (1) What is sufficient evidence to justify a professor in suspecting cheating? (2) What should a professor do when he suspects cheating? (3) What should be done with the parties involved in the act? (4) Should cheating be considered on a plane equal to that of stealing money? (5) What are the motives that lead students to cheat?

Replies to only the last three questions are dealt with in this article, since little or nothing relative to the ethical concepts of college students are to be found in the replies to the first two questions which are not found in replies to the last three.

In compiling the data it was found that not nearly all the

[1] A complete report of the investigation appeared in the *Phi Delta Kappan*, June, 1928.

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students gave usable answers to each of the questions. Some students did not answer certain questions at all. Others gave answers which were incoherent or otherwise so defective that their meaning was not clear.

In reporting it seems quite necessary to take certain liberties with the language used by the students. To repeat all the replies of the students, word for word, would unduly lengthen the report. There was much diversity of language used to express the same idea and there was considerable overlapping of expressions used to convey different ideas. However, a careful study of the replies revealed the fact that they could be grouped into a few large categories without doing great violence either to the language or the thought contained in the answers. Indeed, much of the language in the report is the language of the students.

Question.—"Assuming that you were the teacher and that cheating on the part of a student had been proved beyond a doubt, what would be your procedure?" To this question 233 students gave usable answers. Fourteen students would instigate discussion to get an expression of the class opinion in relation to this matter. In their judgment such an expression of class sentiment against cheating and against those who practice it would, more than anything else, serve to abolish cheating. A student fears the disapproval of his classmates and will consider well the results of openly defying any law, although unwritten, which will arouse the disapproval of his fellows.

Thirty-seven students suggested conference. Twelve of these would confer with both parties involved and reprimand each of them. They reasoned as follows: The conference should impress the copier and the one from whom he copied with the seriousness of the act and with the effect such acts have on the morale of the class. The one who allowed the copying shoud be made to feel that he is as guilty as the one who copied, for in this respect a passive attitude toward cheating is to be condemned as much as the active. The instructor

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should make each one feel his personal responsibility in relation to the morale and morals of the class and of the school as a whole. Twenty-five were of the opinion that the conference should be held with the copier only. They suggested that while the conference be partly in the nature of a reprimand, something should be done by the instructor to encourage and aid the offender. They reasoned that the instructor should make the offender feel that the act might be rectified by future conduct. Knowledge of the conference should not be divulged to the other students and the instructor should promise future secrecy in the matter. It is a personal matter between the instructor and the offender. By such private conferences the instructor may come nearer to the real cause of the action and may receive a better foundation for dealing with such cases in a way so that constructive results will accrue. These students would give the offender a second chance with no penalty attached to the first offense. They reasoned as follows: The practice may not be habitual and may be easily remedied by such measures as suggested above, thus securing an admirable moral triumph in the life of the student. Harsher measures may do more harm than good by resulting in discouragement and disgrace. Such measures may prevent cheating; however, they do so by setting up external inhibitions but they build no internal inhibitions. They may make the individual afraid to do evil but they do not make him love righteousness. The harsher methods may breed a resentment in the life of the individual which may be retained and allowed to grow until it breaks out in open defiance of authority though from an entirely different angle than that of cheating in classes.

Fifty-eight students suggested loss of credit. Of this number, twelve were of the opinion that both the copier and the one from whom copying is done should lose credit in the course. They reasoned as follows: The one who allows his work to be copied is as guilty as the one who actually copied. Punishment of both offenders would be a severe warning to the other mem-

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bers of the class and would put all on a definite lookout for cheaters. The one from whom copying is done may have encouraged the other to copy due to the impression that to be copied is an act flattering to himself. Twenty-two students suggested that the copier be forced to take another examination or do some other sort of extra work as a disciplinary measure.

Three students would require an apology to the class. In their opinion such a public confession and apology would be good for the confessor and would serve as a warning to others who might be tempted to cheat.

Thirty students would refer the matter to the student council and allow that body to deal with the matter according to the rules regulating such matters. They reasoned as follows: Students know of the prevailing rules of the institutions and if they break such rules they should suffer the consequences. Unless the rules are employed in all such cases, they will soon cease to be regarded. In the hands of the student council all cases would be disposed of fairly with no opportunity for prejudice to play a part.

Sixteen students would refer the matter to the disciplinary committee with the understanding that the student be summarily dismissed. They gave as their reasons for so doing that such a person has an evil effect on the spirit of the class and upon the student body as a whole, and should not be tolerated by the institution. If the student is getting his work by unfair methods, presence in the classroom will be of no benefit to him, and for that reason there is nothing to be gained by allowing him to remain at college. Against the idea of dismissal were found the following arguments: It is a confession on the part of the institution of its inability to handle moral problems. The institution thereby admits that it has the capacity to deal only with those who are already morally perfect. Such a procedure has no corrective value. It merely passes the responsibility on to someone else, and to what authority should

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the college look for more competency than it can or should find within itself? If the responsibility is passed on to others, it will fall into hands which are already fuller than the hands of the college authorities.

Question.—"Do you think cheating in examinations is of the same moral or immoral quality as stealing money and ought to be so looked upon? Explain." Only 147 students gave usable answers to this question. Of this number sixty-one said they considered the two acts equally immoral. They reasoned as follows: Cheating and stealing money are both done for the same purpose; namely, personal gain which one has not earned. Anyone who cheats in examination will steal money if he thinks he can get away with it as easily. The only difference in the two is the material stolen, but the principle is the same. In one case one is stealing money and in the other ideas. Information, like money, has been obtained at the cost of some labor by the one who possesses it and belongs to no one else. If one wants that which money will purchase, there is as much justification for his stealing the wherewithal to buy it as there is justification for stealing the wherewithal to buy college credit.

Ten students said that cheating was less defensible than stealing money. They gave as reasons for their contention the following: Where the rank method of grading is used, the student who copies cheats not only the one from whom he copies, as would be the case in stealing money, but he steals from the whole class. He makes the class average higher and thus lowers the individual mark of those who are honest. One who cheats in class not only steals but also practices deception. He poses as possessing qualities which he does not have. The one who steals money may not pose as an honest man.

Six students answered "yes" and "no." "Yes," for students who make it a habit in all their examinations all the time, and "no" for students who do a little cheating now and then in subjects which they are required to take and in which

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they have no interest. Wrong comes when one does not put forth honest effort but relies upon cheating entirely.

Seventy students answered "no," meaning that they did not consider cheating in examination comparable to stealing money. They gave as their reasons for so thinking the following: Many people have gone through school and have cheated more or less on examinations, but they have gone out into the world and have made fine business and professional men, and the idea of stealing money has never occurred to them. When one steals money he is thereby taking away another man's earnings from him, whereas if he cheats in examination, he may be taking something from another man but the possessions of the one from whom it is taken are not lessened. In cheating in examination one harms no one but himself. If he wants to get through college that way, it is his own affair. If he steals money, the one from whom it is stolen is the loser. Stealing money is usually premeditated while cheating in examination is not. When one cheats in examination he does not do it with the idea of its being seriously immoral. If cheating were as rigidly condemned by society as stealing money, then cheating would be a more serious moral weakness than it is now. Examinations tend to produce a state of excitement, and frequently the student becomes panicky so that things which are quite familiar seem to have escaped, and he feels that under such conditions he cannot do himself justice in the examination. He feels that if he had a wee suggestion from someone else, it woud be sufficient to restore the train of association and then he would have a fair chance. Under such conditions cheating might be thought of as on a plane with embezzlement but not comparable to stealing.

Question.—"Assuming that some students in college do cheat in examinations, what in your judgment is the dominant motive for so doing?" In answering this question students were told to put down as many reasons as they could think of, but if they could think of more than one, they should indicate

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the one which in their judgment operated the most frequently and the most powerfully. By such methods we were able to secure usable answers from each of the 443 students.

Eighty-five students mentioned fear of not passing as the dominant cause for cheating in examination. Fear of not passing is itself a result as well as a cause. Some unpleasantness dreaded by the students must adhere to the phenomenon of not passing or else it woud hold no terrors for those to whom it might come. Of the eighty-five students thirty-eight specified the fear of humiliation, as being unable to graduate with their class, as being the dominant motive. They said in effect that the student knows that he cannot afford the time to repeat the course nor lose the credit resulting from failure in a course. He knows that failure in even one course will so lower his scholastic average that he will not be allowed to carry an extra load to make up the work; hence, he must cheat, and by that method pass or else lose step with his fellow-classmen.

Nineteen students said that fear of displeasing parents or those responsible for their education was, in their judgment, the dominant cause of cheating.

Ten students said that the fear of being thought of as stupid was, in their judgment, the biggest factor in leading students to cheat.

Thirteen students were of the opinion that fear of losing certain social privileges which would follow being expelled or even put on probation was the dominant cause leading students to cheat in examinations.

Three students put forth the idea that the fear of displeasing or losing the good opinion of their professor, whom they had come to regard highly, most often led to the practice of cheating in examination.

Two students said that the cause of cheating was most frequently a lack of courage to face squarely the facts when one really knows himself to be too dull and incompetent to pass the examination.

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Ninety-seven students designated the desire for higher grades as the most dominant motive for cheating in examination. The desire for higher grades appears, at first, to be the fear of not passing stated in a different way. But, as brought out by the students, a desire for higher grades affects a different group of students and a somewhat different motive is at work. Here, higher than passing grades are sought for the sake of the privileges which are purchased by high grades. Some of the privileges so obtained are the following: Eligibility to compete in interscholastic activities; eligibility for election to departmental clubs; ability to please their parents, who, in addition to extending their favor, may have offered desirable rewards for high grades. The parents may have even offered continuance in college on condition that a certain scholastic average was maintained.

Thirteen students mentioned a desire for higher grades in order to make fraternities and sororities as the dominant motive for cheating. Ten students said that a desire to help the standing of the fraternity or sorority of which students were already members most frequently led to the practice of dishonesty in examinations. Eleven students mentioned the instinct of rivalry, a desire to surpass one's classmates, as a motive powerful enough to lead many students to cheat in examination, and that in their opinion this motive most frequently led students to be dishonest in their work. Six students even mentioned patriotism or loyalty to the college as the dominant motive for cheating. They explained that such students wished their college to maintain a high scholastic average.

Laziness or unwillingness to put forth the necessary effort to do satisfactory work. This was designated as the dominant motive by eighty-three students. Cheating was the line of least resistance. It is easier for some students to cheat than it is to work. Such students neglect their work from day to day and hence come to the examination unprepared to pass a respectable examination. Such students prefer to remain in col-

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lege because of certain opportunities which college life offers; therefore, the only way to meet the emergency is to cheat in their examinations.

Lack of proper ethical and moral standards. This cause was mentioned by fifty-five students. Of this fifty-five there were twenty-two who said that the cause for this lack of moral discrimination and plasticity of conscience rested upon failure in the home training. There were eighteen other students who attributed this moral laxity to improper school training or improper conditions in the school. These students were of the opinion that, in the overcrowded conditions in the schools of today, many pupils gradually acquire the habit of cheating without any intention of doing a thing that is wrong. Under such circumstances a pupil may carelessly glance at another pupil's work and, by so doing, acquire just the suggestion he needs. Half thinking that the idea is his own, he uses it. Such an act brought desirable objective consequences without arousing much, if any, subjective disturbance in the form of compunction of conscience. Thus, little by little, over a period of years, a habit of cheating is built up without the individual being aware that his conduct is in any way unacceptable. Another group of fifteen students were of the opinion that the lack of moral standards sufficient to prevent the practice of cheating could be traced to the belief of college students that "everybody does it." Such conceptions lead students to believe it is not seriously looked upon by fellow-students or else it would not be so generally practiced. Since he has been told that morality is determined by custom or group sanction he cannot see cheating in examination as something that is very seriously immoral even though the practice might go counter to the teaching of a few professional moralists who are paid for their moralizing. Such a student may have an aversion to reacting dishonestly under different conditions, but follows the assumption that "while in Rome" he should or at least

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may "do as the Romans do" and yet stay within the rules of propriety.

Thirty-five students would shift the responsibility from their own shoulders and make the professors liable for any cheating that occurred. They said that the students cheated because they disliked or had no particular respect for the professors in whose examinations they cheated. Such dislike might spring from one or more of a number of immediate causes: (1) The instructor may be too exacting and unreasonable in the amount of work assigned throughout the entire course. (2) He may administer unfair examinations; that is, the questions may deal with matters which, in the judgment of the students, are of minor importance. Thus the students may be in possession of the major issues covered by the course and yet be able, by honest methods, to answer but few of the examination questions. The students do not see why they should suffer because of the incompetence of the professor; hence, they resort to a general pooling of information and by such means answer a respectable number of the professor's questions even though by so doing they may be indulging in practices which are technically called cheating. (3) The examinations may be too hard, considering the type of work called for day by day. (4) It may be the inability of the professor to teach the course so that the major lines of thought are made clear. (5) Again, cheating is more likely to take place in classes where there has been poor order and little attention throughout the semester. This lack of attention is due to the inability of the professor to teach or lecture in an interesting manner.

A group of thirty-four students mentioned nervousness due to the examination situation as the chief cause for cheating in examination. Of this number twenty students explained cheating as a result of nervousness by saying, in effect, that the students under such conditions lost confidence in their own preparation and in their desperation would trust the knowledge of another student even though the knowledge of the

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latter might be, in reality, less ample and less reliable than their own. Another group of fourteen students explained the effects of nervousness as operating to prevent the student from being able to recall many things which had been thoroughly learned. Though unable to recall, a student might be able to recognize the true from the false when either or both were presented to the senses. Thus such a student would rely upon his neighbors for cues hardly conscious that he was doing anything wrong.

There were thirteen students who believed that too much emphasis placed upon marks, rather than on effort or actual learning in the form of human adaptations, was the chief cause for cheating in examination. Such students feel that though marks obtained largely through examination make up the currency of most educational institutions, they are not true symbols of educational achievements and that often an individual must neglect the pursuits that will bring him success in examination in order to follow lines which are really educative. Thus a student, while technically cheating, does not feel that he is doing anything wrong since by so doing he is only combating a system which he conceives to be wrong.

Eleven students said that in their opinion students cheat primarily because they think it is clever to do so. Even if they were or are capable of doing otherwise they would cheat merely for the thrill of it. They get the same sort of pleasure from cheating in examinations that a kleptomaniac gets from theft.

Another cause, closely related to the one just mentioned and also similar to "group sanction" and "incompetency of the professors" and still having some individuality of its own, is one which was mentioned by ten students and may be termed as a feeling of a lack of a community of interest on the part of students and professors. The students feel that somehow the students and faculty are arrayed against each other. To serve the interest of one is to play traitor to the other group. The student feels that if he can cheat and get away with it, he is scoring one on the faculty and in favor of the students and

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even if he is caught in the act, he will nevertheless have the sympathy of the students and will not have done anything that will call forth the disapproval of the group to which he belongs.

In the opinion of eight students pressure of outside interests is the main cause for cheating. A bright individual and a hard worker may have become so overloaded in work with clubs, societies, and athletics that he is led to cheat in examinations. Such a student may not feel that he has seriously wronged himself or anyone else. These outside interests have so taken up his time that he has not had sufficient time to give to his class work during the semester and has been particularly handicapped in time to prepare for the examination. While others were "cramming" he was busy at these interests which were a part of the larger life and interests of the college. He was carrying out responsibilities which he had been elected to carry because he had been deemed more capable and more willing to work than his fellows. Thus the student feels that he has had an unequal chance to cope with the other students in the matter of preparation for the examination. Furthermore, the student may believe that in participating in these outside or extra-curricular activities he has been educated as truly as those who have spent the time in the curriculum work. Since the extra-curricular work receives no credit and credit is the currency of the college, he must cheat in examination or be dropped from the institution. But in cheating he does not feel that he is doing anything really wrong or even dishonest in the larger sense of the term, but is only trying to cope with an educational situation which to say the least is imperfect if not really unfair.

In the opinion of seven students the chief cause for cheating in examination was the educational practice of requiring certain courses of students who have no interest and can see no real benefit in such.

Five students mentioned the lack of a real and true honor system as the main cause for cheating. They believed that

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students would not cheat if actually put on their honor. According to the way they saw it, there were really no honor systems in operation in colleges. Where such systems were said to exist a definite attitude of suspicion was exhibited toward the students by having them sign so-called "honor pledges" to the effect that they had not cheated in examination. In the opinion of these five students such systems are a dead insult to those who are in the habit of practicing honesty. It were as though a store would require of all its clerks a statement to the effect that they had not stolen anything during the day and had not seen any of the other employees stealing. Moreover, such a pledge was a positive suggestion of cheating to those who were weak of will and to those who were looking for thrills. To the latter group such a system offered a double opportunity—one thrill for cheating and another thrill in lying to get out of it. In the opinion of these students an unqualified assumption that students were honest and a thorough acting upon this assumption would do more than anything else to produce honesty and prevent cheating.

CONCLUSIONS AND INFERENCES

1. Students differ greatly in their attitude toward one who has fallen short of the ethical standards which society has set up. To some students the offender is one who is made of baser stuff against whom society must defend itself by a rigid system of punishment and ostracism. These are to be administered both for the purification of the soul of the offender and as a warning to those who as yet have not been found wanting when weighed in society's balances.

To other students the shortcomings of individuals are only evidences of the imperfections of the mechanisms of society, and therefore to make a scapegoat of the individual is not only unfair, but a stupid procedure on the part of society. To such students moral offenses are effects the causes for which society is as much responsible as it is for the causes which produce more praiseworthy effects. If society has allowed a combination of circumstances that have produced a morally

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warped individual, society owes the individual an apology and the aid which will rectify the matter rather than the individual being the debtor to society for which he must endure punishment and ostracism as an atonement. Between these two quite opposite opinions we find many divergent shades.

2. Students differ greatly in their ethical evaluation of a given situation. This difference is much greater than one would expect to find among what appeared to be a fairly homogeneous group of individuals. All had been trained in the public schools and most of them in the same state. All were upper classmen in a college under the control of a church and supposedly standing for a rather definite set of ideals. Some students reacted to cheating as a major offense in comparison with which stealing and other such types of conduct are much to be preferred. To other students the same situation appears to be little more than a blunder in social etiquette.

3. There is a wide variation of opinion among college students as to why cheating in examinations is carried on. The opinions vary all the way from believing that the main motive for cheating is the thrill that comes from wrong doing to the belief that it is done primarily by the students who feel that in doing so they are justly defending themselves against an unfair educational system. Again opinions vary all the way from believing that the main motive for cheating is an attempt to retain the good opinion of the professors, whom they admire, to believing that the chief cause is the contempt which the students have for their professors. Another group of students who believe that students cheat primarily because of laziness are poles asunder from those who believe that the chief cause is over-work in other activities which the students think are more educative than activities on which examinations are held.

4. We may justly infer that there is no such thing as the so-called "mind of the college student"—an expression so often used by speakers and writers and which seems to indicate an all-pervasive uniformity of mentality to which each

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individual mind loses itself upon entering college. There seems to be a decided lack of uniformity of mental response in this situation and we have no reason for believing that there would be any more uniformity of response to any other situation calling for reflective thought.

5. The opinions of these college students do not agree with the opinions of twenty-five deans of colleges in the North-central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools.[2] The deans believe that the main cause for cheating in college is the fact that so many students come from high schools where cheating is common and where such conduct is taken lightly and very little said or done about the matter. The data in this report suggest that there are many motives arising out of the college situation which are just as powerful if not more so than any that might arise in high school. All the motives operating in high school are at work in college and, in addition to these, other and more powerful motives arise at a college level. The two most potent factors in college which lead students to cheat, according to the opinion of the student, are: first, the fear of being dropped from college; and secondly, a desire to make a grade high enough to admit the student to enter fraternities or sororities. These are motives that operate little or not at all in high school. Of the 443 students reporting their opinion as to the most potent factors which lead college students to cheat only eighteen referred to the idea that the students had learned to cheat in high school and carried the habit over into college. This report would indicate that the twenty-five deans referred to above had better look to their own situation rather than lift up their eyes and behold the wickedness of the Sodom-like high school from which the college students have fled but not before they have been almost irreparably scorched.

ALBION COLLEGE

[2] E. K. Hillbrand, Dean of Dakota Wesleyan College, "Cheating in College," *School and Society*, December 10, 1927.

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BOOK REVIEWS

FAMILY DISORGANIZATION. AN INTRODUCTION TO A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS. By Ernest R. Mowrer. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927. Pp. xvii+317. Price, $3.00.

We have had many studies which give us facts concerning the external results of defects in our families such as divorce and desertion. We have had also many superficial programs of reform for our family system. Dr. Mowrer offers us, in this book, a very important program for study of the actual defects in American families. His book is not about the ethics of the family but about the methodology for a positive study of family disorganization.

The primary contention of the book is that statistical methods are inadequate and that we need detailed case studies of family disorganization. In the first chapter he points out that the usual programs of the conservatives and the radicals are inadequate in that they fail to see the need for knowledge about the family that is deeper than statistical methods can furnish. In the second chapter he summarizes facts about the increase in divorce throughout the world. The next two chapters study divorce and desertion in detail in the city of Chicago. The fifth chapter studies family disorganization in the different areas of Chicago.

Chapters vi–xii show the need for more intimate knowledge of disorganization. The need for case studies is shown and several cases are exhibited and studied. In these cases we see the total process of family disorganization and we understand the conflicts of human attitudes which cause trouble. The cases are said to be typical and to show the individual facts.

The conclusion in chapter xiii stresses our present lack of knowledge about the causes of family disorganization, and insists that treatment can come only after we have more knowledge of causes on which control can be based.

Dr. Mowrer's book is indispensable for anyone who wishes to deal with the problem of the modern family. His facts are important and well arranged. His main contention is undoubtedly true, that statistics dealing with external results of family disorganization needs to be supplemented by case studies. However, there are some questions that should be raised concerning the antithesis between statistics and cases. In the

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first place, cases are important in proportion as they are typical or are recognized to have a stated relation to what is typical. Here we must have statistical studies as the basis of our work. In the second place, as our cases increase we should be able to apply statistical treatment to the important aspects of all the cases. In the third place, cases which involve reports by interested persons may involve more confusion or deception than usually occurs in statistics about the actual facts of such phenomena as divorce or desertion. Finally, it is important to realize that a written case study is an abstract and selected account of an extremely complex process. Cases may be less abstract than statistics, but they differ in degree rather than in kind.

A. P. BROGAN

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

BUDDHISM IN PRE-CHRISTIAN BRITAIN. By Donald A. Mackenzie. London and Glasgow: Blackie & Son, Ltd., 1928. Pp. xx+178; Index. Price 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

This is an attractive book, generously illustrated with photographs and sketches, which carries throughout the aroma of careful and mature scholarship, but, withal, written in easy and popular style. It contains some specific findings of one who has conducted difficult but rewarding explorations in the fields of anthropology, archaeology, ancient cultures, and historic religions. As the title suggests, the main thesis of the book is to show by means of certain evidences that missionary pilgrims of Buddhism had made religious and cultural conquests in Western Europe, particularly in Great Britain and Ireland, even "before Julius Caesar crossed the English Channel." Contrary to the popular view, "derived from prejudiced historians," which held that the Celts of the north (which had struggled so fiercely with the higher civilization of Rome in the south) were barbarians and savages, we must now recognize them as having a striking cultural history of their own, not only in contact with an earlier Greek culture, but also in an "intimate touch with the civilizations of Western and Central Asia." This being true, a new chapter is opened up in the appreciation of Celtic history and culture.

What are the evidences? Briefly, they are: the discovery in Jutland of the so-called Gundestrup bowl (now preserved in the National Museum at Copenhagen) "on which the Celtic god, Cernunnos, is postured like a typical Buddha and given, as is pointed out for the first time in this volume, the attributes of the Hindu-Buddhist god Virūpāksha"; other archaelogical relics, such as Gaulish stones and coins with facings

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of similar striking suggestiveness; certain aspects of pre-Christian Celtic customs, cult symbols, folk-lore, mythology and religious beliefs and practices revealing impressive oriental influences; the testimony of Asoka, the emperor-monk of India, to Buddhist missionary activities in Europe; a significant statement of Origen in reference to Buddhist doctrines which were held in third-century Britain; and, finally, such evidences as issue from a comparative study of ancient cultures.

Students of social origins and especially of the history of religions will find that here is a volume which must be reckoned with.

VERGILIUS FERM

COLLEGE OF WOOSTER

ZOROASTRIAN STUDIES. By A. V. Williams Jackson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1928. Pp. xxxiii+325. Price, $4.00.

This is the twelfth volume of the "Columbia University Indo-Iranian Series" edited by the author. Besides a great deal of new material it contains already published papers and monographs all of which, however, have been thoroughly revised and supplemented. The excellent bibliography, the copious references and the convenient and systematic arrangement of all the material for which the series is especially noted, make *Zoroastrian Studies* very useful in itself and for further research. The student of ethics will be richly rewarded by a perusal of this volume written by the internationally known Avestan scholar who also has a deep feeling for the personages and problems of the Zoroastrian past as well as for the Parsis who are living heirs to that once great religion.

The whole of the Iranian religion is permeated by the great schism between good and evil. If there is one religion that is completely dominated by ethical motives, it is the Zoroastrian. Heaven and earth resound with the mighty battles of good and evil forces—there, Ormazd, Amesha Spentas (archangels), Yazatas (angels), and their kin fight Ahriman, the Daēvas, and other devilish creatures; here, the righteous, good, and virtuous war with the wicked, the evil disposed, and the unkindly.

But there would be no consolation in such a religion which is the very apotheosis of struggle, were it not for a reward and a promise, a staff to support the virtuous on their difficult journey on the straight path. And, thus, one evolved the doctrine that, in the end, the evil will perish in the world. But then, the question—which is not dealt with by the author—arises as to just how real evil is. The problem becomes more involved if we hear that Ahura Mazda never did create evil.

This brings us to the doctrine of free will to which the author de-

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votes the whole of Part II of the *Studies*. He adduces Avestan, Pahlavi, Pāzand, Arabian, and Persian passages, or their Sanskrit or Latin parallels, in translation and original. The free-will doctrine is distinctively Zoroastrian and was opposed vigorously by the Mohammedans.

It was the archfiend Ahriman who chose to be bad and who created all plants, animals, and phenomena of nature harmful to man. And, likewise, man himself makes his choice between good and evil. But here again, the author does not clear up the problem of the limitation which the good principle imposes upon himself by creating free will or the capability of choice at all. Perhaps, there is no solution to this and the above problem to be found anywhere in the Zoroastrian doctrines. The little material we possess does not suffice to draw definite conclusions therefrom (Marṭān-farukh's contentions, though obscure, are however instructive). Nevertheless, Parsis and Gabars to this day hold on to the doctrine of free will and reject fate or a Calvinistic doctrine of predestination.

It is the unanimous opinion of scholars that the Hindus excel by far the Persians in all matters of speculation and have a deeper conception of reality. The Persian, on the other hand, has a very practical mind. This may be seen, e.g., in the lack of ascetic tendencies and the amelioration and expiation of sin which may be brought about by such social acts as killing noxious animals, constructing irrigation ditches, raising dogs, and the like.

Of ethical interest is, furthermore, the double vocabulary in Avestan for things, acts, or parts of the body belonging to gods or to devils, the tremendous effort to realize *humata, hūkhta, hvarshta,* good thoughts, good words, good deeds, the change of the Avestan words *daēva* (demon) and *ahura* (god) to Sanskrit *deva* and *asura* meaning god and devil respectively, the Semitic elements in Zoroastrian ethics, Manichaeism, and the similarities and contrasts between Hindu and Persian social and ethical thought. Perhaps, a future study by the author will co-ordinate all political, social, geographic, and biologic data contributory to the peculiarities of the ethics of Zoroastrianism.

KURT F. LEIDECKER
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF VEDIC AND ALLIED RESEARCH
NEW YORK

A PHILOSOPHY OF IDEALS. By Edgar Sheffield Brightman. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1928. Pp. vii+243. Price, $2.00.

One dominant purpose is manifest throughout the discussions of this book. The ruling aim is to show that, however important they may be as

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human utilities, ideals in their fundamental significance are revealers of reality's objective structure. The author, therefore, complements the expected descriptive treatment of ideals with the presentation of a philosophy justificatory of their lofty rôle. Propounding the philosophical position of personalism, Professor Brightman insists that the examination of ideals, like the investigation of any problem, must start with immediate mind, or self-experience. This view that reality must be understood first as mind and from within is not, however, a solipsistic theory, because mind, although by no means identical with its environment, "certainly can know and be known by, affect and be affected by, what is not itself" (p. 35). The realms of the subconscious, the logical and the metaphysical, no less than the biological, physical, and social spheres, are environments of mind. Nature, in this doctrine, which is entitled critical scientific positivism, is "the whole system of the laws of the actual and ideally possible experiences of all human minds" (p. 47). Nature, however, is not all that there is, for the experiences of finite minds are communications from the universal mind. "Nature is the will of God in action," a notion which, in the light of nature's apparent hostility to ideals, leads Professor Brightman to suggest that in the divine experience there may be an element of struggle.

Ideals function in and for reality, because the datum-mind, as an organic, growing, time-transcending and self-transcending entity, is more or less meaningless unless in relation to a larger whole. The mind's free power to experience imperative ideals is man's way of passing from the present real but fragmentary knowledge to the universe of truth. This progress of mind toward cosmical meaning does not mean that individual selves are lost in the universal self. Professor Brightman's philosophy is an "organic pluralism." The final authoritativeness of ideals for conduct is to be found, not in tradition, desire, wealth, science, law, or even reason, but in the avowed worth of persons who are true to ideals. Such persons will, of course, be guided by reason and impelled by love.

In recognition of the fact that the conception of ideals as cosmically significant is pre-eminently the doctrine of idealistic thought, a large part of the book is given to a comparative study of contemporary idealisms. The opposition, which idealists must face from other thinkers, the evidences of an increasing interest in idealistic notions, the kinds and characteristics of idealism since the crucial year of 1910, and the tasks now confronting the idealistic philosophers are all subjects of painstaking and penetrating analysis. The so-called practical men, the natural scientists, the psychologists and the philosophers, who derogate "mere" idealism, are revealed as virtual idealists who do not quite understand themselves

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or the doctrine which they reject. The contrasts between Platonic, Berkeleian, Hegelian, and Lotzean idealisms are clearly and concisely presented. The four outstanding situations which characterize current idealism, namely, the struggle with realism, the critical condition of epistemology, the sharpening of the distinction between personalistic and speculative philosophies, and the increased emphasis upon axiology are fully and fairly treated, but frankly in a fashion to support the contentions of personalism. Especially provocative in the convincing consideration of idealism's present responsibilities is the appeal for systematic construction, in which better psychological, logical, epistemological, methodological, and axiological principles will be formulated.

The book, comprised largely of special lectures delivered in different educational institutions, is supplemented with notes and bibliographical references. The unified and readable character of the work will make it intelligible, instructive, and interesting to amateur and professional philosophers alike. Sufficient recognition is taken of present-day theories, other than idealism, to acquaint the reader with the main controversial issues in contemporary philosophy. The chief merit of the study, however, lies in its portrayal of personalism's distinctive tenets. The author's argument for the productivity of ideals should successfully combat the opinion, entertained by various opponents of personalism, that the primacy of the datum-mind is contrary to belief in the independent objectivity of selfhood, nature, or God. The "I" in personalism is immediate, individual, intrinsic, but the "what I may mean" is, for the personalist, as complete, concrete, and continuous as reality itself.

D. L. EVANS

COLLEGE OF WOOSTER

METAPHYSICS AND MODERN RESEARCH. By I. C. Isbyam. London: C. W. Daniel Co., 1927. Pp. xvi+479. Introduction and Introductory Essay by Louis Zangwill.

In the face of the assurance of contemporary realism that it voices the authority of current science and that the vestigial remains of idealism are waning fast, the "spiritual pluralism" of this formidable volume from the pen of a mathematical physicist and a mind of a high order gives food for thought. Divided into three parts, the book is an expansion and revision of a former work originally published in three volumes, *The Ego and Physical Force* in 1925, *The Ego and Spiritual Truth* in 1926, and *The Self-Seeker and His Search* later in the same year. The foundations of this metaphysic are said in the Preface to be Plato, Leibniz, Kant, and

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Bergson. From Plato is taken the theory of "Ideas" minus the transcendentalism; the moral and the spiritual do not descend upon consciousness but empirically arise to it from a lower realm of "latency." With Leibniz, the author views the whole world as consisting in centers of force or activity, "Ego-entities" which, however, are free agents whose harmony is developed rather than pre-established, and which "mirror" the universe only through actual interaction one with another. What uniformities and determinism the scientist reveals are statistical and are the result of the "habits" that follow the free decisions of the Ego-entities. Supporting Kant's doctrine of the phenomenal character of space and time, the theory of relativity is asserted to prove that space and time are not real but only conditions of consciousness, and that measurements are relative to the measuring Ego, ways of ordering experience, no more. While accepting the physicist's notion of force as radiation of energy, the author follows Bergson in refusing to accept the view that force is only a locus of entities in a space-time continuum. To be is to act, to act is to change, and either exists only for consciousness. What are usually regarded as states of consciousness of an identical self are considered as separate plural Ego-entities. The spiritual pluralism set up on the foregoing lines and developed into a hierarchy of Ego-entities owes obvious indebtedness to the thought of James Ward.

The book suffers from its profuse and discursive style, employing duologue, monologue, as well as the formal essay. The entire absence of orientation with reference to rival positions, though intended to clarify the argument, has on the whole the opposite effect and makes many of the difficulties simpler than they are. The weaknesses of the book are thrown into relief by the excellent Introduction and introductory essay, "The Quest of Spiritual Truth" by Louis Zangwill. In seven compact, vivid, illuminating chapters Zangwill gives a historical survey of philosophical attitudes with a sympathetic though eminently sane introduction to Mr. Isbyam's philosophy. The reader is apt to leave the book in closer agreement with the former than with the latter. The book includes two appendixes giving a simple explanation of the principle of relativity and the principle of quanta.

DONALD A. PIATT

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

NEWMAN ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FAITH. By Sylvester P. Juergens. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. xvii+288; Index. Price, $2.75.

This scholarly and highly illuminating study of the great English convert to Romanism is presented in five chapters as follows: "New-

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man's Purpose and Method," "Newman's Theory of Assent," "The Nature of Faith," "The Genesis of Faith in the Individual," and "The Sources of Newman's Psychology of Faith," to which are added an extended Bibliography and an Appendix containing cited references and critical notes.

Dr. Juergens (professor of religion and classical languages at Maryhurst Normal, Kirkwood, Missouri) points out the two outstanding contributions of Cardinal Newman to modern Catholic apologetics (1) the theory of the evolution of dogma which has become "the Church's most effective counter weapon against Protestantism and the dissolvent rationalism of the Modernists" and (2) the theory of harmony between natural and revealed religion "as constituting the average man's implicit, and at the same time strongest motive of credibility." It is the latter contribution contained chiefly in the *Oxford University Sermons* and the *Grammar of Assent* which furnishes the proper setting for a study of Newman's psychology of the individual's faith and with which this book deals.

Ordinary folk reach certitude on the unique worth and supernatural character of Christianity, according to Newman, not by logical demonstration, nor by an appeal to such external evidences as written records, testimonies, signs, or miracles (however valuable these may be as supplementations), but rather through an ordinary psychological process. The *terminus a quo* of this process lies with an original datum, a possession of every normal individual, viz., *conscience*. An analysis of this datum together with its effects furnishes the key to an appreciative understanding of both ethics and religion. Conscience (nowhere adequately defined) exhibits two distinct functions: the moral sense which is an original judgment that discerns right from wrong; and the sense of duty that impels, with a mandatory insistence, right action which, in turn, brings either an inner praise or blame in accordance with achievement or failure. Now, the moral sense would be a perfect guide were it not for original sin and obscurities which attend habitual trifling and neglect. Nevertheless, imperfect and clouded as it may be, it forms the basis for the wide recognition among men of codes of moral discernment. Expressed in systematic form, this recognition becomes "the science of Morals and Ethics." The sense of duty, on the other hand, "leads man spontaneously and instinctively to refer it to a Being outside of himself" which forms the basis of Natural Religion. Repeated failure to perform acts which give inner approval and the readiness to perform such as awaken self-censure command implicitly the recognition of a breach between man and the Judge (or God) who is presented in the experience of disapproval. Fear follows, together with a desire for reconciliation. Man becomes, therefore,

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sensitive for some sign of acquittal and restoration on the part of the Being who must accordingly be both "fearfully just" and "supremely good."

This "natural religion," according to Newman, is universal among folk who are normal and who have not fallen into the hopeless and perverted state of ignoring or refusing to accept the datum of conscience in their inner life. A certain doctrinal content is implicit in natural religion: existence of God; man's dependence upon and responsibility to God; a sense of breach (sin) and need for reconciliation; expectation of some sign of restoration; etc., (pp. 169–70). Religions are regarded as false which fail to recognize these fundamental "teachings of conscience."

The whole point of this psychological analysis leads up to the consideration of revealed religion as not only in entire harmony with the data of natural religion but the perfect realization of all that is implicit in the latter. If a man be honest with his own conscience, then, he will find, according to Newman, that Christianity is not only not unreasonable but the perfect sign and adjustment to which that same conscience has all along been pointing. Certitude, then, rests back upon the original datum. The final criterion of the worth and the unique value of revealed religion is to be found within rather than without.

It would not be difficult to find fault with Newman's analysis and viewpoint either on psychological or on philosophical grounds. Keen as is that analysis, it is strikingly artificial. His concept of natural religion is surely dogmatic and hardly fair to the facts revealed by a study of either historic or comparative religion. His notion of revealed religion is identified with a particular type of theology. (In fact, for him Catholocism *in toto* seems to reach back into the very fibre of man's psychological nature!) (Cf. pp. 191 ff.) His conception of what is essential Christianity is of course highly disputable. Yet, for all that, many favorable comments might be made on Newman, e.g., his shift of emphasis in apologetics from external authority, as such, to experience will hardly be criticized by those who hold the modern point of view in religion. We may well ask what he means by "conscience." In turn, he may well ask what many modern ethicists mean by the "moral consciousness" or perhaps what modern theologians and philosophers of religion mean by "religious consciousness" or even "religious experience." Finally, it is to be noted that, after all, his psychology of faith is a testimony of his own experience, however inadequately expressed, and that the *Oxford Sermons* and the *Grammar* present "the autobiography of his mind and heart."

VERGILIUS FERM

COLLEGE OF WOOSTER

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WHAT AM I? By Edward Gleason Spaulding. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928. Pp. ix+273. Price, $2.00.

Since the title of the volume is furnished by the first essay, this collection of six essays covers a wider subject matter than the title perhaps suggests. The book, in fact, presents most of the fundamental theses in the philosophy of the author of *The New Rationalism;* and while the discussion is supposedly in popular form, the subtlety and rigor of the argument bear witness to the author's refusal to vitiate his doctrines in order to make them easily understood. Not by having a simple philosophy, but by the doubtful method of attempting to state a complex philosophy as simply and clearly as possible does Professor Spaulding woo the people.

One of the interesting features of the book is the fact that Professor Spaulding bases much of his argument on an analysis of the presuppositions of knowledge, or, more accurately, of thinking. From the discovery of the fact that thinking or even argument presupposes the possibility of the control of thinking by logical relations, he derives the conclusion that a rigid determinism is untenable. Since thinking about what is good seems to involve the tacit assumption that thinking is better than not thinking, he argues that the presence of thinking may serve as a standard for evaluating standards of goodness which are individual or relative. Other conclusions, based in part on the same method of argument, are that personality is a unique fact emerging from organization but not reducible to its components, that analysis in general, while valid, must not be regarded as excluding or replacing a synthetic view which sees the novelty added to the elements by their organization, and that in addition to matter and mind there is a realm of entities, such as values and relations, which are neither matter nor mind.

CHARNER M. PERRY

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

WHITHER MANKIND: A PANORAMA OF MODERN CIVILIZATION. Edited by Charles A. Beard. London: Longmans, 1928. Pp. 408. Price, 12*s.* 6*d.*, net.

This series of essays, edited by Professor Beard, is a popular discussion of the leading problems of contemporary life, in so far as it signifies a standard of culture. Naturally the essays are on different "levels." Professor Hu Shih, of Pekin University, gives us a most valuable and scholarly judgment on Western civilization, showing that it implies a much more "spiritual" attitude than the conventional East has preserved. On the other hand, Mr. H. W. Van Loon appears to be wrong in his conclusions and somewhat confused as to the evidence in regard to

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ancient and medieval civilizations. Again, Emil Ludwig manages to write of war and peace without any understanding of the League system; for one can hardly imagine what he intends by saying that "it . . . . has now been established on the banks of a Swiss lake"—he can hardly believe that the Secretariat is the League or that the League exists any more in Geneva than in Berlin. There are, however, many interesting summaries of their normal attitudes by Bertrand Russell, Sidney Webb, John Dewey, and others. And indeed the criticism which the scholar will naturally make upon the scale and the method is perhaps irrelevant, if the book is intended for what is usually called "the general reader." For him, on the other hand, bibliographies and an index would be useful; and neither is added. Nevertheless, the student of moral sciences should read the book, as an indication of the prevalence of a certain indefinable confidence in the future, which corrects the pessimism so common immediately after the war. A general appraisement of contemporary standards would certainly be valuable. But probably the analysis of those standards would be much more exact than they are in this book; and for the moral sciences this book is therefore rather in the nature of raw material than of finished product.

C. D. BURNS

UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW

L. OPPENHEIM: INTERNATIONAL LAW. Vol. I. Peace. 4th Edition, edited by A. D. McNair, Lecturer in the University of Cambridge. London: Longmans, 1928. Pp. 827; Index. Price, 42*s.* net.

This newly published fourth edition of the volume of Oppenheim's Treatise which deals with peace is of the greatest importance not only to international lawyers but to students of moral science. It is in this section of international law that international morality is developing most rapidly; and Dr. McNair, the editor, has had to add large sections to the original work even in the form in which it last appeared in 1920. Particularly with regard to the League system and the International Labour Organization, the new practices and the experience of eight years has led to revision of old theories of the relation between states. And as this is the first of the two volumes of the Treatise, the second of which was published some time ago, the earlier part of the book is concerned with general principles. The strict interpretation of law does not include discussion of tendencies affecting the moral standard: but these are dealt with summarily. It is doubtful whether the original summary as to the effect of the Renaissance and Reformation should not be corrected; for

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the Renaissance implied a moral attitude quite distinct from that of the Reformation and therefore their effects upon international law were probably quite different. There is some notice of the growth of non-governmental organizations and regulation but perhaps more might be made of the influence of conferences of shipping companies in the formation of state laws in regard to collisions (p. 492). The growth of principles leading to the formation of an international police force is most clearly seen in the international law with regard to the stopping of ships of a suspicious character by warships of any state. Clearly the standards of "suspicion" must be the same internationally. The jurist is not concerned to discuss the moral standards on which the law rests: but clearly the actual law is good material for the student of the moral sciences, if he can "analyze out" the standard of conduct it implies; and for the statement of the law in its widest interpretation, as understood on the European Continent, as well as in Great Britain, no treatise is more valuable than Oppenheim's. Dr. McNair is to be congratulated upon the skilful way in which he has added new material, which has become very abundant since the League of Nations began to operate.

C. D. BURNS

UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW

PRE-EXISTENCE AND RE-INCARNATION. By Wincenty Lutoslawski. London: Allen & Unwin, 1928. Pp. 157. Price 6*s*. net.

In 1897 Professor Lutoslawski published his famous *Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* and *The Progress of the Soul*. The latter was revised and reissued in 1924 as *The World of Souls*. It claimed that individual souls are ultimate facts and that we are assured of their immortality by definite and almost ecstatic intuitions. Now with the true mystic intuitionists there is no arguing. They see and know, and that is the end. Sometimes, however, they deign to prove things for the benefit of the rest of us, and that is their mistake. We did not see and believe then, nor are we convinced now—except that the proof is inadequate.

The present work carries on and is further proof of the ideas of *The World of Souls*. Professor Lutoslawski knows we are hopeless. "The great majority . . . . are not interested in their souls. They will never believe that infallible knowledge, implying absolute certainty, exists as to our souls' eternal destiny." Of palingenesis, i.e., pre-existence and reincarnation, of his own many past lives, in fact, "extending over thousands and millions of years," the professor is absolutely certain. And, not content with the vague dreaminess of the general notion, he will have

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palingenesis established "both as a dogma of the church and as a scientific truth."

The first chapter is a mass of testimony. Belief in palingenesis prevailed in Hindoo, Persian, Chinese, Greek, and Roman thought. It was not without approval in the church till the condemnation of Origen in 543 A.D. After that it was not prominent till the nineteenth century. Then English Romantic poets "recognise reincarnation." The same belief "permeated French poetry and literature as never before," while in Polish literature and philosophy the belief "is even more prominent than before." He conjures the names of Renouvier, to whom palingenesis is a "fundamental truth," and James Ward, who "considers pre-existence and reincarnation as certain."

The view of the evidence is certainly rosy; but there are eight arguments which "amount to a perfectly scientific proof of palingenesis or at least of pre-existence, with a reasonable probability of reincarnation." These are: (1) Through the divine creative power, creatures rise slowly to higher levels by conscious endeavor. This requires many lifetimes. (2) We are what we have been, as we see by human inequalities in mind and body and (3) moral qualities. (4) Without this belief, immortality would be meaningless—our soul carries on. (5) Those who have known romantic love know it does not end with death but requires an eternity for its full realization. (6) Likewise true lovers of their country have lived in and for it before and will do so again. (7) Some people remember their previous lives and all people remember something (cf. Plato's *Meno*). (8) Children have died and been born again into the same family.

The glow of enthusiasm and the wealth of eloquence which dilate on our moral advance, on the fortitude and patriotism that this philosophy gives here and now, together with the fervent belief in the nothingness of matter and the allness of souls will doubtless reach a wide circle of readers. They could find no better book than this if they want the intimacy of belief in our continued existence and progress on the way of life. The enthusiasts will not believe me but I must, all the same, say that these eight arguments are no proof. It is pure fancy and dogma. The first is little more than the optimism of orthogenic evolution, which is not proved. Under (2) we are required to believe that Mozart learned to play the piano in previous existences, i.e., that the piano pre-existed too. In (3) perhaps moral defects and misfortunes are a result of past sins. Perhaps not: the sociologist has a word to say here. Whether (4) immortality would be meaningless or not without this belief proves nothing as to the validity of the belief either in immortality or anything else.

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The belief of romantic lovers (5) proves that they believe so. People do believe that they will meet again in heaven, and so the church dogmatizes, but we are still with Samuel Johnson not scorning a little more proof. People remember a lot (6), and instincts are often interpreted as racial memory, yet as a teacher Professor Lutoslawski must have been called upon to teach much that was not remembered. While (8) would prove that children who were born sufficiently like living people were the incarnation of those people. It is too haphazard to believe merely because someone reiterates a thing emphatically. Seven is the most amazing of all. Lutoslawski's own many past lives seem to have been lived in Poland. He knows and loves and works for the ideals of Poland and loves the humblest Pole more than the greatest German. So, too, all the great Poles live and live again for the freedom and messianic future of Poland. This notwithstanding their untrammelled spiritual lives in infinite possible planets!

I have done. It is poetry and pure fancy; beautiful and inspiring us if you will with a moral perfectionism of tremendous scope, setting before us the fulfilment in each incarnation of a definite task and duty, and so leading us to achieve the infinite ends of our spirits. Perhaps so. But perhaps, in spite of all the scholarship and yearning of Lutoslawski, nothing more than the mounting wishes of our poor humanity.

E. F. METTRICK

HEALEY, BATLEY
YORKSHIRE, ENGLAND

THE GUIDANCE OF CONDUCT. By Edward T. Dixon. Published by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Price 10*s.* 6*d.*

This work has the welcome appearance of not having been written because the author conceived himself to be under some special obligation to produce a book on philosophy. The style is fresh and vigorous; but, while many points are well put, the views expressed are hardly as peculiar to the writer as he imagines.

The title of the work, which is perhaps justified by the consistently pragmatist standpoint adopted, is likely to prove misleading as to the scope of the contents. It does not set out to provide us with a formula, recipe, or prescription for the guidance of conduct in the ordinary sense, but it seeks to show that our whole philosophic outlook is capable of being profoundly modified by the habit of thinking in terms of mere pictures which we make to ourselves, instead of our accustoming ourselves to thinking in terms of "formulas" as guides to conduct.

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Mr. Dixon illustrates his main thesis by a discussion of various problems arising in the departments of mathematics, economics, sociology, and ethics. No doubt the fact that we have to resort to statical terms in order to represent processes that are essentially dynamical is a prolific source of dialectics, but, though Mr. Dixon is always interesting and suggestive, this view as to the genesis of dialectic, as exhibited particularly in the course of the history of philosophy, might be developed on more comprehensive and systematic lines. For instance, we have not to deal with a mere indiscriminate picture-making, but with pictures standing to one another in determinate logical relations, as in the case of the pictures implied in the mechanical and teleological representations of evolution.

Perhaps, also, Mr. Dixon does not do justice to the usefulness of static or "pictorial" representations. He would, for example, have us substitute a "formula," or dynamical representation, for our "pictorial" or static representation of property. But the representation of a "licence" was from the first conceived dynamically. It passes no interest, it does not transfer property in anything, but simply renders something lawful which would otherwise be unlawful. In Mr. Dixon's phraseology it simply removes an "interference." But a contract to grant or not to revoke a licence may be specifically enforced, and a licence may extend to the licensees of a contract which may be assignable or transmissible, and recently it has been held that a Court of Equity could relieve from the forfeiture of a licence. The result is that in practice and in effect licences for value for a definite period have come to be assimilated to property, not vice versa. The pictorial method of representation in most practical relations makes for convenience of handling, and there seems to be no use condemning it in general. The need for critique only arises where the abstract antithetical elements used in the representation of a dynamical process are treated as realities and dialectical arguments based on that assumption. Mr. Dixon promises a work on natural philosophy in the near future, and it may be awaited with interest.

J. C. MEREDITH

SHORTER NOTICES

RELIGION COMING OF AGE. By Roy Wood Sellars. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. xi+293.

A popular treatise which endeavors to develop the humanistic import of the naturalistic outlook in recent science and philosophy. Inspired by a facile optimism and a not too discriminating sense for philosophical movements which fail to interest him, Professor Sellars opines that what is significant for religion is that philosophy has at last come of age in the giving way of idealism to a critical form of realism in the theory of knowledge, in the overthrow of mech-

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anism and materialism by evolutionary or emergent naturalism, in the resultant solution of the mind-body problem, and in the recognition of the difference of valuation from scientific knowledge. Although this new and promising perspective in philosophy is declared to be inseparable from the advances in science, the quantum and relativity theories are passed over as having no particular bearing on religion, and emphasis is placed rather upon the fact that in scientific knowledge "there is no intuition of the physical stuff; all is inference and measurement and concerns quantity and pattern." There follows a running survey, comprising about half the book, of the historical development of traditional religion, exposing and functionally explaining its infirmities. Philosophy is then shown to be the solvent of the traditional riddles and the grand beliefs of religion. As men learn to feel at home in their world and accepting their responsibilities to stand on their own feet, it is thought that religion comes into its own as an expression of social and creative human values. Just what is left of religion when it comes of age, when "the world must go to the scientist and to the philosopher for leadership," the reader is left to wonder. The author assures him that there is no conflict between religion and science when we have put the framework of the past behind us, since "religion is an inescapable aspect of life," but he offers no account of the technique to be employed. The need for historical and philosophical setting has given way to that of illumination on the present problem. Many of us feel that this problem is not so simple as it has been made to appear.

DONALD A. PIATT

TAKING THE NAME OF SCIENCE IN VAIN. By Horace James Bridges. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. 273.

One need pursue the truculent argument of this book but a short way to appreciate the propriety of the title. The narrowness of the author's vision, the pathetic incongruity of the scientific attitude which he professes to espouse with the "invincible faith" which he not only openly confesses in places but is clearly tied to from the start, and the general shallowness of his arguments conspire to strengthen his enemies and to discredit what, rightly conceived, is not an unworthy cause. The argument was doubtless more persuasive in its original form (here expanded) of lectures delivered under the Jayne Memorial Trust, at the Academy of Music, Philadelphia, in 1927, under the less controversial title, *Some Aspects of Life and Conduct*. The book comprises four chapters of which the first two pretend to invalidate the mechanistic interpretation of evolution crystallized in the behaviorism of John Watson; and of which the last two aim to complete the job by dramatizing the excoriating consequences of mechanism for the sense of freedom, morality, creative art, and the political rights of man. Typical of the arguments against Watson, who is the chief villain of the piece, is the echoed assertion that he denies consciousness and the mental life; the possibility is not even entertained that Watson is attempting to redefine and to explain (put into observable terms in which all scientific explanation must be couched) the actions of the mind. Of determinism it is said that it "collapses like a house of cards at the first breath of criticism," provoking the reader's

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surprise that the question of determinism remains a central issue in science and philosophy today. The tone of the book in the latter chapters is somewhat softened where the moral verities take the measure of the fatalistic and satirical tendencies in contemporary literature with special reference to Messrs. Eugene O'Neill and Sinclair Lewis.

DONALD A. PIATT

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Sir Geoffrey Butler, M.P., and Simon Maccoby. London: Longmans, 1928. Large 8vo. Pp. 566. Price, 25s. net.

A most valuable treatise this is. The method is unconventional and very interesting. The general attitude toward world problems is practical. There is a background of historical thought, and the major political issues of each period provide the general structure for the treatment of international law. Thus happily we escape from the traditional book-learning. The first part is called the "Age of the Prince." Intercourse is shown to have developed through trade and travel; and war is discussed with a keen moral sense of its futility. Then comes the "Age of the Judge"; an age also of ocean voyages and the new nationalities arising. Then the "Age of the Convert," the appearance of the Americas as political forces and the conferences of the later nineteenth century. This last age is ours and our contribution is not only the treaty system, with the new world outlook it implies, but also the League of Nations. The writers deserve the highest praise for the liveliness of their style and the vigour of their judgments. All through the book one feels the appreciation of living issues; and it is a better advocacy of peace and co-operation between nations than many a propagandist pamphlet. The historical facts are given in full and the doctrines of authorities discussed; but the general movement of thought from age to age is in the center of the stage.

C. D. B.

THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC RADICALISM. By Elie Halévy, translated by Mary Morris, with an Introduction by A. D. Lindsay. London: Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. 554. Price, 30s.

Professor Halévy is well known as the leading historian in France of the development of British civilization in the nineteenth century. The book here translated is of the very greatest value to all students of moral science, especially because the author is chiefly concerned to show the influence of physical science upon the traditional view of social life. The book covers the utilitarian philosophy during Bentham's lifetime. It is very full of matter, both historical and philosophical; for Professor Halévy is a master both of the historical evidence he deals with and of the critical method. The effect upon Bentham's mind of the Constitution of the United States is very well rendered; and the issues in regard to representative government are still with us. The weakness of Utilitarian philosophy is so apparent to us now that it is well to be reminded of the very great services performed by it, not only in the support of actual reforms but in the practice of exact thinking on social problems.

C. D. B.

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AN ANTHOLOGY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHY. By Daniel Sommer Robinson. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1929. Pp. xi+674. Price, $4.00.

Professor Robinson has done a service to the teaching of contemporary philosophy in executing this anthology. He has so ordered the selections from diverse thinkers as to throw systematic light on the various problems raised under idealism, realism, pragmatism, and other types not so easily classified. The emphasis is upon Anglo-American philosophers, though Driesch, Bergson, Vaihinger, Nietzsche, Croce, Spengler, and Radhakrishnan are included. The selections are short and ordinarily of interest to more than technicians in or professional students of philosophy. It is likely that the book may further stimulate the awakened interest in philosophy on the part of general readers. Each essay is preceded by a brief analysis for students and followed by provocative questions. Brief biographical sketches are appended for the sixty-odd philosophers here represented. T. V. S.

THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION (International Psychoanalytic Library, No. 15). By Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth Press, 1928. M. 98. Price, 6s. net.

The "illusion" in question is "religion," which is taken by Freud to mean that peculiar system of dogmas usually called "theology" to be found by outside observers in Western Christendom. This system of belief, Freud thinks, having originated in the Oedipus complex, is disappearing because we are now in the middle of a sort of cultural adolescence. Freud himself seems in this little book to be obsessed by a fear that it may harm someone or something; and he shows no acquaintance with any recent work on religious experience or the psychology of religion. Most of the book contains the old arguments of the controversy between what used to be called "science" and "religion," that is to say, dogmatic analysis of perception and theology! So brilliant a mind as Freud's naturally adds some illumination in discerning the ancient controversy; but the book contains no analysis of religious experience, and the well-known psychoanalytic phrases, such as "Oedipus complex," are used superficially and almost carelessly. It is asserted, but nowhere proved nor even explained, that dogmas are illusions, which are "wish fulfilments." Certainly the book is worth glancing at; but it does not add to Freud's reputation. C. D. B.

THE BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. Oxford: University Press, 1928. Pp. 248; index. Price, 16s. net.

This volume of the *Yearbook* contains much that is of interest to moral philosophers. The problems which are dealt with even by lawyers in the international sphere now tend to be, like those of jurisprudence generally, problems of morality. These are articles on the property of aliens, state complicity in international claims, the rules for admission of states to the League of Nations, etc. The reviews of recently published books are long and valuably critical. One of the most significant is that on Dr. Lauterpracht's study of analysis drawn from private law which affect international relations. All the articles and reviews are by well-known authorities in the subject. C. D. B.

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FITNESS TO WORK. By P. H. Pear, Professor of Psychology in the University of Manchester, England. London: University of London Press, 1928. 8vo. Pp. 186; index. Price, 5s. net.

This is a short psychological study of skill and special ability in industrial occupations. But half the book is concerned with the analysis of characteristics which are usually called "moral," namely, laziness and hatred of work. The problem whether these are inevitable results of the industrial system is partly psychological; but the attacks on that system made by moralists such as Ruskin imply that moral effort can cure the evils of monotony and lack of interest. Professor Pear deals admirably with contemporary evidence in literature, on "the screen," and in revolutionary propaganda. He states the problem, but he does not attempt a solution. The book is valuable in providing material for the study of the moral problems involved in industrial occupations.

C. D. B.

WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS. By Harold A. Larrabee. New York: Macy-Masius, The Vanguard Press, 1928. Pp. 204. Price, $2.00.

A simple and clear account of the motives which have driven men to philosophize, both in the past and in the present, and a statement of the influences which produced the various systems of philosophy. The chapters deal with the philosopher's quest: how it began; the relations between philosophy, religion, science, art, and literature; the methods used by philosophers; and the major types of philosophy. It is not an attempt to give the views of individual philosophers. The chief points of strength and weakness of the great systems are pointed out, and the rôle of philosophy in life is brought out and its social value urged. Excellent suggestions are given for further reading. The book is not entirely free of prejudice against certain viewpoints, but it is a real achievement in answering the question contained in its title. It can be read at one sitting, and is an attractive instance of book-making.

ORVIL F. MYERS

SOCIAL PRINCIPLES OF THE GOSPEL. By Alphonse Lugan. Tr. from the French by T. Lawrason Riggs, with a preface by John A. Ryan. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. xii+262. Price, $2.25.

This book presents a very clear apologetics for the Catholic attitude on social questions. The author feels that Protestantism has in modern times overweighted the social element in the gospels. But he is concerned to show that there is room for great emphasis in any true evaluation of the social bearings of the teaching of Jesus. Individual salvation in the theological sense is of greatest importance, but nevertheless Christianity, rather than democracy, is entitled to credit for the modern ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity.

T. V. S.

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JEWISH THEOLOGY. By Kaufmann Kohler. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. xiii+504. Price, $2.00.

Combining respect for past insights with recognition of later growth and development, Dr. Kohler attempts to render accurately the spirit of the religion of Judaism. The result is a book which is at once an account of what Judaism has stood for in the past and been thought to be, and a creative expression of Dr. Kohler's belief as to what Judaism really is and will be. Moreover, the two phases of the book are so skilfully handled that neither interferes with the other. Nor do the feeling and conviction which pervade the book impair its clarity and urbanity. One is surprised that a book concerned with religion should be so interesting.

CHARNER M. PERRY

THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Burleigh Cushing Rodick. New York: Columbia University Press, 1928. Pp. ix+195. Price, $4.00.

Even while admitting as a legal principle the proposition that "Necessity knows no law," the book under review shows by analysis of cases in which the excuse of necessity has been urged for exceptions to recognized international law that necessity must know a certain amount of law. She must know the law that "Necessity knows no law"; and she must know enough additional law to identify herself and to recognize where she legally ends and something else begins. By means of a survey of the views of early writers and an examination of later developments in international law, the author attempts to determine how much law necessity should know. He has done a careful piece of work; and that he is a scholar is evidenced by the fact that there are two pages of notes or index for each three pages of text.

CHARNER M. PERRY

THE VEDANTA, ACCORDING TO SAMKARA AND RAMANUJA. By S. Radhakrishnan. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1928. Pp. 287. Price, 10s.

The author is professor of philosophy in the University of Calcutta; and the present book is a reprint of some chapters of the second volume in the author's *Indian Philosophy*. The dates and facts regarding the two commentaries on the Vedanta here dealt with are very well stated. The general view of the universe as understood by Indian philosophers is admirably discussed, although there is too much mere reporting of terminology and too little comparison with our contemporary methods and conclusions. Professor Radhakrishnan has shown how valuable a knowledge of Indian metaphysics may be for understanding the background of Indian life. The old controversy, so important for moral sciences, with regard to the unchangingness of the real world has apparently obsessed Indian thinkers. The analysis of phenomena thus becomes secondary in importance. But that is a fault in Western as well as in Eastern philosophy.

C. D. B.

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THE WORLD AS AN ORGANIC WHOLE. By N. O. Lossky. Translated from the Russian by Natalie A. Duddington. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1928. Pp. vi+199.

Based upon his earlier books, *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge* and others, in which it is sought to validate metaphysics through an account of knowledge as immediate contemplation of what is itself extra-mental, Professor Lossky's present book essays to push the metaphysical ascent to its summit, "organic, concrete ideal-realism." To those who share the author's conviction that the task of metaphysics has been completed save that of harmonizing "the precious heritage bequeathed to us" and who are sufficiently familiar with traditional metaphysical abstractions, this book may have some appeal. For some of us, the game in which an abstract opposition begets an abstract unity to overcome on a higher (?) level the defect of the lower has lost its meaning and its zest.

DONALD A. PIATT

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND CONFESSION. ("The Calvert Series." Edited by Hilaire Belloc.) By Leonard Geddes and Herbert Thurston. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. 104. Price, $1.00.

The present revival of interest in the mystical aspects of religion, together with the proclamations of Protestant prophets in high places of the unique value of the confessional, make one pause respectfully before such a book as this. For, whatever else we may say about Catholicism, we can hardly escape the conviction that both its dogma clothed with supernaturalism and its ecclesiastical technique provide an atmosphere which easily fans into flame whatever spark of mysticism may be found among its devotees. The sacrament of penance which begins with confession and culminates in the magical words of the vicar, *Ego te absolvo,* surely is an achievement in mystical art, and continues to function effectively as an answer to certain human needs.

However, it is not this psychological function to which these Catholic apologists appeal in setting forth the worth of this institution and practice. Rather, they would rest their case upon a certain theology and ecclesiology than upon any psychology. Curiously enough, the weakest arguments in the book become for them the strongest; and, conversely, the strongest become for them the weakest. The *raison d'être* of confession (like other Catholic dogma) is intimately bound up with a theory of the church which in turn rests upon certain Scriptural declarations and traditional practices. This, their strongest argument, rests (it is almost too trite to remark) upon sparse and isolated Biblicisms to which are applied highly questionable exegeses.

On the other hand, a final chapter is given over to an evaluation of confession on the basis of "reason and experience," which, for non-Catholic readers, forms the most convincing part of the apology. The long-hallowed practice has justified itself not only before the tribunal of individuals as such, but of society as well. It has acted as a moral restraint upon human conduct with far-reaching implications to social welfare. It has kept alive the voice of conscience which has saved men from living together in "fools' paradises." The performance of

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works of satisfaction imposed by the confessor reaches out into the very world where wrongs have been committed and where they must be righted. Moreover, the individual is forced to take a moral inventory of himself repeatedly. He is saved from the tragedy of self-complacency and hypocrisy not only by the requirement to confess but to confess all, under penalties provided for. He is given a place and a way to unburden himself. He is not thrown upon the mercy of ill-advised amateurs and quacks but is given access to funded wisdom by experts trained to administer relief and counsel. In this way, the church secures its most vital contacts and learns how to carry on an effective program. And so, there is "no school of morality equal to the confessional." In fact, confession "is a gift of such far-reaching beneficence that it may well be believed, from that mark alone in all its circumstances, to have God for its author."

VERGILIUS FERM

CHRIST: THE WISDOM OF MAN. By A. Boyd Scott. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1928. Pp. xvii+433. Price 15s.

This book is an attempt to investigate the significance of Christ's moral wisdom and to correlate it with the wisdom of the schools. Although the English is rather pompous and sometimes ornate to the point of inaccuracy, the book will be interesting to large numbers of Christian men and women, and especially to Christian preachers. It will, in spite of Dr. Scott's first chapter, interest these more than students of ethics.

The book is theological rather than ethical. Christ is (by implication, see p. 22) "a lord of life who conferred regeneration through sacraments and was the incarnate logos of God." His originality was a matter of personality not of ethics, and the comparisons of his teaching with that of classical moralists seem intended to prove that Christ had something to say, something better to say, on the leading problems of moral philosophy. These comparisons are interesting and well done and doubtless many will understand Christianity the better for them, but I think Dr. Scott's assertion that Christ was poetic and intuitive and not philosophic and rational shows that he hardly understands the peculiar business of moral philosophy in its comprehension of the why of good and evil.

E. F. METTRICK

THE USE OF PHILOSOPHY. By John H. Muirhead. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928. Pp. 209. Price 7/6.

In these "California Addresses" of Muirhead's, we have a book, easy enough for all to read, leading to the core of a philosophic doctrine that is not always easy. No one with any care for the things of the mind could fail to enjoy, and even an opponent must admire the fluent mastery of this gentle protreptic to the newer idealism.

Only a few of the lectures are "professional," but the teaching of the great essays—"The Spirit of Man," "Religion," "The Life of Knowledge"—runs through them all. We cannot do without a philosophy, without some conception of the whole, without some grasp of principles that go deeper than facts,

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not only because we were otherwise little better than thriving earthworms, but because our nature, partaking of and indeed part of the eternal spirit, can only find completion in thought and religion. Very significant too, as becomes a pupil of Green, is the widening of the narrower Hegelian state: " . . . . the civic community is not everything . . . . there is a community that goes beyond all States and nations . . . . the creation of the spirit . . . . to serve ever more fully the ends of the spirit" (p. 149).

A wise book, full of maturity and consolation.

E. F. METTRICK

THE SCIENTIFIC WORLD VIEW. By William Kay Wallace. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. xi+316. Price, $3.00.

This book covers a wide area—a wider area indeed than the title represents. Science is its nucleus; but the author works up to science through an account of the decay of religion and works away from science in his quest for a morality adequate for our time.

Conceiving religion as necessarily authoritative and as implying a personal God, he has little difficulty in showing that modern life is not *en rapport* with the religious tradition. Christianity found feudalism more to its temper. With the rise of science, efficiency tends to take the place of divinity. It becomes not merely the watchword of science in its impetus toward control, but also the key word for the morality that arises with science. "Morality is thus nothing more than a plan of efficient action which it is recognized by experience is the best policy to pursue." Life, relieved by science of supernaturalism, will be free to make of itself whatever its own ingenuity and co-operation can devise. The new morality that arises with science is no more than the freeing of human ability to deal with all its problems as, heretofore, it has dealt with only the more impersonal ones. Education, public opinion, and freedom become the factors of morality, and transformation in the fields of economics, international relations, and sex awaits the acquisition by the scientific mind of its moral courage.

The approach to the several problems here treated is historical, and the book is done in the grand manner of a historian dealing with ideals. One need not look here for a specific and critical exposition of the way the scientist takes life. But one can here find a highly appreciative account of the larger values of science as it leaves religion behind and forges ahead to an empirical morality.

T. V. S.

BIBLICAL ALLUSIONS IN POE. By William M. Forrest. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. 208. Price, $2.50.

This is a literary study of a literary man written essentially for the literary reader. The burden of the book is to show the shaping influence of the Bible as literature upon the productive works of the eccentric Poe, and essays as well "to bring into high relief the literary features of Scripture." "The most universally renowned of American authors" is set forth in the striking paradox of having a wide acquaintance with biblical material, making generous use of it to the point of saturation (pp. 146 ff.), and yet for all that, his own thinking was so

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little affected by this same material that he might as well have written eighteen centuries B.C. as eighteen centuries A.D. (p. 81). (A case-study worthy of psychological analysis.) Although "consistency is not to be sought in Poe" nevertheless he represents certain definite schools of thought. He was a pantheist, panpsychist, absolutist, idealist, mystic, pessimist, apocalyptist, occultist, a devout pagan, non-conformist, and above all a deeply religious soul. His ethical and religious interests lack any distinctly Christian note; they belong to any highly enlightened pagan culture (p. 18). Poe furnishes the striking instance of one who creates a world after the image of his own peculiar temperament.

VERGILIUS FERM

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: THE METHODIST FUNDAMENTAL. By Wilfred R. Wilkinson. London: Holborn Publishing House (J. Swinden), 1928. Pp. ix+248; Index. Price, 5s. net.

There is nothing original or especially striking about this volume which carries the imprint of "The Twenty-Eighth Hartley Lecture." Readers familiar with current literature on the psychology and philosophy of religion will find here the well-known views of such authors as Baron von Hügel, Höffding, Rudolf Otto, Streeter, Waterhouse, James, and others; as well as excerpts from the writings of classic mystics and the usual criticism and evaluation of the claims of mystical experiences. A genuine devotional tone pervades the whole treatment.

The author would make plain that the glory of Methodism lies in its broad but fundamental platform—the possession of a religious experience. With the single exception of its clergy, this Protestant group has never demanded a credal statement of belief as a condition to its fellowship (p. 10); but that it has made the most of its fundamental, such a typical practice as "the experience meeting" bears ample testimony. Theological and metaphysical controversies therefore lie outside its pale; for its chief concern is to foster and nurture only that which can become a fact of experience.

One wonders if historical Methodism can lay full claim to such a broad platform as the author suggests. Rather, has it not been a "certain type" of religious experience which this church set up as not only fundamental, but normative and conditional?

VERGILIUS FERM

THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1901–1902. By Ralph Clipman McDanel. "Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science," Series XLVI, No. 3. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1928. Pp. vii+166.

Because of the fact that the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1901–2 had as one of its main problems limitation of Negro suffrage, and the fact that the resulting constitution was initiated by proclamation rather than by submission to a popular vote, this study of the work of the convention and of the conditions resulting in the calling of the convention contains material of general ethical, social, and legal interest.

CHARNER M. PERRY

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KANT'S INAUGURAL DISSERTATION AND EARLY WRITINGS ON SPACE. Translated by John Handyside. Preface by Norman Kemp Smith. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1928. Pp. xii+85. Price, $2.00.

This attractive little volume but adds another debt philosophic students owe to the Open Court Publishing Company. It makes available in a competent translation and convenient form some of Kant's early writings, much needed fully to understand his later work and the morphology of his mind. There are selected passages from his *Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Force* (1747), his essay *On the First Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space* (1768), and finally his *Dissertation on the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World* (1770).

T. V. S.

REALISM. By Syed Zafarul Hasan. With a Foreword by J. A. Smith. Cambridge, England: University Press, 1928. Pp. xvi+333.

Satisfying the "realistic instinct" (pp. 1, 3, 4, etc.) is the object of all philosophy, according to the author, who has studied the realistic movement extensively in England and Germany and who is now at Aligarh University, India. The realistic dialectic, he holds, is not complete until not only the interdependence of subject and object or the directness of perception is proven, but the absolute independence of the object (pp. 10 ff., 64, 78, 106, 287 ff.; with R. B. Perry's theory the author is not content, pp. 308–10, 189). The realist who would accomplish this (and so far no one has accomplished it, according to the author) ought to show that in knowledge the object "reveals" itself or that the subject "goes out to meet" the object, i.e., transcends itself (cf. pp. 13, 16, 17, 289—perhaps the subject of a later treatise by the author?). The author traces this tendency, beginning with Descartes, Locke, Reid, and Hamilton. He thereby proceeds logically rather than chronologically (cf. p. 290), adding and synthesizing, in Rignano fashion, the progress that has been made by every thinker.

G. E. Moore's theory commands the author's greatest interest. Developing from year to year, it promises to satisfy the "overwhelming conviction," postulated by the realist (reasons on p. 229 *et al. loc.*). Considerable space of criticism and exposition is, moreover, devoted to Alexander, Holt, and Bertrand Russell. The "realism" of the German philosophers Mach, Schuppe, Avenarius, Meinong, and the phenomenology of Husserl as well as a number of other American and English realists are also discussed. Still other exponents of realism might have been mentioned or treated more fully. Yet, as far as the author's thesis is concerned, this criticism is, perhaps, not to the point.

The uniqueness of the point of view, the breadth of research as well as the clear and almost epigrammatic style make "Realism" recommendable to all students of philosophy. Valuable are the numerous references no less than the bibliography itself. Though one may disagree entirely with the author regarding the fundamental task of philosophy and the contentions on p. 289 one must fully appreciate his labors and the lack of prepossession with which he himself —as Professor J. A. Smith also notes (p. vii)—has treated thinkers not of his own mind.

KURT F. LEIDECKER

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BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE. By Florence Brewer Boeckel, Education Director of the National Council for Prevention of War. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. x+591. Price, $2.50.

Fortunately, the number of those is growing who "cannot see why active good will among men and nations is not the most natural thing in the world" and are "baffled" by "the absence of it." The cogent quotations rather than the dispassionate and matter-of-fact style of the author will shake the dogmatism of the most indolent and skeptical minds who believe that the most natural thing in the world is, in biological terms, struggle and war, in plain language, ill will.

Arguing less against war and working more for the appreciation of peace expresses the tendency of the book. Really only chapters xxii–xxv deal with the negative aspects of war. The problem, therefore, is one of educating for peace. Such is already being done on a large scale by schools, colleges, universities, churches, labor, farmers, veterans, commercial interests, women, and youth (Part II). Part IV brings programs and suggestions for individuals and organizations working for peace. However, these ought to be studied in the light of Part I, which lays down the principle that, in the modern world, individual effort is futile if it does not result in government action (consult chart, p. 11). Ways and means of such are discussed extensively in Part III. Chapters xii, xviii–xxiii especially make the application to the policies of the United States, as, e.g., the activities of the war department, the scientific treatment of immigration, the adequate definition of the Monroe doctrine, the war debt settlement, etc.

The book should prove extremely useful to students of ethics, politics, and education and to various discussion groups. For it touches a great many angles of the peace problem, gives a large bibliography, supplies many addresses, and, above all, suggests throughout practical plans to promote the much needed "world-mindedness."

KURT F. LEIDECKER

ROMANCE IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. [Criticisms of Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy* (2 vols.) and Other Papers.] By R. Nagaraja Sarma. Madras: S. Ganesan, 1928. Pp. 24.

Radhakrishnan is charged with an imperfect acquaintance with the original Sanskrit texts (pp. 6*a*, 14*b*, 20*ab*, 22*b*), garbling evidence adduced (p. 20*b*, etc.), a "rank monistic bias" (pp. 10*a*, 11*a*, 15*ab*; cf. pp. 6*a*, 9*b*, 14 ff.), and discarding Hindu tradition generally. Radhakrishnan's work has, therefore, also not been received kindly in India (p. 14*a*).

To Western minds, Radhakrishnan's concessions to Western thought are few. His work is spirited and, as such, not flawless (cf., e.g., *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXVIII, 109 ff.). Nevertheless, it has done good in creating greater interest in Indian philosophy. Indians should acknowledge that: it will surely be superseded anyway.

We should learn from these criticisms by one who, thoroughly versed in

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Eastern and Western philosophy, yet accepts Hindu traditions, that we are in need of correct translations of Sanskrit philosophic works (cf., pp. 19*b*–20, 23*b*). However, when interpreting these in order to place them on an equal footing with occidental philosophic literature, we would not suggest "parting company with Western savants" (as is implied, p. 18*b*). Rather, we would urge that, while employing Western scientific methods, the Hindu point of view be kept—not in spite of its being different from ours, but because of it. The Hindus do have a contribution to make to thought. They should, therefore, not be too timid and compromising.

KURT F. LEIDECKER

PROGRESSIVE SCHOLASTICISM. By Gerardo Bruni. Translated by John S. Zybura. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1929. Pp. xxxviii+185. Price, $1.75 net.

In view of the current suspicion that the new Scholasticism is hopelessly prejudiced by its relation to religious dogma and its adherence to a discredited philosophical system, it is interesting to find in the book under review a careful discussion of Scholasticism's relation to dogma and to the older Scholasticism. In regard to the first problem the author concludes that "Scholasticism *is a philosophy*, and represents a purely and strictly philosophical conception of the world, notwithstanding its relations with Catholic dogma," though the reviewer must admit that he cannot find this conclusion written very clearly in the detailed argument. The author's opinion in regard to the second question is that the new Scholasticism owes allegiance, not to the Scholastic "system," which became decadent in the fifteenth century, nor even to the Thomistic system, but rather to the spirit and method of Thomas and to the permanent truths embodied in his synthesis. The new Scholasticism must be eclectic, coming to grips with modern science and with all types of philosophy; and its task is preparing the way for a new synthesis, a synthesis that will be based upon the older Scholasticism but will be more than a mere restatement of the old system in modern terms and with external embellishments from modern science. One is inclined to believe that the neo-Scholastics have at least good intentions.

CHARNER M. PERRY

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NOTES

Professor Shorey reviews *Plato's Theory of Ethics* (this *Journal*, XXXIX, No. 2, 231–35), in spite of its Preface and method, from the standpoint of a professor of Greek literature. He thinks the book too long, and suggests four headings under which what he calls "the Platonic ethics" could be handled in "a dozen pages." Doubtless it could: but Professor Shorey's headings are of philological, rather than of specifically philosophical interest. Philosophers will regret that Professor Shorey has not been able to follow his distinguished colleague in Berlin[1] in recognizing the nature, legitimacy, and importance, in this field, of the analysis and synthesis which characterize philosophy.

R. C. LODGE

UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

[1] U. V. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Platon* (2d ed.), I, 3–9.

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

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NATIONAL-MINDEDNESS AND INTERNATIONAL-MINDEDNESS

GEORGE H. MEAD

IN THE year 1910, in an article entitled, "The Moral Equivalent of War," William James stated the anomaly of war in the following sentences: "There is something highly paradoxical in the modern man's relation to war. Ask our millions, north and south, whether they would vote now (were such a thing possible) to have our war for the Union expunged from history, and the record of a peaceful transition to the present time substituted for that of its marches and battles, and probably hardly a handful of eccentrics would say yes. Those ancestors, those efforts, those memories and legends, are the most ideal part of what we now own together, a sacred spiritual possession worth more than all the blood poured out. Yet ask those same people whether they would be willing in cold blood to start another civil war now to gain another similar possession, and not one man or woman would vote for the proposition."

This was written for the Association for International Conciliation and was published four years before the beginning of the Great War. If the same proposition were offered to the voters of the nations who fought through that war, I doubt if there would not be as unanimous a consensus of opinion in favor of expunging that war from history and replacing it

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by a peaceful advance toward our present day, though there might be a tough-minded group in the community who would insist that there had been gained in the awful conflict a lesson that could never have been learned in any less terrible an experience. And that lesson they would say was the duty that lies upon the society of the human race of doing away with war. We are in no mood to cover up the criminal ineptitude of warfare by the heroisms which it displays or the ideals which it may consecrate. Yet we have not become noncombatants. The country would arm to a man in a genuine war of self-defense, but the doctrine of the recently solemnized Pact of Peace, that war as a legitimate measure of public policy has been forever damned, has the full-hearted support of the communities of the Western world. And I do not think that it is the horror of human suffering, even on the colossal scale of the Great War, that has been the controlling sentiment in this almost unanimous consensus of the communities of the world. We have learned more from the published archives of Foreign Offices than we have from the records of battlefields and atrocities.

We have learned that those who controlled public policies and finally mobilized armies were utilizing fears and hatreds and cupidities and individual greeds and jealousies which were far from representing issues over which the communities themselves wished to fight or thought they were fighting. We know that even in this day a war may arise between self-governing communities, but we know also that the issues that would lead up to this war, if they could be intelligently presented to the peoples involved, would never be left to the arbitrament of the god of battles. Even national cupidity, if it exist, realizes that under present conditions a so-called successful war will cost more than it can profit. Warfare is an utterly stupid method of settling differences of interest between different nations.

Professor James's position is this, that no people would

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enter upon a war for the sake of that very ideal heritage, which they would not be willing to sacrifice after the war was fought. He did not believe that in prospect any community would regard war as a spiritually profitable undertaking. The belief I have expressed is that as regards the Great War no nation in retrospect regards the spiritual results of fighting it as a sufficient price to pay for having undergone its evils. Having stated his paradox, that while a war in retrospect may have paid a spiritual dividend which renders it a great national blessing, no war in prospect can be so assessed, Professor James advances to the explanation of war's continued existence, for we do not now maintain armies and navies for the sake of "battles long ago" but in preparation for those which may be just around the corner. I am using the word spiritual as the opposite of material. It covers every value that we cannot put into economic form.

Let us be quite clear upon the issue under discussion. It is conceded by everyone that any war but a genuinely defensive war is a prospective evil which intelligent communities will avoid. We are not entering into the contentious question whether offense is not the best method of defense, nor are we, at present, undertaking to define the field which a genuinely defensive war will defend, whether this field will include national honor and peculiar interests. We will assume that these questions have been decided in a common agreement to the satisfaction of all civilized communities. It is evident that if this fortunate position were ever attained, intelligent statesmanship would without difficulty eliminate war.

And Professor James goes on to point out the spiritual losses which society will suffer if war goes. First of all come "those ancestors, those memories and legends—the ideal part of what we now own together," the spiritual heritage from war. But it is not upon this that Professor James insists, for he admits that we cannot deliberately shape our conduct to reach these results. We cannot plan wars to obtain spiritual herit-

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ages. The important spiritual values that he spreads out which come to us from war are the hardihood of body and mind, the willingness to pay to the uttermost for a supreme value, the ability to get out of our lesser selves, the acceptance of a supreme discipline which consistently subordinates minor ends to an ultimate end, the sense of at-oneness with all others in the community in the great enterprise, that exaltation of spirit which we all know is the loftiest experience and is so rare of attainment. For these war is in some sense a school. Professor James does not discuss the seamy side of this schooling and the immense spiritual frustrations which it involves. And indeed he is not called upon to do so, since he was a pacifist and was seeking for the moral equivalent which he thought we should provide if we abandon this schooling, however costly and unintelligent it may be. For there is in his opinion nothing in an industrial civilization, which is organized for profit and comfort, whose springs of action are competition and our efforts to get ahead of our fellows, and whose great social organizations fail to sweep the individual into emotional realization of his identity with the community—nothing indeed in such a civilization that does or can provide this schooling. We conduct our government only by the use of political partisanship. The church anxiously avoids the major issues of the community. Loyalties to family, business, or schools, the more intense they are, the more exclusive are they.

Professor James's suggestion is that the youth of the country should be conscripted for useful labor, in which they would get the hardihood of body and mind which military training gives. It would be essential to the accomplishment of the purpose which Professor James had in mind that this labor should be felt by the conscripted youth to be necessary to the life of the community. They would have to feel that they were identified with the community in what they did, if they were to reach that emotional fusion which war under favorable conditions induces.

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I do not think that Professor James regarded his suggestion so much as an immediately practicable undertaking as an illustration of the type of experience which society in some fashion must bring into the lives of citizens if they are to get the qualities and training which war gives however imperfectly. What he insists upon is that the social ends and values are there and that they should enter the lives of our citizens, and that society has within its power to work out in some fashion practicable ways in which this can be accomplished. His scheme of conscription to community labor was a striking and picturesque manner of presenting what ought to be a logical part of a pacifist program.

Nearly twenty years have passed since Professor James wrote "The Moral Equivalent of War," and within those years the Great War has been fought, and has brought forth the League of Nations, the most serious undertaking to end war which international society has ever made. The attention of the pacifist is upon other things than the "moral equivalent of war." A hopeful project has been put into actual operation, and the relations of nations have been subject to a publicity and a sort of criticism which are novel in history. We have remained outside of the League of Nations because in our history we have been largely outside of the political life of Europe that led to the great catastrophe. We have been and are unwilling to enter into that complex of national, racial, and economic problems which are so foreign to us. But the outcome of the war has none the less brought us into more intimate human and economic relations with European peoples than we have occupied in the past, and the absence of imperialism in our history and our fundamental dislike of militarism inevitably arouse a sympathy with the great experiment that is being tried out at Geneva. The pacifist has a text to preach from that that he never had before and a practical program that was inconceivable twenty years ago. The somewhat embarrassing challenge which the great psychologist put up to

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him, he has pushed one side in the press of more practicable undertakings. Indeed, one re-reads the essay today with a certain sense of unreality.

Following this essay in *Memories and Studies* is an after-dinner address given by Professor James at a peace banquet. There is there the same account of human nature, bred through long centuries to fight, the same emphasis upon the failure of the pacifists' program to come to terms with the exigencies of life, and there is the same sense of the strength of the enemy —the rooted bellicosity of human nature and its demand for the thrill of battle. Said Professor James, "A deadly listlessness would come over most men's imagination of the future if they could seriously be brought to believe that never again in *saecula saeculorum* would a war trouble human history. In such a stagnant summer afternoon of a world, where would be the zest or interest?" We have had a surfeit of those thrills and have counted their cost, says the pacifist. It is not necessary to see the good in fighting any longer. The task of getting rid of it is too insistent when we have seen it and lived through it on the grand scale. There is the Peace Pact and there is the World Court, the very inception of which was American. For us to remain out of it is a scandal. In the midst of such activities, why should the pacifist stop to consider the psychology of fighting? But the challenge is still there, and it may be that the pacifist is not wisely pushing it one side, in the press of his immediately practicable undertakings. He might get a deeper insight into their import.

Let us consider the spiritual values in which war may school men and women, however costly the schooling may be. The hardihood of body and mind—the opposite of the nature of Roosevelt's "mollycoddle"—can conceivably be secured without the expense of warfare. The program suggests that of Charles Lamb, burning down the house to get a roast pig, but it points out sharply the criticism upon the present order of society. Our insistent motives to strenuous conduct are personal

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and individualistic, those of success in the competitions of business, the professions, and the social struggle. The effective public ideals are those of well-being, comfort, and that condition of body and mind in which men can enjoy life. Our social programs look to the removal of evils, sickness, misery, and drudgery. As Frederick Harrison said of the ideal of the utilitarians, they look toward a world in which everyone could be sure of smacking his lips over a good breakfast of ham and eggs. The strenuousness of life seizes upon the individual in the struggle for the means of living and competitive success, but it does not inexorably involve his public interests, until the existence of his society is threatened, and when a man becomes altruistically interested in public ends, these ends appear as the alleviation of suffering and attained enjoyments rather than as his own achievements—the concentrated interest in mastering and controlling his world.

The other values that war may foster—willingness to pay to the uttermost for supreme goods, the rising above our lower selves, the acceptance of a discipline which subordinates minor ends to ultimate ends, and the exaltation that rises from identification of one's self with all who are with him in the great enterprise—that we should look away from civil life to war to arouse these is but a further reflection upon the conscious motivation of that civil life. War presents common goods in an imperative mood, which they will not assume in peaceful times, and therefore gives them a hold upon us which they never secure in philanthropic undertakings.

Professor James, however, has painted a picture of men who enjoy fighting immediately and have the zest of violent adventure in their blood through a long physiological and social heritage—the immanent bellicosity of human nature—which I think he has overdrawn. The average man does not want to fight for the sake of fighting. Threaten him and what is precious to him and the fighting complex is indeed ready to blaze out. His interest in violent adventure is easily satisfied

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by the movie, the detective tale, and the dramas of literature and history. Professor James was himself sympathetic with the revulsion to violence from drudgery and ennui. There is a story current that after a two days' session at a Chautauqua he exclaimed, "O, for an Armenian massacre!" But I do not think that in the interests of peace we have to combat a fundamental instinct of bloodshed. If the bare interest in slaughtering our fellows were so immediate, the campaigns of Army and Navy Leagues would be much simpler and much less expensive. The case for war does not lie in the fighting itself, but in that for which war compels us to fight.

Professor James then calls the attention of his fellow-pacifists to war as a schoolmaster that succeeds, at least on occasions, in making the public good the intense interest of the individual, in enforcing a discipline which reduces minor ends into subordination to a supreme end, and finally in arousing an exaltation of spirit that springs from identification of one's self with the community for which he is ready to make the supreme sacrifice, and points out that as long as human nature responds almost instinctively to the call to arms and as long as there is no other undertaking that accomplishes this for the whole community those who would abolish war must offer some moral equivalent for war or render a reason for the sacrifice. War on occasions makes the good of the community the supreme good of the individual. What has the pacifist who would abolish war to put in its place?

In a word we make the public good our immediate interest when it arouses the fighting spirit. Otherwise it is apt to be a philanthropic good, to reach which we must put one side our private interests. To be interested in the public good we must be disinterested, that is, not interested in goods in which our personal selves are wrapped up. In wartime we identify ourselves with the nation, and its interests are the interests of our primal selves. And in the fighting mood we find that we are in sympathetic accord with all others who are fighting for the

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same cause. Then we experience the thrill of marching in common enthusiasm with all those who in daily life are our competitors, our possible rivals, and opponents. The barriers are down which we erect against our neighbors and business associates. In daily life they may be hostile to our interests. We proceed warily. We protect ourselves even against our partners, associates, and employees with contracts and agreements defended with penalties. Even our good manners are means of keeping possible bores at a distance. It is sound sense to regard everyone as a possible enemy. In wartime these barriers are down. We need to feel the support of our fellows in the struggle and we grapple them to ourselves. The great issue itself is hallowed by the sense of at-oneness of a vast multitude.

It is easy to study this in everyday situations. Gather ten or fifteen of your acquaintances and make the subject of your conversation the admirable qualities and services of some one known to all. Then change the subject of converse to someone for whom all have a common dislike, and note how much warmer is the sense of at-oneness of those who are engaged in common disparagement than in encomium. The hostile attitude is peculiarly favorable to social cohesion. The solid South is the product of common hostility to the negro as a social equal. The Ku Klux Klan is a deliberate manufacture of compact groups by the use of racial and religious antipathies. I think it is worth our while to make some inquiry into this cohesive power, which the hostile impulse in human nature exercises with such absolute authority.

We have long known that behind the spiritual exaltation of wartime patriotism and the irresponsibility of mob-consciousness lies the same psychological mechanism. And this fact is a ground neither for extolling it nor for damning it. It is just a psychological mechanism which like other mechanisms has served both fine and ignoble ends. It is equally inept to define, with Dr. Johnson, patriotism as the last refuge of the scoundrel, and to exalt Judge Lynch as the embodiment of

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social justice. But it is both apt and obligatory upon us to examine this mechanism when we are not caught in its meshes, and are free to comprehend it; for when we are involved in it, it is next to impossible to approach it with impartial consideration. Neither the patriot in his moment of exaltation nor the member of the blind mob in his unrestrained ferocity is capable of following the dictum: Know thyself. He may conceivably get outside of his intoxication, but he is then engaged in controlling his passionate impulses. He is in no mood to understand them.

I have already indicated the character of this mechanism. The hostile impulse unites us against the common enemy, because it has force enough to break down customary social textures, by which we hold others at a distance from our inexpugnable selves. But it was this social structure by which we realized ourselves. Our rights and our privileges, our distinctions of capacity and skill, our superiorities and our inferiorities, our social positions and prestige, our manners and our foibles not only distinguish and separate us from others but they constitute us what we are to ourselves. They constitute our individualities, the selves that we recognize, when we thank God that we are not as other men are, and when we determine upon what terms we can live and work with members of our families, with our neighbors and our countrymen. If these are in any degree broken down we are no longer the same individuals that we were. To join ourselves with others in the common assault upon the common foe we have become more than allies, we have joined a clan, have different souls, and have the exuberant feeling of being at one with this community.

There lie in all of us both of these attitudes. It is only in our common interests and our identities with others that there is found the stuff out of which social selves are made—and it is only in distinguishing and protecting these selves from others that we exercise the self-consciousness that makes us responsible and rational beings.

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But even the apparatus of this self-consciousness we have borrowed from the community. What are our rights in which we defend ourselves against all comers, but the rights which we recognize in others, that ours may be recognized by others? What are our peculiar powers and capacities but the facilities by which we perform our parts in common undertakings, and where would they be if others did not recognize them and depend upon them? The proudest assertion of independent selfhood is but the affirmation of a unique capacity to fill some social rôle. Even the man who haughtily withdraws himself from the crowd, thinks of himself in terms of an ideal community which is but a refinement of the world in which he lives. It is by assuming the common attitudes to each other, which an organized community makes possible, that we are able to address ourselves in the inner forum of our thoughts and private purposes. A self is a composite or interaction of these two parts of our natures—the fundamental impulses which make us co-operating neighbors and friends, lovers and parents and children, and rivals, competitors, and enemies; on the other side the evocation of this self which we achieve when we address ourselves in the language which is the common speech of those about us. We talk to ourselves, ask ourselves what we will do under certain conditions, criticize and approve of our own suggestions and ideas, and in taking the organized attitudes of those engaged in common undertakings we direct our own impulses. These two parts are the matter and the form of the self, if I may use Aristotelian phraseology. The one is the stuff of social impulses and the other is the power which language has conferred upon us, of not only seeing ourselves as others see us but also of addressing ourselves in terms of the common ideas and functions which an organized society makes possible. We import the conversation of the group into our inner sessions and debate with ourselves. But the concatenated concepts which we use are ours because we are speaking in the language of the outer universe of discourse, the organized human world to which we belong.

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In the sophisticated field of self-consciousness we control our conduct. We place ourselves over against other selves and determine what we want to do, what we have a right to do, and what other people may do. Here we assert ourselves and maintain ourselves by recognized rights and accorded privileges. In the field of the stuff—the matter—of personality we have no such power. We are born with our fundamental impulses. We choose our business associates and the members of our clubs and the guests at our dinner parties, but we *fall in* love, and whatever action we take upon this primal premiss, it is not a matter of our own choice. We say that we instinctively help a child who has fallen down, and our immediate attitudes toward puppies, kittens, and little pigs are different from those we take toward dogs, cats, and hogs, and the impulse to helpfulness is just as much an endowment as the impulse of hostility. This primal stuff of which we are made up is not under our direct control. The primitive sexual, parental, hostile, and co-operative impulses out of which our social selves are built up are few—but they get an almost infinite field of varied application in society, and with every development of means of intercourse, with every invention they find new opportunities of expression. Here by taking thought we can add to our social stature. But we have no direct control over our loves and our hates, our likes and our dislikes, and for this reason we are relatively helpless when a common enemy fuses us all into a common patriotic pack or stampedes us under the influence of sympathetic terror.

This, then, is the stuff out of which human social selves are made up, their primal stuff or matter of social impulses, and the form of sophisticated self-consciousness. But society is the interaction of these selves, and an interaction that is only possible if out of their diversity unity arises. We are indefinitely different from each other, but our differences make interaction possible. Society is unity in diversity. However there is always present the danger of its miscarriage. There are the two

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sources of its unity—the unity arising from the interconnection of all the different selves in their self-conscious diversity and that arising from the identity of common impulses; the unity, for example, of the members of a great highly organized industrial concern or of the faculties and the students of a great university and the unity of a crowd that rushes to save a child in danger of its life. By these two principles of unity society is maintained; but there is an ever present risk of failure. Every society has it at the back of its mind. We want security and we distrust it. Society in every period of its history has presented to itself that danger in one form or another. Today we dread the Bolsheviki. At another time it has been the "interests"; at times the mob, and at other times the arbitrary power of a monarch.

We come back to our original question, How shall we get and maintain that unity of society in which alone we can exist? The ever present method of creating cohesion from below, from the impulses, is found in the common hostile impulse. The criticisms which are exercised upon the civil motives are but illustrations of this. Government is by partisanship. We can bring the voters to the polls only through their hostility to opposite parties. A campaign for a community chest is quickened by competitive teams. The great days of the religions have been the days of hostility, between the religions, between the Church and the sects, or between different churches. The fight with the devil and all his angels united men whom a common hope of salvation left untouched. More evident still is the need of the fighting attitude when a large community with varied groups and opposing interests is to be brought into a self-conscious whole. The antagonism of the Chinese to the Japanese and the English did more than anything else to awaken a Chinese national spirit. In our Civil War slavery was the issue, because it divided the nation. Men of the North fought for the Union and in fighting for it they felt it. The readiest way of arousing an emotional appre-

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ciation of a common issue is to fight together for that issue, and until we have other means of attaining it we can hardly abandon war.

It is not a question of thrills nor of satisfying a deep-seated bellicosity in the human animal. It is a question of making ourselves actually feel the values that are wrapped up in the community. While war was still a possible national adventure, there was a certain rough psychological justification for the dictum, that at least one war in a generation was essential for the spiritual hygiene of the nation. The toleration of secret diplomacy, the cherishing of national honor and peculiar interests as lying outside the field of negotiation had behind it an obscure but profound feeling that in national honor and in these peculiar interests were symbolized a national unity which could be made precious by the arbitrament of war.

What better illustration of this can be found than in the Monroe Doctrine? None are agreed upon what the doctrine is. The nations of South and Central America in whose interests it was inaugurated with one voice denounce it. It is absurd to say that we can find an issue in the threatened neighborhood on this hemisphere of European powers, when our continent-wide, unfortified Canadian frontier, within the century and more since it was established, is almost the only frontier in the whole wide world that has not been crossed by belligerent forces. No, it is something—no matter what it is—for which we will *fight*. To think of it in these terms is to feel that there is a nation back of it. The more unintelligible the issue is, the more it emphasizes the unanimity of the community. It is an issue that cannot be discussed for we cannot in cold blood find out what the issue is. We must be of one mind about it, for it is impossible to have different minds about that which no one can comprehend. The only issue involved in the Monroe Doctrine is this, are you a patriot, are you a red-blooded American, or are you a mollycoddle? Let us get down to real rea-

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sons and abandon good reasons. Even when we hope that there may be no future wars, we feel that we should keep certain issues which can arouse the fighting spirit, for the sake of their effect in drawing men together in a fashion which cannot be achieved by public interests, which are after all so divisive.

I take it that this is the real question that is put up to us by Professor James's moral equivalent of war. Can we find outside of the fighting spirit that unifying power which presents a supreme issue to which all others are subordinated, which will harden us to undergo everything, and unite us in the enthusiasm of a common end?

> When I have borne in memory what has tamed
> Great Nations, how ennobling thoughts depart
> When men change swords for ledgers, and desert
> The student's bower for gold, some fears unnamed
> I had, my Country—am I to be blamed?

There is nothing in the history of human society nor in present-day experience which encourages us to look to the primal impulse of neighborliness for such cohesive power. The love of one's neighbor cannot be made into a common consuming passion. The great religions that have sought to embody it when they have dominated society have appeared as the Church militant. Auguste Comte, the great French sociologist and philosopher, sought to fashion a universal religion out of it. It gathered a handful of great souls into its communion. How widespread was its sweep of the community may be indicated by the tale that, in London, a gathering of the Comtists took place within which a schism arose. For even in this church sects appeared. A London wag reported that the members of the convention gathered in one cab and came away in two. There is, to be sure, no falling off in numbers of those who identify themselves with different Christian sects in the Western world, but there never was a time when the churches have had less power in organizing the community

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into common action. We can unite with common zeal to aid the victims of famines, of earthquakes, and of conflagrations, but we do not go into nor come out of such common undertakings with a sense of the supremacy of the nation or society that holds us together. The passion of love between the sexes isolates those whom it consumes, and family life segregates us. The positive social impulses exhibit no forces that bind us immediately together in conscious devotion to the complex community out of which our sophisticated selves arise. They have their place in the cults, mores, and customs that form the tissue of human society, but they do not flame out into a patriotism that can fuse men in the devotion to the fatherland.

The Great War has presented not a theory but a condition. If war were a possible measure of public policy, it might be kept for the sake of social cohesion, even if the ends for which wars are ostensibly fought were illusory and inadequate. But the Great War has made this no longer possible. Every war if allowed to go the accustomed way of wars will become a world war, and every war pursued uncompromisingly and intelligently must take as its objective the destruction not of hostile forces but of enemy nations in their entirety. It has become unthinkable as a policy for adjudicating national differences. It has become logically impossible. This is not to say that it may not arise. Another catastrophe may be necessary before we have cast off the cult of warfare, but we cannot any longer *think* our international life in terms of warfare. It follows that if we do *think* our national and international life, we can no longer depend upon war for the fusion of disparate and opposing elements in the nation. We are compelled to reach a sense of being a nation by means of rational self-consciousness. We must *think* ourselves in terms of the great community to which we belong. We cannot depend upon feeling ourselves at one with our compatriots, because the only effective feeling of unity springs from our common response against

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the common enemy. No other social emotion will melt us into one. Instead of depending upon a national soul we must achieve national-mindedness.

Professor James seems to have thought that we might substitute some other cult for the cult of warfare and reach the same emotional result—the cult of youth conscripted to necessary social labor. But cults are not deliberately created in this fashion. Plato admitted this. He needed a set of cults for his ideal state, but he was compelled to postulate them as already in being. Even his philosopher king could not legislate cults into existence. Mussolini refuses to recognize the logic of the situation. He is depending upon the hostile impulse to fuse his Fascist state, and he is compelled to talk in terms of wars. He has to quicken imaginations with pictures of Roman conquests, and the threat of full panoplied legions. He is undertaking to arouse an Italian soul, not to fashion an Italian mind. He is, undoubtedly, very far from wanting the wars whose threat helps to hold this society together, for nothing would more certainly shatter it than the operation of a modern war; but he can safely threaten for a while, in a Europe whose surrounding populations have had a surfeit of fighting. The task of becoming nationally minded is then that which the outcome of the Great War is imposing upon us.

We enter upon our civil conflicts with the comfortable sense of a sovereign state behind us endowed with supreme and ultimate force to compel adherence to law and order. This state can if necessary call out the national troops to enforce the unity of the community which conflicting interests may have threatened. Can we keep this sort of state unless it is endowed with an army trained to fight the country's wars? A police force, even a national police force, is not an army. The dread sovereignty of the state is evidenced in troops trained to the unthinking obedience which warfare enforces. If we are compelled to surrender war with the blind military obedience which it puts into the hands of the state, we will be

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compelled to think out rational solutions of our civil quarrels and think them out a good deal more quickly. It is a great deal easier to feel than it is to think. It is a great deal easier to be angry with one's enemy than to sift the grounds of one's quarrel and find the basis for a reasonable solution. And if you can find grounds for making your enemy the enemy of the community—a Bolshevik, for example—the procedure is still easier. To use the mind with which the community has endowed you to compass the common interests rather than as a means of pursuing your own interest is a strenuous affair, and this is what it means to become nationally minded. Let me repeat if we surrender war there is no way of maintaining national unity except in discovering that unity in the midst of the diversity of individual concerns. There *is* a common good in which we are involved, and if society is still to exist we must discover it with our heads. We cannot depend upon our diaphragms and the visceral responses which a fight sets in operation.

There is something profoundly pathetic in the situation of great peoples, that have been struggling up through long centuries of fighting and its attendant miseries, coming closer and closer to each other in their daily life, fashioning unwittingly larger racial, lingual, liturgical, confessional, political, and economic communities, and realizing only intermittently the spiritual life which this larger community confers upon them, and realizing it only when they could fight for it. The pathos comes out most vividly in the nationalisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These nationalisms have meant the sudden realization that men belonged to communities that transcended their groups, families, and clans. They had attained selves through which they entered into relation with their common nationals, and the only way in which they could seize upon and enjoy this new spiritual experience was in the fight for its symbols, their common language and literature, and their common political organizations. The pathos

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lies in the inability to feel the new unity with the nation except in the union of arms. It is not that men love fighting for its own sake, but they undergo its rigors for the sake of conjunction with all those who are fighting in the same cause. There is only one solution for the problem and that is in finding the intelligible common objects, the objects of industry and commerce, the common values in literature, art, and science, the common human interests which political mechanisms define and protect and foster. But all these values are at first divisive. They appear at first as individual and class interests and at first one fights for them and against others who threaten them. The rational attitude is to find what common values lie back of the divisions and competitions. Within our communities the process of civilization is the discovery of these common ends which are the bases of social organizations. In social organization they come to mean not opposition but diverse occupations and activities. Difference of function takes the place of hostility of interest. The hard task is the realization of the common value in the experience of conflicting groups and individuals. It is the only substitute. In civilized communities while individuals and classes continue to contend, as they do, with each other, it is with the consciousness of common interests that are the bases both for their contentions and their solutions. The state is the guardian of these common interests, and its authority lies in the universal interest of all in their maintenance. The measure of civilization is found in the intelligence and will of the community in making these common interests the means and the reason for converting diversities into social organization.

The Great War has posed the problem before contending nations of carrying civilization into the community of nations; that is, it has left us with the demand for international-mindedness. The moral equivalent of war is found in the intelligence and the will both to discover these common interests between contending nations and to make them the basis for the

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solution of the existing differences and for the common life which they will make possible.

This is the moral equivalent of war if the office of war is to adjust international differences. As an adjudicator war is utterly discredited since, as I have said, if war is logically pursued it leaves nothing to be adjudicated, not even the enemy nations themselves. However, it has not been the peace treaties after hostilities have ceased that have been the valuable contributions which warfare has made to human history. Professor James has indicated them—the spiritual heritage of devotions and heroisms and the consecrations of national values which occupy the most precious pages in history, and the emotional exaltation which accompanies the merging of a crowd of discrete individuals into a living union of men with a single purpose. These are the by-products of war which are in themselves invaluable, but to compass which no people would deliberately undertake war. This constitutes the paradox with which Professor James opened the discussion of his theme. It is a paradox the full depth of which he did not sound. The lying secret diplomacies, the exasperations of suppressed minorities, the profiteering of individuals and combines, the underhand conservation of selfish interests, which men have allowed in the past and still in a measure allow because they keep war as a valued possibility to hold the nation together—this is a stranger paradox. Must we simply surrender the values which we dare not directly invoke?

It is a question that concerns both ethics and psychology. The answer of ethics has already been given. The spiritual losses of war in prospect enormously outweigh any estimate we dare put upon these by-products. The psychological solution Professor James sought in a somewhat fantastic cult of youth conscripted for social labor. He would substitute a harmless cult for one that is extremely hazardous. We have seen that cults cannot be manufactured to order. The willingness of the communities of the world to keep up the apparatus

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of fighting and the threat of war is an advertisement both of the supreme value of the larger national self and the extreme difficulty of bringing the citizen to realize it. What Professor James saw was that it was only in war that public interests do not leave men cold. The war taxes are the only taxes that are willingly paid. It is still so much easier to revert to the old dispensation and chant with the Psalmist that our God is a man of war.

What I am seeking to bring out is that the chief difficulty in attaining international-mindedness does not lie in the clash of international interests but in the deep-seated need which nations feel of being ready to fight, not for ostensible ends but for the sake of the sense of national unity, of self-determination, of national self-respect that they can achieve in no other way so easily as in the readiness to fight.

National-mindedness and international-mindedness are inextricably involved in each other. Stable nations do not feel the need in any such degree as those that are seeking stability. It was the militaristic fusing of the German nation out of separate German states by Bismarck's policy of blood and iron and the fusion of a vast backward community of Russian peasants by a Czardom with a pan-Slavic battle-cry that played a great part in the origins of the Great War. When the French are convinced that the German nation no longer needs to threaten her neighbors in order that she may feel her own national self, the fears of France will subside. Bismarck's proud sentence—Germany fears God and no one else on earth—was the challenge of a nation that dared not disarm because it feared internal disintegration. Bismarck's God was a man of war, that was the reflex of an international inferiority complex.

The outlawry of war as proclaimed in the Peace Pact goes then only halfway toward its great goal. It will be presumably approved by the nations of the world. So far as ostensible international differences are concerned, the peoples of the

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Western world are agreed that they should be settled by some method of negotiation, and that war to this end is no longer a policy which civilized nations may pursue. Self-defense remains a permissible ground for fighting, but with no war of offense there would be none of defense, and wars would vanish with the development of adequate means of negotiation, but we are not willing to have the readiness to fight disappear. So we retain national honor and peculiar interests. Why cannot these be adjudicated as well? Because these touch the sense of national self-respect. As long as we have these provisos, we have the proud sense of being willing to fight—to stake everything upon the assertion of national selfhood. It was this sense which President Wilson's unfortunate phrase offended—being too proud to fight. It was seemingly a phrase that contained a contradiction in terms. Pride predicates a fighting-spirit.

Now, if I am not mistaken such an attitude at the present period in human history is a revelation of an uncertainty of national selfhood and a grasping after the approved means of securing it—the wartime spirit. For at this period of the world's history there is no point of national honor and peculiar interest which is not as open to reasonable negotiation in a community of self-respecting nations as any of the so-called justiciable and negotiable issues, if we were sure of ourselves. But we are not sure of our national selves, and a certain amount of national psychoanalysis would be very valuable if not very probable. One thing, however, is clear, that we cannot attain international-mindedness until we have attained a higher degree of national-mindedness than we possess at present; and a rough gauge of it will be found in the necessity of retaining national honor and peculiar interests as *causae belli*.

Such a formulation seems to imply that if we were willing to get down to real reasons and abandon good reasons, if we were willing to be really reasonable we could immediately banish the threat of war from our international and our national life. I do not believe that this is the case. Civilization

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is not an affair of reasonableness; it is an affair of social organization. The selfhood of a community depends upon such an organization that common goods do become the ends of the individuals of the community. We know that these common goods are there, and in some considerable degree we can and do make them our individual ends and purposes, to such a degree that we have largely banished private warfare from the recognized methods of maintaining self-respect in civil conflicts. But there are still great gaps in our social organization, notably between our producers and the social service which they perform. Here there are groups that have to assure themselves of their self-respect by fighting on occasions. The labor unions and the employers as well preserve their solidarity, that is their sense of common selfhood, by the mechanism of hostility, that is by the threats of strikes and lockouts. Back of it lies the inability of the laborer to realize himself in the social process in which he is engaged. Where such a situation becomes acute, men, if they can, will always bind themselves together by hostile organizations to realize their common purposes and ends and thus assure themselves the selfhood which society denies them. Men will always jealously maintain and guard this mechanism to assure themselves to themselves. We will get rid of the mechanism of warfare only as our common life permits the individual to identify his own ends and purposes with those of the community of which he is a part and which has endowed him with a self.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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PSYCHOLOGY AND HEDONISM[1]

W. B. MAHAN

ONE of the most interesting phases of the current stage of philosophic theory is the effort to base certain philosophic interpretations on psychological facts and principles. Nowhere is this tendency more clearly exhibited than in the common criticisms of hedonism. So effective has the criticism been in this case that those few in our day who defend hedonism against its critics ignore the psychological attacks and by silence affirm their effectiveness.[2] Now this appeal to psychological facts as a refutation of hedonism would imply that the facts are *there,* self-revealing and undisputed, and that all the philosopher has to do is to fit his ideal to them. But all too often the psychology of a philosopher is simply his own logical interpretation of human nature.

If we examine the current psychological literature, we fail to find the *facts* to which our ideal must conform. The three psychological facts to which the antihedonists usually appeal are the nature of desire, the existence of mental states, and the rôle of feeling. Curiously enough there are no topics upon which psychologists seem to be in more thorough disagreement, both as to experimental data and as to their interpretation. In current psychological literature it is difficult even to find the term "desire." It is sometimes classified as a waste-basket term with the implication that it is too loose for scientific usage. What passes under the name of desire, however, belongs to the general problem of human motivation, and concerning it there are innumerable theories. Among these, how-

[1] Read in part before the Western Philosophical Association, University of Cincinnati, 1929, and listed, after publication, as *Research Paper No. 111, Journal Series, University of Arkansas.*

[2] See R. M. Blake, "Why Not Hedonism? A Protest" in this *Journal,* October, 1926.

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ever, the theories of Professors Thorndike and Troland may be classified as expositions of the pleasure[3] hypothesis. As to mental states, they have certainly not gone out of style in psychology. The extreme behaviorists deny them and some functionalists ignore them; but the majority of psychologists accept their existence and center the dispute about their importance, their number, and their relations. The meaning and status of feeling is the most controversial of all, as the recent Wittenberg Symposium illustrates.[4] Thus it seems rather difficult for a theory to violate facts about human nature which are non-existent.

It is indeed unfortunate that in the very instance in which ethics needs psychology most the psychologists are in the greatest disagreement. Such psychological factors as human motivation, feelings, and the like, are the basic ones for ethics, and it is precisely on these topics that definite knowledge is lacking. Obviously, the present paper is unable to offer a "proof" of hedonism on psychological grounds. What it will endeavor to show is that hedonism may possess just as sound a psychological basis as any other theory. Much use has been made of psychological arguments in the attacks on hedonism, and if it can be shown that the hedonic theory is in just as good psychological standing as any other theory of ethics its case will not have been proved but it will have been advanced. Toward this purpose the following considerations are presented.

The problem of desire is the crucial one. As stated in the foregoing, the term "desire" is a difficult one to treat psychologically. It is a concept having a long history, possessing many and various connotations, and yielding to all sorts of applications and interpretations. Its almost complete absence in current psychological literature is due partly to its loose mean-

[3] Throughout this article the term *pleasure* is intended to include its opposite, *unpleasantness* or *displeasure*.

[4] M. L. Reymert (editor), *Feelings and Emotions*.

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ing, partly to its complexity, and partly to its dependence on the problem of human motivation which needs a more refined meaning than the word desire can supply. What follows, therefore, can in no sense be said to be a psychological analysis of desire. It is rather an attempt to formulate a theory of desire which will not do an injustice to any known psychological data and which will at the same time at least show its compatibility with hedonism.

A desire, whatever else it may be, must be a mental state. It is possible to deny mental states, and some schools of psychology do deny them. Their denial, however, deprives ethics of its content, and spells death to such things as desires, purposes, activities, ends, goals, ideals, and judgments. One has only to read the literature of extreme behaviorism to see this fact abundantly illustrated. Interpreting value and motives in terms of biology may be well and good; but such procedure is not psychological. If the term desire is used at all in a psychological sense, it simply is a mental state. Taking this for granted, one may say that desire belongs to the general field of human motivation which may be characterized in terms of various phases or stages of complexity such as motives, desires, purposes. The point to be emphasized is not the names of these stages but the fact that there are stages.

There are, however, certain characteristics that are common to all human motivation. One is the circular character of the process or behavior involved; another is the dynamic nature of the process; a third is the fact that a certain transcendence is involved in the life-history of a motive, and the fourth is that the process *begins* and *ends* in a mental state. These properties can best be explained together. In so far as it is conscious, all human motivation is a mental state. All motives direct themselves toward their elimination. In so far as the individual has had previous experience with the motive in question he is engaged not only in the elimination of the present mental state (motive) but also in the acquisition of

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another mental state. Hence motives are dynamic in that they bring certain behavior into being and keep it going; the presence of a motive is indicative of an unsatisfactory mental state and the resulting behavior is engaged in its removal and replacement. When the motive is "satisfied," it disappears. Thus the motive may be said to lead to behavior which kills the motive. Finally, the satisfaction of a motive involves a certain transcendence in that the motive must go beyond itself to find the conditions of its release and in that the release itself involves the passing of the original mental state into another. Surely it is the satisfaction of the motive—the resulting mental state which the motive produces—which governs it and constitutes its value rather than the transcendent objects or instruments by means of which it is released. Thus a hungry person may ransack the house for food; but neither the various movements he performs in his search nor the objects of food he may discover can in any fundamental sense be called the end, purpose, or value of the motive. Instruments and objects of a different character can frequently produce the same results. Experiments on psychological patterns have shown that the pattern of an experience can remain constant although its objects vary. The value lies in the consequent mental state. The course of a motive is thus circular: it begins as a disagreeable mental state; it moves on certain transcendent objects and conditions which will remove the disagreeableness, and ends with the elimination of itself in the rise of a new mental state which can be described as satisfactory or pleasant.

When motives and their realization have been frequently experienced, plans and means of satisfying them may arise in the individual. Symbols of these plans may develop. Motives that are persistent or dominant may be called desires, and desires the means of whose realization take on symbolic form may be called purposes or ideals. A purpose or ideal is, then, a dominant or persistent motive whose end and the means of

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realizing it are foreseen in terms of symbols. Since the end of the motive may thus be present in symbol (purpose), the latter may properly be called a part of the motive. Being a part of the motive, its aim, so to speak, is to eliminate itself. In purposes and ideals, as well as in lower phases of motives, the consummation is to be found in the mental state resulting, not in the purpose itself nor in the objects through which the purpose operates. A purpose cannot, therefore, properly be called an immediate or direct experience since its locus of value is outside itself. It is primarily referential or symbolical—pointing to something *else*. This something else is another mental state, not the objects through which this mental state may arise.

An individual may, for example, have a purpose to go through college. At the time of the formulation of the purpose, his mental state should be described as disagreeable inasmuch as the purpose stands for an unrealized experience—lack of a college education; it should be characterized as dynamic in so far as it moves him or attempts to move him out of the present experience. The symbolic representation (and, for that matter, the actual performance) of the means of releasing this purpose in the form of attending college, studying, listening to lectures, and so on, would not constitute the value of the purpose. That would lie in the acquisition of another mental state of which they might or might not be an indispensable means. There is accordingly nothing in the nature of motives, desires, or purposes which is inconsistent with hedonism. Through past experience one forms ideals and purposes; past experience may have taught us to value mental states in terms of pleasantness and unpleasantness so that in the present one may seek to retain the former and remove the latter.[5] This

[5] It can be argued that all motives are disagreeable in the sense that they characterize a present experience from which release is sought. To the objection that the anticipatory realization is agreeable the reply could be that the agreeableness is a direct, immediate, non-transcendent, enjoyed experience and not, properly speaking, a part of the motive. A situation in which one was in an agreeable state but pur-

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hypothesis is argued with great force and persuasiveness in a recent book by Troland called *Fundamentals of Human Motivation.*

If the foregoing analysis of desire and purpose is plausible, it offers a solution of the hedonistic paradox in so far as the paradox consists in arguing that the value of a situation and the attention to that situation must have the same locus. The paradox is really too comprehensive. One cannot realize oneself by attending to oneself; nor perfect character by attending to character; nor harmonize one's desires by attending to the harmony. Psychologically speaking, one cannot gain any objective by attending solely to that objective; but it does not thereby follow that there is no objective or that this objective is not governing attention wherever it is. The difficulty lies in the confusion of the motive (as stimulus to action), the objects and instruments by which this motive is released, and the end-product, or result, or objective, which is accomplished. As stated in the foregoing, motives are always transcendent (1) in that they are released in objects, and (2) in that the releasing of the motive produces a new mental state. In the discharge of a motive attention is always centered on the object. The important psychological question is concerned with the law that governs the attentive process, not with *what* one attends to. The ethical problem is to discover what factor or factors in the situation contain the value. The answer to both is the same: it is the end-result or consequent mental state. The paradox lies in conceiving any other relationship.

Attention is the functional direction of a mental state on an object or on another mental state treated as an object. In the case of motives its function is to facilitate the bringing into existence of another mental state. In this respect attention is just a description of the dynamic phase of a motive.

posing to prolong it could be explained in the same way: the given pleasantness would not be a part of the purpose since it would involve no transcendence. An absolutely pleasant experience would present no motive whatsoever.

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Wherever there is attention there is transcendence in that there is a special act of attending, a special object attended to, and an end or objective to be attained. Attention thus exists as part of the cognitive or representational character of mental processes. Stout describes it in this way: "Attention is activity; and it is the essence of activity that it should be directed toward an end. . . . . It follows from it (his previous analysis) that every specific process of attention tends to bring about its own cessation. It tends to 'run down' like a watch. Its end in a teleological sense is also its end as an occurrence in time."[6] Although Stout does not argue that the end of the attentive process is pleasure, his analysis is relevant in that it does locate the value of attention *outside* the attentive process—in a certain resulting mental state, and this is our point. If immediate experience of some sort controls the attentive state, it cannot itself be an attentive state. Pleasure, being a direct non-cognitive experience, can never be the *object* of attention in the sense that attention is directed upon it, but it can be the *objective* of attention in the sense that it is the state which controls the attentive process and in which that process issues. The pleasant experience itself is anoetic; it is immediate and has no referential, and hence no attentive, characteristics at all. It is an experience, not the object of experience.

If the good is some sort of immediate experience and if immediate experience is a certain type of mental state, then hedonism is no more troubled with egoism than any other theory which makes goodness concrete and immediate. Under any theory of concrete goodness, values can be experienced only by individuals; and these concrete experiences may be called unique. Now the difficulty which the antihedonist sees here is that since pleasure is the value and at the same time is immediate and concrete, it is an altogether different thing (in value) from the idea of a sum of pleasure for all, which is a

[6] *Analytic Psychology*, I, 189–90.

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universal. A certain epistemological stultification is asserted in defining pleasure as concrete and idealizing it as universal. This criticism implies, in the first place, that an ideal or idea cannot represent an immediate non-ideational experience. It implies, in the second place, that the representation is not a representation but is in fact *the thing* represented. The difficulty with the first implication is that it proves too much; the trouble with the second is that it would completely eliminate obvious distinctions.

If an idea of a sum of pleasures cannot represent concrete pleasures in a genuine and real sense, it would seem to follow by the same logic that no immediate experience whatever could be represented. Taken strictly, it would mean that one could not even be an egoist. In the individual's own biography the concrete immediate character of his value-pleasures (or any other immediate value) would be on a different level from his *idea* of the greatest possible value for himself. One would be immediate and direct; the other indirect and universal; and there could be no meeting place. The way out of such a situation is never to get into it. The very distinction between value and non-value, between idea and immediacy, between data and their meaning, between particulars and universals *presupposes* the existence of them all, and a certain rational connection between them which enables us to talk about them, identify them, and discriminate between them. Psychology as a science would be impossible without the assumption that there are immediate experiences which can be adequately known through universals both by the subject which possesses them and by others. Introspection of colors, tastes, sounds, etc., illustrates this quite clearly.

The second criticism argues that because the universal and particular are on different levels, the former has to be identical with the latter or else stultify its meaning. Obviously the idea of a sum of pleasure is not itself pleasure; neither is the idea of the kingdom of heaven actually the kingdom of heaven; nor

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the idea (or ideal) of the social happiness actually that happiness. So eager have been the antihedonists to demolish the pleasure theory that they have forgotten Kant's scathing refutation of this sort of argument. An idea or ideal, of course, is never the object for which it stands and to which it refers. In any theory of value which is non-ideational and psychological, the idea is instrumental. It has value through delegated authority; it is a messenger of value. (One may be said to *live in one's ideals* and that they are thus intrinsic. In this instance, however, the ideals would cease to be referential and ideational and would become direct, immediate, and actual—for the person concerned.) The very fact that we have deliberate and conscious ideals indicates that there is something lacking: we want what we have not, the greatest pleasure, the sum of pleasure. If we had the pleasures (or any values) we should not frame ideals about them. We should have no need of ideals. The ideals are the instrumentalities in securing the values, and are not themselves the values. Hence the criticism that there is epistemological difficulty in passing from concrete to universal pleasure is inadequate unless one is prepared to apply it to all particulars and universals.

All one really needs is the assumption that the idea of a sum of pleasures can be a symbolic representation of concrete experiences which, if had, would possess value. One doesn't really desire the *idea* of a sum of pleasures; one desires the pleasures for which the idea of a sum is a symbol. Not to grant this assumption—that an immediate experience can retain its uniqueness and at the same time be adequately represented in idea—would imply for ethics a non-immediate goodness and for psychology a death-knell. To state this is not to prove that hedonism is sound, but simply that this particular objection cannot be confined to hedonism alone. If ideas can represent immediate experiences in any sense and at the same time not be those experiences, then the burden of proof is on him who would make pleasure an exception to this procedure.

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Exactly the same analysis can be made with reference to the altruistic character of pleasure. To present the problem in terms of the ego-alter dilemma is to give it a false setting, although even here there have been plausible solutions in terms of empathy, overlapping of minds, enlarged personality, and the like. The real problem, however, does not lie in bridging the gap between one mind and another, but in the relation of meaning to data, of idea to direct experience. The distinction between self and others presupposes at least sufficient knowledge to make the distinction. One must pass epistemologically into the other in order to be an egoist. If it is possible to be an egoist, it must also be possible to be an altruist. Both are on a reflective or ideational level; both are transcendent in character in that they represent the symbolizing in idea of experiences that refer beyond them. Psychologically, there is good ground for assuming that we know other minds before we know our own. It is true that all knowing, desiring, and feeling are located in individual consciousness: they issue from personal selves; but they are not thereby enclosed in a personal self.

Pleasure as a direct experience, as an egoistic ideal, and as a universalistic ideal has exactly the same epistemological difficulty, and no other, as is involved in any theory of value whatsoever that makes the whole or a part of its value lie in direct experience. The difficulty can be solved for hedonism in precisely the same way that it can be solved, for example, in Perry's theory of interest[7] or Dewey's theory of self-realization.[8] But from a psychological (and, it would seem, from an epistemological) standpoint the problem is a question-begging one in that the positing of it presupposes the data and the distinctions. Hedonism, like any other theory, does not necessarily have to be universalistic; but it does have to be aware of universalistic values (and hence possess the possi-

[7] R. B. Perry, *General Theory of Value*, pp. 128 f.

[8] John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 136 f.

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bility of entering into them) in order to be a theory at all. To argue that immediacy loses its uniqueness by being represented in idea is to rob experience of its content; to assert that immediacy is locked up in the self in which it happens to be a resident would imply that universals have nothing to communicate. Universalistic hedonism is simply the symbolization of a number of immediate experiences having a common value, and it is on the same psychological level as the formulation of a color series having a common quality.

One may, if one chooses, characterize the objectives of desire and purpose in terms of the instrumentalities through which they work rather than in terms of the mental states of satisfaction into which they issue. This is, indeed, a good practical way of stating the situation since the best way to create (but not to experience) the satisfactions or pleasures is to be busy with their instrumentalities. Custom and habit have taught the human race a great deal about the objects through which pleasure will be released, and there is general agreement on the more fundamental of these. In a manner of speaking, one may call these objects the good, as the general populace does. But if one takes the view seriously he is committed to a non-psychological theory of value.

He puts the value out *there*—in the object. He is unable to put it in activity; for psychological activity is a direct experience. Value thus becomes an objective entity, a part of the world of things, and has no psychological basis upon which it can rest. In this case the value lies in the object toward which one must move, regardless of the state of mind produced. The only way out of such a difficulty would be to set up a pre-established harmony between the objects of value and psychological motives; but this hypothesis would in no case be grounded on human motivation in a psychological sense. A further difficulty would be to discover a common denominator which would provide a means of classifying various objects on a value scale. Be that as it may, a theory of value based on

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psychology must consider human motivation, which, however conceived, must be located in the consciousness of persons. It is highly plausible that the object-theory of value is an instance of the psychologist's fallacy in that the force and strength of a motive are transferred to the instrumentalities and objects through which it operates and that the resulting value (mental state of satisfaction) into which the desire issues is located in the object which releases it.

A frequently propounded difficulty with respect to hedonism is the problem of whether or not consciousness must be included with pleasure in order for pleasure to be an intrinsic good. For criticisms made in the name of psychology it is difficult to see how this objection could have arisen. It may be legitimate to deny the existence of any mental state whatever; it may be possible to define feeling in terms of bodily motion. Some of the extreme behaviorists have done this very thing.[9] In this instance, however, consciousness must disappear also, and the problem of the relation of feeling and consciousness merges into the problem of the relationship of various types of motion. The terms consciousness and feeling simply disappear. With this sort of argument this article is not concerned; for it is tantamount to denying not merely pleasure-experiences but all conscious experiences whatever. The criticism of hedonism evidently takes for granted the existence of both pleasure and consciousness, since it seems to be concerned with their relationship.

It is quite possible to argue that pleasantness is a characteristic of all conscious phenomena; it may be asserted that some conscious experiences are non-pleasurable and that some are pleasurable; and it can be maintained that pleasantness is an elementary conscious experience along with sensations and images. But what may not be argued is that consciousness is something that has to be *added* to pleasantness. Pleasant-

[9] See A. P. Weiss' article called "Feeling and Emotion as Forms of Behavior" in Reymert's *Feelings and Emotions*, pp. 170–92.

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ness *is* a conscious state, and to say that a hedonic good must contain at least the two elements of consciousness and pleasantness is like arguing that a circle must contain the element of roundness. Good or bad, natural or unnatural, pleasantness as a psychological fact is a state of consciousness. Elliptically we may speak of pleasure just as we speak of sensation or image; but grammatical usage should not blind us to the obvious meaning.

This interpretation of the status of pleasure does not admit of classifying hedonists as introverts and non-hedonists as extroverts, as is sometimes done. In truth there is nothing intrinsically characteristic of either type that demands the hedonic hypothesis as its ground; nor is there any difficulty in assigning either or both types as such to hedonism. The extrovert is simply one who centers his attention on external objects; the introvert makes his own ideas, images, and sensations the objects of attention. The difference is in the *locus* of the object whereby motives are released. In neither case does the subject attend to pleasure. As stated in the foregoing, pleasurable consciousness is itself an immediate state and hence cannot be the object of attention. The introspective impossibility of attending to a pleasant state is due to the fact that as soon as one makes the attempt to attend to a pleasure his attention is drawn away from the conditions that produce it, and the pleasure vanishes (one can, therefore, analyze pleasantness only by retrospection).

Thus the difference between the extrovert and the introvert does not lie in the fact that the latter is a seeker of pleasure and the former is not. Both evaluate life in terms of psychic states. The extrovert directs his attention on external objects as means; while the introvert gives his attention to internal ones. Even with the coarsest sort of hedonism practical observation would forbid the classification. On that basis the great poets and artists (and even philosophers) would, for the most part, be crude sensualists, while the Babbitts and

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politicians would not. Freud himself until quite recently held to the pleasure principle as a basis for the motivation not merely of abnormals but of all human beings. Neither from practical observation nor psychological analysis can it be said that the introvert-extrovert classification is based on a motivational distinction. It is due rather to the type of object upon which this motive power is released. Although it is beside the point, it may be true that one of these types releases a more satisfactory end-result or pleasure than the other.

Another point upon which the psychology of hedonism might profitably comment is the characterization of good as ultimate and intrinsic. One notion of the ultimate good is that it is good, or would be good, if it existed quite alone. But since nothing ever does exist by itself (indeed, the conception of a thing by itself is self-contradictory since its formulation requires transcendence), one is simply romanticizing to set it up as a postulate. Psychologically it would be devoid of content and beggar description. Even if a thing were considered the best possible good with respect to life's conditions and circumstances and even if it were possible to set up a thing by itself, one could not thereby say that a good in the former sense would be a good in the latter. There is, in point of fact, no psychological reason why it should not be otherwise. An experience that is good with respect to certain conditions might in their absence be bad.

In terms of "natural" psychology goodness must be found in the total experiences of the individuals, and the test of intrinsic goodness lies in the fact that we do not want to change a situation when it is possible for us to change it. The test of ultimate goodness does not consist in the process of squeezing out the environment and valuing the good by and of itself; it lies in the framing of a concept which locates the value in life. In this way the ultimate good becomes the ideal (in the sense of a symbolization of concrete experiences already explained) by means of which we estimate the common denominator in

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intrinsic goods. In so far as we have had experiences and in so far as we can idealize them, this is the sort of good we want. Pleasure taken in this sense is thus relieved of the problem of ultimate goods in themselves, which is after all a logical rather than a psychological problem. A psychological exposition of value finds value not in isolating it from all other experiences but in relating it to all other experiences that are given. Instead of abstracting the value-experience from all other experiences and from objects and things to which they are related, it is precisely *because* of its connection with them that it gets value.

Many critics seem to agree that in the last analysis ethical theory rests on intuition. Intuition is a slippery word. It may mean those direct feelings about which we are very certain; it may describe a certain persistent attitude which cannot be defined very clearly and for which we can give no adequate reason; or it may characterize a certain attitude or feeling or theory representing feeling for which we can offer no proof but which is harmonious with the main body of our experiences. It has been the aim of this article to show that hedonism, with reference to its relation to psychology, can be accepted in the last interpretation of intuition. The objection that the admission of qualitative experiences (scale of preferences) in pleasure does violence to pleasure as standard has no more validity than the argument that qualitative discriminations in color destroy color as a standard. It is simply the old argument over again that there cannot be differences in identity, and the refutation lies in an appeal to experience.

Thus hedonism in itself does not commit one to any given preference, and questions resting on differences in preferences are beside the point. It makes no committal about the type of object through which pleasure is released; so the introvert-extrovert problem is irrelevant. It argues nothing about the peculiar residence of pleasure; so the ego-alter problem is indifferent. That certain transcendent processes are involved in

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the realization of pleasure is simply the way that all "naturalistic" psychological motivation operates. Its theory of intuition, being experiential, is not bothered by the logical problem of whether or not the test of goodness is isolation. Identifying man in a world of things and persons and seeking his values in this environment, a psychological analysis of him yields nothing which is inconsistent with the acceptance of hedonism as an intuitive principle, i.e., as a direct experience which we intuit to possess value. The future will undoubtedly teach us more about human motivation, and when that time comes hedonism may have to be revised; but until then it will rest its case.

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MARXISM, COMMUNISM, AND THE JAPANESE SPIRIT

CHIKAO FUJISAWA

WE MAY hazard at once the prediction that Marxism, haunted incessantly by hateful class war and destructive social revolution, will prove itself incapable of creating any better and happier world. The sophistical argument that a peaceful world will be called into being by a class struggle, which is an evident revelation of compressed hate, is akin to the absurd reasoning that the false mathematical formula $2+2=5$ is right. Being born phenomenologists, the Japanese élite in particular have been quick to apprehend the dismal nature of hatred, along with its kindred feelings. The following proverb gives utterance in a striking way to this sentiment—"If you curse anybody else, beware of two holes."[1]

In order to make short work of Marxism, I consider it wise to concentrate my fusillade upon the surplus-value theory which upholds, so to speak, the whole fabric of Marxistic ideology. Marx speaks of the value of merchandise as being determined by the quantity of labor required for manufacturing it. In other words, no value can be created without labor. Although wrapped in a pseudoscientific mantle, this theory is in reality a by-product of social resentment issuing from the feeling of iniquitous exploitation of the working-class by the capitalist. Now the conception of exploitation is not economic but ethical. Generally speaking, Marx committed a grave fault in trying to demonstrate his social theories entirely in terms of formal economics. In the light of this fundamental weakness, the theory of surplus value should be criticized. The theory postulates as facts the following four hypotheses,

[1] It implies that the cursed and the curser both will be ruined.

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invalidating which the whole doctrine would lose its ground: (1) the desire of acquisition is the sole motive of capitalists as well as workers; (2) all labor is quantitatively measurable and can be reduced to an equal value, proportionate to the working hour; (3) the only labor that gives rise to value in capitalistic undertakings is the labor of the worker; (4) the determination of wages is the unilateral effect of the capitalist's will.[2]

Wholly in acceptance of the hardly uncontroversial fact that the bulk of our necessities will acquire their value first through the working hands of laborers, the aforementioned four hypotheses cannot be given unconditional credit. Anybody invested with clear-sightedness cannot but perceive that, in addition to the desire of acquisition, the parties concerned would be moved not unfrequently by the sheer pleasure of labor, or even by higher emotional motives. In the second place, there are many categories of labor which must be evaluated *qualitatively*. It but suffices to mention that individual abilities of the industrial undertaker and manager, displayed for instance in the happy combination of the simple outcomes of muscular labor measurable perhaps with working hours, give birth to a not inconsiderable portion of the value of good.[3] Third, it goes without saying that, independently of labor, part of the value is contained originally in the *material* itself out of which the given good will be manufactured. Let us take bread as an example, and we shall comprehend immediately that we cannot appraise it highly unless its material corn possesses nutritious ingredients that have no relation whatsoever to human labor. Finally, the determination of wages depends not only on the will of the employer but also on the ethical

[2] Henri de Man, *Au dela du Marxism*, pp. 318–19. His penetrating remarks are all the more pregnant of suggestions as he was once a Marxist.

[3] Max Scheler, *Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen*, p. 188. In respect of the systematic critic of the surplus-value theory, the following works are recommended: Karl Muhs, *Anti-Marx*, Bd. I; Seibi Hijikata, *The Rejection of the Marxistic Surplus-Value Theory*.

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consideration of a given epoch. In a society whose structure retains the main characteristics of "community," no employer is exempt from moral restraint in determining the wages of his employees.

For these reasons I imagine that the famous theory as to surplus value will not survive the heavy attacks flung at it from various angles.

The materialistic dialectic that Marx borrowed from Feuerbach is likewise exposed to the acerbity of Scheler's censure. In accordance with the subtle interpretation of this remarkable thinker, the dialectic concerned has perceptibly suffered from the ascendancy of the *resentment moral,* because this method will, by way of the negation of *A*, create not merely *Non-A* but also *B*.[4] But he thinks that the synthesis (*B*) is not empowered to repudiate the objectively indelible existence of the thesis (*A*) and of the antithesis (*Non-A*). On the contrary, the Marxists persist in contending that the thesis and antithesis are bound to go off the stage at the appearance of the synthesis. To make this abstract reasoning comprehensible for us, the subsequent instance may be quoted: if the capitalistic régime (thesis) were overthrown by a social revolution undertaken by the proletariat (antithesis), there would be created an ideal world (synthesis) wherein no exploitation of one man by another could be possible, thanks to the abolition of the social class.

However, such a mechanical process is far from being the case in reality; *the structural change of a society does not always synchronize with the conversion of the ethos attendant upon it.* It need hardly be disputed that even a Utopia dreamed of by Karl Marx would not outgrow the capitalistic spirit, which never dies per se in no matter what milieu.

Not until we strike a mortal blow at our natural egoism

[4] Max Scheler, *Das Ressentiment in Aufbau der Moralen,* p. 85. Every manner of thinking that is calculated to attribute a creative force to mere negation and criticism is nourished secretly by this poison (resentment).

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will any outer change of economic conditions lead to the creation of a better world. Broad-minded as we are to appreciate in fulness the great contribution of Marxism toward the clarification of the close relations between our moral and intellectual life and economic environments, we shall never yield to the conception of looking upon the human culture simply as the social overstructure superimposed on the economic understructure.

As Werner Sombart indicated in his exceedingly interesting essay, *Anti-Marxism,*[5] it is apparent that scientific materialism as much as the Darwinian theory of the struggle for existence, then in full swing, has engraved strong impressions on the rationalistic mind of Marx.

In the last analysis, whatever merits we may recognize in the Marxistic theories, their literal application to the whole earth regardless of national and geographic conditions is an absurdity; not to speak of his deliberate intention to frustrate his opponents, Marx has worked out *inductively* his theories and principles by employing economic and social data gathered in a specific area of western Europe at the specific period.

Russian communists succeeded in forcing Marxism into effect at the turbulent moment of the social revolution which occured in the fall of the year 1917, but it has become gradually obvious that they have gone beyond the bounds of good sense on account of their having overlooked the social conditions peculiar to Russia. Thus the Soviet authorities saw themselves compelled to resort to a new economic policy (*nep*) to camouflage the flagrant abortion of Marxism, and to recognize a new bourgeoisie (*nepmen*) that emerged powerful out of the failure of communism.

A certain number of Japanese economists, full of creative talent, are now of opinion that they must find the principles of Japanese national economy by systematizing economic data gatherable and observable in this country, the current ab-

[5] Article contained in a number of *Das Archiv für die Weltwirtschaft.*

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stract theories after the fashion of Marxism leaving much room for controversy as applied to this land.[6]

In coming again to the point, we may say that Marxism with its characteristic ethos would but thrust us into an inextricable morass of moral inversion brewed out of strong resentment. Professor Gide hits the right nail on the head when he insists that Marxism be treated only as a grim protest against the idealism once praised to the sky in Germany.

Scheler seeks to discover the new guiding principle of social reform in a sweeping depuration of our consciousness, often rendered little susceptible to sublime human emotions by the constant pursuit of insatiable egoism. This preliminary condition once fulfilled, our hearts will be made capable of feeling noble virtues, which nature has scarcely cleared up by the *experimental* method used in current psychology, which is preoccupied in general with the registration of the casual phenomena taking place between the cerebral nerves and the sensations. Such spiritual phenomena of the first magnitude, as shown in the pathetic self-sacrifice of the late General Nogi, do not lie within the range of analytical experiment.

It is to be noted that the modern Occidentals, enthusiastic with the abstract doctrine of human equality, have conceived an experimental psychology on the presumption that human sentiments would always be expressed in an equal manner. However, in the higher sphere of spiritual emotions, the inherent inequality of human beings will strike us visibly, frustrating the mechanical observations of popular psychology. In the department of social science, a great deal of intuitive understanding must be called for, in addition to the so-called scientific method, which consists in deriving an explanation from abstractly framed principles.

[6] See T. Katsuda, *The Economic Structure of Japanese Society*, and S. Hijikata, *The Economic Investigation of Japan*, Vol. IV. In this respect Professor Hijikata, endowed with a rare perspicacity, will sooner or later reduce to silence his overbearing opponents, such as Dr. Fukuda and Dr. Kawakami, who stick to the abstract theories elaborated in the Occident.

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While paying due regard to the unheard-of service rendered by modern occidental civilization, we must nevertheless bear in mind that there are, above work knowledge, still higher insights of self-culture and self-deliverance, aiming respectively to consummate our personality and to reach the ultimate being of the universe. A society in which these higher insights reign supreme may be defined as a community, as opposed to an association established with the object of squeezing as much profit as possible from others.[7]

Vladimir Soloview, a great Russian thinker, had certainly such a community under contemplation when he sought the ethical foundation of human society in the three feelings of shame, sympathy, and reverence.[8]

In the milieu of association, epistemological philosophy, experimental psychology, and communism will thrive, owing to its undurable structure, which is subjected to an arbitrary manipulation of partners busying themselves with the prosecution of material interest. The ideal type of society we are anxious to create must be that soaring high above the low dimension of egoism, in the grip of which both capitalism and communism are grappling with each other in a death and life duel. Reverence, gratitude, love, sympathy, tolerance, and magnanimity shall fill the depurated hearts of the inhabitants living in the society concerned. Disgusted with the rampancy of perverted individualism,[9] the contemporaries of the West do aspire to the serenity of the oriental mind, feeding an abstruse metaphysics, once misjudged by Kant to be out of our philosophical cognition.

Although Max Scheler gives us, in reference to the grave sequel of occidental atomism, many a pertinent lesson, we

[7] Reference is made, of course, to the important work of Tönnies, *Gemeinshaft und Gesellschaft* (Japanese translation), p. 58.

[8] K. Ambrozaitis, *Die Staatslehre Solowjenes*, pp. 17–32.

[9] I conjecture from my personal experience in western Europe that an abnormally immoderate hankering after self-assertion, regardless of innate endowments, has given rise to the theory of human equality.

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shall be wise to make ample allowances for the reactionary tendency of his ideas, formulated indubitably to counter the egotistic *Zeitgeist* of modern Europe. An uncritical acceptance of Scheler's philosophy will certainly cause great inconvenience to us Japanese, because it tends to retard and thwart the normal awakening of individual consciousness, not yet sufficiently developed in this country. After all, an important warning, which we can draw from Scheler's admonition, is that, *once gone beyond the appropriate line of demarcation assigned to it, individualism will not fail to degenerate into licentious anarchy breaking down the organic unity of society.*

In the second place, we must notice the fact that Scheler, embracing the Catholic creed, harbors a strong antipathy toward the Reformation, as repercussive as the French Revolution in the provocation of the rise of hyperindividualism. During and after the World War, we saw a glowing revival of Catholicism throughout the Western world, and scholars with a Catholic leaning were thus induced to enter upon vehement polemics with Protestant thinkers who plead as a rule the cause of the formal equality of men before God. It may be suggested that Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism have each made a sort of pact in turn with modern democracy, aristocratic conservatism, and Marxistic materialism. As detached judges of Western thought, we must endeavor to guard against becoming the dupe of a maneuver of Catholicism directed toward the overthrow of the Protestant hegemony well anchored in the Teutonic countries. We are filled with sincere admiration of the spirited figures of Protestant champions who dauntlessly fought for the sake of their spiritual independence. We ourselves cannot indeed imagine the greatness of the United States of America without its religious background of Puritanism.

A slightly one-sided animadversion of Scheler regarding modern Western ideas invites us, however, to reflect deeply in connection with the future of Japan, which is assiduously

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following the path of Westernization. It is not a mere contingency that we find Scheler an outstanding exponent of *emotional* ethics, emerging triumphantly out of a hard context with the *formal* ethics of Kant, who is believed to have had hitherto a preponderant influence in the Western hemisphere.

In attacking the cold formalism of practical reason, Scheler and his successors, as repeatedly stated, attach paramount importance to the genuine emotions pouring spontaneously from an immaculate heart. The stern but freezing conception of the categorical imperative sees itself obliged to acquiesce in its spuriousness in the face of the soothing and gentle virtue of sympathy. Scheler comments further that higher emotions ought to become the dynamics of an ideal community, where the hierarchy of the three knowledges alluded to—efficiency knowledge, self-culture knowledge, and self-deliverance knowledge—will be rigorously respected, the efficiency or work knowledge being on the lowest scale.

Now let us look to the problem of the Japanese state, and make an attempt to shed light on its fundamental traits, with full reference to the thoughts expounded by the prominent phenomenologist. The main reason why we have set much store by Scheler's works is not that we are prevailed upon to give our whole assent to his philosophical system, but that *he was led to the same conclusion as ours after having defeated by a fine analysis neo-Kantian epistemology and materialistic Marxism,* whose blind followers unfortunately fill the ranks of university professors in this country.

Being acquainted with the gist of Scheler's ideas, we can hardly resist the temptation of asking ourselves whether he did not envisage the national structure of this country in handling the various problems of the community par excellence. It is a wonderful thing for the civilized world that Japan retains the distinctive features of the typical community, and that its ethos has still a strong hold upon the greater part of her people. It is due to this fact that the Japanese nation

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has exhibited a marvelous vitality and an unusual cohesion throughout the whole of its eventful history.

Tersely speaking, the Japanese state is a big synthetic family that has suffered no dissolution heretofore, despite the heavy shocks that have been dealt to its foundations from within and from without. Yet the permanency of the state structure has not stood in the way of the normal evolution of society; on the contrary, this structural peculiarity of Japan has prevented social dissensions from being aggravated to the point of revolution. Under these circumstances, it may be easily understood that the head of the state, Tenno, plays a very important rôle in state affairs. In a word, he is to his subjects what the head of the family is to his subordinates. Even nowadays a popular conviction is spread abroad to the effect that every Japanese family owes its uninterrupted lineage to the imperial conquerors who pacified this land more than two thousand years ago. It follows that the relationship of father to son is synonymous with that of Tenno to subject, and that allegiance to the Tenno may be said to fall in line with filial piety toward the parents. Many passages excerpted from Japanese classics make us believe that the people have venerated and served the Tenno, taking him as incarnating the very spirit of the national structure, while the latter, too, cherished the former as "a great treasure" to be found nowhere but in this realm. In consequence of this prevailing ethos, the fundamental relation between *I* and *you* is neither dominating tyranny nor servile submission, but mutual confidence. In fact, it is sympathy and trust that settle social relations in the last resort.

Those who are baffled by the scare of Marxistic ideology would be misled in thinking that Japanese society is also split into the two antagonistic camps of bourgeoisie and proletariat. But we shall see immediately that such views are not based on reality, which speaks a different language; over the line of division made by economic interests there is a very strong tie

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of social solidarity apparently unique in its kind. I am afraid that none of the social philosophies that sprang up in the West is able to do full justice to these phenomena fraught with profound meaning. We are now confident that oriental philosophy once discarded by the oriental intelligentsia itself will recover in course of time an incontestable authority commensurate with its spiritual depth. In saying so we do not mean, with insular obstinacy, to thwart the entrance of Western thoughts, with a view to intrenching ourselves complacently within the citadel of oriental culture. Such is far from our real motive. Nay, strenuous efforts must continuously be made in the direction of adopting as much Western civilization as is necessary for enhancing the intrinsic worth of our national culture and also for making up for its shortcomings. Japan may be compared to a spiritual reservoir, into which the main currents of oriental civilization have been poured, and where they are carefully preserved. Thus Buddhism and Confucianism, among other things, have enriched, embellished, refined, and deepened our national life. On the other hand, in spite of these cultural alluvia of alien growth, it has rarely occurred that our national culture has lost its individuality from time immemorial. Hence I believe that the same process of assimilation would be reiterated in the course of grafting Western civilization on the main trunk of our national culture.

Full of radiant vision, we do hope that the affluence of foreign cultures in this country will one day give birth to a wonderful synthetic civilization, no counterpart of which would be discovered in the whole world.

Resuming the thread of our principal discourse, our particular attention is called to the fact that the *co-world*[10] is vividly actualized within our society, because the correlations of individuals are psychologically little different from those of brothers and sisters in blood, this being so evidently by grace

[10] As representing a more spiritual environment than the around-world *(umwelt)* of empirical fact. Cf. Royce's world of appreciation as against his world of description.

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of the Tenno, symbolized as the august chief of a large synthetic family. This unselfish ethos of co-world has swayed our minds so influentially that Japanese history is prolific of relevant examples which can at any moment be called in testimony. We come upon the heartrending self-immolation of General Nogi, who wished thereby to absolve himself from the enormous coresponsibility which weighed unceasingly upon him after the days of his triumphal entry home. We remember that he had brilliantly discharged his military duties by having forced a sweeping capitulation upon the powerful Russian army which, behind the impregnable fortress of Port Arthur, withstood the Japanese besiegers so tenaciously. Had he been a Western soldier he would in all likelihood have profited by his glorious exploits to win popularity and reputation, just as did Napoleon, who personified the very soul of domineering egotism rampant in the Occident. Being *Samurai* to the core, General Nogi took upon himself the full coresponsibility (despite the fulfilment of his individual responsibility) for a host of Tenno's subjects who perished on the battlefield. He ceased to be a limited individual by making his fate the fate of men under his command. A noble act of "manifestation," elucidated by Dr. Kakehi, was beautifully accomplished by the great warrior. At any rate, his holding himself answerable for the events that did not lie within the compass of his power was typically expressive of his having been concerned always with the co-world.

Not merely the co-world, but also the foreworld and afterworld do exist in the invisible kingdom of our heart. The foreworld enters our consciousness when we learn we owe an enormous debt of gratitude to all those who have worked in a variety of ways to lay the cornerstone of our empire, which has lasted and will last eternally, like heaven and earth. Thus, from this feeling of thankfulness and respect emanates ancestor worship, which puts foreigners in possession of the clue to many things Japanese; e.g., filial piety for our parents may

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be said to be derived therefrom. It is well understandable that the larger number of Occidentals are hardly responsive to this delicate sentiment, since their national structure was altered and manipulated arbitrarily on the spur of the moment; they are too much rationalized to be able to take notice of the invisible links that bind the living with the dead. Conversely, our forefathers were trusted to hold perpetual guardianship over this country to make us safe from foreign invasions. It is in accordance with this national virtue that, in case of emergency, we Japanese flock to the great sacred shrine at Ise and offer fervent prayers to the spirit of the mighty Goddess of the Sun, who has her abode therein.[11] It is under the influence of the same ethos that our parents (our mothers in particular) devote their whole-hearted affection to their children, frequently at the cost of their own happiness and comforts. Here markedly comes to the fore the mentation of after-world. In this conjunction we have naturally to admit that there may happen in the Occident, too, many instances reminiscent of what we have related about our Japanese spiritual life. However, the point at issue is that the general tendency of Western ideas runs counter to ours. For example, the occidental conception of home differs to no small extent from our conception of family, in that the principle of "couple first" is brought into prominence, rendering the relation between parents and children often oddly indifferent and rationalistic.

Though by no means backward in extolling the spiritual independence and self-responsibility to be fostered in a like environment, we yet fear lest this family individualism be led some day to work as a dissolving factor of the whole society. The phenomenal appearance of companionate marriage foreshadows the precipitous loosening of social solidarity in America.

Although likely to enervate the spirit of autonomy and

[11] To follow the national legend as to the creation of Japan, the son of the goddess descended upon this land, and his offspring sits on the imperial throne.

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self-help, the Japanese régime of family has none the less a very strong argument against the occidental home, in its pledging mutual assistance to its members and in its keeping the hearth ever ablaze with overflowing sympathy and love. Adverse in some cases to the idea of efficiency and business, for which an average American would fain sacrifice anything whatever, the spirit of the Japanese family will in the near future be highly appreciated in the Occident as an antidote to overdriven individualism. Scores of Japanese publicists, fascinated by Western rationalism, naïvely insist that the progress of our society should be achieved by the supercession of gentle sentiments by frigid reason; they, however, lose sight of the momentous possibility that they thereby run the risk of deteriorating our nationality itself, which is the spiritual foundation of the country. It is impossible to shake abruptly the fundamentals of a powerful nationality although susceptible to a gradual evolution in some degree. Indeed, it is required for us to introduce in amplitude the régime of self-government that has been considerably pushed ahead in the West, in order that we may counterbalance the drawbacks of our civic education, wanting in the element of self-consciousness. But the purport of proceeding so is neither to grant the individual the absolute freedom of conduct, nor to vouchsafe him equal capacity with the state organism; on the contrary, it is precisely to get every individual to display as much as possible his particular character and ability for the benefit of the public whole. If the spirit of autonomy be interpreted credulously as the bestowal of unlimited right on the individual, it will result in giving a loose rein to the inferior and ignorant elements of society incapable of comprehending the true import of self-government. Nobody would deny that the corruption of politicians signalized in Japan in recent times accrued from such an abuse of the autonomous right.

In dealing with foreign institutions we must not forget that the keynote of our ethical ideas is self-abnegation, incompati-

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ble in principle with the egotism that pervades Western thoughts. The conception that the strenuous assertion of right constitutes a salient trait of enlightened nations borders on a superstition. We hear often that the Japanese are unmindful of public morals and remain languid in the fulfilment of public duties. This criticism may not be very remote from the mark. But attention should be taken of the fact that the Occidentals, in participating in the work of public organs, are actuated rather by the concern for the promotion of their personal interest than by the motive of self-sacrifice for the common welfare. The public body is generally handled as a means in the West, whereas it is estimated as something above the individual in this country. That is partly the reason why the Japanese are not disposed to use it. But should the existence of a public body once be jeopardized, its members would leave no stone unturned in its cause, even at the expense of their personal interests. The Occidentals are apt to become indifferent toward a public organ if it demands a great amount of self-sacrifice from its members.[12]

Viewed under this light, excessive individualism must be rejected at all costs—there is a Japanese proverb which says, "Too much is as bad as too little." Neither capitalism nor Marxism makes a strong appeal to the Japanese people in general, inasmuch as both are the products of atomistic individualism. Anyhow, there is every reason to believe that what crossed the sensitive mind of Max Scheler finds itself crystallized in all its essentials in the national structure of Japan. Far from being cranky chauvinists, we may hazard a conjecture that no nation in the world is in a position to vie with Japan in point of the permanency and solidarity of the framework of the State. To our great regret, modern Japanese scholars are so prepossessed in favor of Western ideas that they think they have discovered the ideal state, now in the stereotyped form of state conceived by Kelsen and Stammler, now in the

[12] Kaiichi Toda, *The Japanese Society* (in Japanese), p. 66.

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bizarre image of state conjured up by Marxism's sorcery, and now in the monstrous figure of the state overriding overweeningly the emasculated individuals. However, as most of these efforts turn out to be sterile, they may fix anew their eyes upon their own beloved state and rejoice at finding it in possession of the characteristics of an ideal state. I recall the charming story of the Blue Bird, masterfully dramatized by Maurice Maeterlinck. Two small children, vainly wandering through the world in quest of a blue bird, the symbol of true happiness, return home weary and disheartened. But to their surprise they discover the bird twittering and perching beside them. Similarly, in regard to those Japanese who are now delighted at laying their fingers upon the object they longed for. Alien capitalists and communists alike can barely understand how deeply our historical traditions are rooted in the national structure, and how our emperor long ago shook off his patriarchal nature, becoming the spiritual vehicle of national unity.[18] If a state structure were not guaranteed by historical traditions, national psychology, and spontaneous patriotism, it would be anything but durable and become a helpless prey to violent revolution. Plenty of such instances are recorded in the annals of world-history.

In striking contrast to the sad destinies of occidental dynasties, the Japanese imperial lineage, transmitted right down to the present in an unbroken chain, offers the strongest security of the state. The national structure of this country is nothing less than an *organized feeling* of the whole people, and it is manifest that this constitution, unique in the world, bids fair to assume ever increasing significance, the more so as the prevalence of unfettered egoism threatens to undermine the social foundations of the West. As was made clear, within the bounds of the perennial state structure the process of natural evolution is safely carried on along political, economic, and social lines; it is accordingly due to a delusion common to

[18] Toru Nagai, *On the Japanese National Structure* (in Japanese), p. 157.

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those giving themselves up to the fancy of identifying European history with universal history that our national structure is sometimes deemed inconsistent with the interests of the proletariat.

Exposure of the intrigues of the communists to broad daylight caused an outburst of anger throughout the country; the whole nation, regardless of party and factional considerations, was welded together in the heat of indignation against the red scourge. We are only too glad to notice, beneath the strata of Western materialism that has lately insinuated itself in Japan, our national morale still remaining very sound and serving as the potent deterrent to the setting in of national decay.

The imperial ordinance concerning university education provides in Article 1 that, in addition to the investigation of scientific matters, the cultivation of national thoughts shall be prosecuted in the Japanese universities. Professors tinged with Marxistic ideology raise boisterous protests against the clause, grumbling that it necessarily infringes on the freedom of the university and thus impedes the advancement of science. But in order to sober these pseudoscholars into good sense, let us briefly remind them that they have a wrong habit of taking licentiousness for liberty, and that the withdrawal of university discipline is certain to bring in its wake perdition to freedom itself.

It seems to us that the Western conception of freedom has developed in accord with the rebellious spirit turbulently vented at the moment of the French Revolution; it cannot be considered apart from the historical antecedent of the violent struggle waged between monarchical despotism and the idea of people's sovereignty. As for us, we have experienced in the past no clash of such fundamentally disharmonizing ideas, with the result that the Japanese conception of freedom and justice must be otherwise construed; *freedom is for us an ob-*

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jective expression of the broad and deep sympathy that enables us to communicate spiritually with one another.

Now, in connection with the foregoing, a question of considerable weight will arise: Why have we of late been gradually inured to look down upon things and ideas Japanese and to hang wretchedly on the sleeve of Western culture and civilization? In what circumstances have the greater number of university professors engaged in the pursuit of social science come to kotow before insane Western thoughts and impertinently to stigmatize our national thoughts as reactionary and old, disgracefully paying homage to capitalistic hedonism as well as to Marxistic egoism? Marxism, which is now hailed as the most progressive idea in certain quarters of the nation, is, in fact, nothing short of a typically retrogressive doctrine bent on destroying everything positive, while Japanese genius, partaking of a much more constructive character, keeps pace with progress and at the same time abstains from encroaching upon happiness.

We think that this morale of servility crept into our intellectual circles and readily got the upper hand of the nation according as we threw away our national countenance and self-respect, which are vital to a great nation.

In taking account of the spiritual crisis that haunts this country, a young Chinese writer puts his finger on three causes that are of a grave nature: the waning of the people's belief in the national strength, spiritual and material; the spread of a mercenary spirit throughout the country, and the successful propagation of Bolshevist ideas.[14] We cannot but admit frankly that he is not very far from the truth, and we do hope the intellectual strata of our country will be magnanimous enough to draw out of his remarks many lessons. When we look back to the gigantic achievements of our illustrious patriots who ushered in the Restoration, we shall be strongly impressed by their unflinching spirit of self-respect vis-à-vis the Western

[14] A Chinese review devoted to the study of Japan, called *New Life*, pp. 7–8.

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civilization. By transplanting European statecraft and techniques into national soil, they desired first to defend their fatherland efficaciously against the imminent encroachment of the Western powers then busying themselves with imperialistic exploitation, and second to make known abroad the superiority of our national ideas, so far as spiritual culture is concerned. In short, the outward westernization was originally decided upon not as an end in itself, but merely as a step to safeguard national independence.

The national aspiration for the recovery of spiritual freedom from occidental materialism has recently given full swing to the extensive researches on national history and literature, emphasis being particularly laid on the Meiji era, which marks a decisive turning-point in the national destiny. We are thus being initiated into the very elevated disposition of the distinguished loyalists who have never allowed themselves to be overwhelmed by the splendor of Western material civilization. One of them, Okumi Takamasa by name, commenting on the purport of the catchword "reverence for the Emperor and expulsion of the foreigners," which was on the lips of every iconoclast of the Tokugawa Shogunate, has shown unusual wisdom and composure in enunciating that the most honorable attitude of the nation toward foreigners lies in making them convinced of the uncontroversial primacy of our national spirit. The small-minded proposal to expel the foreigners by arms would not have become the traditional greatness of our nation, for she could make her own *à merveille* what she has received from foreign lands.

It is this noble spirit of the samurai élite that guided the bold patriots of the Restoration epoch.

In this connection a few words may be said regarding the position we take toward Christianity (mostly of Protestant sects), which was introduced here in accompaniment with Western civilization. That Christianity and occidental imperialism went hand in hand to a large extent is now openly

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avowed by fair-minded missionaries;[16] they entertain a sincere wish to sever Christianity as an *organization* from Christ himself, who figures ever benignantly in the invisible realm of the yearning heart. No wonder that Protestantism brought over to this country by Anglo-Saxon nationals animated with a marked individualism could not pick up many devotees from among the Japanese masses. I am afraid it will scarcely have a chance of insuring triumph over us so long as it does not stoop to assimilate itself with the main current of Japanese thoughts, which esteem above all harmony between individual and community. Fully thankful to the Protestant missionaries for their praiseworthy efforts to instil the sense of the dignity of personality into the Japanese mind, we yet regret being compelled to point out the lack of foresight on the part of a portion of foreign missionaries who wish to translate intact into Japan those creeds and institutions which have grown in foreign lands, the inhabitants of which are inspirited by unlimited individualism, now and then trespassing on the social unity. I hope that instead of the American or English Christ, a Japanese Christ will come down to this country, becoming a dear and familiar figure upon the Japanese road. Then I am sure a brilliant prospect will be laid before the future of Christian belief in Japan.

In following the course of the wonderfully rapid growth of our national power, we must be awake to the fact that the keeping up of a strong national self-respect is a preliminary to the rise of any nation. But unfortunately the moral fiber of our nation has become gradually feeble, in measure as we have become relieved of the hard economic pressure under which all of us had to strain our spiritual forces almost to breaking point. I dare say the most formidable enemy to be found is mammonism, which could steal into our society by taking advantage of the relaxation of general discipline. After the Russo-Japanese war, a variety of dangerous and uncouth ideas

[16] Stanley Jones, *The Christ of the Indian Road.*

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found their way into Japan, recruiting not a few followers from among the intellectuals infatuated with the demoralizing gospel of Western materialism. Of these alien thoughts bourgeois hedonism and communistic Marxism have done the greatest damage to our moral life. One is likely to charge communists with the unpardonable felony of upsetting the state foundations, while the not less condemnable wrongdoings of capitalists are connived at with impunity. There is no denying the fact that Marxism has appeared in the arena with the grim intention of administering the finishing blow to the stronghold of capitalism. I wonder if the plutocrats, politicians, and scholars, patronized by the government, who all cry out loudly against the so-called dangerous thoughts, and demurely make semblance of good patriotism, have virtually clean consciences, seeing that they betray an apparent dearth of sincerity in not making their personal conduct compatible with the laudable principle they are impudent enough to stand for publicly.

It happened recently that a few politicians enrolled in a powerful party and renowned for outright integrity, were found guilty of a shameful bribery in conjunction with a very disgraceful affair. Such fellows deserve our severe denunciation as much as insolent Bolsheviks, both being traitors to our country.

At all events, capitalism and communism will not be suffered to coexist with the fine Japanese spirit so tersely expressed in an old proverb: "The samurai glories in honorable poverty." This spirit has not diminished even in the teeth of the heavy economic depressions that have several times befallen us.

At present the entire nation is confronted with the sober problem of conducting a severe self-introspection, in order to resume the national dignity greatly impaired by its frivolous and preposterous behavior. The urgent need of the hour is to return to the time-honored tradition of our sound spiritual cul-

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ture, which has heretofore stood all sorts of tests. While going to any lengths to nip dangerous thoughts in the bud, we must do our utmost to make our country a home for the free man actuated by mutual respect and sympathy. The ultimate object of universal suffrage, enforced a year ago, is to induce all persons to give full scope to their abilities, so that they may complete the task of establishing the most perfect community in the world.

IMPERIAL UNIVERSITY OF KYUSHU
FUKUOKA, JAPAN

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POPULATION, POVERTY, AND ETHICAL COMPETENCE

EDWARD F. METTRICK

THE poor have always been with us. At least there have always been in the history of civilization relatively dispossessed mortals to contrast with those others for whom the fruits of life seem to be garnered. Turn the page where we will, and we are sure to find not a population of entire indigence, not a population of utopian equality and bliss, but an unequal possession which is the essence at once of riches and poverty. In our own day we have the destitute, the poor, the unemployed, and we have therewith not merely an economic but also, and perhaps fundamentally, a moral problem.

We have a moral problem because the virtue of charity and the moral principles of the brotherhood or the equality of man and of the right to life and maintenance are involved. We have an economic problem inasmuch as there are involved questions of work and employment, of distribution and of population. But the question I wish to raise is this: if there is ever, as I believe, in all our economics an attempt to justify the right of this or of that class to so much of the whole product of nature and human endeavor, such that even the most "scientific" economist can never wholly remove moral considerations from the sphere of his discourse, will there not also be an economic element within the sphere of ethics that will forever forbid ethics to be a purely a priori and cloistered discipline? May it not be that the economic is not merely the plastic material in the hands of the moralist, untractable perhaps at the moment, though not so in the long run, but that it is also in a very real sense constitutive and determinative of morality?

I think it can be shown that this is the case in the matter

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of poverty and population and that, therefore, no cloistered ethics ever could be competent to give an ultimate verdict.

We will consider charity first and show that it cannot simply be considered as a virtue, but that we must look to the effects, that is to the economic as well as the moral effects of our giving, and then we will consider the direct attack of Malthus' *Essay* on the so-called rights of man.

The poor, we have said, are with us; they have in fact been with us so long that we have made a virtue of their relief. There is, moreover, within the constitution of man a principle of sympathy that prompts us to relieve distress. But we have no indication, either from the moral science that declares charity a virtue or from the innate sympathy in man, as to how much, to whom, and when we must give. Obviously the number of the poor, the wealth available, the knowledge of the result of our charity upon the poor and the country at large are potent factors, but these are not primarily, if at all, moral considerations, and if they do determine the extent and the direction of charity, then the crucial judgment may be taken out of the hands of the moralist altogether.

If we are to "give to him that asketh," that is indiscriminately, whether from the general charitableness that is within us or from the principle of the author of the *Religio Medici*, who "gave no alms to satisfy the hunger of my brother, but to fulfil and accomplish the will and command of my God," we are at once faced with the disastrous outcome of charity in the medieval church, of which Hallam wrote—"the blind, eleemosynary spirit inculcated by the Romish church is notoriously the cause and not the cure of beggary and wretchedness," and with the emphatic conclusion of the British Poor Law Commission (majority report) of 1909 that indiscriminate charity is a palliative little worse than criminal in its effect upon both parties to the charity.

But if we are not to give to all and sundry, then the virtuousness of charity is of little effect, for we are bound to turn elsewhere than to ethics for guidance.

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Nor is it merely a matter of our ability to distinguish the deserving poor from the undeserving: the history of the English Poor Law, from the famous "Act concerning the Punishment of Beggars and Vagabonds" (22 Hen. VIII) to the Commission of 1909 is decisive on this point. It is very little if at all a matter of fixed moral character, but it is one of the economic organizations of a country, and perhaps of the whole economic globe. It is also equally a matter, as Malthus insisted, of the principles of population.

We must never forget that the *Essay on Population* was written by an Anglican clergyman who had the concerns of humanity deeply at heart and that it was written against the hopes and the specifically moral aspirations of Godwin. The French Revolution had aroused the hopes of social reformers, it had kindled in them the fair prospect of human perfection, bliss, and the attainment of the deepest longings of the human heart. Led by Godwin they saw everywhere natural goodness and the harmony of man with the scheme of things. The hopes and beliefs of the reformers were not new, the grim reality of human life was not new, but it was strange to be confronted in theory by a Malthus who saw mankind doomed to bondage, strife, and inequality, to perpetual poverty, misery, and degradation through the simple agency of a population which ever presses on subsistence and is only held at bay on the lowest and meanest level by war, disease, famine, and death.

If ever we look for the chilling effect of reality on human dreams and aspirations, if ever we look for the arrestment of moral obligation and a priori right, we shall find it in the opening pages of the *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1st ed.). Malthus wrote:

> I have read some of the speculations on the perfectibility of man and of society with great pleasure. I have been warmed and delighted with the enchanting picture which they held forth. I ardently wish for such happy improvements. But I see great and, to my understanding, unconquerable difficulties in the way to them.[1]

[1] Malthus' *Essay* (1st ed.), p. 7.

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And again:

> The substitution of benevolence as the master spring and moving principle of society instead of self-love is a consummation devoutly to be wished. In short, it is impossible to contemplate the whole of this fair structure (of Godwin's) without emotions of delight and admiration, accompanied by ardent longings for the period of its accomplishment. But, alas! that moment can never arrive. The whole is little better than a dream, a beautiful phantom of the imagination. These "gorgeous palaces" of happiness and immortality, these "solemn temples" of truth and virtue will dissolve "like the baseless fabric of a vision," when we awaken to real life and contemplate the true and genuine situation of man on earth.[2]

Malthus' gloomy doctrine, that "black and terrible demon that is always ready to stifle the hopes of humanity," as Godwin put it, was not simply accepted. Though edition followed edition (1798, 1803, 1806, 1807, 1817, 1826) the attention gained by the work was by no means confined to that of disciples, for a great fury of controversy arose. Malthus himself is said, by some, to have softened the harsher conclusions of the original essay, and by the end of the nineteenth century many were of the opinion that the incubus of population had been definitely shaken off, through the agency of a more exact inquiry into the evidence for the famous "tendencies" and through a difference of practical attitude toward "vice" from that so undeviatingly held by Malthus. But even if this were so, even if Malthus had been substantially disproved—a question we cannot canvass here—we should find in this very fact the strongest support for the present argument, that the facts and principles of population are determinative of our practical and theoretical morality as concerns the poor. For, if it were necessary to disprove the contentions of Malthus ere the practice of benevolence, for example, could be allowed virtuous, then obviously morality is not uninfluenced by purely economic doctrine; whereas if Malthus is right, be it in never so small a degree, then also have we proof of the intimacy of economics and ethics. In this question of population we are deal-

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 175.

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ing with problems that go to the core of morality as all the host of them that rose to confute Malthus well knew.

Yet, in spite of all the refutations, Malthus did convince his contemporaries and successors. In spite of their belief in the one increasing purpose, he conjured up before the Victorians a grim vision: "slowly comes a hungry people as a lion creeping nigher." For behind the theoretical law of population was its obvious growth. There was poverty and increasing distress, and all those "clear proofs" of the operation of that "law of diminishing returns" which is in reality the basis of the law of population itself. Moreover, in the subsequent editions of the *Essay,* Malthus adduced those great masses of sociological fact, which surely drove home more effectively the prime conclusions of the first edition, however "softened" those conclusions may have been. The array of convincing proofs was terrifying.

But we must look at the matter a little more closely. Malthus is no isolated thinker. Problems of poor law had vexed England for many a long year. The Elizabethan statesmen as well as Malthus knew, with Defoe (1707), that "giving alms was no charity." The changing condition of England was fecund of pauper legislation from Gilbert's Act (1782) to the great Poor Law of 1834. But neither was Godwin unique. And it is in the issue directly joined with Godwin, even more than in his influence on legislation, that Malthus becomes of supreme importance in moral theory.

Foxwell, in his introduction to the English translation of Anton Menger's *Right to the Whole Product of Labour,* places Godwin first among the six[3] who challenged the very principles upon which the system of society rested. Through Tom Paine and the French Revolution, Godwin joins with the Declaration of Independence. Their common ideas were rooted in that abstract doctrine of natural rights which has been writ so often in the pages of history. Men are free and equal, they have an inalienable right to life, liberty, property, and

[3] These are Godwin, Hall, Thompson, Gray, Hodgskin, and Bray.

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the pursuit of happiness. The rest of the political claims follow. And if these rights of man as such are at the bottom, as they are, of all other claims to rights, and if these claims to rights are fundamentally moral claims, as indeed they are, then in attacking these claims or any part of them as he does, Malthus represents at its very clearest the claim of economic doctrine, if not to supersede ethics, then to enter with ethics as the dominant partner, as the ultimate arbiter on several specific questions of moral theory and practice. There is only one alternative, that the science of morals is somewhat other than it is often conceived to be.

Perhaps Godwin in the flush of enthusiasm that arose in 1789 had gone farther than the accepted spokesmen of the movement. From the postulated equality and brotherhood of men he had reasoned (in his *Principles of Political Justice* [1793] and especially in the *Enquirer* [1797]) to the possibility of human perfection. Reason would triumph over the follies of government, would remove the causes of natural and moral evil, and, as for population, if there were any ground for anxiety, the thought of the increase of knowledge would quickly reassure men. Even if men became immortal, as well they might, the present command and the promise of command over brute existence absolutely drove away incipient fears on the score of population, for by that time men would have triumphed over the base animal passions, not merely sublimating them, to use a modern term, but eradicating them altogether.

Discussions on population, as we have seen, were not novel then, but few had found therein much to be terrified at. Archdeacon Paley, for example, had thought that the quantity of happiness in a country could be measured by the number of its people, doubtless imagining that here was a simple test of that quantitative value at which he and his fellow Utilitarians aimed; and Adam Smith, though "Malthus" is writ large in the pages of the *Wealth of Nations,* had written that "the most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country is in the

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increase of the number of its inhabitants."[4] He had seen in the demand for men the controlling factor in population and he had thought that the liberal reward of labor was at once the result of increasing labor and the cause of increasing population and increasing industry. What wonder then if optimists like Godwin looked on growing numbers as a thing of hope? Yet Malthus, on the contrary, feared that the happiness and prosperity, of which advancing population was the sign, might only be those of the past.

So Malthus, aroused if you will by the extravagant optimism of Godwin, set himself to counter not merely the whole system of indiscriminate charity, private and public, not merely current views on population, but also the whole theory which teaches that benevolence is and should be the foundation of all morality, together with that doctrine which declares that man as such has even the most elementary "right" to life.

Malthus' *Essay* is a grim commentary on the "command" to be fruitful and multiply. We have within man, he says in effect, nay within the most precious system of love and family and home, the potential degradation and destruction of humanity itself. The geometrical progression of population is ever kept down to the level of the arithmetical one of food supply, but at what a cost! Misery ever stares humanity in the face. And even in the second and later editions, where the possibility of keeping the "tendencies" in balance is more fully allowed, and where as a result Malthus comes nearer to Godwin and Condorcet, Malthus has put his sole hope in a celibacy of moral restraint in which, to tell the truth, he has scarcely any hope at all, and whose adoption, even if it were reasonable to expect, would, he fears, but be productive of more vice. Further, as there is no reason whatever to believe that Malthus, were he now alive, would be a neomalthusian,[5] and as Malthus himself throws none of Lecky's glamour over "the eternal priestesses of humanity, blasted for the sins of the

[4] *Wealth of Nations* (Everyman ed.), I, 62. See also pp. 71–72.

[5] See Gide and Rist, *History of Economic Doctrines* (Eng. Trans.), p. 134.

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people," there remains for him scarcely more than a grim and tragic choice between vice and misery.

Yet there emerges clear from the great essay, from any and all its editions, one main doctrine: that charity, except in rare cases of private and well-considered relief, is rather a crime than a virtue; that the amiable benevolence of the eighteenth-century moralists is foolish if elevated to a principle of ethics; and that any public treatment of poverty and destitution is futile and worse, other than one that will swiftly drive the poor to self-reliance and independence no matter how hard, and will therefore quickly remove all poor laws from the statute book.

Now the Poor Law legislators of Elizabethan England (39 and 40 Eliz., c. 3) had organized charity on behalf of the "lame, impotent, old, blind and such other being poor and not able to work." There was in contemplation before them an excess of work over workmen such that sturdy vagabonds could be offered work or the whip and poor children could be apprenticed. In this they were more favorably situated than either the men of Malthus' day or of ours. For them there was no haunting dread of an excessive population bringing down the country to one dead level of misery, for them there was no conviction that the Poor Law was futile unless built on the assumption that its prime aim was its own extinction, for them there was no open denial of the right to exist.

For us the problem of poverty is merged into that of unemployment, and how shall men be employed where there is no employment to offer? Now, to put it another way, shall Louis Blanc be conceded the "right to work" if there is no work, and how, to put it as Malthus saw the question, shall men be granted the right to maintenance if there is no food whereby to maintain them?

This right of the poor to support is specifically disposed of by Malthus in a lengthy appendix to the fourth edition of his essay, though this appendix were hardly necessary since the whole essay is little more than this denial writ *in extenso*. One

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pregnant sentence in this appendix sums up the whole argument:

> If it is not possible (as according to the whole tenour of this work it is not possible) for the industry of man to produce on a limited territory sufficient food for all that would be born if every person were to marry at a time when he was first prompted to it by inclination, it follows irresistibly that all cannot have a right to support.[6]

Again: "We are bound in justice and honour formally to disclaim the right of the poor to support."[7] And directly to the point of the relief of the poor:

> The famous 43rd of Elizabeth . . . . which enacts that the overseers of the poor shall take order from time to time . . . . for setting to work the children of all such whose parents shall not (by the overseers) be thought able to keep and maintain their children . . . . is as arrogant and as absurd as if it had been enacted that two ears of wheat should in future grow where only one had grown before. . . . . It is expected that a miraculous increase of these funds (for the maintenance of labour) should immediately follow an edict of government used at the discretion of ignorant parish officers.[8]

All plans hitherto proposed for the amelioration of the lot of the poor are futile and worse, indeed "the first great obstacle which presents itself in this country is the system of poor laws, which has been justly stated to be an evil, in comparison of which the national debt, with all its magnitude of terror, is of little moment."[9]

The result we know; for although to an England embroiled in the Napoleonic wars the great Poor Law (of 1834) was long delayed, yet it came. To a generation led by Senior, Chadwick, and Nicholls, and inspired by Malthus (economists all, be it noted) the remedy was simple. It was summed up in the two famous principles that the condition of a pauper should be "less eligible" than that of the lowest paid independent laborer, and that relief should only be given to the able-bodied in "well-regulated workhouses." In short, poor relief was only to be given in cases of imminent starvation and

[6] Malthus' *Essay* (Ward and Locke's Edition, 1890), p. 552.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 486. [8] *Ibid.*, p. 345. [9] *Ibid.*, pp. 484–85.

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then only with the utmost parsimony and under conditions that were at once a reproach and a deterrence to the recipients. Readers of social history know how workhouses were built more fearsome than prisons, dietaries drawn up and "skilly" was "brewed" more revolting than the hardest wayside crust, and how the whole was administered with a doctrinaire harshness that drove the poverty-stricken laborers into revolt.

Charity, benevolence, goodness of heart, fraternity, equality, and the fundamental rights of man, all these and other undoubtedly moral principles had been taught (with accretions and vain extravagancies if you will) by Godwin. And Godwin, if not one of the great names in the history of moral theory, stood for a method of moralizing that went far beyond his immediate followers. Look into the human heart and there you will find in its own untutored goodness, in its own spontaneous longing toward the well-being of others, the very core of morality. From the fundamental rights of man as such you can build up the only enduring ethics. Malthus' answer is writ in the *Essay on Population,* it is writ large in the fabric of every civilized country, and how shall any moralist who holds by a principle of *claude fenestras ut luceat domus* point us the answer or direct our conduct aright? We cannot allow of an indiscriminate charity, we cannot, except on terms, allow the principle of the right to live, and then only on meager conditions, we cannot universally allow an unlimited fecundity. Nor even if Malthus were as wrong as his bitterest opponents avow, could we accept the guidance of the moralist uninformed as to the nature of the economic framework of our life.

Our treatment of, and our theoretical attitude toward, the poor are neither a simple spontaneity of an instinctive charitableness nor a stony-hearted rejection of their claims. Neither are they a simple resultant of a moral consciousness that contemplates its own navel. In addition to and correcting all these there must be, by reason of the constant drain of chari-

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ty on the means of existence, a rational investigation of the causes of poverty and a scientific handling of it in which many hands beside those of the moralist are required. If, for example, foreign policy and war, depreciation and appreciation of currency, increase and limitation of population, nurture and tradition, health and disease, and what not have entered into the multifarious whole of poverty and unemployment, then the study of none of these can be neglected by the student of ethics. The so-called intuition and common sense are out of court, for these cannot exist save on a basis of knowledge—however adequate that knowledge be.

We have seen that we cannot simply, on the ground of any wish or moral consciousness, elevate charity into a virtue. It is the doctrine of Malthus that we cannot simply proclaim the rights of man. We do not plead the right to live in the face of flood, earthquake, and fire; we do not thus meet the invading horde, nor can we, without taking measure of the number of the people and the means of subsistence present and potential, even speak of a right to life. I do not say there is no right to life and the rest that follow; but I do say that it is the moralist's business, if he will speak of such rights, to ask himself what he means, and I say also that he cannot reach a valid answer without considering the economic bearings of his material.

In drawing attention to the influence of this economic factor on morality, I do not say that morals should resign in favor of economics or any other science, real or alleged, for none of these pretends to show forth more than one aspect of life, and none is competent to comprehend the full reach and scope of the moral end which is the special business of ethics; nor do I say that economics is a science and morals an art, that economics cannot or should not, to the extent of its capacity, be shaped by the moralist's hand; but I do say that morals can never ignore and will be ever impotent if it tries to ignore the economic foundation on which our life is built.

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YORKSHIRE, ENGLAND

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THE PARADOX OF ETHICS

GUSTAV MUELLER

I

ETHICS philosophizes about human "values"; a value is "something" that would be desirable for the fulfilment of one's life. No "object" as such is value. It is *of* value to a subject. Its being value is relative to the subject's desires. Bread is of value only to hunger. If the hunger has gone it may become an evil, because it is now contrary to the subject's desire. Values, then, have to be defined in terms of subjective functions. If we judge about the value of values—and we do that in every act of preference—we judge about our functions; the question is, which functions of ourselves we would place above other functions. Values, represented by "something" outside of ourselves, would be symbols or mirrors reflecting the functions invested in them.

This thoroughgoing relation to the subject, wherein the subject is the all-important and determining factor, distinguishes ethics from "logic," which methodically abstracts from the subject and gives account of the "other-than-I" in its objectivity.

This definition of ethics is sure to meet the following objection: If there are no objective values or "values in themselves," is not every evaluation arbitrary? Does it not depend on the chance-organization of life? Others might greet it with approval: if values are symbols of desires, ethics is a branch of biology.

But, why must the "subject" be understood as a biological unit, herd or individual? The very existence of the ethical problem—what is the value of life—indicates a subjective function or interest that transcends vital values. We are able to state our "love-and-hunger" interests and their values. But that we are able to state them shows that we are "above"

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them. We do not consist of them. If we did consist of them, we could not place ourselves over against them. We could not call them in question. We could not ask, what is their value, if we had no other interest besides, because in this case they would be all, and self-evident as our all. But in weighing them, in doubting that they exhaust the meaning of our existence, we distinguish ourselves from the animal realm, to which we belong as far as they are concerned.

What value have values? It is by virtue of this self-conscious, this self-reflective, this ethical question that the fundamental meaning of the "subject" is discovered. Thereby we betray an uncertainty about the good life, which is very different from the uncertainty of the famous ass between two equal bundles of hay. It is by virtue of this question that we distinguish ourselves from our own given and necessary vital interests, that we discover the "goods" outside of ourselves to represent actions, functions, interests, whereas an animal would take them as indistinguishable from its vital existence. For in this question we assume a *right* to ask and to decide. We constitute a supreme court before which claims are scrutinized. And there is no court of appeal outside of ourselves, which might settle the value question in our stead. No "value" tells us that it is supreme and is to be accepted as such. Only men tell us and we make them responsible for so doing. In other words, as for the naïve instinct things are decided to be goods or evils in the interest of its self-preservation, so are these instincts themselves decided upon, whether they are and to what extent they are of value to "me," and "I" am constituted through this self-reflective evaluation of my functions. In assuming responsibility for them by ascribing them to my self-fulfilment, I have also distinguished myself from them and in this dialectical state of myself, I am above the realm of biology.

The ethical question, understood in its critical radicalism, at least ought to suffice to distinguish the human sphere as an

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ethical sphere from the sphere of biology, which is characterized by the absence of a "subject," in relation to which alone we can talk of "values." But drawing the line of demarcation between the ethical and the biological sphere does not protect us against the foregoing objection, which demands "values-in-themselves," values that are not "made" by subjective interests. Ethical values—like justice or Christian love, for example—are thought by ethical objectivists as ideal entities, which subsist independent of their realization. The subject discovers them in time. The succession of these discoveries is its history. For our ethical question it is irrelevant whether these discoveries are thought to be cumulative or whether the discovery of one value means the oblivion of another. The question here is whether values are to be thought in terms of subjective functions or whether subjective functions are to be reconstructed and defined in terms of independent values.

But unless I endow these subsisting entities with personal life, as the Greeks did with their gods, how shall I understand them to "direct" or to "govern" my life? How shall I understand their "effect" on me? For somehow they must act, must stand in a functional, active relation to me, in order to be taken up in a context of actions or attitudes. If they are concepts or "ideas" they must be transformed into purposes. As purpose a concept like "justice" is a form of my action, which ought to be realized. And why ought it to be realized? Is a just decision good, because it can be subsumed under the general idea "justice"? It is good as a means to manifest the "better man" in us, or to make real in appearance, in a gesture, what we, what the subject is fundamentally, namely, an ethical subject. We think a value to be a value if it helps to express the idea of our own self. And this self, being active, cannot realize itself outside or apart from its activity. Concepts can be of value only if they are not taken as neutral, subsisting entities but *as contents that ought to be.* It is an impossible contradiction to posit values as eternal, objective entities

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and then to demand that they ought to be. Whether I realize them or whether I do not makes no difference, either to me or to the "values"—not to me, because I am not "better" after I have realized them, I remain a passive vessel; nor to them, because they are afterward what they were before, values in their own "ideal" realm.

Ethical objectivism is based on two inadequate premises. The first is the fear that the only other alternative would be a biologic subjectivism, which would render all ethical values arbitrary. This biologism, knowing no subject at all, has no criterion to distinguish between different vital impulses and appearances, as far as their ethical meaning is concerned. On its ground, the "élan vital" of tubercular organisms has, after all, the same right to live as the human being, which is threatened by them.

And in order to escape this danger of arbitrary impulses, on whose grounds everyone might "invent" and impose "new values," objectivism falls in the opposite error of intellectualizing the ethical sphere, i.e., of objectifying duties (which are always duties of the present *action*) as if they were objects of logic. By this wrong method, objectivism does not achieve what it originally has in mind, but instead of discovering our ever present and actual problem, hides it in a survey of the past. There the subject has no ethical problems to solve, he is not involved in the puzzles of existence, but he serenely can order and idealize situations, which, for the men involved there, were situations of anguish and uncertainty.

The right of ethical objectivism lies in the logic of historical sciences. Its wrong begins when it mistakes this for the sphere of ethics. The question, "What shall I do?" is never answered by describing forms of bygone civilizations.

II

The fluid ambiguity and precariousness of our situation manifests itself in historical conflicts and in the ethical dialectic, either of which swings between such poles as freedom and

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authority, pleasure and duty, individual right and social order, self-realization and subordination under traditions and exemplary models. But those poles or "values" are not given entities, which could be envisaged objectively; they have their ethical being only in the form of contents and directions our actions may take or decide upon. They depend on the subject's decision, which course it wants to take, or as to what kind of subject it wants to reveal itself. It does not know that before it begins to act, and beginning to act means a decision, and deciding means to end an uncertainty. But this uncertainty remains as truly as there is need for new decisions, new actions, new self-manifestations.

This ambiguity of life and the everlasting dialectic of "values" is the real problem of ethics. It must be understood out of the fundamental functions of the subject rather than from a catalogue of products and objectified symbols of this living, enacting, ambiguous, dialectical ground. Thus ethical reflection has a critical task. It destroys the assumption that our ethical problem is solved by achievements of the past, that we could rest on our "progress." It must point out that such achievements and such progress are themselves expressions of the same dialectical problem that is with us. It must prevent the confusion between the ethical sphere, which is always problematic, open, and actual, and the sphere of known or remembered "values," which is "closed," definitely given, ordered, classified.

What, then, are these "fundamental functions" whose contradictory tendencies constitute the subject and its ethical problem? We know life in no other form than in the form of individual organisms. In this fact we grasp one of the "fundamental functions" of life, viz., to be individuated. To be individual means representing life in one of its fundamental interests. Everything, therefore, that furthers this interest and makes its realization possible appears to us as vital good or value.

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Each individual thus represents a center of activity, a "knot" of vital energy. But as individuals we are, at the same time, not purely active. We are active only in relation to other individuals. We need "stimuli" to react upon. By reacting we reaffirm our individuality. Those "stimuli" do not level or extinguish our being individuals. Their "influence" cannot be gotten hold of as such; we experience it only in our answer, in our reaction, wherein we show our character, our functional quality. Each "other," seen from the individual's point of view, represents a possible action. And since the individual is a "center of activity," there is as much individuality as there is opportunity actively to distinguish itself from "others."

But individuality does not mean "center of activity" alone. It also means a center that is unique, different from all others, standing in functional relations to all others, which are unique, contingent, "historical." And since this holds good for all individuals, we speak of "higher" individuals, if this fundamental character is more expressed than in "lower" ones. The more differentiated an individual is, the more functional contacts it can establish, the more opportunities of action it has. A more differentiated individual sees "more sides," places itself more effectively, manifests itself "better" as a center of interests and functions.

As a consequence of this differentiation the "other" can become a co-ordinated partial function of myself, which I may strive to alter or which runs against another function of myself. In this case we speak of "inner actions."

The result of all this is a perplexing uncertainty about what we should will. Individuality, no doubt, is a fundamental interest of life. What satisfies this interest would be "good," would make the individual "happy." But the very complexity and bewildering uniqueness and unexpected manifoldness of our opportunities make it hard to decide in which direction this end would be best achieved. And if we take into

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account that every individual tends to achieve the same thing, we add to the uncertainty of the one individual the contradictory tendency of the other. And thus we realize a first meaning of what we call the ambiguity or the problematic character of our search for happiness. The vital function manifest in the individuation of life is without definite "direction."

But all this would not be so "bad" were not every individual a necessary and perpetual contradiction in itself, a living contradiction. In the struggle and discourse wherein each individual is engaged with every other individual, opposite use needs to be made of its vitality. The individual "defines" itself by this opposite functionality necessary to its existence. It posits itself actively by distinguishing itself from every "other," by thereby treating the other as not—I. In this distinction it can either emphasize the separating or the uniting side of its relationship. In either instance the vital individual acts in order to posit, to maintain, to restore, to enjoy itself. The other appears as value for this double-faced vital desire.

If the other is treated as means to emphasize my isolation, vital selfishness is called *egoism*. It is harnessed, pertinacious, impertinent, persistent, self-preserving subjectivity. The egoistic tendency wills at all costs and in any case to have the upper hand, to be above and ahead of others. It posits the individual as the center of the universe and wants to keep it there. It tends to concentrate all outside energies available for the sake of its preservation. If it could realize its "Scroogish" function entirely, it would enjoy the happiness of entire inertia and laziness as a majestic lump and cluster of power. But since this end is not achievable, because of the resistance of the others moving the same way, egoism works as a factor of conservatism, permanence, "authority," maintenance of established orders. Its primitive expressions and "goods" are sleep, the restoration and withdrawal of the individual within itself; and feeding, the assimilation and annihilation of the other for the sake of the self-preservation of individualized

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life. Egoism is the "pathos of distance"; it alienates the other in order to exploit it. Its happiness is measured by the usefulness of a "thing," by the degree it can be alienated and employed for the egoistic desire.

Unfortunately space forbids touching upon the inexhaustible wealth of "values" and symbols, draperies and sophistries, wherein this fundamental interest of life has invested itself. We must pass to a short characterization of its opponent, which is given with "being an individual."

In distinguishing itself functionally from another, the vital subject may stress the relational, relative side, the uniting function of the relation. In this case the "other" appears to the individual as friendly, inviting, similar. The other suggests an alteration. It shows to the individual that it could be otherwise than as it actually is. It provokes a new possibility of individualization. I will become like it, I will identify myself with it. I will "explode" and throw away my egoistic isolation.

To escape my loneliness, I seek new sensations, changes, otherness, all in order to enjoy myself as an individual with a thousand and one possible alterations, self-variations. Thus vitality specifies itself as identificatory tendency or "alterism," eroticism.

Eroticism is fickle, opportunistic, anarchistic. Selfishness and self-alteration coincide. Its news hunting curiosity and faithlessness finds itself at home in a sentimentally gallant, unobliging, rapidly changing society. The eroticist is revolutionary in his mood, hating established and unmoved orders. He becomes aware of his potentialities in the mirror of others. He is a friend with everybody and everything that strikes him as new, unique, unexperienced, and his friendship lasts as long as the novelty lasts. Being always dependent on others he becomes one of the herd, which he constitutes. Needless to say that sexualism is only one partial aspect of this fundamental tendency, which is visible in the restlessness and sensation-seeking of the infant. Again, it must be sufficient here to

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sketch the tendency in its contradiction to egoism without going into the phenomenology of it. Like the other it permeates all spheres and values of life.

And neither can we analyze here the combinations and shifting compromises and alterations between the one and the other "good." But it is evident, that any compromise necessarily frustrates the one or the other and thwarts both.

Vital happiness is ambiguous. It is more than that, it is a paradox. Consequently a secret and anxiously inhibited cloud of desperation hangs over its successes, its laughter and self-assurance. The individual establishing itself as end, as all, as good, establishes a deadly contradiction; for individuation means establishing the other which wants the same thing and thereby threatens your existence. In order to maintain yourself, you must overcome the other, which threatens to take possession of you. Vital happiness, therefore, consists in negating a threatening negation, the famous "struggle for existence." Individuality as end means a finite, definite, unique good. The will for this turns out to result in an infinite complexity. A thousand wishes must die for one to be gratified.

If an individuated vitality should reign unrestrictedly, life would be a mad, wild, boundless, measureless chaos. Either of the fundamental tendencies necessary for individual existence, taken by itself and followed to its consequences, would lead to self-destruction in its utter self-fulfilment: the one by isolating petrification, the other by choatic explosion. A perfectly constant environment as the result of a universal victory of egoism would destroy vitality, which must be refreshed by new opportunities to enact itself. A perfectly changing environment as the result of a universal victory of eroticism would destroy vitality by too great demands on its erotic potency. The individual happens to seek its good in a fleeting compromise between the Scylla and Charybdis of two negations of negations, casting itself feverishly from one side to the other.

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III

This problem of "balance" or of "compromise" reveals a function not identical with vitality. If there were not a regulative, normative, censuring function, checking and repealing vital tendencies from their measureless pursuit, life would be madness. For a tendency, once having the upper hand, would not willingly abandon its happiness if it were not disciplined and interfered with to let the other interest have its chance too. This function we call "spirit" or "idea."

One might describe this disciplining, regulative function as interest for "centrality" as over against the eccentricities of vital wishes which always tend to become "grotesque"—judged so by our normative function. Aristotle probably had this in mind with his "golden mean." When vitality is the interest in individuation, the "I-and-otherness" of life, normativity, would be the interest in the elimination of the "I-and-otherness" for the sake of their common, frictionless, harmonious "being together." It tells the individual that it is not only this and that and the other thing, but that it *is*, and that it should treat therefore every other being not only as a means or an instrument but as having the same dignity of *being*, which is Kant's formulation. The content of the categorical imperative lies in its form or function. It means unity in spite of the manifold, subordination of vitality to "community," harmonious, "coexistence" not as fact but as idea, as a direction, which gives form or *telos* to the directionless vital energies.

Vitality seeks its good in the freedom of the ego. Ideality seeks its good in the freedom from the ego. Vital life wants differentiation, individuation, exploitation of the moment; ideal life demands unity, being, wholeness, devotion to this common ground of all individuals, loyalty to objective tasks. It directs not as push and action but as conviction, conscience, norm, which retains its authoritative "voice" regardless of whether we follow its demand or not.

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We also speak of our "better self." We mean by that that we are able to criticize ourselves, able to call our vital goods in question, able to know that they ought to be at our disposition, that we are able to see through them as merely hypothetical, provisional ends, as "goods for" and that we should not mistake them as justifications of our existence, as ends in themselves. We know that they belong to ourselves as not "final," that we are responsible for them. The "better self," then, expresses nothing else but the normative or "central" function.

From the vital point of view, the normative function appears as critical negation; its veto is felt in what we call shame or what we call respect. Vitality feels hurt and yet rebels. Thus, instead of complete surrender and obedience there is worry about the naked subjectivity, feeling of impurity, unworthiness; we pose and pretend what we feel we ought to be and are not. Or there is the symptom of respect for another, whom we dare not treat as mere means any more, whom we envy because we should like to possess his cultural valor. We symbolize in him our conscience instead of seeing in him the representative of the same task of unity, in which we are equal. If we would realize our own conscience fully and without rebellion, we should vision in him the friend and "brother."

The normative interest is not action, "does not move," but it gives form and meaning to action. Its happiness or good antagonizes the vital happiness and good. What satisfies the one does not *eo ipso* the other. The vital value signalizes a success of subduing and exploiting the other for the individual's profit. The formal good is independent of success and is good in itself. Its happiness lies in the joy of having overcome the noisy struggle of life, of being united with the other in a common ideal orientation.

As vitality symbolizes its idea of happiness or good in an infinite range of "tangible" and "visible" values, so the normative will creates its symbols in values of culture. To men-

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tion examples: it begins with the values or virtues of purity and measure, i.e., having dominion over vitality which is to be ready, plastic, and free for all tasks. It continues by positing the individual in a community of work, which would not be possible without the mutual respect of the individual for the common order, for the share of others in the same *telos*. Over against the fluctuating, oscillating vital interests it praises loyalty. The natural inequality of vital talents is counterbalanced by treating each specific function as of indispensable value to the idea of a whole. In theory, cultural value means to think what is given not as it is useful or important to you but as it is important in its universal relations.

But these virtues are only symbols or "values"; they do not exhaust the function itself which is not summed up by them. All empirical "authorities" or "governmental" functions are inadequate and partial realizations of their ground. This leads to a paradox that is peculiar to the spiritual side of the ethical problem.

The meaning of conscience is freedom, responsibility, unity, harmony. But each step of its realization necessarily has to rely on vital force to "make a success" out of it. Therefore each step of its realization creates oppression, compulsion, antagonism, disharmony—all in the name of the ideal. The demand of unity necessarily arouses its own opposition and a dualism. The demand of freedom from the ego relies on the ego to carry it out. Thus the greatest injustices and the most fanatic wars are injustices in the name of right and holy wars. *Summum jus summa injuria.*

We saw vitality destroying its good in realizing it, negating its own negation and restoring it to recommence the same, futile process. The ideal will, on the other hand, is paradoxical, because the I wills freedom from itself. It must defeat its purpose in the moment of its activation. As long as I desire to change the state of the world, so long do I prove to be entangled in vital antagonisms which I was to overcome, to unify and to harmonize. But if the absolute meaning of conscience

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is unity it cannot rest satisfied with this war of values it has given rise to. It again must raise its voice—not against it—but embracing it in superior humor and compassion.

Vitality and the spirit are, in their wrestling antagonism, relative to each other. And this relativity constitutes the full meaning of "subjective." The vital good is possible only through the regulative control, its unity and consistency. The ideal good (established proportion and harmony of interests) is dependent on the vital participation and consent. It must be "indorsed" by vital force. But the idea demands absolute and unconditional wholeness, unity of will, unambiguity of life, and therefore involves an endless struggle *without committing itself ultimately to any party of the combatants.*

The absolute idea must reside throughout and above the struggle. The regulative function of the idea points back and beyond itself to its absolute function, which relativates all cultural efforts. The problem of the good, as the problem of an absolute and complete conscience, must embrace the vital happiness or good, because it cannot antagonize their right without falling short of its own meaning of complete unity, which "excludes" antagonistic "I-and-otherness"—the ethical problem, then, can be formulated thus: How is being possible in existence; how is self-control consistent with self-realization? The problem is not, how is vital happiness possible, because in its isolation it is judged by its antagonist as extravagance, excess, ὕβρις, insolence, suicide. And it is not, how is formal happiness possible, because this appears judged by its antagonist as empty, dualistic, hypocritical, illusory, devoid of content.

The ambiguity of living (vitality in its double tendency versus the spirit) and the practical paradox (idea individuated and idea absolute) are the living, practical ground on which ethical theories and civilization grow, which are its projections and tentative solutions. And the task of ethics is to criticize these solutions measured by the problem itself. It is not to criticize the problem measured by past "solutions."

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON

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THE CONCEPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY

BRUCE WALLACE BROTHERSTON

THE clear-cut and self-sufficing conception of individual responsibility which has played so central a part in all types of ethical theories presents a grave difficulty. Differ as widely as they may, with one type as with the other, individual responsibility is understood to be the distinctive mark of the field of ethics. For they all agree that voluntariness is what gives conduct its ethical quality. And volition is always defined in terms of the individual. Hence courses of action for which individuals are responsible are the subject matter of ethics. Yet Aristotle, the first thinker who clearly defined the field of ethics by this conception, evinces its difficulty in a striking manner. He was placed by it in an equivocal position. While he clearly saw that politics play an intimate part in the realm of ethics, so that there are different sets of virtues and vices in different political situations, he yet excluded from the field of ethics anything that the individual lacked moral ability to achieve or to avoid.[1] He excluded with physical compulsion and ignorance of the matter, also psychical coercion which comes from a social or political milieu. But when he comes to cases it becomes clear that the social milieu does have a most intimate effect upon the moral conduct of the individual. He found it impossible in any concrete case to mark off with distinctness what the individual could avoid from what he could not.[2] Indeed it may be stated with confidence that it is absolutely impossible to draw a distinct line except in the abstract between that into which the individual is intrigued by psychical coercion out of his social milieu and that which is due to his own volition and which hence, according to ethical theories in general, is alone to be called moral evil.

[1] *Nichomachean Ethics* iii. 5. 1, 2, 4.

[2] *Ibid.* 1. 3, 5–11.

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It is an example of historic irony that Aristotle, who was so careful to maintain the relation of ethics to politics, has, by thus making the abstract notion of individual responsibility the nub of ethics, done more than any other perhaps to set ethics upon its high abstract course, cutting out the whole political realm from its historic position between the individual and the universal Good. The result has been more than two milleniums of wide discussion, helplessly swinging between theories, stringent and libertarian, absolute and wholly relative; between intellectual virtue achieved in mystic contemplation and a surface spirit, content in conceit of mechanistic science to be in a world without hope. In recent times students are turning aside from ethical tradition into the great field of human facts where the force of human responsibility is ever operating and are there seeking a new analysis; so that ethics may be written in its inextricable relation to social philosophy and a genuine method of moral advance be achieved.

It is a well-known fact that social responsibility characterized the world-view of early men with little reference to individuals. We might be put in the way of such a new analysis if we could trace the development of the conception of individual responsibility as it grew up upon this wider social attitude. Since, as we have seen, it was Aristotle who first made individual responsibility the nub of ethics, we will use for our purpose the material of the Greek tradition.

At the outset we are led to ask why it was that the process of clearly distinguishing the notion of individual responsibility completed itself only in the ethics of Aristotle. This in itself presents a problem. For individual responsibility is by no means a difficult notion to apprehend. It takes a very low degree of reason to mark the agent of a wrong deed, whether it be one's self or another. Elephants and apes can clearly mark the agents of ill turns, even passing over others who were mere tools.[3] Was it not some strong bond in the original

[3] Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, I, pp. 36 ff.

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equipment of human nature, not present in elephants and apes, which prevented the astute Greek thinkers from making their way to this *Ultima Thule* of ethical analysis for two hundred years?

A certain passion in the fragments that remain from the early Greek scientists evinces an inward strain in their thinking. It is a strain by no means due to the social coercion of tradition upon the individual. In the Greek colonies, where philosophy arose, there obtained the liberty of new lands with mixed customs. Moreover, so long as act conformed to rite and custom, early thinkers in general never repressed their first thinkers. The tension between common opinion and philosophy—between νόμος and φύσις—was a tension inward to Greek philosophy itself. Scorn opinion in behalf of reason —νόμος in behalf of φύσις—as philosophy might, there was that in the very nature of νόμος with all its inconsistencies which imposed itself upon φύσις—that in the very nature of opinion that imposed itself upon reason; and made reason appear, after philosophy, with its realm of Platonic forms and Aristotelian deity, had done its best as only a replica in pale glory of common Greek opinion—of the traditional superrealm of gods and spirits and sacred forces. Was this, as John Dewey thinks, because reason and tradition together were both removed from any empirical basis?[4] Or was it perhaps because human nature in its constant aspect, in its original equipment, was resident at the heart of tradition which had built itself about her? The instinctive basis of human nature was passionately holding Greek reason in bonds—bonds which only after two centuries of the "enlightenment" of individuals were attenuated to the breaking-point. The individual reason, itself an abstraction, was finding its abstract universals and upon them was misplacing the concrete reality of social life. An abstract, universalist ethics developed and, even in Aristotle, in spite of his efforts to the contrary, left the historic, social groups quite on one side. In this ethics the

[4] *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, chap. I, also pp. 67–68.

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individual, cut loose from νόμος—from the conscience of social bodies—accepted complete moral responsibility, a burden which only a few prophetic minds, drawing moral force by religious experience from beyond their social milieu, have been able to support. On the other hand national codes, with their social responsibility vaguely apprehended and needing analysis, had to make their way cut off from the light of science which was seeking in abstraction a direct path to reality.

Let us attempt to discover what were those bonds which held Greek reason so long from this desertion. With the early Greeks, as with all early peoples, moral good and evil were by no means clear conceptions. They were always found indistinguishably commingled with two wider notions, the positively and negatively sacred, the ἅγιος and the ἄγος, the *fas* and the *nefas*. The primitive conception of "uncleanness," pollution, and "sin" is inclusive of all kinds of evil, natural, accidental, and moral, indistinguishably confused together. Moral evil in primitive conception, as indeed also moral or religious good, is an entity, widely general, not to say universal, which is ever tending to focus itself in particular persons and things. It is a well-known fact that individuality had slight force in primitive consciousness. The individual is lost in a continuity with clan, tribe, and natural environment. The presence of superindividual and superparticular operations and forces is felt most strongly. It is the predominant experience of primitive men. The earliest prerogative of the human, among lower races, was not an individualistic self-consciousness, but rather a consciousness of self in which individuality was very vaguely held; but which rather, when in times of emotional crises it became strongly felt, was identified with an objective Presence viewed as a potent superindividual reality. Man's attitude to that potent Reality rendered him at once a moral and religious being. Elephants and apes, having a different original psychology, not being apprehensive of a superindividual potency, are unhampered in fixing the blame upon the immediate agent of an ill turn. It

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was of course too early for any clear analysis of the relation of individuals and particulars to social forces or superparticular operation. But there arose a kind of first draft of a moral order and system of knowledge in a pseudo-science of magic rite and religious ritual. This reduced a sum of loose observations to a system of rules which the superindividual Presence was believed to follow in its operation in events.

The significant points to bear in mind for an understanding of primitive ethics are the agency—not of the individual—but of the superindividual; under what circumstances the superindividual reality concentrates its potency; on what points it focuses; and whether for good or for evil. The individual is not conceived of as an *agent,* but rather as a *locus* of this higher agency. And this *locus* may just as well be an inanimate thing, a stick or a stone that has accidentally fallen upon a man. It may be a dead body, or a man who has touched a dead body. It may be a man who has inadvertently entered some holy precinct. Or it may be a wilful murderer. Each is abhorred with the same moral feeling. And indeed, as we shall see, philosophers and dramatists as well as common men found a reality in these traditional attitudes not easily to be shaken off. This did not appear to the foremost minds of Greece to be a silly superstition. It fixed itself upon courts of law down even to modern times. The fact gives evidence that this early attitude has some basis in human nature itself. Pericles and Protagoras debated through a whole day as to whether, in a certain accident, a man or a spear was the bearer of the guilt of bloodshed.[5] Plato's *Laws* provide for the trial of animals or inanimate things and for their death or banishment if found guilty.[6]

It is this predominance of the superindividual and the superparticular that may be called the essence, the very spirit of the Greek νόμος. And as elsewhere its operation was conceived in terms of the vendetta. Early man regarded the vendetta

[5] Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers,* I, 446.

[6] 873 ff. Cf. Westermarck, *op. cit.,* I, chap. x.

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as the very form and nature of the superindividual reality. Negative and positive sacredness are early conceived as opposing realms of nature. Now a feud however it began was a battle of opposing loyalties in which each deed is an unending series was first an act of justice and then itself a crime calling for new justice. It is evident that here the experience of social forces has provided the form in which universal reality is conceived. The opposing forces in storm, the incroachment of season on season had immediately the moral meaning of the human drama. The positive or negative, the advantageous or disadvantageous, the good or evil direction which social passion may take was one with the positive or negative, the advantageous or disadvantageous direction natural force may take. But positive and negative, good and evil are one superindividual reality and merge into each other. The strife between good and evil, negative and positive sanctity, lay at the basis of the Greek νόμος. The god of the new year against the god of the old who had committed the crime of ὕβρις, of unsocial arrogance. Natural forces against natural forces. Man against nature. Man against man. It is all one moral and religious phenomenon. Right rising against wrong to amend it, but in the victory becoming wrong itself and needing new vengeance. Religion and conscience and law all have their first definite form in the vendetta.

Now this thing which was the heart of νόμος became the φύσις of the Greek scientists. They stripped "tradition" of its garment of traditions and took its naked spirit for their principle, which they called "Nature." Φύσις was nothing other than the naked form of νόμος. A fragment of Anaxamander makes a cosmic principle of the vendetta. Its injustice is made universal. "All things suffer retribution for their injustice to each other according to the ordinance of time." With Heraclitus the strife of opposites in nature is the groundwork of the world. War is the father of all things. Homer did not know what he wished when he desired the elimination of

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strife from gods and men. He was desiring the downfall of the universe. Here the superindividual is all. The power of men to operate it is eliminated. The individual, more completely than in tradition is only the *locus* of the fall of cosmic forces. The religious doctor is no "good," nor the magician any "evil." Obedience to custom has no staying "virtue." The early philosophers departed from tradition by excluding even the vague and confused conception of individual responsibility which tradition always held. They explained responsibility away altogether in an absolutely determined world. In them Greek fate became scientific determinism.

It was from this cosmical reduction of ethics that Socrates revolted. He must reduce the universe not to a physical principle but to an ethical norm—to discover that things are as they are because it is best. Socrates advanced as the basis of the universe the Form of the Good. This Form can be grasped by the individual mind. Hence we have a clear but intellectualistic definition of the relation of superindividual and individual. But Socrates opposed to the Good, as an intelligible Form at the head of some system of intelligible Forms, a more or less unified realm of ignorance or opinion wherein the common man is held in bonds. His ethical non-freedom still emphasizes the superindividual nature of moral evil. Greek fate enters the Socratic world in a tamed condition. And, since for Socrates to grasp the Good intellectually is to achieve it morally, intellectualism has here given the individual complete moral ability in himself, and we have another hint of the relation of intellectualism to social atomism. Plato, like Socrates, holding the superindividual Good to be within the grasp of philosophic individuals, attempted to intellectualize also the superindividual evil by reducing it to habit.[1] And Aristotle, as we have seen, completed the tendency eliminating the superindividual entirely from the field of ethics by making individual responsibility the criterion of the ethical.

[1] Windelband, *History of Philosophy* (tr. James H. Tufts), pp. 191 f.

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What that force was in the moral life of the Greeks which Aristotle had finally excluded from ethics may be seen perhaps with complete clearness by a comparison of the trend of philosophic thought with that in the Greek drama. It is well known that the inception of Greek drama is in the Dionysaic ritual with its vendetta of the old and new years. The super-individual nature of evil has captured the minds of the dramatists in their experience of humanity and they are working out the relation of individuals under it. They as well as Aristotle exclude what is merely external—ignorance of the matter and physical coercion—from the realm of the ethical. In Euripides' *Suppliants,* Theseus himself washes and tends the bodies of the dead. He does not fear being made "sinful" by a deed of human tenderness. And in *Hercules Furens,* the same king embraces the blood-guilty Hercules, saying that no pollution can come to a man from his friends. Sophocles indeed is still dealing with ignorance of the matter as though it made no difference with "sin." The sins of Oedipus are committed in ignorance and yet he is represented as πας ἄναγνος, wholly polluted, sin-cursed. Incest and patricide are "sin" though fallen into in entire ignorance. At the same time Sophocles implies the exclusion of such mishaps from the realm of ethics, since it is characters drawn in moral grandeur whom he presents thus as polluted. In Aeschylus and Euripides however the stage is never held by such events but always by evil in which the volition of the agent is involved. So far these two are on a footing with Aristotle. But in the matter of retaining psychical coercion within the realm of ethics, they remain with tradition. Moreover their whole dramatic power centers in the reality of this position in which they are maintaining the essential characteristic of Greek tradition, that of the super-individual nature of moral evil. It is now more clearly conceived because individual volition has found its true relation within it. The individual's will has been swept into the larger evil to become a part of it. Here appears clearly the force that retarded Greek thought so long in its abstract course. What is

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voluntary is here presented at the same time as involved in psychical coercion from the social situation. A man's voluntary deeds are involved in "fate." The crime to which Clytemnestra has given her heart is at the same time the "fury of the house of Atridae." The dramatists are restrained from following the ethics of the philosophers by the force of a fundamental fact of human nature, that voluntariness is not to be separated from psychical coercion out of the social milieu except by an unreal abstraction. A superindividual force plays a part in volition as intrinsic as is the part of the individual. Such a force has from the beginning played a primary part in human conduct, merging into *mores* vastly the larger proportion of the acts of individuals at any point of time, and being an escapeless silent partner in the acts of even the most "emancipated." For milleniums it held sway in custom over the whole human race, ruling and controlling the more special instincts of sex and mastery; which later, having broken free, provided the forces for a radical individualism. It should be evident that it was itself an original impulse, or impulsive principle of unity among the impulses, an instinct of order with its accompanying emotion among the special instincts and feelings, holding them so long in leash. How could it thus for milleniums have obtained in so absolute a form without the force of original impulse and emotion?

It would seem then that that view is mistaken in which moralists have assumed that *homo sapiens* arrived upon the planet long before *homo moralis*. That the psychical basis of man's later intellectual achievement was present in original humanity, but not the psychical basis of man's later moral achievement. That the moral and the social are adventitious to human nature, or at least were there only "in germ." What this view overlooks is that the ethical feeling-tone, though mistakenly extended to accident and natural event, is by no means less profound among primitive peoples than among advanced races. Moral evil in early attitudes, while it is essentially a superindividual fact and may attach to the individual entirely

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by accident and not by his own volition, carries with it precisely the feeling of moral opprobrium and with profound intensity. Responsibility may be so much merely a feeling and so little a clear conception that the idea of human agency may be almost absent from it altogether and it may attach indiscriminately to any *locus* where the superindividual good or evil falls; yet every student of early peoples finds the feeling-tone of moral good present among them to a passionate degree. They accept forlorn hopes. The American Indian fights to the death to give a contingency of his tribe a chance to escape.[8] Menoikeus immolates himself to save his city;[9] and Oedipus desires his own exile to effect the cleansing of Thebes. We have here surely the mark of moral consciousness in its complete fullness. Of *homo sapiens, homo moralis* is the motivating spirit. Within his moral consciousness, responsibility, though not yet arrived at individual self-consciousness and though extending its scope indefinitely to the animal and even to the inanimate world, was nevertheless a powerful impulse and a passionate feeling. To trace the development of morals is not to discover new moral qualities acquired by humanity or inwardly evolved. But that development is rather, as indeed is probably also the development of science, simply the analysis, by means of reason upon continued experience, of the true relation of particulars and individuals within this experience of superindividual reality, replacing the old pseudo-science of magical and religious rites, which was man's first rough construction of a moral order and of a scientific system of knowledge.

If we turn from the Greek to the Hebrew tradition, we can mark a development of moral conceptions which remained free from the individualism that was initiated in the Greek Enlightenment and which therefore may prove more fruitful, even for ethical theory, than the traditional history of the

[8] W. J. Thomas, *Source Book of Social Origins* (paper by William Jones), p. 686.

[9] Cox, *The Mythologies of the Aryan Nations*, p. 415. Euripides *The Phoenician Virgins*, pp. 990 ff.

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subject. It began in the same primitive world-view which finds a precise counterpart among every early people. By the passionate loyalty of Moses for enslaved Israel, the whole realm of the superindividual—the *ruah elohim* or spirit of deity—was conceived as a passion of social justice, a demand for social righteousness. As among many barbaric peoples, the superindividual realm centering in Israel, was conceived as a Rule or Kingdom of God. But in the Jahwism founded by Moses and carried to its logical conclusion in a national experience achieved under the leadership of a succession of great prophetic minds culminating in Jesus, the Rule of God was at last conceived definitely and in much detail as a moral order, a system of social justice, political and ethical in one. Ethics are here always an intrinsic element in the solution of the social and political problems of Israel. It is only by an accident of history that the ethics of Jesus came to be conceived as merely a universalist ethics. The good life was to be effected by effecting together a new political situation and a new ethical attitude. That superindividual realm, which from the very beginning had constituted the point of view from which men had regarded the world, had never been lost. But it had at last become in prophetic thought, an order of social justice, a social harmony. Thus the point of view, or the "subject" of moral judgment, lost in the Greek Enlightenment and become a "problem of ethics," remained native and arrived at clearness in Hebrew conception. With the "subject" of moral judgment conceived as social harmony, the object of moral judgment was passionately separated from ritual acts and identified with acts and attitudes relative to their fruits in social harmony. It is soon apprehended that moral authority arises from the fact that the superindividual force is innate in the individual and is thus an inner motive. With Jeremiah, it is the law of God written on the hearts of Israel; with Jesus it is the "kingdom of God within you." In the passion of their spiritual experience, the instinctive basis of the demand for the solution of the social problems of their people pushed out

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to consciousness. In the thought of these powerful minds, responsibility remains the nub of ethics, but it never changed from its early seat in the superindividual. It never became the responsibility of an individual irrespective of his social or political situation, for the achievement of a universal Good. It is rather a merged responsibility for a certain social and political situation—responsibility that means be found to render it a genuine "Kingdom of God." Right ethics are therefore inextricably bound with right politics. Where the political situation is evil, as in the days of the prophets and of Jesus, right ethics implies a right political and social platform.

Is it not the case that responsibility, which is perhaps the most distinctive mark of humanity, is not rightly to be conceived as confined to the immediate agency of the individual but is rather a social and political passion that delights in moral good and reprobates moral evil without immediate reference to individuals; that sees a whole social situation as avoidable wrong, without placing passionate measures of responsibility upon individuals and groups? Roughly to assess individual responsibility in things past has its judicial use; and of course responsibility is to be consciously recognized and assumed by individuals. They are self-conscious centres, creative and directive, of social forces. But the individual is to be conceived as the *locus* of a responsibility wider than and inclusive of his individual responsibility and organically related to it. It extends to the limits of his social milieu and unites in a whole indefinitely many individual responsibilities. Responsibility finds its complete meaning only in its forward-looking aspect, where some large social purpose renders each individual a *locus* of a common responsibility, each *locus* differing from others according to differing powers and opportunities of individuals. The progress of ethics is inextricably bound with the rewriting of our national codes, running pace with social and political reform under the ideals of national and international harmony.

ST. LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY
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CAUSATION AND MORAL EXPERIENCE

J. E. TURNER

THE degree to which the Principle of Causation can be accepted as applicable to moral experience will long remain a crucial issue. It is contended, on the one hand, that even the minimum of actual contingency involves the fatal intrusion of disorder, unreliability, or even chaos; while, on the other hand, universal necessity seems absolutely to exclude that freedom which is the essence of responsibility, and, therefore, of moral individuality and conduct. Thus the antinomy arises between two basic ideals, each of which claims to be equally indispensable to any coherent concept of the universe—an antithesis whose resolution, in my own opinion, can be found only in the acceptance of the principle of self-determination which appears to be gaining wider recognition. For, when we turn from individuals to social groups, it has become almost a commonplace to maintain that national liberty consists precisely in the capacity for virtual self-determination. Unfortunately, however, almost all the emphasis is thrown here upon "self," instead of falling upon "determination" also. Doubtless this is only the natural consequence of the powerful reaction from hateful external restrictions combined with the ever present instinct of self-assertion. But it is none the less obvious that to "determine" means definitely to decide or to settle; while the efficient carrying out of every final decision, so far as any important national policy is concerned, depends entirely on the precise working out of long trains of extremely delicate and complex influences of widely different types: financial, industrial, and diplomatic. Now every one of these influences is plainly a cause, which is adopted simply because it is believed to involve certain quite definite and desirable effects; and whenever na-

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tional policy fails either partially or completely, the reason always lies in the employment of some unsuitable cause, or rather combination of causes—an imprudent representative, a premature display of force, an unwise concession, or what not. Conversely, the successful attainment of all national purposes —the conduct of a campaign or the enforcement of a treaty— demands careful and farsighted planning; or (in other terms) demands that precise adjustment of means to ends—once again of causes to effects—which only the ablest statesmen or commanders can achieve.

1. Political liberty, therefore, consists always in self-determination; but it remains an ideal that can never be completely attained, for two reasons. The first is obvious: the incessant conflict between rival communities, none of which is powerful enough to do more than interfere, in greater or less degree, with the purposes of its contemporaries. The second reason is much more subtle: the incalculable complexity of the causal combinations which are always operating, only, very largely, altogether beyond control; uncontrolled, however, not because causation has ceased to act—not, in other words, because contingency prevails—but simply because the vast number and the extreme delicacy of all the causal features taken together conceal their true character. But in spite of this it is steadily becoming plainer that in many subnational spheres—in educational policy, in social reform, and in industrial organization—this formidable complexity is slowly being unraveled; and equally obvious is the result of this widening knowledge in the increasingly definite affiliation of desired effects to their real causes.

2. At this point, however, a further serious misconception threatens to vitiate ethical discussion. For increasing definiteness is a quality that is almost invariably regarded as involving a narrow rigidity wholly out of place in delicate social interrelations. But this is true only when the combination of the factors concerned is of a very simple order, as it is

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in all primitive machines. These are undeniably rigid in their mode of operation; on the other hand, it must be observed that every later advance in the complexity of their construction inevitably brings with it an advance in plasticity of function or of response also, as is obvious in the finely graded velocity and power of good motor engines or of the machinery of a great liner or airship, more especially when these become self-controlled by gyrostatic appliances. In all such instances, swiftly multiplying as they are, the primal rigidity has long since given place to a wide range of variable responsiveness which, in the case of an airplane, has become strikingly analogous to the flight of a living bird. Yet in spite of this, it must also be noted, the original definiteness of structure must be retained, and indeed even heightened, so far as the detailed parts of the entire mechanism are concerned; the smallest wheels and the most delicate levers must all alike remain precisely adjusted if efficiency is to be maintained.

Thus, far from being inimical to elasticity of response, structural definiteness of an extremely delicate order is absolutely indispensable to all highly efficient and plastic functioning; and the mechanical instances just alluded to are clearly analogous to that rigidity of discipline in a well-trained fighting force, or likewise in the civil services, upon which every superior officer relies to effect his ends. It is true that under incompetent leaders this rigidity defeats its own purposes; but this is no valid reason for seeking to dispense with it, any more than for destroying a good engine because it is clogged by bad lubrication. Turning to a different sphere of inquiry, it is patent that biological—or equally psychological—research is disclosing an ever increasing number of natural mechanisms, far transcending human inventions in their intricacy and delicacy, upon which the phenomena of inheritance, reproduction, and consciousness most intimately depend. Every disturbance of their precisely adjusted interplay, as for example by glandular defectiveness

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or radioactivity, inevitably produces serious results, in exactly the same way that poor petrol lowers the efficiency of an engine, or slack discipline the morale of a regiment.

Throughout all these instances alike, therefore, we observe the inescapable operation of causes and effects, equally in the physical, the vital, the psychical, and the moral spheres which we are fully justified in regarding as definite and invariable even though they still remain undiscovered; and upon which, still farther, all educators, medical practitioners, and social reformers either instinctively or deliberately depend.[1] In restricting further consideration to the specifically moral realm I should like to discuss certain important aspects of the situation which ethical theory appears hitherto to have disregarded.

3. For while the invariability of causal connections is generally sufficiently appreciated, it is on the other hand rarely recognized that, whenever causation operates for long periods and on a large scale, it becomes definitely selective. It should further be clear that the character of no cause can be completely understood unless its entire range of operation has been ascertained. The actual conditions of investigation naturally compel us drastically to delimit specific cause-effect relations, so that they can be analyzed. But if this restriction is carried too far, much more if the phenomena are permanently isolated, their continuity with the environment is severed and their real character to some degree distorted. Provided however that this error is discovered, so that a large-scale view of causal processes is obtained, then these processes are found to be not only invariable but at the same time selective, exactly as natural selection influences the biological sphere. Natural selection, in fact, is only the name

[1] I may refer more specifically to current research into the changes effected in germinal structure by X-rays, and the electrical reactions in the conduction of nervous processes. Even Kant unreservedly recognized that "in the world of phenomena . . . . there would be no action which we could not anticipate with certainty, and recognize to be absolutely necessary from its preceding conditions." *Critique of Pure Reason* (Bohn's edition), p. 340.

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given to the comprehensive or total effect of all biological causes taken as acting together in their totality; and it is only the unfamiliar space-time dimensions that are involved which conceal the truth that precisely the same methods of rigorous selection prevail throughout the entire physical universe on the one hand, and the sphere of conduct on the other. As regards the structure of the stars and their combinations into stellar systems, e.g., certain configurations and certain masses are possible while others are excluded; similarly, at the other end of the inconceivably vast scale, certain orbits of revolution in which electrons travel and certain modes of atomic and electronic vibration are selectively determined by the totality of causes acting together, while other alternatives are rendered impossible.[2] It is obvious that this universal selection is not, primarily at least, a conscious selection any more than is that of a centrifugal separator. But neither is the selection of living organisms and species conscious; all these types of ordered relation alike are the final resultants of invariable causal agencies acting over immense ranges of time and space, although the consciousness of animals assumes in due course an important part in the entire development. But just as this large-scale selectiveness is difficult to discern in the physical realm, so it is in the moral realm and again for the same reason—that is the extreme complexity of all the phenomena, combined as this is with the unfamiliarity of the space-time dimensions. Only a large-scale survey of the history of humanity can reveal its essentially selective character—good in the long run being conserved while evil is eradicated; and to man's extremely limited vision, unfortunately, it inevitably appears to be a painfully long run.

So much then for the invariability and the selectiveness of the causational process; these must now be associated with the third and yet more important feature—its irreversibility. For although I have just maintained that evil is progressively

[2] For a clear outline of the details cf., Eddington, *Stars and Atoms*.

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eradicated, it must at the same time be realized that no effect, once it has been produced, can ever be actually destroyed although it may certainly be occasionally compensated. But even this can be achieved only by means of some quite specific cause whose action has become necessitated by the effect in question, which, therefore, remains an eternally persisting factor throughout the entire sequence simply because every effect in its own turn becomes a cause. The compensation which is thus attained is, then, much more apparent than real. If, e.g., my pen rolls off the table, it seems that I can readily replace it in its original position. Conceding this debatable point, it is obvious that it forms only one feature of the entire situation which, when taken in its entirety, can undeniably never be precisely restored. For both the pen and my temper will have been injured, no matter how infinitesimally; while at the same time the earth's center of gravity—again infinitesimally—has been displaced. This is of course only one instance of Professor Whitehead's general principle that the influence of every electron radiates itself throughout the entire physical universe; and this, we must now recognize, it does unalterably and irrevocably.[3]

But what is true of such trivial occurrences must be still truer and much more significant in more important matters. The recovery of sound health is quite impossible without some permanent alteration in the invalid's condition, since he can never be in all respects what he was originally. All such compensation can, therefore, never be more than partial; while the higher the level of experience concerned—the more valuable the factors in the situation—the more inadequate must any compensation become. A bankrupt may become solvent again, a discredited statesman regain power, and a declining nation fame; but never without some permanent and often radical change which leaves an indelible impression, no mat-

[3] Cf., "The attraction between small spheres of lead in a laboratory must depend on the girth and mass of the whole universe." Haas, *The New Physics*, p. 150.

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ter how skilfully this may be concealed. For even granting that all else could be restored, still memory would retain the unalterable past; and whether this alleviates or intensifies the situation is irrelevant, since we are here concerned with the undeniable irreversibility as this bears upon moral experience.

4. For moral theory is concerned not only with acts but also with the agent. Now every act is a cause which produces its own specific effects, at once indelible and irreversible; and in the present connection the most significant effects are those which permanently alter the personality of the agent. Every deed makes the self different from what it was before, either better or worse as the case may be; and this in no merely haphazard fashion, since every act finds its place in some more or less systematic series such as the settled policy of an able statesman or financier; and even the most commonplace life approximates to this level to some extent. Thus every action has a twofold aspect: externally, it expresses the character of the doer, while, internally, it modifies that character just as firing a gun causes the recoil. Conduct is therefore inseparable from the self-development of personality; the first is the outer, the second, the inner aspect of a single course of development which is inescapably subjected to the irreversibility of causation.

Now both the entire course of action and the development of the self are controlled in the end by those ideals which the individual more or less consciously, and more or less successfully tries to realize. However obscure these ideals may remain and however partial their attainment, they still form the ultimate determinants of conduct. But precisely because they are ideals, they must always transcend actual achievement; for every ideal, as such, is slowly generated by our actual experience,[4] and is finally adopted because it tran-

[4] This is true even when ideals are accepted *in toto* from some external source, since even then they have emerged from some person's experience, and must be incorporated within personal experience before they function as ideals.

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scends earlier ideals, and with these, earlier achievements. All ideals, still further, enjoy some measure of imperativeness—they present some demand, however feeble, to be actualized.[5] Even the criminal acts in accord with an ideal which he feels he must realize in order to be successful; he is, therefore, just as conscious of an obligation as is the saint; and his "world," radically distorted as it is, nevertheless presents itself to him in such a way that, if it is to endure, certain deeds must be performed. If, then, bad ideals possess imperativeness and also reveal a "real world," still more must all good ideals enjoy a far higher imperativeness and manifest Reality though never, of course, exhaustively.

Finally, this imperativeness of all ideals—even of bad ideals to those who pursue them—is in principle a permanent and absolute imperativeness. It may, that is to say, be ignored or defied, but it can never be destroyed. Always it revives and presents itself anew in undiminished rigor; and it brings with it the ever growing consciousness of two vitally important features—first, of the cumulative yet inescapable penalties for its neglect; and secondly, of the agent's diminishing capacity to meet its unrelaxed demands. It is noteworthy that in these two respects the mentality of clever criminals is much more instructive than is that of ordinary persons, since the former are much more keenly conscious than the latter both of the objective risks of failure and of the subjective results of slackness; and similarly as regards artists and athletes. But this unusual clarity of vision is only the natural consequence of the relative simplicity of the given situations, where the desired ends are definite and the penalties of failure swift and complete; on the other hand, the far higher complexity of the moral sphere, as such, inevitably conceals its governing laws, obscures its operative causes, and defers the final consequences.

[5] Of course, the situation can become envisaged in these set terms only after some philosophical analysis.

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5. None the less we may apply what we have learnt from the evil self to the experience of the good self. For despite their almost absolute contrast, no individual is ever perfectly good; and it is this fact, that everyone is tainted by some evil however negligible it may be taken to be, that now demands consideration.

The "almost absolute contrast" between the good and the bad self is most fully manifested in their respective attitudes towards the evil traits which both alike—though in different measure—possess. The former seeks to purify himself from these, while the latter makes no such strenuous effort and may indeed intensify them; and this raises the crucial issue of the moral realm—an issue which, however, rarely seems to receive adequate attention in ethical theory. For as soon as man endeavors to realize any of his moral ideals, as he feels these demand to be, he finds that he can never do so. In the first place, he has repeatedly betrayed or abandoned them, either deliberately or unintentionally; and even when he has done his best, still he recognizes that his highest achievements fall short in one way or another. This again holds true in such non-moral spheres as art or athletics, where there arises a keen sense of inadequacy, or at least of misgivings as to whether the maximum efforts have been put forth and the best means chosen. It is indeed almost a platitude to say that one indisputable condition of aesthetic excellence is the severely self-critical attitude, while self-complacency involves deterioration. But aesthetic ideals share with moral ideals that necessity which imperatively claims to determine action; while moral self-complacency is more intolerable and more fatal than its artistic analogue, since it vitiates not merely one side of personality but the whole.

The plain fact is that, at all levels of experience alike, man confronts the irreversibility of causation; every act entails its own ineradicable residuum; every failure, and especially every deliberate dereliction, has consequences both ex-

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ternal and internal. Just as every electron radiates through all space, so every self influences society and, indeed, the universe; as is readily seen whenever some obscure criminal sets in motion, or may in the end even modify, the procedure of national law. Similarly, like the gun recoil, must every bad action permanently and sometimes profoundly, modify personality, always in the direction of rendering it less competent than before to realize its ideals; every unexpected catastrophe being only the natural culmination of imperceptible degenerative stages.[6] The final result is, therefore, a handicap which must militate against further moral striving, just as a swimmer might be burdened by an increasing bodily defect.

Ethical theory has been concerned with moral ideals rather than with the agent's inadequate response thereto, intensified as this must become by every advance in the ideals themselves. Omar's familiar lines therefore—"the moving finger writes"—far from being metaphorical, literally express the irreversibility of spiritual causation; and this raises two further vitally important considerations. First, the original ideals retain their pristine integrity and their drastic imperativeness; secondly, the self desires most keenly to "wash out" the past, and recognizes this to be impossible only with profound reluctance, as the almost universal belief in the efficacy of compensation amply proves. This again is often more obvious in the criminal's regret over his failure than in the average person's indifference. Still sharper is the remorse of the good self; and the higher its type the more intense becomes its futile sorrow. There is, however, the radical difference that while the criminal deplores the objective consequences of his incompetence, the good self laments its subjective aspects—the crippling of the native capacity to meet the obligatory demands of its chosen ideals. Thus they stimulate

[6] These may of course extend beyond the individual, as in heredity.

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and deride him simultaneously, until he is tempted to discard them in favor of others that are lower, or even positively bad.

6. Now however much we must sympathize with such moods, still it is impossible to palliate them. For no truly great artist, no fine soldier, nor athlete, ever thus abandons his pursuit of great achievements; or if he does so, he inevitably falls in general estimation, which thus unmistakably indicates our actual standard in these matters; since it is, in the end, morally wrong for thinker or artist to work consistently below their finest levels. The characters of the dominating ideals are therefore universal—necessity, imperativeness, and transcendence of actual achievement, yet at the same time the inescapable penalizing of every infringement proportionately and quite naturally. Only under these conditions, rigorous though they are, can art and knowledge ever attain any high level and then proceed to transcend that level; and similarly must it be with moral development.

Nevertheless, a profound contrast must now be observed. For although the consequences of intellectual and aesthetic faults can never be completely remedied, still they can generally be reduced to a negligible minimum; such errors, again, are rarely persisted in, simply because their penalties are so patent and swift. Still further, whenever an artist becomes the victim of some early defect, the ineradicable result remains plainly visible to the trained observer; but in dealing with conduct in general, all these adverse features are immeasurably intensified. Unintentionally or wilfully, evil is persisted in either because of its immediate pleasures or because its full consequences are obscure and remote; while its effects are no longer negligible, but widespread and serious as well as permanent. There follows, therefore, a threefold result: (1) an ineradicable tainting or vitiation of personality comparable to, but far more penetrating than, the unmistakable stamp which all artistic defects produce; (2) an inextin-

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guishable desire in the good self, and even to a minor degree in the bad also, to remove this taint and to compensate for its objective consequences; and (3) the dawning recognition that the self is in the grip of a relentless causal sequence which can no more be relaxed than can heredity or even gravitation although it may be alleviated. Finally, the better the self, the more clearly are these three conditions realized;[7] while the repentance of the bad self is similarly marked by the keen sense of its own incurable state and of the necessity to attempt compensation, impossible though this must be.

These conclusions appear to be most clearly generalized in the principle that every high type of personality is conscious of existing within a certain "world," of art or knowledge or goodness as the case may be. To insist that this is a world of ideals is not to render it unreal. Rather are such ideals, in virtue of their inherent imperativeness, the most fully actual of all entities as is most vividly shown in the punctilious regard paid by the boy and youth to the tradition of his school or regiment. Here it must be observed that every lapse from good form or every violation of the tradition no matter how artificial this may have become, inevitably tends to sever the offender from his environing "world"; while in the most serious cases the penalty becomes absolute and irreversible as social ostracism or professional degradation.

We must, therefore, in my opinion regard these conditions as typical of the relations always subsisting between the self and its moral world, which is (to repeat) an aspect of the real world. Throughout this "world," exactly as in the spheres of matter and of life, the Principle of Causation, with its necessity, invariability, and irreversibility exerts its irresistible sway. Every action, therefore, indelibly modifies the agent, and every bad action indelibly vitiates him. Compensation

[7] Similarly, again, the higher its level in knowledge and art the more sensitive is the self to its own shortcomings and the more insistent on compensating for these. It is always a Newton who most candidly admits his ignorance.

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may—and indeed must—be sought, simply because the agent is a moral being; nevertheless it can never become adequate, because the moral world is throughout a causal world. Whether this is a counsel of despair or not depends, then, on the possibility of that compensation, which the moral universe itself imperatively demands, arising from some source, or being adequately rendered by some agency, which must plainly possess higher than human powers.

UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL
ENGLAND

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DISCUSSION

A PROPHECY AND A PLAN

FUTURE historians may write that the decades following the first World War, when the widely differing national cultures and religions of the earth were brought into intimate intercommunication, witnessed an unprecedented overthrow of all sorts of authority. Provincialism and dogmatism on the part of national and other groups, even in religion and in social and individual morality, became intolerable to progressive minds. These historians may then record one, but only one, of the three following paragraphs.

I. The peoples of the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century saw the sudden crash of their civilization because, although fully aware of the disruption of the historic bases of morality, they failed to heed the warnings of contemporary historians and prophets. Of those who might have saved that civilization, some did nothing because they were lulled by material satisfaction or absorbed in specialized intellectual researches; others, although they tried, accomplished nothing because they clung fatally to the decaying scaffolding of traditional morality. Had their educational system produced leaders capable of suggesting to the people new sanctions for social conduct, the second World War might never have occurred and given the less cultured peoples an opportunity to overrun every continent and plunge humanity into the Second Dark Age followed by this thousand years of slow recuperation.

II. Near the beginning of the twentieth century, a slow decadence attacked civilization because the stronger leadership, which in the account of former periods we saw manifest chiefly in the ministry of religion, was now attracted by commercial, political, and military progressiveness. Potential leaders were repelled by the reluctance of the organized forces of morality to transcend apologetics. Yet even material progress eventually deteriorated for lack of the sustaining social spirit which brought it into being but which failed to meet its developing demands. Leaders with first-rate ability and with knowledge of the science and public issues of the day as well as of the principles and practices of their own and other religions, were too few and unorganized to formulate an adequate substitute for the outworn systems of religious and moral teaching. The lack of moral ideals fitted to the problems of actual life gradually brought it about that men of education and power turned their abilities to antisocial ends; youth and age without fear of hell or hope of heaven despised all legislation and exhortations to duty; even disinterested science gradually lost its devotees; and the world entered again the larval stage from which now after forty groping generations it is only beginning to emerge.

III. In the first half of the twentieth century a World War and the consequent contacts of varied cultures, together with the bewilderment due to great

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unassimilated accessions of scientific knowledge, so disintegrated the established mores and faiths of that age that budding civilization nearly withered before it had really blossomed. But knowledge of the earlier fates of Babylonia, Egypt, Greece, and Rome reared up prophets and statesmen. They perceived that a material civilization could not survive without a healthy moral religious life in individuals and groups which was adequate to the problems arising from commercial and industrial change. Deliberately they set aside millions of their wealth to enable the young men and women of greatest ability to train themselves in the best educational institutions of that day with a view to becoming leaders in the religious and moral movements of their transition period. These equipped men and women were eagerly put into positions of power by congregations of the multitude of sects which then existed, for in each sect there were a few congregations which saw the danger and judged wisely of the means to meet it. These able leaders were planted here and there over the whole earth, and became centers of new thoughts and fresh inspirations to social living and creative endeavor. Historians are agreed that the subsequent long age—warless in spite of tremendous chemical and physical power which nations could have turned against one another; happy, co-operative, and creative in spite of the ever increasing specialization of work and knowledge—enjoyed unprecedented material, intellectual, and spiritual advance because these early twentieth-century prophets conceived and executed plans for providing an adequate leadership. The moral nerves and spiritual vitality of civilization was kept fresh and vigorous enough to set the goals and direct the muscular activity of its corporate existence. Because of their foresight and because they did not live solely unto themselves, we enjoy this civilization, magnificent beyond their dreams of what a millenium could bring forth; and we call them and their age "great." Greater than they, we and our age cannot be unless we, too, enable our children in turn to become greater than their parents.

To help make that third paragraph a true description of the fate of our children and our great grandchildren, the Foundation for Moral Leadership was created. This Foundation has already worked a great miracle. More than a hundred philosophers who would consider it undignified to agree upon any other subject, have subscribed unanimously to the greatness of the idea which inspires the Foundation. Serious consideration is induced by the thought of a corporation, organized under the laws of the state of New York, and listing among its members Adams, Alexander, Bakewell, Carr, Hoernlé, Leighton, Lovejoy, McDougall, Monroe, Montague, Overstreet, Perry, Starbuck, Thilly, Tufts, Coit, Ginsberg, Gooch, Dawes Hicks, Laird, Lamont, Mackenzie, Moore, Muirhead, Schiller, Stout, Radhakrishnan, Tagore, Hoeffding, Brunschvicg, Loisy, Husserl, Anesaki, and Tomoeda, and having as president of its Board of Directors John Dewey. An advisory General Council, including already a score of outstanding leaders of many denominations and religions, such as Dr. Norwood, Episcopalian, Dr. MacCallum, Presbyterian,

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Rabbi Fineshriber, and Dr. Eliot, Unitarian, increases the variety of points of view here focused. Moreover, it seems certain that the Foundation will appeal strongly to men of wealth who can make the idea effective through an endowment, and plans are now under way to bring it to the attention of men with such interests.

The Foundation for Moral Leadership attacks in a fundamental manner the basic problem of our civilization. The crumbling of geographical and cultural barriers, and the tidal waves of disconcerting scientific knowledge, have strained the moral and spiritual undergirding of our complex social structure. The vast and increasing store of human experience and the progressive division of labor are compelling men to become more and more exclusive specialists. The unprecedented social and religious transition has struck terror to the hearts of the traditional guardians of the souls of men. Fearing to experiment with such precious substance, they would enact world-wide legislation to sit on the cork of the fermenting spirits. The thoughtful are agreed that the deepest problem of our age is to effect a sound readjustment of moral and spiritual values.

With respect to the future status of religion and morality, the Foundation for Moral Leadership has no codes or creeds to offer. Instead it proposes to offer *men*. And a foundation that offers educated and unpledged men will never outgrow its usefulness. We cannot dictate to the future, but we can delegate. Our children will thank us not so much for principles to determine their minds as for minds to determine their principles. This Foundation rests on rock bottom when it proposes, first, to select from the colleges and universities throughout the world only the men and women of undoubted character and intellectual ability and of demonstrated leadership capacity who have an abiding desire to become powers in the moral and spiritual life of individuals and communities; and then to help these potential leaders to obtain a thorough and balanced preparation for the task. Most students of this ability demand a right, with competent advice, to choose for themselves where and what they shall study. The Foundation believes that a larger proportion of our abler students may be saved for the ministry and other positions of moral leadership, such as directors of religious education, deans of students, personnel managers, and secretaries for organizations of young men and women, if they are given an opportunity for a thorough graduate education leading at least to the doctor's degree in the great educational institutions of the world. Many such students will enter law or medicine or business rather than give up their prejudice against theological seminaries and their desire for more knowledge in the great fundamental subjects of history, economics, political and social science, scientific method, psychology, biology, philosophy, comparative religion, ethics, international relations, and the humanities in general.

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Just here the Foundation for Moral Leadership again strikes at the root of a serious problem. The lack of interest in the church and religion today on the part of many intelligent people is due, I believe, primarily to the fact that preachers are suspected of bias as a result of an unbalanced education and excessive sectarian devotion. They are not disinterested persons, and this is a disinterested age. Only one kind of authority can hope to survive among increasingly intelligent people, the authority, namely, possessed by a mind whose first loyalty is to truth. Fortunately our people are decreasingly interested in partisan and sectarian thought. But the man who can speak about religion from sound learning, profound insight, and scientifically interpreted experience in all phases of human life, is crowding his church today. In spite of the increasingly disinterested character of some of our great theological seminaries, many capable students mistrust the philosophy or economics or psychology which is taught in affiliated institutions, and can be saved for the ministry only by recognizing their individual ambitions. The president of Oberlin College has recommended to the Foundation for a fellowship a young man of unusual capacity who wishes to prepare for moral leadership by way of two or three years of graduate study in philosophy, political science, and international relations. The dean of Ohio Wesleyan University recommends a son of a Methodist minister who wishes to detour through psychology and philosophy before following in the footsteps of his father. This semester a man of twenty-four, who has been preaching for six years, left Ohio State University and registered in the graduate school of philosophy at Harvard, foregoing the financial assistance available in the Theological School and choosing to earn most of his expenses in order to reenter the ministry with a Ph.D. Already three men in England are preparing with the aid of the Foundation. The Foundation for Moral Leadership proposes to award fellowships to students with such strength of character and leadership capacity, and better still, to grant them, with respect to choosing graduate institutions and courses of study, all freedom consistent with a thorough and balanced knowledge of the experience of the race. In many cases, undoubtedly, such as prospective rabbis or Y.M.C.A. secretaries, some training in special schools or seminaries will be necessary. The Foundation will favor in each case that training which best fits a man for the position of leadership which he wishes. The Foundation will trust its reputation and the future of our civilization to the type of student it will select. They will be our ambassadors plenipotentiary to the next generation.

The Foundation considers no student qualified for satisfactory graduate study and subsequent co-operative leadership who accepts moral judgments solely because they are dictated by some external dogmatic authority, but suggests that such judgments be based upon a universal

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co-operative and individual interpretation of experience. On this basis the Foundation can function for and through any sect or religion or nationality. It proposes to aid such potential leaders for every religion which will offer them congregations. The increasing number of unaffiliated, community, and union churches, as well as liberal congregations in almost every sect, will give ample opportunity for all the leaders the Foundation can provide. In case no position is available, a man with this capacity and training can make a place for himself such as a community church or lectureship. Outstanding ability so educated and placed here and there throughout the world will be the surest guaranty of universal co-operation and enlightened peace. The brotherhood of man and the kingdom of God will come, if ever, through the mutual need felt for one another's experience, a feeling inseparable from the scientific and philosophic way of seeking knowledge.

The same tendencies which are increasing the need for philosophers are making preachers and churches more and more indispensable. Ever greater specialization in knowledge and in work places greater responsibility upon those agencies which attempt to help specialists to see their particular occupation and information against the background of the whole of humanity and experience. The more we specialize, the more difficult is the task of reaching an adequate *Weltanschaung*. If our people could be gathered into congregations weekly before men capable of leading farmers, merchants, bankers, manufacturers, housewives, parents, politicians, students, educators, scientists, and other specialists to think accurately about their interrelationships and their relation to humanity and the universe, the more abundant life of individuals and communities would be a sufficient vindication of the church. The Foundation wishes to discover, interest, and prepare men and women whose judgment and dynamic initiative in problems of human relationships and values will be welcomed at strategic points in every land.

In summary, the Foundation for Moral Leadership would strengthen the bases of civilization by organizing a permanent and world-wide co-operative effort to discover outstanding leadership capacity inside and outside of all religions and sects, and aid these potential moral and spiritual leaders to prepare themselves with a thorough and balanced graduate education. Thus a greater proportion of our youth with broader understanding and sympathy will man the oars of civilization.

WILLIAM ALLISON SHIMER,
Assistant Secretary,
Foundation for Moral Leadership

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE WILL TO BE FREE. By Howard V. Knox, M.A. London: Constable & Co., 1928. Price, 10*s.* 6*d.*

The age-long controversy between determinism and the freedom of the will affords Captain Knox full scope for his highly polemical style. His main case against determinism is that it plays fast and loose with an ambiguity of attitude in respect to the existence of purpose.

Is the "deterministic universe" such that it may include will? Or is it such that it must include will? Captain Knox considers that in the last analysis determinists must be regarded as endeavoring to explain away will altogether. That conclusion may perhaps be accepted if we adopt Captain Knox's view that a will without freedom as conceived by him is not a will at all. But the reader is not left with any very clear conception of what the writer understands by "freedom." Possibly it is some sort of unconditioned spontaneity, and the reader may find himself overtaken by a growing suspicion that there is as much ambiguity about the writers "freedom" as in the "determinism" of his opponents. That, however, would not disconcert Captain Knox, because part of his case against determinism is that it is a theory conditioned by the very voluntary element that it denies, and that it deliberately turns a blind eye to its essential ambiguity. That supporters of the freedom of the will only do the same as to ambiguities on their side is but another beautiful illustration of the freedom of the will, and thoroughly accords with the pragmatist philosophy. A large portion of Captain Knox's work is taken up with a critique of formal logic and an exposure of its so-called "laws of thought." Many readers will probably agree with much of this critique as mere negative criticism, but that criticism seems to suggest the necessity for a positive conception of the real meaning and function of formal logic, if it is not to be understood as a science of the laws of thought as thought.

Kant gives us a hint as to a possible theory when he speaks of mistaking for real things what are mere functions of the logical exposition of thought. It would seem quite possible to give a consistent and intelligible account of formal logic if it is treated as conversant simply with a system of conventions adopted for the purpose of communicating thought. All the so-called laws of thought can be justified from this point of view, and the onus is then thrown on those who contend that they have some further significance in reference to the process of thought itself. Anyway

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the reader will probably find Captain Knox's criticisms entertaining. That directed to the syllogism reminds this reviewer of a question he put in class to a college professor years ago. "Given the premises 'Running is a tiresome thing,' and 'Shrubb is running,' why can I not draw the conclusion 'Shrubb is a tiresome thing'?" The professor answered this question in the usual way; but it was only intended to lead up to the further one: "But does not your proof that there are four terms enable me immediately to draw the conclusion 'Shrubb is doing a tiresome thing,' particularly if Aristotle's discussion of the categories is worth anything?" This led to an altercation that was ultimately closured.

In an early chapter Captain Knox says of the general deterministic theory of existence: "This general theory itself appears to claim nothing more than that Reality, in order to become an object of knowledge, properly so-called, must be such that it can be understood." That seems a correct statement. But why then not admit determinism as necessary from the point of view of science, and confine the defense of the freedom of the will to ethics and the field of practical affairs? That would seem to be an attitude to which Captain Knox's pragmatism could have no objection, unless it be that no originality could be claimed for it. But at this stage of the controversy it is difficult for anyone to throw much additional light on the question by means of mere dialectics.

J. C. MEREDITH

DUBLIN, IRELAND

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA: THE UNITY OF HIS THOUGHT. By Richard McKeon. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1928. Pp. ix+345. Price, $5.00.

In this volume Mr. McKeon gives to the philosophic public the fruit of long and patient study of Spinoza, and the volume is a challenging addition to the wealth of secondary material which has grown up around the great Jewish thinker. On the side of historical research Mr. McKeon's constructive contribution lies mainly in showing the extent to which Spinoza's leading ideas were already consciously present in the thought of the medieval Jewish thinkers—in Crescas, Ibn Ezra, or Maimonides the author finds clearly formulated even such doctrines as the attribution of extension to God, rigid determinism, and denial of final causes, and the relativity of good and evil. On the side of original interpretation Mr. McKeon's treatment contrasts strongly with that of most recent commentaries on the point suggested by the subtitle. The insistence is throughout that there is no important historical development in Spinoza's views, and no essential contradiction if one is willing to grant the basal as-

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sumption of the philosophy that any existence, however meager, attests the reality of an inclusive source from which all existences necessarily proceed. What seems like the former Mr. McKeon regards as due to misinterpretation of the *Short Treatise* and failure to take Spinoza at his word when he says he is expounding Descartes' philosophy rather than his own. As for contradictions, he thinks that if we really succeed in placing ourselves in full possession of Spinoza's meanings all of them will easily disappear.

The treatment is on the whole an exposition without critical defense. The discussion is so very sympathetic that one gains the impression that Mr. McKeon would second practically everything that Spinoza affirms, though such commitment is carefully not explicitly stated. It is highly doubtful, however, if this sympathetic interpretation will be persuasive enough to convert any who have failed to find in Spinoza the unity and consistency assumed by the author. It would add critical stimulation to sympathetic exposition if the author had embarked upon systematic discussion of some of the important debatable issues. Perhaps this will appear in a further publication; till then, gratitude for what he has done is more genial than chiding for what is left undone.

E. A. BURTT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CULTURAL EVOLUTION: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT. By Charles A. Ellwood. New York: Century Co. Pp. viii+267. Price, $2.50.

This is a non-technical but extremely scholarly treatment of cultural evolution. Based on the conviction that the social sciences must be more daring and imaginative in speculation, this work presents a sweeping theory. Cultural development, he maintains, is in the nature of a collective learning process, and this fact gives the clue to its direction and possible goal. It is also a process of social accumulation, and this fact makes a historical approach necessary. The term *psychosocial* covers what is essential in the point of view. The discussion and criticism of the several schools of sociology and cultural anthropology would be illuminating to one who supposed that warring camps are confined to philosophy.

We are all familiar with the learning curve. Professor Ellwood finds an analogous curve of cultural evolution.

> Let us imagine humanity like a comet coming out of the darkness of the animal world, moving toward the sun of knowledge. As it moves it gradually rises. But for hundreds of thousands of years its progress is very slow. It remains in the dim twilight of savagery. Then through the light of knowledge it

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begins the conquest of physical nature with the invention of agriculture. Then it rises to the invention of writing. Now its movement begins, like that of a comet at perhelion, to be very fast. Rapidly passing through barbarism and semi-civilization, it reaches the point where knowledge begins to be universally diffused through a system of universal education. This is the point at which most advanced peoples are at the present time. We may expect that they will gradually learn to control their life upon the basis of established knowledge. . . . . A period of adjustment will then be reached the length of which may be comparable to the long dawn of culture [p. 40–41].

Put in the form of a graph we would have a parabola, the upper portion of which would be roughly analogous to the familiar learning curve.

For a theory of ideals the book has much of interest. Culture must develop within the bounds set by heredity and environment, but within these limits it develops by laws of its own. Since culture consists in achieving control, first, of the physical environment and, then, of the very ideas and beliefs through which control is achieved, these laws will follow roughly the psychological stages of the process of learning. Verbal language is the main vehicle of the process. "It is the diffusion of mental patterns by language through the group thereby making the *social* patterns, which forms culture [p. 12]." Culture, in fact, he defines as "*an appreciation of values brought about through the accumulation of experience* [p. 43]." "Tools themselves are nothing but external embodiments of human thought; and institutions, as has been well said, are but 'crystalized ideas' [p. 42]." This view is what I would call "evolutionary idealism."

The chapter on the development of war is one which would particularly interest the ethicist. Many people have held, indeed the belief is almost universal, that man is naturally a warlike animal. While the author would not go so far as to say that peaceful behavior is typical of mankind, he does maintain that the fighting habits of savage and barbarian peoples have been greatly exaggerated. Man has had to fight with the animal world, he has hunted animals for food, and he has fought with his fellowman over food, wives, and hunting-grounds, yet such fighting has usually been limited and sporadic. War involves high organization, and implies large numbers of men, concerted action on an intelligent plane, and a mastery of tools and weapons. It reaches this stage as a result of a highly developed hunting pattern. Warfare is hunting turned from its primary purpose to the hunting of man. Hence it usually takes the form of raiding settled agricultural peoples or towns for food, wives, slaves, or other goods, and is typical of upper-barbarian and semicivilized peoples. When human beings have solved the problem of food and other raw materials,

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and have adjusted their populations, war will disappear. "Human society began in peace and will end in peace [p. 141]."

Other chapters trace the curve of cultural evolution in the development of physical tools, food processes, clothing, property, law and government, ethics, religion, science, and so forth. The departure from the narrowly technical standpoint is exemplified not only by the daring invention of interpretative laws but also by the liberal and scholarly use of materials from all the social sciences. The student of social ethics will find the book exceedingly stimulating and suggestive.

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

E. T. MITCHELL

DOMESTIC DISCORD. By Ernest R. Mowrer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928. Pp. xvii+277. Price, $3.00.

In this book the author of *Family Disorganization* centers his attention upon the diagnosis and treatment of cases of domestic discord by family case-work agencies. That such agencies have found difficulty in handling cases of this kind is indicated by records, referred to in the book under review, of two family case-work agencies. According to the records, there was adjustment in only 4 per cent of the cases involving domestic discord, and continuing discord in 90 per cent, the outcome of the remaining cases not being shown. The present study, after the presentation of various relevant principles in regard to research and social therapy, proceeds to examine in detail the methods and techniques used in diagnosis and in treatment of cases involving conflict between husband and wife. Evaluation of such techniques as "ordering and forbidding," "persuasion," "conference," is supplemented by suggestions looking toward more effective treatment. The defects of the case-work approach may be indicated briefly in the words of the author.

> Case-work, as has been pointed out, is segmental in its approach to the treatment of domestic discord. Emphasis is placed upon the immediate situation with particular attention to the economic. Diagnosis is chiefly in terms of overt behavior and often couched in moralistic terminology. Little or no attempt is made to get at the genesis of the discord. Treatment is didactic, tending toward the dictatorial.

Ultimately this oversimplified technique seems to result from certain erroneous assumptions—an out-of-date philosophy of society. Some of these assumptions are: that the husband and wife, if they would be honest, know what the conflict is all about; that an adjustment can be accomplished immediately, an act of the will being the chief requisite; that the

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process of adjustment is a rational one; that persons generally quarrel about unimportant details, though fundamentally in agreement; and that only organic difficulties are insuperable obstacles to adjustment. It is obvious that the author does not offer as a remedy a new and automatic technique. On the contrary, his recommendations seem to involve, aside from getting rid of embarrassing assumptions, nothing more novel than thoroughness. Examples which he gives of improved technique indicate, however, that the addition of a certain amount of background knowledge of human nature and the further addition of thoroughness in investigation and analysis make a tremendous difference in the results obtained.

CHARNER M. PERRY

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

LIVING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By Harry Elmer Barnes. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1928. Pp. 392. Price, $3.50.

This is the day of industrialism, corporations, and capitalism, of birth-control and Dawes plan, of relativity and tariffs, this is the hour of J. H. Robinson, Wells, Russell, Darrow, Dewey, Einstein, Michelson, Irving Fisher, Morgan, Ford. To feel the pulse of this new life and to appreciate and evaluate it rightly by considering "how we got this way" means to live in this century and to keep pace with it.

Thus, the present age is a challenge to the historian and the author meets it by advocating the "new history," whose pathfinders are Karl Lamprecht, Henri Berr, J. H. Robinson, F. J. Teggart, and F. S. Marvin. This "new history" enters upon a course long followed by ethics (acknowledged pp. 366–67) and purports to present the modern outlook on the basis of present-day social and political situations together with the commodities accruing to them. The spicy last chapter sums up the point of view and subject matter of the "new history" involving reconstructing past civilizations and tracing the genesis of the present one (p. 358). This necessitates greater historic thoroughness by taking account of all relevant sciences, psychology, medicine, anthropology, geography, etc. Consequently, endocrine glands, the atmosphere, food, and soil will figure just as prominently in the "new history" as did swords, crowns, and "a few gentlemen," thus transmuting more or less all personal and numerical landmarks so dear to the old history.

One must share the author's enthusiasm about a history conforming to twentieth-century knowledge and method (p. 367). There is nothing radical in his contentions. But dangers are imminent. We can prognosticate a painful process such as psychology is experiencing. Moreover, the

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progress of the relevant sciences must be watched closely by that new history. Medicine, more specifically, e.g., endocrinology, is in such a fermentation that its co-ordination and relevancy is extremely complicated and precarious. Thus, here as everywhere in our modern world, co-operation would seem the only adequate solution of the problem. However, it is most gratifying to see history join the alliance of all sciences.

Expressing, then, the purpose of the book in our own terms, living in the twentieth century is partaking in a complex of discoveries, inventions, and happenings that have definite historic antecedents which must be understood to make the present meaningful and the future tolerant. In the first chapters, which are jubilant with the accomplishments of science, the author declares the scientific outlook as the only possible one in all departments of life. He contends with very antiquated views, which would appear to be unnecessary. His language is biting and sometimes unkind. Moral theories, e.g., those involving man as a free agent, are treated disdainfully (pp. 50 ff.). Philosophically, these chapters must be considered not quite satisfactory inasmuch as the fundamental assumption is that science itself possesses moral and religious criteria, whereas it is but a way or method of action. Furthermore, having the "old" cause one a nausea, intellectually, seems to do justice neither to the disciplines dealing with thought nor to the science of "how we got this way." And in this place we also would defend the humanities, which the author stigmatizes as "obsession" and a capitalistic scheme (cf. pp. 19, 231–32).

However, enough has been said in the way of general criticism. Where the historian is describing and determining the causes, values, and effects of events he is most resourceful, illuminating, and convincing. The vein in which the whole is written is extremely refreshing. The author's challenge to allow science to construct an organization of the world ought certainly to be heeded universally; yet we would reserve some determining value to the ethical and philosophical disciplines.

The value of the historic method advocated comes out most strikingly in the rare keenness and insight with which, e.g., the World War is treated (cf. pp. 317, 162–63; pp. 324, 366 ff.; cf. also pp. 341, etc.). Though absolutely opposing war (pp. 340 ff., 272) and the military cult (pp. 316, 342), he deems class struggle worth more attention than the settlement of boundaries by the peace-conference (pp. 271–72). And here we strike the taproot of the author's social conceptions. Among the modern trends commanding most serious attention are production, trade, tariffs, banking, big business, absentee-ownership, and labor. But capitalism especially is believed to lurk everywhere in education, morality, art, and what not, undermining all efforts to see the truth behind the

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stage of the modern world. Nevertheless, the author is convinced that there will be no socialist revolution in the United States (cf. pp. 179, 195, 249; but cf. p. 272), the capitalists using utmost precaution and having a thorough hold on the state, the workers learning much from their opponents.

To sum up, finally, the author's views on democratic government we may say that his historic method leads him to believe (chap. x) that democracy is primitive, a failure, and a fiction and that contemporary politics with its "bell-hop service" of officials is unsatisfactory, resembling a plutocracy rather than a democracy. The best government we would have when the latest results of scientific research find application and political leaders are thoroughly trained in their field.

A laud- or wrath-provoking volume, whichever we prefer, but thought-provoking in any case. The student of present-day problems cannot well pass by it.

KURT F. LEIDECKER

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF VEDIC AND ALLIED RESEARCH
NEW YORK

SHORTER NOTICES

THE LURE OF SUPERIORITY: A STUDY OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MOTIVES. By Wayland F. Vaughn. New York: Henry Holt & Co. Pp. viii+307. Price, $3.00; students' edition, $2.40.

This book discusses in an interesting and popular way the inferiority-compensation processes as one of the motives of human conduct. It is written from the general standpoint of Adler, Shand, and McDougall. Unlike Hobbes the author does not ascribe to the self-regarding sentiment and the longing for security and prestige the sole motivating influences. The lure of superiority, he is careful to point out, is one among many motives. An inferiority complex is associated with some defect or combination of defects, physical, intellectual, moral, or social. Persons with deficiencies are peculiarly subject to the will-to-power. In such cases the subject seeks to overcome the handicap either by special effort in the defective department, or by achievement in some other direction, or through compensatory imagination. Individual achievement in athletics, scholarship, art, religion, and so forth, are explained by the author from this motive. The compensatory drive in the group is worked out in the same way. Labor movements, communism, feminism, and nationalism (in the case of the Jews) are explained as efforts to overcome, or to compensate for, social inferiority. The best chapters are the last two in which a detailed examination is made of the lives of Schopenhauer and Lincoln as exemplifying the thesis of the book.

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The book is interesting for its store of bibliographical data. It does not seem to the reviewer to exemplify the scientific use of such material. One looks in vain for any technique of control. Anything could be proved by unlimited freedom in the selection and interpretation of materials. It is easy to find cases which can be interpreted as exemplifying the inferiority-compensation motive. It would be equally easy to use the same biographies to prove the dominating influence of the passion for righteousness, the aesthetic sense, or the love of truth. Biography and fiction provide inexhaustible, unexploited resources for the social sciences, but he who would use them must first devise a technique. With the psychologists who use instincts, sentiments, and traits as explanatory concepts the reviewer has little in common. What is this self-regarding sentiment and what does it explain? Is there also a dog-regarding sentiment, and does it explain the fact that ladies pamper poodles? What is this longing for security? Is it something like the longing for government bonds or the lure of the wide open spaces? What is meant by the statement that "Avarice lies at the root of the ambition for pecuniary honors"? Not to be captious, it seems to the reviewer that for profound and trenchant discussions of human nature from the point of view of passions, sentiments, etc., the reader would be well advised to go to such seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers as Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hume, and Adam Smith. Progress lies, does it not, in studying the genesis and control of sentiments, etc., rather than in using them as ultimate explanatory concepts?

Whether or not these criticisms are valid, the book is valuable for the attention which it directs to this sort of social data. It is interestingly written, full of valuable information, and very suggestive.

E. T. MITCHELL

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

THE VEDANTA AND MODERN THOUGHT. By W. S. Urquhart. Oxford University Press. Pp. 256; index. Price, 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

This book is one of a series on the religious quest of India and the author is a professor of philosophy in the University of Calcutta. Sankara is taken as the typical philosopher of the Vedanta school; but the author tends to think in the simpler terms of missionary thought: "much of Sankara's philosophy is unconsciously anticipative of Christian thought." The author depends, however, on the work of Professor Radhakrishnan, reviewed above, and confesses that his authority disagrees philosophically with the Christian point of view. Indeed, although Professor Urquhart deals with modern philosophy, as late as F. H. Bradley but not later, he does not seem to be interested in the purely scientific analysis of experience. He seems to test his subject matter by reference to the satisfactoriness of certain conclusions for certain "religious" needs which he feels. There is a veiled propaganda for Christianity of the simpler evangelical type in the whole treatment of the Vedanta.

C. D. B.

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THE NEW INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION. By W. Meakin. London: Victor Gollanz, Ltd., 1928. 8vo. Pp. 284. Price, 9s. net.

This is described as "a study for the general reader of nationalisation and post-war tendencies of capital and labour." The author is the correspondent of the *London Daily News* who deals with "labour" problems in that paper and has made a close study of German industrial experience. Indeed, most of the examples of nationalisation discussed in the book are German. These are very valuable and suggestive analysis of the organization of the coal and the iron and steel industries. The removal of workers from old occupations is said to have been soon shown to be advantageous for these workers themselves. The general argument of the work aims at the formation of industrial policy in Great Britain; but it contains valuable indications of principle and even of moral principle in industrial policy.

C. D. B.

MODERN PSYCHOLOGY. By Daniel Bell Leary. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1928. Pp. xiv+441. Price, $4.00.

According to the author, psychology is likely "to become unduly atomistic and hence to verge toward mere physiology or at best biology, else to sway toward the other extreme and, in the effort to be synthetic, become hopelessly and cloudily speculative." Apparently these extremes may be avoided by a behaviorism of personality, a scientific study of the integrated, complete human personality, a study which will be based entirely upon experiment and research but will be "synthetic and all-inclusive, and show the meaning and significance of the facts one to another." That the author's hope of being scientific is not forgotten is evidenced by continual and lengthy defenses of empirical method, and that he remembers the necessity of being inclusive is indicated by the appearance of chapters dealing with religion, art, and philosophy. Whether the author has attained, as well as remembered, his high aim, the reviewer does not venture to say. This much may be asserted, however, that the book contains a certain quota of empirical fact, a considerable amount of common sense, and a fair share of very good philosophy.

CHARNER M. PERRY

ESSENTIALS OF CIVILIZATION. By Thomas Jesse Jones. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929. Pp. xxvii+267. Price, $2.50.

The author decides that the four essentials or constants of civilization are health and sanitation; appreciation and use of environment, material and human; effective development of the home and the household, the chief factors for the transfer of racial heritage; the processes of re-creation—physical, mental, and spiritual. Since a synthesis of available facts is a present-day need, he then devotes the major part of the book to showing how these essentials, are not, but might be, attained by the organizations—governmental, economic, educational, religious, philanthropic, and artistic—which make up our civilization. Aside from specific comments on various contemporary phenomena, the conclusion seems to be that civilization in general and each of its organizations

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need "synthesis, survey and service," or stated more fully, "a determination to become vitally conscious of community life, effective provision for systematic survey of neighborhood conditions, and the high resolve to serve humanity through the best possible work, directed and inspired by a realization of the interrelations of modern society." The book contains a number of interesting quotations. CHARNER M. PERRY

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD. By Bertrand Russell. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1929. Pp. ix+268. Price, $3.00.

The first edition of this work appeared in 1914. Perhaps the fateful intervening years have not made as much difference in the subject matter here discussed as in other fields of Mr. Russell's preoccupation. The preface of the second edition, however, indicates that account is here taken of progress in theoretical physics, more particularly with reference to the general theory of relativity. The slightness of the change necessary in this field is taken by the author as indicating that physics has tended to catch up with him rather than to leave him behind. The other change, a philosophical one, is the abandonment by Russell of his earlier distinction between sensations and sense-data. He now professes agreement with the American realists in regarding this distinction as illusory. The new edition brings up to date Russell's views upon the logico-analytic method in philosophy. T. V. S.

COMMUNITY CONFLICT. A study directed by E. C. Lindeman. New York: The Enquiry, 1929. Pp. xviii+156. Price, $1.50.

Operating upon the assumptions that conflicts inhibit the best functioning of communities, that many conflicts are resolvable by intelligence, and that a study of them is a valuable technique for resolution, Professor Lindeman has gathered together here many types of community disagreement, a brief history of what was done about them, an analysis of them with a view to suggesting a better technique of handling such causes of social inefficiencies. The volume is intended to stir up interest in the application of common intelligence and of the social sciences to concrete crucial human problems. Methods of study for various groups are suggested at the end. The volume is a preliminary study, and invitation is extended in it for persons and communities who have observed or participated in conflict to contribute their experience to the continuing study of how such conflicts may more effectively be resolved. T. V. S.

THE DELPHIC MAXIMS IN LITERATURE. By Eliza Gregory Wilkins. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929. Pp. ix+271. Price, $3.00.

This volume takes the three maxims—"Know thyself," "Nothing too much," and "Give a pledge, or give security, and trouble is at hand"—which were of old inscribed on the temple of Apollo at Delphi, explains the probable significance of them to contemporary Greeks, and then traces their influence upon subsequent literature. Not all literature, however, was scanned in pre-

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paring the history of the influence of these maxims. Science and history were omitted. Drama and the novel received only a partial scrutiny. "It is chiefly from poetry other than drama, from essays, and from philosophical and ecclesiastical writings that the passages quoted in this volume have been gleaned."

T. V. S.

RACE ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN. By Bruno Lasker. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929. Pp. xvi+394. Price, $4.00.

Based chiefly upon material obtained from letters, group discussions, and returned questionnaires, this book makes no pretense of being ultra-scientific or statistical. By making what use he could of the material available, the author has obtained more valuable results than could have been obtained had he attempted to wring scientific exactness from material not containing that desirable quality. The study is divided into four parts: "What race attitudes do children have?" "How are race attitudes acquired?" "How are race attitudes taught?" "How may race attitudes be modified?" Much interesting material is presented under each of these heads; conclusions drawn are both tentative and cautious; and the entire presentation is characterized by the open-mindedness which permits the author to refrain from being dogmatic in regard to the directions in which children's race attitudes should be modified.

CHARNER M. PERRY

AN OUTLINE OF AESTHETICS. Edited by Philip N. Youtz. Written in five volumes as follows: Irwin Edman: *The World, the Arts and the Artist.* Pp. ix+95; Henry Wells: *The Judgment of Literature.* Pp. ix+95; M. Cecil Allen: *The Mirror of the Passing World.* Pp. xiv+102; Henry Ladd: *With Eyes of the Past.* Pp. x+100; Thomas Munro: *Scientific Method in Æsthetics.* Pp. xi+101. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1928. Price $5.00 the set.

An attempt has been made in these volumes to avoid the conventional approach to art and to take a fresh view of an old subject. The volumes are beautiful in appearance and are written in a style to illustrate as well as to clarify aesthetics. The function of art may be conceived as threefold: the intensification, the clarification, and the interpretation of experience; and the several arts get here judged with reference to the performance of one or more of these functions. From these appealing discussions art is in large measure assimilated to philosophy and, as Edman thinks, emerges as "the name for that whole process of intelligence by which life, understanding its own conditions, turns them to the most interesting or exquisite account."

The introductions to the several volumes are uniformly well done, compelling interest and inviting criticism. The publisher is to be complimented on the books, the editor has his reward, and the several authors may rejoice in a presentation of this important subject, in its several phases, so as to be intelligible to laymen.

T. V. S.

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ANTHROPOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE. By Franz Boas. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1928. Pp. vii+246. Price, $3.00.

Writing for the first time with a general audience in mind, Professor Boas recommends the teachings of anthropology as capable of throwing light for modern men upon such problems as race, nationalism, eugenics, crime, education. He sees no danger for either white or negro or mankind in miscegenation. The federation of nations he sees as the next step in the evolution of mankind. As regards eugenics, the author concludes that "at the present time the idea of creating the best human types by selective mating is hardly a practical one," though the elimination of the obviously unfit is possible. "The irrelevancy of environment as a factor producing criminality has not been proved." "It is a mistake to assume that the mentality of the intellectuals is, on the average, appreciably higher than the rest of the people." "I should always be more inclined to accept, in regard to fundamental human problems, the judgment of the masses rather than the judgment of the intellectuals, which is much more certain to be warped by unconscious control of traditional ideas." Whether these be the teachings of anthropology or of an anthropologist, this book is interesting. T. V. S.

UNIVERSAL KNOWLEDGE. Volume II, B. Edited by Edward A. Pace *et al.* New York: The Universal Knowledge Foundation, 1928. Pp. 890.

With 2,913 articles from B to Byzantium, this second volume of the comprehensive encyclopedia appears. The articles are short, pointed, and vigorous. Less indication of bias in the direction of certain religious dogmas has been noted in this volume than in the preceding one. The format is attractive, the print good, and the volume up to date and usable. T. V. S.

THE ESSENTIALS OF EASTERN PHILOSOPHY. By Prabhu Dutt Shastri, with a Foreword by Sir Robert Falconer. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. x+104. Price, $1.60.

In two lectures there is here presented in simple flowing style what the author conceives to be "the spirit of Eastern philosophy" and "the Eastern systems of philosophy." The book constitutes more a generous and graceful gesture toward international understanding and good will than any attempt at a technical study in philosophical systems. T. V. S.

THE CORRESPONDENCE OF SPINOZA. Translated and edited with Introduction and Annotations by A. Wolf. New York: Lincoln MacVeagh. The Dial Press, 1928. Pp. 502. Price, $5.00.

The editor of *The Oldest Biography of Spinoza* here presents in English the correspondence of Spinoza. Subjects of historical and scientific interest growing out of the letters are discussed in the introduction and annotations. A better picture of the philosopher's mind off duty, as it were, than has been available in English before is here presented. The volume is very attractively done. T. V. S.

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COSMOLOGY. By J. A. McWilliams. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. x+243; Index. Price, $2.50.

The publishers introduce the author as "Professor of Cosmology" in St. Louis University. The book is a compendium, evidently, of class lectures and notes; its treatment is highly systematic and succinct, the subject matter arranged under paragraph themes, theses, major and minor arguments, corollaries, replies to alleged difficulties, topics for discussion, and references (largely from Catholic apologetic sources). The stamp of approval on the flyleaf of the book by officials in the church (the usual form: *Nihil Obstat* and *Imprimatur*) serves as a warrant to the reader that no revolutionary doctrine is to be expected within its pages, that the novel in modern science and philosophy must somehow be correlated with accepted ecclesiastical tradition or else disavowed, and that, as before, philosophy is still the handmaiden of theology.

True to form, then, the book is a theological metaphysics. Non-Catholic readers will find the book of interest perhaps chiefly because it indicates the character of the philosophy that is being expounded in a modern Catholic University; it reveals how some of the significant data of modern science and current metaphysical notions derived from these are being correlated with an older tradition; and it reflects the thoroughgoing way in which a modern Catholic apologetic is being constructed. We may well disagree with the underlying deductive procedure and with many of the inferences thus drawn in the book, nevertheless we can hardly fail to respect the critical acumen and the great amount of erudition which the author brings to bear upon the facts and theories brought under discussion. As is to be expected, the names of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas figure conspicuously throughout.

A few of the points of view defended might well be set down: the theory of inorganic evolution is not incompatible with either theism, creationism, or even the Genesis account; the material universe affords sufficient evidence for the doctrine of intelligent design; physical and moral laws give evidence of intelligent regulation; miracles are not only possible but actual and recognizable; time and space, while issuing as products of mind, nevertheless are grounded in objective reality; necessity, which rules the events of the material world, is not absolute; the various types of inorganic matter as they occur in nature cannot be explained except by substantial form; pure spirits, or angels, it is possible to hold, not only exist but may effect intervention in the forces of nature; "the intrinsic end or purpose of human nature is to possess true good and happiness; our nature is constituted with that objective in view . . . . in the conferring of this true good and happiness God finds his greater glory. That glory therefore is the ultimate extrinsic end of mankind"; and so on.

VERGILIUS FERM

CHINESE SOCIAL ORIGINS. By Herbert F. Rudd. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928. Pp. ix+221.

From an analysis of early documents the author attempts to arrive at a description of Chinese moral sentiments before Confucius and an explanation of them in terms of social and economic situations. The study is carefully done

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and fully illustrated by quotations from his sources, direct evidence being supplemented by the use of such clues as are furnished by examination of language patterns. Most of the results are too detailed to be summarized; but the author does reach the general conclusion that the peaceful agricultural life of an indigenous people without hostile neighbors naturally emphasized family life; that "Chinese society must be explained in terms of the family and of the morality which characterizes the primary groups"; and that "The Chinese people are little inclined to abstract speculation and philosophical reasoning, but they are peculiarly sensitive to the demands of human society and to the meaning of particular social relations."

CHARNER M. PERRY

NATURAL CONDUCT. By Edwin Bingham Copeland. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1928. Pp. vii+262. Price, $3.50.

Careless of the quibblings of oversophisticated philosophers, the author states in simple terms a theory of ethics based upon the principles of evolution. Three doctrines constitute the framework of his theory. The real, ultimate goal of conduct is the permanence of life—the permanence not of individual life but of the life of our people. Happiness is the natural result of such conduct, and is, in general, evidence of nature's endorsement of our conduct. We owe our lives to society; and since payment of debts is a necessary condition of society and hence of the continuance of life, it is our duty to do whatever is for the good of society. In addition to these principles, the book contains two or three subsidiary theoretical doctrines and a certain amount of supporting argument. Most of the book is made up, however, of interesting illustrations from biology and of applications of the theoretical principles to personal, social, political, educational, and international problems.

CHARNER M. PERRY

SOULS IN THE MAKING: AN INTRODUCTION TO PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY. By J. G. McKenzie. London: Allen & Unwin, 1928. Pp. 249. Price 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

Since Hadfield's *Psychology and Morals,* many books have appeared to introduce Viennese psychology to ministers of religion. The present book will be found a readable and useful volume of this kind. It has been written to help, and doubtless will help ministers to understand many pastoral problems. An evangelical gospel is presupposed and the psychology is tacked on to that. Hence some will find it rather facile in parts, while others will note how easily traditional dogmas of sin are set aside under the impact of Freud.

E. F. METTRICK

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NOTES

Mr. L. Ho disclaims responsibility for the article entitled "The Philosophical Background of the Chinese Revolution" (this *Journal*, XXXIX, 306–12), to which his name was appended as joint author without his knowledge or consent.

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